What We Know and What We Do
The fighting in Iraq has changed as Sunni tribes in Anbar province turn on the al-Qaeda forces they once encouraged to enter their region to fight for Sunni restoration. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces are pushing al-Qaeda out of its Baghdad strongholds.
The fighting in Iraq has changed as Sunni tribes in Anbar province turn on the al-Qaeda forces they once encouraged to enter their region to fight for Sunni restoration. At the same time, U.S. and Iraqi forces are pushing al-Qaeda out of its Baghdad strongholds.
The reasons are clear. Al-Qaeda fighters said they were pure, uncorrupt and disciplined, but it turned out they rape, pillage and steal just like anyone else and the Iraqis don’t like it. And, with no commitment to a national solution, al-Qaeda’s way of “restoring” the Sunnis was simply to kill as many Shiites as possible. Sunni leaders, on the other hand, seem finally to have figured out that they have to find a political home in Iraq with the Shiites or, as the minority in the national structure, they will be on the wrong end of the sectarian killing al-Qaeda started. Finally, al-Qaeda attempted to install its religious ideology on Iraqis who have never been particularly ideologically religious.
The result thus far has been to push al-Qaeda forces out of Anbar and into Diyala – a multi-ethnic province where it considerably harder to hide. There, U.S. and Iraqi forces have been pursuing al-Qaeda in the first American-led offensive since the fall of Baghdad. Read “Winning on Offense” by the estimable Ralph Peters. (NY Post 6-21-07)
That doesn’t make the Sunnis our friends, but we are finding common ground in the understanding that Iraq is a country and religious fundamentalists who see Iraq as a launching pad for international religious ventures are ultimately destructive. We agree that peace, security and a “political horizon” for Iraq requires pushing the enemy out of your neighborhood and destroying him and his military capabilities.
In the broader scheme, it may be instructive for breaking the web of religious/ideological and financial support provided by Iran and Saudi Arabia to non-state actors in weak states. The Lebanese Army, for one, appears clear on the principle. According to Reuters, “The Lebanese army’s insistence on the surrender of the leaders of a militant group holed up at a Palestinian camp is complicating efforts to mediate an end to fighting… Mediators had been upbeat (but)… A Lebanese security source confirmed the army wants the surrender of Fatah al-Islam leader Shaker al-Abssi and his military commander known as Abu Hurayra… A group of Palestinian clerics has been leading efforts to end the fighting… One of the mediators said the army had yet to respond to a peace initiative presented by the clerics on Wednesday.”
Surrender. No mediation; no co-optation; no fooling around. Security will come when Fatah al-Islam is gone. The army would likely have entered the camps already except for a 1969 agreement keeping Lebanese forces outside all 12 Palestinian refugee camps. Which is also instructive. Giving the Palestinians military extraterritoriality in Lebanon contributed mightily to this problem, but the U.S., Israel and the Quartet are scrambling to pour money and arms into Abu Mazen and his Fatah fighters on the West Bank. They propose a new “political horizon” with Israel even as Hamas continues its murderous acquisition of territory and power on the backs of the Palestinian people.
Abu Mazen has already proven incapable of providing security and without that there can be no “political horizon.” Ask the Sunnis in Iraq and the Lebanese Army.