The Road Map from Iraq, Part III
[Before this week’s bombing in Tel Aviv, we had written, but not yet published the following JINSA Report. In light of the bombing, our concerns only increase.]Even before negotiations, there are three problematic elements in the “Road Map”: the dubious political and moral acceptability of the UN, the French and the Russians as partners; enforcing the required emphasis on transnational Arab acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy; and the singular pitfall of Oslo – unaccountability for terrorism.
[Before this week’s bombing in Tel Aviv, we had written, but not yet published the following JINSA Report. In light of the bombing, our concerns only increase.]
Even before negotiations, there are three problematic elements in the “Road Map”: the dubious political and moral acceptability of the UN, the French and the Russians as partners; enforcing the required emphasis on transnational Arab acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy; and the singular pitfall of Oslo – unaccountability for terrorism.
President Bush rightly framed America’s 21st Century war as being “against terrorists and the states that harbor and support them.” And far from being a diversion, regime change and the liberation of Iraq are central to its success, because it is precisely the nexus between terrorists and state sponsors that makes them both so dangerous.
States have attributes that terrorists need – territory for training and refuge, weapons, money, passports and diplomatic cover. Terrorists have the single attribute that states covet – the ability to kill and destroy without a return address, i.e., plausible deniability.
What has this to do with Oslo, or the Road Map?
The Palestinian Authority combines the physical and financial attributes of statehood with plausibly deniable death and destruction. It is both terrorist and state sponsor. During the Oslo period, every time a bomb went off, the U.S. condemned “terrorism,” but Arafat said, “But it wasn’t my fault. Those damned terrorists are making me look bad.” Then Oslo-ites would say something like, “If ‘terrorists’ want to stop the ‘peace process’, we have to show them they can’t. The Palestinians and Israelis have to keep going in spite of terrorism.”
Meaning that while pizza parlors blew up, Arafat retained the position of “state leader” and only vague denunciations would fall on vague “terrorists.” It was precisely on those points – no penalty accruing to Arafat for talking and killing at the same time, and dead Jews being no serious impediment to his rule – that Oslo-itis finally died.
President Bush understood Arafat’s double game and refused to meet with him. He called for “new (Palestinian) leaders not compromised by terror.” Instead he got Abu Mazen. But what will happen when the next bomb goes off? If the President condemns “terror” and Abu Mazen says, “I condemn terror, too, but let’s not let it get in the way of Palestinian aspirations,” and if the President agrees, the Road Map will be no different from Oslo.
Abu Mazen has to know that his is the address – fairly or unfairly. If he doesn’t want to control terrorism, he is not a partner. If he wants to and cannot, he is not a partner. Only when a Palestinian leader combines the ability and will to end the dichotomy of the PA as a state sponsor of terrorism and the PA as a terrorist organization, can there be serious discussions of a provisional Palestinian state alongside the sovereign State of Israel.