Yamal Pipeline Redux, Part II
In an attempt to control the gas pipeline running through Ukraine to Western Europe, and to guarantee a pro-Russian Ukrainian foreign policy, Russia threatened to quadruple the price of Siberian gas for Ukraine on 1 January. When Ukraine didn’t agree to pay, Russia cut off Ukraine’s gas supply, diminishing as well the amount running through Ukraine to Western Europe. The Europeans called it an act of hostility toward Europe and today the Russians and Ukrainians announced a rather convoluted new deal.
In an attempt to control the gas pipeline running through Ukraine to Western Europe, and to guarantee a pro-Russian Ukrainian foreign policy, Russia threatened to quadruple the price of Siberian gas for Ukraine on 1 January. When Ukraine didn’t agree to pay, Russia cut off Ukraine’s gas supply, diminishing as well the amount running through Ukraine to Western Europe. The Europeans called it an act of hostility toward Europe and today the Russians and Ukrainians announced a rather convoluted new deal.
The European response sounded surprised and more than a little bit frightened. They should be the latter, but the former is inexcusable. This is 2006. It is inconceivable that the Europeans believe their energy supply is immune to the political forces that shape not only Russian policies, but those of the Middle East, China, India and the U.S. One of the few things we are absolutely sure of is that energy availability, now and for the future, is a function of indivisible strands of politics, economics and security. It was through great trauma that America learned that lesson. President Bush spoke for us when he said the West had been “willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered…”
He was talking about the Middle East and the phony bargain of Arab “stability” for cheap energy, but European reliance on Russian gas is the same story. So what do we do now?
We are indebted to Professor Derek Leebaert for reminding us of the coordinated American policymaking apparatus that accompanied discussions of the first Yamal Pipeline crisis during the Reagan Administration. He wrote:
For the first time in the Cold War, a U.S. administration began looking at its opponent from the perspective of cash flow. Under (NSC Director William) Clark, a long overdue instrument had been created in 1982, the Senior Interdepartmental Group-International Economic Policy. Strange as it may sound, this was the only time during the Cold War that the heads of the CIA, NSC, and Department of Defense met as a top policy-formulating organization tasked to integrate international economic and financial matters with national security. The group reported through Clark to the President.
If 1982 was the first time, this should be the second. Ukraine must be supported in its effort to ensure its economic and political independence from Russia, and must be able to count on the U.S. and the Europeans to stand behind it – despite the European mistake with Yamal and the Russians this time around. The U.S. could do its part by assembling a similar group to “integrate economic and financial matters with national security,” including finding ways to keep the Europeans with us on this – instead of having our erstwhile allies make separate deals with unreliable partners (not only Russia, but also Iran) and expecting the U.S. to guarantee their defense.
As an added benefit, the various agencies of the American government could focus in tandem on long-term domestic, rather than short-term imported, answers to America’s own energy needs.