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The Mandate, Part II

Yesterday we raised some potential problems likely to be encountered by Lt. Gen. Ward because of the mixed mandate he received from Secretary of State Rice. We asked about “doing something” vs. “getting something done.” Today we ask, “What is it that we want the Palestinian security services to get done?” For what purpose is Gen. Ward tasked with “training, equipping, helping the Palestinians to build their security forces”?


Yesterday we raised some potential problems likely to be encountered by Lt. Gen. Ward because of the mixed mandate he received from Secretary of State Rice. We asked about “doing something” vs. “getting something done.” Today we ask, “What is it that we want the Palestinian security services to get done?” For what purpose is Gen. Ward tasked with “training, equipping, helping the Palestinians to build their security forces”?

The U.S. has said the PA has to “dismantle the terrorist infrastructure (i.e., Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in the territories” and be responsible for security in their areas. It’s in the Road Map. How to do it, however, is not in the Road Map and Abu Mazen has thus far ruled out using force against terror groups, preferring to “negotiate” with them.

When Abu Mazen was briefly Prime Minister in 2003, he advanced the notion of the hudna, a temporary ceasefire with radical groups so he could consolidate his position. But Hamas and PIJ only agreed to the hudna to gain time to regroup and rearm after the devastating Israeli attacks on their infrastructure that the PA was unwilling to undertake. The 2005 version of the hudna appears to be the same – reeling from Israeli attacks, Hamas and PIJ are willing to “suspend activities” until some unspecified date in the future, leaving in their hands the time and place of a return to large-scale violence. (There remains an underlying level of Palestinian violence, including mortar attacks, which would be considered unacceptable against any American city).

And even under the best of circumstances, even if they agree on the mandate, what if the Israeli government decides the new PA security apparatus simply isn’t up to the task of protecting Israel? Who has the right to tell Israel to put the lives of its citizens at risk by permitting the PA to continue to be responsible for Israeli security?

We have other questions.

If Gen. Ward is responsible for training the forces, will he be permitted to “vet” the applicants? Given American difficulties in training the new Iraqi security forces, that should not only be an option, but a requirement. According to The Jerusalem Post, the PA admits that 600 of its security personnel have been killed by the IDF in the past four years – MOSTLY WHILE ENGAGING IN VIOLENCE AGAINST ISRAEL.

According to The Post, a senior Palestinian security officer said that many of them joined Fatah’s al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade rather than religious groups, adding, “The fact that they had received paramilitary training as policemen was an asset because they were able to implement tactics learned in the fighting with the Israeli Army.”

And if Palestinian security forces moonlight as terrorists, wouldn’t Gen. Ward be in the awkward position of training them to be better at their chosen sideline? That would be totally unfair to him and dangerous for Israel.

This mandate needs revising.