The President’s Libya Speech, Part II: A Problem for Us

American core principles as articulated by President Obama are indeed a prescription for intervention everywhere – despite his firm denial. “America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs…. we must always measure our interests against the need for action.” But, he said, “We had a unique ability to stop that (Libyan) violence” and so “to brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are.”

American core principles as articulated by President Obama are indeed a prescription for intervention everywhere – despite his firm denial. “America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs…. we must always measure our interests against the need for action.” But, he said, “We had a unique ability to stop that (Libyan) violence” and so “to brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are.”
Why our capabilities were unique as regards Libya is unclear, as is the decision for Libya not Iran or Syria.

The President tried. “As Commander-in-Chief, I have no greater responsibility than keeping this country safe.” Fair enough. But, “There will be times, though, when our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and values are… natural disasters for example; or preventing genocide and keeping the peace; ensuring regional security and maintaining the flow of commerce.”

In other words, his greatest responsibility is keeping America safe. Or not.

“Regional security” and “maintaining the flow of commerce,” is a euphemism for “maintaining the flow of oil from the Middle East.” Does that make this a “war for oil”? Is that a national security interest for the United States? In point of fact, while our European allies are dependent on oil and natural gas from elsewhere – the Middle East or Russia – the United States can produce its own. There would be dislocations for sure, but given the right circumstances, the United States can be self-sufficient to a much larger degree than most of our friends. So the President acknowledged that “These may not be America’s problems alone, they are important to us.”

One of the most worrisome concepts is that without military action, “The writ of the UN Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words.” In this case, the writ of the Security Council was not endorsed by Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany – most of the world’s population and a lot of rising economic clout. It stretches credulity to call upholding the credibility of part of the UN Security Council with American troops a national security interest. Passing title to NATO was simply disingenuous. The United States provides the lion’s share of military muscle and the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO is an American.

At bottom and looking back at prior large-scale “man-caused-contingencies” (to borrow a phrase from the Department of Homeland Security) the president appeared to fear he would miss an impending genocide, and so felt compelled to act. Indeed, a lot of Libyans were at risk, although it is fewer than have been killed in Darfur by the Sudanese government, or who have been starved to death in North Korea by Kim Jong Il or hung by the Iranian regime, and may be fewer even than the United States has killed in air strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Surely it is fewer than we killed in Nagasaki and Hiroshima or the British killed in Dresden.

So what and now what?

Is the death of civilians different when it is done by their own government rather than by others? How many have to die before military intervention becomes appropriate? Is it possible that prolonging the war by doing just enough to keep the rebels in the trenches a little longer will also engender more civilian deaths? Some of the bloodiest battles of the American Civil War were fought after the cause was hopeless, but while the Confederacy still saw glory in not surrendering. How many civilians were killed after the defeat of the South was inevitable, but not accomplished? What constitutes “acceptable” civilian casualties?

Does the “human rights community” have a different understanding of humanitarian military intervention than military professionals? Johanna Mendelson Forman, a “humanitarian-affairs specialist” at a Washington think-tank was quoted in The Washington Times saying said she understood the reluctance of Defense Secretary Gates and other military leaders, including NSC Adviser Thomas Donilon, to launch military action in Libya. “It’s very hard to figure out where this takes you… No one has the stomach for a continued ground presence in Libya,” she said, noting there is no clear end in sight. “Once you’ve gone in, what is the commitment to stay?”

Where was she before we started shooting people?