The Question of Afghanistan is Still Open

Lest our comments on the “wings” of terrorist organizations be misconstrued, let us say outright that it was not an endorsement of either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism as a policy for Afghanistan. It was simply a warning that some organizations-Hamas, Fatah, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Taliban-have strategic goals that are inconsistent with liberal, tolerant thinking and inconsistent with consensual government (“democracy” not being relevant).

Lest our comments on the “wings” of terrorist organizations be misconstrued, let us say outright that it was not an endorsement of either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism as a policy for Afghanistan. It was simply a warning that some organizations-Hamas, Fatah, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Taliban-have strategic goals that are inconsistent with liberal, tolerant thinking and inconsistent with consensual government (“democracy” not being relevant). Those organizations graft onto host governments to get what they cannot get alone-space for training and refuge; access to bank accounts, passports and modes of travel; political support in national capitals and international organizations (the five UN committees devoted to the Palestinians). Choosing to accept their “political” wings while fighting their “terrorist” wings runs the risk of allowing terrorist organizations to take over their host governments-as has happened in the West Bank and Gaza, and may be the sad end of democracy in Lebanon.

The question of Afghanistan is still open.

The United States has done very well in damaging al Qaeda-ousting it from Afghanistan, decapitating its leadership and cutting off its funds-but it lives, for the moment, in Pakistan as well as retaining allies in Afghanistan. If we control Afghanistan without being in control of Pakistan-a nominal but conflicted ally-will we not simply have pushed the problem across the border? And if so, what is our plan for nuclear-armed Pakistan? The Pakistanis were furious with the American decision to vastly increase foreign aid to their country since it came with controls and “benchmarks” they found “insulting.” The Pakistani government is also unhappy with what it perceives to be a lack of American intelligence information-which we decline to share because we believe the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to be in bed to some extent with the Taliban and al Qaeda-which at least part of the ISI sees as a means of ensuring a “friendly” government in Afghanistan and a hedge against India.

Complicated? Yes. And whatever the United States decides is its strategic aim in AfPak has to take account of all of the complexity plus the problem of how big a “footprint” to place in a country rightly called “the graveyard of empires.” It was not just neglect that had the Bush Administration treading lightly there-it was a perfectly respectful desire not to become Afghanistan’s occupier. We now run that risk.

Al Qaeda has already proven that it can migrate and graft onto a new host-it started in Sudan, moved to Afghanistan, spread into Europe (where the 9-11 plot was organized) and Pakistan, and now appears to have centers as well in Syria and Algeria. The Iraqi government is planning to take to the United Nations its claim against Syria for harboring al Qaeda and permitting it to move across the border (which should unhinge the American public as our government tries to cozy up to Syria as American soldiers are dying in al Qaeda-sponsored attacks). It is our enemy.

Is the Taliban?