The Inmates are Running the Asylum

Last week’s appointment of Hans Blix to head UNSCOM monitoring missions has revived the debate over the thorny Iraq issue. The selection of Blix, a veteran Swedish arms control expert and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), followed months of deadlock with Baghdad over lapsed UN inspections of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and weeks of dissention within the UN Security Council over the proper choice to head a new trimmed, less-invasive monitoring regime.

Last week’s appointment of Hans Blix to head UNSCOM monitoring missions has revived the debate over the thorny Iraq issue. The selection of Blix, a veteran Swedish arms control expert and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), followed months of deadlock with Baghdad over lapsed UN inspections of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear facilities and weeks of dissention within the UN Security Council over the proper choice to head a new trimmed, less-invasive monitoring regime. Perhaps more than anything else, however, Blix’s appointment highlights the flaws in our Iraq policy. Watered-down and conducted under Iraqi supervision, this new “UNSCOM Lite” seems more like a salve to the Administration’s faltering containment policy than a meaningful arms control measure.

Significantly, the UN inspection regime under which UNSCOM was established is not supposed to be an optional one for Saddam. Created under Security Council Resolution 687 at the end of the Gulf War, it is instead a quid pro quo for a cessation of hostilities and includes an UNCONDITIONAL Iraqi acceptance of UN inspections. But no monitoring has occurred since 1998, because Baghdad has simply refused to submit to UN arms inspections.

The nomination of Blix therefore seems more than a bit like capitulation. We have no doubt that Blix is a distinguished arms control specialist. But his approval by the Security Council, in marked contrast to the hostility that greeted the nomination of Rolf Ekeus, another Swedish arms inspector, earlier this month, clearly indicates that Blix is a more palatable choice to Russia, China and France. More importantly, Iraq’s grudging acceptance of the nomination – and by extension, the revamped UNSCOM monitoring regime – means Blix is an acceptable choice to Iraq as well. Since angering Saddam could lead to a continued bar on UN arms inspections, which would allow Iraq to develop its chemical, biological and nuclear stockpiles without any international supervision, the Administration – operating under the idea that a little regulation is better than none at all – seems satisfied with this outcome. We are not.

Allowing Iraq and Iraqi sympathizers in the Security Council to dictate the terms of inspections shows just how disorganized and ineffectual our containment policy vis-a-vis Iraq really is. Not too long ago, the Gulf War coalition led by the U.S. presented a united front to Saddam Hussein. The coalition crushed Iraqi forces and compelled Saddam to accept terms of surrender aimed at ensuring that Iraq, with its hegemonic, expansionist ambitions, would not violate the peace and security of the region again. But nearly nine years later, the United States seems content with an inspector which Baghdad believes poses little or no threat to its WMD program. In the face of such lackluster policy, Saddam would be justified in saying that he has won the peace.