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Regime Change: Now Libya

As first postulated by the Bush Administration, “regime change” had three possible incarnations:

1) A rogue country could reform itself and conform to civilized norms.

2) A dictatorship could face the wrath of its own people.

3) Outside forces could remove an unacceptable regime.


As first postulated by the Bush Administration, “regime change” had three possible incarnations:

1) A rogue country could reform itself and conform to civilized norms.

2) A dictatorship could face the wrath of its own people.

3) Outside forces could remove an unacceptable regime.

The first two options are most attractive because they don’t require direct American intervention. Attention has focused primarily on the third because in Afghanistan and Iraq, outside forces were necessary. But American successes may have concentrated the attention of some rulers on the need for self-generated change.

Over the weekend, the U.S. and Britain announced that Libya had agreed to abandon its WMD programs under international supervision. American and British experts have already entered 10 Libyan facilities and Libya has contacted the IAEA to arrange the follow-up. The change appears to be the result of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) under which countries resolved to search planes and ships suspected of carrying WMD or missile components, coupled with Gaddafi’s fear that Saddam’s fate would be his fate. He apparently told Italy’s Prime Minister, “I will do whatever the Americans want because I saw what happened in Iraq and I was afraid.”

Over the weekend, too, the U.S. announced that Syria had seized more than $23 million and several agents of al Qaeda.

Since Libya and Syria had been vying for the open seat on the Axis of Evil, any determination to avoid that fate is welcome. Their attitude adjustment may indeed be evidence that regime change can start at the top. So bravo and Merry Christmas to the administration, and in particular John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Counterproliferation, who has led the charge on Libya and who is responsible for bringing allies – including France on this one – into the PSI.

But a caveat, as well. Even if Libya does make a clean break with its own WMD programs – including its nuclear capability – the fact that Gaddafi was so far along in the development of nuclear weapons once again raises questions about the IAEA. In 1981, Osirak was farther along than we thought. Saddam was farther along in 1991 than we thought. North Korea was farther along than we thought. Libya was farther along than we thought. We suspect Iran is farther along than the IAEA thinks.

We would like to believe that international organizations could help to protect us from rogue states and rogue capabilities. But for the moment, at least, we have much more faith in the U.S. government and regime change based on leaders’ fear of the consequences of their own behavior.