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Yasser Mazen

When Yasser Arafat walked away from the Camp David II summit in July 2000, he rejected the most far-reaching offer any Israeli leader had ever made or could make. Some of his interlocutors were surprised. To this day they say, “But we were so close!” They blamed Arafat’s inability to project a Palestinian national future and rued his failure to lead his people to freedom and democracy.


When Yasser Arafat walked away from the Camp David II summit in July 2000, he rejected the most far-reaching offer any Israeli leader had ever made or could make. Some of his interlocutors were surprised. To this day they say, “But we were so close!” They blamed Arafat’s inability to project a Palestinian national future and rued his failure to lead his people to freedom and democracy.

They think the failure was one of personality, of an inability to reject terrorism, of shortsightedness and failure to wear a pinstriped suit. Those people are ready to hoist Abu Mazen on their shoulders and hope he can conclude the deal with Israel that Yasser couldn’t. Oh, to be so close again.

But Arafat didn’t fail. Aside from the money, he had two goals. First, to be accepted by the world as a legitimate leader without conceding one inch of the land he claimed – both Jordan and Israel – and without recognizing the legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty in any part of it. Second, never to give up the so-called “right of return,” for to do that would have required telling millions of Palestinians that they couldn’t go home again; that their “sacrifice” had been in vain; that the entire 56-year miserable enterprise was a mistake.

Arafat was wildly successful on his own terms. And we were never close.

The issue was not then and is not now where to put a border between Israel and Palestine. It was not then and is not now about “settlements” vs. other Israeli communities. The requirement was then and remains today for the Palestinians to accept that there is a legitimate place called Israel, and to accept that the legitimate Government of Israel can determine who lives within its borders and under what circumstances.

Arafat couldn’t do that. Abu Mazen surely cannot do that, and in fact, has said he doesn’t intend to do it. So what to make of Sunday’s “election”?

Not too much would be best. It was more a referendum than a contested election, and Abu Mazen has much to prove to his own people and the rest of the world about his intentions and his ability to take on difficult internal issues before he can be expected to do what most full-scale Arab countries haven’t done yet – i.e., recognize Israel.

Prime Minister Blair shifted the paradigm in a healthy way when he told a news conference in London, “It depends whether people want my sympathy or they want the actual reality.” Insisting that transforming the PA was a precondition for Palestinian political advancement, he said, “We’re not going to get a peace conference with the Israelis until we do the preparatory work… (and) manage to put in place plans that guarantee that the Palestinian state we want to see is viable, not just in terms of territory but in terms of its political institutions, its economy and its security measures.”

That seems enough for any new government and it avoids the pitfall of presuming Abu Mazen has intentions or capabilities we have no reason to presume.