Uses of Intelligence

Opponents of the war in Iraq, and the larger war against terrorists and the states that harbor and support them, have latched onto “intelligence failures” as a means of criticizing the President and his policies without appearing to criticize American troops (a political “no-no”). Defenders of the President and the war, have been hiding behind the classification of “intelligence sources and methods” to deflect the criticism. Suffice it to say that both intelligence information and the classification thereof can be manipulated to serve any master.

Opponents of the war in Iraq, and the larger war against terrorists and the states that harbor and support them, have latched onto “intelligence failures” as a means of criticizing the President and his policies without appearing to criticize American troops (a political “no-no”). Defenders of the President and the war, have been hiding behind the classification of “intelligence sources and methods” to deflect the criticism. Suffice it to say that both intelligence information and the classification thereof can be manipulated to serve any master. And intelligence information itself may not be proof of anything. The strands of information uncovered by the vast array of sources available to the FBI, CIA, DIA and foreign intelligence agencies are at best a guide for political and military leaders to help them make decisions in the interest of national security.

We don’t know for sure whether Iraq was interested in Niger uranium (although we strongly suspect it was, since Niger has nothing else which might interest Iraq and the head of Iraq’s nuclear program was part of the “trade delegation” there), or whether Saudi Arabia’s terrorist links are being hidden by the classification of 28 pages of information on their dealings (although we strongly believe they are). The larger concern is what happens to our ability to act in our own national security interest if the politicians don’t trust the intelligence they receive, and the administration doesn’t trust anyone to receive intelligence at all.

No credible intelligence agency disputed that Saddam had WMD and was working on a nuclear capability – not one. The Russians, the French and the Germans agreed that he had them; they just didn’t want military action to uncover it. Looking to the future, no credible intelligence agency disputes that Iran is working overtime to go nuclear and has in fact developed long-range missiles and supplied Hizballah with rockets in Lebanon that threaten Israel; or that North Korea is on the cusp; or that Libya is acquiring capabilities that threaten Europe from the south more than they threaten the US; or that Syria is a hotbed of terrorist activity; or that China is refining its missile capabilities in a way that threatens not only Taiwan, but America’s other Pacific allies and perhaps American assets as well.

What will our government do about what it knows if it also knows that, with hindsight, individual pieces of intelligence that formed a picture, or failed to form one, will be examined individually to make or break a position? Will the president choose to ignore information for fear that it will later turn out to be false? What if it turns out to be true? What if, by waiting for more proof, or better proof or proof positive, some madman actually acquires WMD? What if he uses it? Condoleezza Rice was on the mark when she said at that point the “smoking gun” could be a mushroom cloud.

And, sadly enough, we know what happens when bits of intelligence are not acted upon. Waiting for more and better proof led some American officials to discount reports of a possible threat posed by nationals from Arab-states known to harbor and support terrorists who were taking flying lessons in the summer of 2001 but weren’t interested in learning how to land.