What If They Want Them?

The Asian “Six Party Talks” were designed to talk or bribe North Korea out of its intention to test and then produce nuclear weapons. Likewise, the EU though it could talk or bribe Iran out of uranium enrichment, the prelude to weapons production. But Iran and North Korea want nuclear weapons for reasons that are very important to them, and neither is likely to be talked out of it.

The Asian “Six Party Talks” were designed to talk or bribe North Korea out of its intention to test and then produce nuclear weapons. Likewise, the EU though it could talk or bribe Iran out of uranium enrichment, the prelude to weapons production. But Iran and North Korea want nuclear weapons for reasons that are very important to them, and neither is likely to be talked out of it.

According to AFP, the EU will acknowledge as much today in a memorandum saying that nuclear talks with Iran have failed. They will support a move to the UN Security Council to prepare sanctions. This follows the sanctions agreed upon in the Security Council for imposition on North Korea for having detonated a (very small, but real) nuclear device.

We are now in the position that we were with Iraq between 1991 and 2003 – the “international community” pats itself on the back as the UN creates sanctions with no enforcement mechanisms.

Then, a wide array of international intelligence services (including those of countries vigorously opposed to the 2003 invasion), American presidents of both political parties, a veritable register of Democratic Senators and a raft of UN inspectors from scrupulously neutral countries knew, KNEW that Saddam had maintained his WMD program if not stockpiled WMD itself. There were UN sanctions that had impoverished the people but not the leadership. Saddam was in violation of all UN Resolutions requiring him to reveal and dismantle his WMD programs, but he was hoping the sanctions regime would crumble and he would be free to import the materials necessary to re-start the program. He came close – had not 9-11 changed the political landscape in the U.S., it is likely that the endless international carping about the ineffectiveness of sanctions would have taken their toll.

It was, in fact, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of sanctions coupled with what we then believed was good intelligence that directly led to the war. We believed we that in the face of determined provocation we had no choice but to ensure that Saddam didn’t have the means to attack us.

Iran and North Korea are in the determined provocation stage, laying Orwellian blame on the U.S. for their nuclear programs and threatening “retaliation” for presumed slights and threats. North Korea has already called the UN sanctions “an act of war,” presumably by the U.S., but perhaps by the whole UN.

Sanctions will be no more effective against them than they were against Iraq, punishing the weakest layer of society. But while the UN countries dicker among themselves about gasoline vs. liquor vs. pistachios vs. rugs, and while China may agree to “inspect” cargo but not “interdict” cargo, Iran and North Korea will pursue their nuclear aims because that is their goal and they want them. Our failure to acknowledge the determined rationality of their quest by their own standards has hobbled our search for security.