The Brits Make the Case (Part I)

With the publication of “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government” (9/24/2002), the evidence is plain and willful ignorance remains the world’s last excuse for not dealing with Iraq. The report is admittedly not easy to read, but the concerns of professionals in the field are compelling. We will bring you some highlights as UN weapons inspectors contemplate their return to the scene of the crimes and the new German government contemplates its navel.

With the publication of “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government” (9/24/2002), the evidence is plain and willful ignorance remains the world’s last excuse for not dealing with Iraq. The report is admittedly not easy to read, but the concerns of professionals in the field are compelling. We will bring you some highlights as UN weapons inspectors contemplate their return to the scene of the crimes and the new German government contemplates its navel.

In the years following the war, UNSCOM and the IAEA “surveyed 1,015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

• Destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tons of chemical precursors and 411 tons of chemical warfare agent.
• Dismantling of Iraq’s prime chemical weapons development and production complex at al-Muthanna and a range of key production equipment.
• Destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads.
• Destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons.
• Discovery in 1991 of samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq’s acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programs and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons program.
• Removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons program, including the al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.”

But, there have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998, and the Assessment notes, “Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:

• Up to 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tons of VX nerve agent.
• Up to 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, including approx. 300 tons, which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare program, were unique to the production of VX.
• Growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 liters of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured).
• Over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.”

The Assessment adds, “The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq’s continuing attempts to reconstitute its programs.”

In particular “large discrepancies” would seem a good place for inspectors to start, but as we shall see, there are other discrepancies and other dangers.