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Six Years After 9-11: Are We Safe Yet?

It’s not just the symbolism of Gen. Petraeus’s report to the President at the anniversary of September 11th; it is the very real connection between conclusions about Iraq and the very American question, “Are we safe yet?” Our enemies, Islamist jihadis of both Sunni and Shiite persuasion believe they can continue this war indefinitely. The better question then is, “Have we become more adept at fighting the enemy we face?”


It’s not just the symbolism of Gen. Petraeus’s report to the President at the anniversary of September 11th; it is the very real connection between conclusions about Iraq and the very American question, “Are we safe yet?” Our enemies, Islamist jihadis of both Sunni and Shiite persuasion believe they can continue this war indefinitely. The better question then is, “Have we become more adept at fighting the enemy we face?”

In WWII, land equaled success – the farther across Europe we advanced, the closer we were to victory in the German homeland. The atomic bomb was the result of understanding the fanatical nature of Japan’s planned defense of its homeland.

Al Qaeda, not being a country but an ideology, has no homeland; it has only land on which it sits. Not burdened with a mechanical army or land it must defend to survive, it morphs faster than we do. In the digital age, it can penetrate silently and spread its ideology without resistance until the time is ripe to activate its capabilities.

In Iraq, al Qaeda tried to restore Sunni hegemony after the fall of Saddam. Operatives knew they couldn’t overthrow the Shi’ite-led government, so they tried to open a civil war at the local level and to undermine the government’s ability to provide security and services to the people. Car bombs in crowded places for the first, attacks on oil facilities and electricity grids for the second. They are terrorists, but functionally their job is “wrecking,” and they’ve been very good at it. They caused thousands of deaths and widespread damage, and the Iraqi people do doubt their government’s ability to protect and help them. The United States and the Iraqi governments have spent billions trying to fix what the wreckers wreck.

Building is expensive; wrecking is cheap. Building is hard; wrecking is easy. When builders fail, they care; when wreckers fail, they try again. People are impatient with building; people are afraid of wreckers, which makes Iraqis more likely to complain about the U.S. than about the terrorists. Builders have to be very good for a very long time; wreckers only have to be determined.

That understanding – gained both by Americans and the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar – led to changes in our operation in Iraq and a changing of sides for the local Sunnis. Al Qaeda has been dispossessed of land on which it sat and from which it made life miserable for Iraqis of all stripes. Dispossessing them in Anbar is not the same as defeating them, but it makes it harder for them to organize, train and operate; harder to wreck what the Iraqis and we build. To the question, “Have we become more adept?” the answer is yes, but we’re not safe yet; we’re not there yet.

Here at home, there hasn’t been a major terrorist attack since 9-11-01, and for that we are grateful to all who protect us. But just as we are not done with al Qaeda yet, we have to assume they are not done with us.