The NIE – Shutdown

We’re trying to follow the thought process of the intelligence and former State Department personnel who determined with “high confidence” that Tehran “halted” its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and is “less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging.” We have questions, starting with a footnote to the NIE (actually the only footnote and an extraordinary admission of the limitation of the process): “By ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran

We’re trying to follow the thought process of the intelligence and former State Department personnel who determined with “high confidence” that Tehran “halted” its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and is “less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging.” We have questions, starting with a footnote to the NIE (actually the only footnote and an extraordinary admission of the limitation of the process): “By ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”

“Declared civil work” is exempted. How much overlap is there between “civil” work and weapons-related work? Saddam kept thousands of weapons engineers segregated and on his payroll right up to the invasion of 2003 despite UN sanctions and inspections. If Iran has a cadre of “civil” nuclear engineers, how many of them could, and how many of them do moonlight in covert programs unaccounted for by the NIE? With what degree of certitude would our intelligence establishment and its State Department friends answer?

The NIE uses the word “covert” only to modify “uranium enrichment” in the footnote but in fact, the nuclear weapon design and weaponization programs were also covert until they were discovered. What other covert programs does Iran maintain? How would we know? And with what degree of certitude?

The NIE trumpets that the program was “halted.” But nowhere does it say it was “rendered inoperable.” The Libyan nuclear program was rendered inoperable; Iran’s only stopped. Why and what are the implications? The NIE assesses that weaponization and weapons design stopped “primarily in response to international pressure,” i.e., the Iraq War, but could it have been because a) the weapon designs were mature and b) there was no enriched uranium ready for weaponization? If the latter, what does it mean not to have accounted for the “civilian work” in enriching uranium and not to have accounted for possible covert programs? And how does this relate to the dual-use R&D programs the NIE acknowledges Iran maintains?

The NIE also acknowledges the Iranian centrifuge program, which it assesses “with moderate confidence” faces technological problems. The fact is that if the technological problems that may or may not exist are overcome, Iran could have enough uranium for a weapon in 2009, but the NIE calls that “very unlikely.” Why? Because the Iranians can’t solve the problems? Because they don’t want to enrich enough uranium for a bomb? Because then the NIE would have to account for the fact that if enough highly enriched uranium existed, the weaponization programs could be revived?

On the point of weaponization: The first nuclear explosion on earth took place 16 July 1945. Less than three weeks later, with no test, the United States dropped a nuclear weapon on Hiroshima.

Next: Capabilities and Intent