The Evil of the Axis

North Korea’s underground nuclear test offers the Obama administration an opportunity to remake American policy on a crucial issue. The Bush administration used the Six Party Talks and the UN Security Council as its chief instruments and pursued policies of varying carrots and sticks to change Kim Jong Il’s calculus about the benefits of nuclear capability. But the Six Party format mortgages any possible progress to the lowest common denominator, generally China, and China’s veto does the same with the Security Council.

North Korea’s underground nuclear test offers the Obama administration an opportunity to remake American policy on a crucial issue. The Bush administration used the Six Party Talks and the UN Security Council as its chief instruments and pursued policies of varying carrots and sticks to change Kim Jong Il’s calculus about the benefits of nuclear capability. But the Six Party format mortgages any possible progress to the lowest common denominator, generally China, and China’s veto does the same with the Security Council. [How odd that the Bush administration, often charged with reckless unilateralism, was in this case an instrument of reckless multilateralism.]

We suggest that President Obama take leadership of the issue and determine what American policies would a) best protect the United States and our allies, and b) reduce the likelihood of future North Korean nuclear successes.

Several potential policies spring to mind – an enhanced Proliferation Security Initiative, enhanced missile defenses, returning North Korea to the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring countries and a return to the financial sanctions the Bush administration dropped for no fathomable reason.

None require Chinese participation – although that would be welcome – and all permit like-minded countries to participate as well as they can. An increased interest in missile defenses both for our Asian friends and for us would require the Obama Administration to change course, but the President has shown a willingness to alter his positions when shown compelling security implications. There are few things we think more compelling than the security implications of North Korea with nuclear weapons and a missile capability that reaches our allies or our homeland.

And then, American leadership should acknowledge the Bush Administration’s finest and probably least appreciated policy formulation – the clear understanding of what was Evil about the Axis.

The Axis between North Korea, Iran and Iraq (now replaced by Syria) was a separate but coincident interest among Asians, Persians and Arabs in the acquisition of nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. It was and remains Evil because it overrides what should be the civilized impulses of government: Kim Jong Il’s starvation of his own people, pauperizing the country in pursuit of missile and nuclear technology was related in theory and in practice to Saddam’s manipulation of the Oil for Food program and the mass graves that are still being discovered around the country, and to Iran’s explicit determination to erase America’s friend and ally Israel.

President Obama has highlighted his interest in soft diplomacy and what he understands as the need to acknowledge and apologize for shortcomings in American policy and history. The shortcomings are there, certainly, but it would be a mistake to equate them with the Evils of the Axis and by that, fail to take the steps necessary – alone and in concert – to protect us from all of them and defeat all of their aims.