Separation Anxiety

A recurrent theme in U.S. policy toward the Israel-Palestinian issue is that a negotiated settlement is required at whatever time the Palestinians can be induced to accept one. We have been saving a seat at the table for them in theory since 1947 and in practice since 1967. No, it was never so clearly spelled out, but this is the conclusion to be drawn from American policy regarding “settlements,” the security fence and even Israel’s proposed “unilateral withdrawal” from Gaza.

A recurrent theme in U.S. policy toward the Israel-Palestinian issue is that a negotiated settlement is required at whatever time the Palestinians can be induced to accept one. We have been saving a seat at the table for them in theory since 1947 and in practice since 1967. No, it was never so clearly spelled out, but this is the conclusion to be drawn from American policy regarding “settlements,” the security fence and even Israel’s proposed “unilateral withdrawal” from Gaza.

The State Department does not call “settlements” illegal, only an “obstacle to peace.” Why? As nearly as we can tell, in case one day the Palestinians decide to accept the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty, land east of the 1949 armistice line won’t be filled with “settlers” (i.e., “Jews”). The rejections of 1947 (Partition), 1948 (end of the British Mandate), and 1949 (armistice), 1993 (Oslo), and 2000 (Camp David II) – all of which provided mechanisms for legitimating Palestinian claims to roughly the West Bank and Gaza – are irrelevant. If the Palestinians pull a chair up to the table tomorrow, they should find the land waiting for them, as empty of Jews as possible.

The security fence is accepted by the U.S. as a defensive measure to protect Israelis from infiltration by Palestinian terrorists. However, both Secretary Powell and NSC Advisor Rice have firmly rejected the fence as a political border because of its encroachment into land east of the 1949 armistice line. Again, holding space for the Palestinians in case they decide to exercise their option.

And while welcoming Israel’s intention to withdraw from Gaza, spokesman Richard Boucher said, “Unilateral steps, even positive ones, don’t resolve the issue, don’t constitute a settlement. A settlement can only be reached by negotiations between the parties.” So apparently, even when Israel does what we said we want it to do, it should only do it when the Palestinians want to participate in the decision-making.

The whole philosophy is backward – the Palestinians are more likely to be induced to negotiate seriously if they believe there may be NOTHING left for them at some point than if they believe they have all the time in the world.

So it is interesting that PM Sharon offered no program for the withdrawal. In fact, some have castigated him for what appears to be only a half-formed suggestion. But he asked the U.S. administration for input – and from input it is a short hop to discussions about whether/how/when to implement the idea. While denying any U.S.-Israel negotiations, the administration did send three high-level diplomats to Israel, certainly making it look as if negotiations were taking place WITHOUT ANY PALESTINIANS.

Is this a ruse to bring the Palestinians to the table for more unproductive blather? Is it a real change in U.S. policy? Early returns indicate that, either way, Palestinians other than Arafat are worried, finally, that if they miss this opportunity all the serious decisions may be made WITHOUT THEM. This separation anxiety should be strongly encouraged by both Israel and the United States.