The Bottom Line

Shortly after the Yom Kippur War, an Israeli general was privately informed by an Egyptian general that a strategic decision had been made that Egypt would not go to war against Israel again. After all, said the Egyptian, in 1948 Egypt had been repulsed 10 miles from Tel Aviv; in 1956 Israel had come to the Suez Canal, albeit with French and British help; in 1967 Israel had come to the Canal alone; and in 1973 Israel had crossed the Canal and was 101 kilometers from Cairo. The war, he said, was over.

Shortly after the Yom Kippur War, an Israeli general was privately informed by an Egyptian general that a strategic decision had been made that Egypt would not go to war against Israel again. After all, said the Egyptian, in 1948 Egypt had been repulsed 10 miles from Tel Aviv; in 1956 Israel had come to the Suez Canal, albeit with French and British help; in 1967 Israel had come to the Canal alone; and in 1973 Israel had crossed the Canal and was 101 kilometers from Cairo. The war, he said, was over.

In the years that followed other important people – including Sadat himself – said more or less the same thing. But only in 1977 did the Israelis begin to believe the existential war with Egypt was over. Why?

Because in 1977, Sadat demonstrated his acceptance of Israel’s sovereignty in the Middle East. He came to The State of Israel, was welcomed by an Israeli military honor guard and the Israeli Head of State and Head of Government, spoke in Israel’s chosen capital, and in the seat of Israel’s government. From that platform he said the war was over, and Israelis believed him. This paved the way for the Camp David Accords.

Israeli relations with Jordan over the years had become an open secret, so when the King of Jordan signed a treaty with Israel, no one doubted that the Hashemite ruler accepted Israel’s legitimacy.

Even Yasser Arafat understood the rules, although he didn’t live by them. He wrote to Yitzhak Rabin in 1993 that the PLO “recognized the right of Israel to live in peace and security,” and would undertake to change the PLO Covenant that denied the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty. “In light of PLO commitments included in the letter,” Rabin replied, he would begin negotiations with the PLO.

Never mind that Syrian Foreign Minister Sharaa couldn’t be Anwar Sadat or King Hussein. He couldn’t even be Arafat. Sharaa said at the White House, that the question of Israel’s legitimacy remains open. “Those who reject to return (sic) the occupied territories to their original owners in the framework of international legitimacy, send a message to the Arabs that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is a conflict of existence in which bloodshed can never stop and not a conflict about borders.”

Central to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is Arab adherence to UN Resolution 242’s requirement for “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

It can reasonably be said with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians that Israel received less than the optimists hoped for and less than Israel deserved. One can and should want more. But in no case could an Israeli leader have undertaken serious negotiations without a priori acceptance of Israel’s legitimate sovereignty. Nor can they be expected to in the case of Syria, which leaves little ground for optimism here.