Think Twice Before Ratifying CWC
Congress has legislated the destruction of America’s entire chemical arsenal by the year 2004. JINSA applauds this moral, ethical and militarily appropriate action. It might seem logical, then, to favor the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in an attempt to make the rest of the world join us. However, the CWC cannot make any country do what it has already chosen not to do. Therefore, JINSA has serious reservations about Senate ratification of another multilateral treaty relying on dubious inspection regimes, impossible verification goals, good will, and no sanctions for violators.
Congress has legislated the destruction of America’s entire chemical arsenal by the year 2004. JINSA applauds this moral, ethical and militarily appropriate action. It might seem logical, then, to favor the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in an attempt to make the rest of the world join us. However, the CWC cannot make any country do what it has already chosen not to do. Therefore, JINSA has serious reservations about Senate ratification of another multilateral treaty relying on dubious inspection regimes, impossible verification goals, good will, and no sanctions for violators.
Of the signatories to the CWC, many do not have or do not wish to pursue chemical and biological weaponry. We are pleased when any country makes that decision. Nevertheless, some countries routinely cheat on international agreements, and the cheaters are those whose arsenals of non-conventional weaponry most concern us. Iran, Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Russia and China, among others, are countries whose seal on a piece of paper does not exactly inspire confidence. Iraq’s nuclear program grew and prospered right in the face of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its inspection provisions, as did that of North Korea.
The clandestine development and manufacture of chemical agents are easier by orders of magnitude than nuclear weapons.
Russia, for example, secretly developed a deadly new nerve agent, A-232. The Russians have signed the CWC and are contemplating ratification; so one might reasonably ask why they are continuing to develop new nerve agents? But the really interesting part is that A-232 is comprised of agricultural chemicals that are not lethal until mixed, and thus do not appear on the CWC list of banned chemicals. Technically, then, the Russians have developed an agent that will not violate the CWC until it is used. A-232 is known to us only because a Russian scientist blew its cover to make the point that Russia is still heavily invested in its chemical and biological capabilities. The only reaction from the Clinton Administration on this matter is to say the Russians have “violated the spirit” of the CWC. We are not impressed by this statement.
We are reminded of Shalom Aleichem’s character Tevye who, discussing the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (i.e., from others to himself) said, “If the rich would agree, I would agree.” If the countries that most concern the United States would agree to give up their chemical and biological arsenals, we would certainly agree that they should give them up.
Until then, a treaty with no sanctions for violators; an inspection regime more likely to uncover legitimate industrial secrets than illicit production facilities; and loopholes big enough to shoot A-232 through will be unlikely to affect the programs that threaten American and Western interests.