The Hebron Protocol

PM Netanyahu, in his speech to the Joint Session of Congress, stated his determination to implement the Oslo Accords left to him by his predecessors, but insisted that they be based on 1) security; 2) reciprocity; and 3) human rights and democracy. The revised Hebron Protocol – emotionally difficult as it is – better fulfills the first requirement, and acknowledges the second. JINSA sincerely hopes the plan for Hebron succeeds, because it is there that the Israeli government has staked its credibility.

PM Netanyahu, in his speech to the Joint Session of Congress, stated his determination to implement the Oslo Accords left to him by his predecessors, but insisted that they be based on 1) security; 2) reciprocity; and 3) human rights and democracy. The revised Hebron Protocol – emotionally difficult as it is – better fulfills the first requirement, and acknowledges the second. JINSA sincerely hopes the plan for Hebron succeeds, because it is there that the Israeli government has staked its credibility. The Protocol itself is straightforward, but JINSA’s analysis of it and the surrounding documents reveals potential problems for Israel and for the U.S. which, if unaddressed, could prove difficult.

1. While a timetable is fixed for Israel’s redeployment, there is none for the Palestinians to meet their commitments – the same ones they have failed to respect since the signing of the original Oslo Accord in 1993 – and there is no penalty for noncompliance. Furthermore, the new agreement by the PA to meet those original commitments is NOT actually in the Protocol itself. It is contained in what is called a “Note for the Record,” written and signed by U.S. Ambassador Dennis Ross. The enforceability if commitments in the “Note” remains to be seen, but since Mr. Arafat has failed to meet commitments to which he is an actual signatory, we are extremely skeptical about efficacy of this new mechanism.

Congress can help here. As a prime financier of the Palestinian Authority, Congress can exercise far more serious oversight into the spending of American tax dollars by the PA than has been the case until now. the disbursement of money should be related to actual fulfillment of commitments, not only in the Protocol itself but also in the “Note.”

2. Outgoing Secretary of State Warren Christopher is providing a side letter to the PM which contains the seeds of a problem. One line reads, “I have conveyed [to Arafat] our [American government] belief that… all three phases of the further redeployments should be completed… not later than mid-1998.” In the next paragraph, he writes, “A hallmark of U.S. policy remains our commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel identifies.” Although the exact boundaries of redeployment are an Israeli decision, what would happen if, owing to events not foreseen in the agreement, Israel determines that ANY further redeployments are inconsistent with Israeli security? Arafat would point to one line in the letter, but the PM would point to another. Which line takes precedence? Would we force Israel to redeploy against its own security evaluation? The potential dilemma for the United States looms large.

3. And, finally, the actual Hebron Protocol is a blueprint for solving only a single problem. The larger process of engagement between Israel and the Palestinians must be predicated upon clear acceptance of the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty in the Middle East by the Palestinians and the Arab states. The United States, as the guarantor of the process, must impress upon the PLO and the Arab states the seriousness with which we regard their present and future behavior in this respect.