The NIE – A First Thought

One of the interesting things about national intelligence is that while it describes what it thinks it sees (hedging its bets with what it calls “estimative language” and degrees of confidence), it derives no implications and prescribes no policies.

One of the interesting things about national intelligence is that while it describes what it thinks it sees (hedging its bets with what it calls “estimative language” and degrees of confidence), it derives no implications and prescribes no policies. Also remember that National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) only cover what the intelligence community is studying – our intelligence community missed the Pakistani nuclear test until it happened, missed the three-stage North Korean rocket until it was fired over Japan, and missed the extent of the Libyan nuclear program until the Libyans turned it over.

So what to make of the new unclassified NIE on Iran? Not having to worry about implications or policy, it is quick reading. The “Key Judgments” are only three pages long, followed by a handy-dandy chart comparing the 2005 NIE to its current counterpart.

Most prominently in the news, the NIE asserts with “high confidence” that Iran shut down its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has “moderate confidence” that it has not restarted. “Our assessment that the program probably was halted in response to international pressure suggests Iran might be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.”

Let us assume for the moment that the NIE is entirely correct. (We know, we know. Hold the nasty e-mails; just suspend disbelief and follow the first train of thought.)

• Question: What international pressure?
• Answer: The American invasion of Iraq in May 2003 followed by the interception through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI, the brainchild of John Bolton) of an illegal shipment of uranium-enrichment equipment bound for Libya in October. Iran’s nuclear weapons program began in the early days of the Revolution and continued unabated through periods of relative freeze and thaw with the United States. The Iraq war and the PSI, however, certainly convinced Libya and may have convinced Iran that the United States had become serious about stopping proliferation.
• Implication: The NIE doesn’t do implications, but we do. That might change the answer to the question, “Was the invasion of Iraq ‘worth it’?”

Before the invasion, the UN was convinced – through intelligence estimates, including British inspectors’ field reports – that Iraq had a hidden nuclear and chemical/biological weapons program. Even countries strongly opposed to the American invasion [mainly because they were making millions of dollars on the UN Oil for Food (read weapons) Program], agreed with the intelligence assessment that Saddam had non-conventional programs in defiance of UN demands for transparency.

Iran and Libya pursued their programs in the belief that UN inspection was a joke and American threats were bluster. Their intelligence missed the fact that in the post-9/11 atmosphere, the United States was unwilling to accept continuing uncertainty.

We have known since January 2004 the impact of U.S. policy on Libya. We may now understand the impact on Iran, making us wonder whether increased pressure at the time might have convinced the Iranians to show what the Libyans showed.

Next: Shutdown