Thoughts on American Retaliation Against Iraq for Kurdish Assault

The Iraqi assault on the Kurds, and the American bombing in reply, are the inevitable result of the inconclusive end to the Gulf War and the failed Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against Saddam that followed. The politics are complicated, but a few facts emerge:

The Iraqi assault on the Kurds, and the American bombing in reply, are the inevitable result of the inconclusive end to the Gulf War and the failed Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against Saddam that followed. The politics are complicated, but a few facts emerge:

1. The Kurds are not the current focus of American interest, although a vigorous U.S. effort to reconcile the sides was lacking. Saddam crossed a clear line drawn by the U.S. and coalition allies in 1991. Violation of the coalition’s conditions for ending the hostilities requires a swift, certain and painful response. One might usefully argue that the initial American bombing targets are not sufficiently important assets to cause Saddam the requisite pain. Taking out elements of the Republican Guard and its equipment in the north, or obliterating the Defense Ministry in Baghdad) preferably during a staff meeting) are more to our liking.

2. The U.S. was denied cooperation from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, under its present government, and Jordan in preparing the response – three countries who rely on us to protect them from a resurgence of Saddam’s reach. The United States habitually makes the mistake of assuming that countries with which we share certain interests, are also countries upon which we can rely when our own interests are at stake. We cannot. No one – particularly our State or Defense Department – should mistake the above countries for allies in this instance.

3. The punishment of Iraq, while necessary and right, is only an interlude in the chaos; selective bombing is not a substitute policy. Long-term protection of the Kurds in a an autonomous zone has created opportunities for Marxist PKK terrorists (supported by Syria) to create havoc in southern Turkey. There is also the possibility that the breakup of Iraq and ensuing power vacuum could make it easier for Iran to spread radicalism across the region.

A few missiles here and there might keep things quiet for a short while, but the problems posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq will not go away any time soon.
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JINSA Vice-Chairman Morrie Amitay’s letter to The Wall Street Journal in August responded to a suggestion that U.S. aid is bad for Israel. Morrie wrote, “ The US’s overriding interest to maintain stability in the Middle East is well-served by an effective Israeli military. Without this…additional billions would be needed by our own defense planners to provide the same benefits.”

Tom Neumann, JINSA Executive Director, replied to an editorial in Newsday which encouraged the U.S. to allow Louis Farrakhan to take Khaddafi’s money. “The acceptance of money by an American organization from a terrorism sponsoring state that both the Congress and the President have universally declared to be an outlaw state, cannot in any shape, form or manner be justified.”