The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) raises the same concerns as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Land Mine Ban and the ABM Treaty. First, countries that are most likely to pose a threat – either by design or by chaos – are countries most likely to cheat. Second, while the U.S. is democratic and reasonably transparent, making verification of our behavior reasonably certain, verification in other countries is harder by orders of magnitude.

Adm. Henry G.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) raises the same concerns as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Land Mine Ban and the ABM Treaty. First, countries that are most likely to pose a threat – either by design or by chaos – are countries most likely to cheat. Second, while the U.S. is democratic and reasonably transparent, making verification of our behavior reasonably certain, verification in other countries is harder by orders of magnitude.

Adm. Henry G. Chiles, Jr., USN (ret.) was a participant in JINSA’s Flag and General Officers Trip to Israel and a member of the Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise, which reported to Congress in March. We have here excerpted from his October testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“When you compare the loss of life in terms of the world population in warfare in the last century and first half of this bloody century before World War II (about 2-3%) to the loss of life after World War II (.1-.2%), it’s obvious there was fundamental change. I believe a key element that enhanced the deterrence stability between superpowers in the post-World War II era of the Cold War was the presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the superpowers. These highly destructive weapons stimulated both sides to more aggressively work to peacefully resolve problems… Thus, at an unprecedented level during the Cold War, we negotiated with the Soviet Union, established means for communication, and sought to control the escalation of direct confrontation.”

“There is a common belief that elimination of nuclear device testing through a comprehensive test ban is an effective deterrent to acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue states and terrorist groups even if they acquire fissile material. This is dubious… Early nuclear devices were developed without testing. The obvious example is Little Boy, the first U.S. nuclear weapon used. Crude nuclear devices could be designed and built today without testing.”

Admiral Chiles said ratification of the CTBT would pose specific difficulties for the U.S. because of the limitations of simulation and modeling. Testing replacement components; replicating hostile environments; managing the stockpile as it ages; and training replacement personnel would become issues for American defense planners. “The current stockpile is evaluated as safe and reliable by those responsible. However, we cannot count on that assessment in the future…”

He addressed JINSA’s concern about the behavior of other countries. “Verification of compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is an inexact science. We cannot be sure of our capability to detect worldwide low yield nuclear detonations despite extensive effort, technology improvement, and international cooperation.”

“Mr. Chairman, in all good faith, I do not believe it is in the United States best interests for the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time.

“Finally, it is recommended that congressional oversight of the nuclear weapons program be reinvigorated. During the Cold War, the Congress took a major role in oversight and support of nuclear weapons. That emphasis on the broader program was lost with the demise of the Soviet Union… Reinvigorated, organized, Congressional oversight will strengthen the program and reinforce the public service character of the mission as vital to the supreme national interest.”