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They’re Back

Assume for the moment that President Obama’s sea-based interceptor plan adequately addresses the threat posed to Europe by Iran. Further assume that Secretary Gates’ shift from selling his former President’s proposal to selling his current President’s proposal represents an honest evaluation of a changing threat based on intelligence information that is complete and accurate.

Those are very big assumptions, but go with them for a moment.


Assume for the moment that President Obama’s sea-based interceptor plan adequately addresses the threat posed to Europe by Iran. Further assume that Secretary Gates’ shift from selling his former President’s proposal to selling his current President’s proposal represents an honest evaluation of a changing threat based on intelligence information that is complete and accurate.

Those are very big assumptions, but go with them for a moment.

If true, one could assume the Obama Administration simply found a happy confluence of events. First, a desire to “reset” U.S. relations with Russia as Russia did not want the heavy American commitment to Poland and the Czech Republic that would come with the land based radars and interceptors. Second, a change in the objective threat that allows President Obama to do what Russia wants while preserving security in Europe. With that out of the way, the Obama Administration can move forward on the START talks with Russia, with the possibility of a treaty that can be signed in a photogenic ceremony.

What’s the problem? The problem is that it walks the world back more than 60 years, restores the Cold War balance of power, and reminds countries yet again that America’s reliability as an ally is questionable. [What Americans think of as an admirable change in leadership every four or eight years is sometimes seen by others as dangerous instability. And sometimes it is.]

Russia’s unchanging goal since the end of World War II has been to weaken or sever the Atlantic Alliance; to separate the United States from NATO. After 1991, the liberated countries attached themselves to the West. They would be “Central Europe,” their historic designation next to “Western Europe,” and would no longer be regarded as “Eastern Europe.” They joined NATO. They went to Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States inside the NATO alliance was supposed to be the guarantor of “Europe whole and free.” While the Russians were trying at a minimum to restore themselves as a superpower with a sphere of influence in Europe.

It took the Russians 20 years, but they’re back. Russian President Medvedev said, “Naturally, we will have to conduct substantial, expert consultation… we will work together to develop effective measures…that take into account the interests and concerns of all sides and ensure equal security for all countries in European territory.” He said President Obama had a “responsible attitude.”

Russia and the United States, together “ensuring” security for the “European territory.” How secure do the Poles feel today, or the Czechs? How do the Romanians or the Hungarians feel about Russia assuming the role of their “security guarantor”? Do the Georgians and Ukrainians think President Obama is being “responsible” with their future? Did the President of the United States think it would be easier to deal with one dictatorial country rather than more than two-dozen free countries in various messy states of political evolution?

If he is expecting to find the Russians eager to hit that “reset” button, he may need to reconsider. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, said of the abandonment of the missile/radar sites and the Polish and Czech governments that made the difficult political decisions to host them: “The Americans have simply corrected their own mistake. We are not duty bound to pay someone for putting their own mistakes right.”

The Poles and the Czechs this morning may be forgiven for wondering how to put their own mistakes right.