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		<title>How Turkey&#8217;s trade suspension could derail Israeli importers</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/how-turkeys-trade-suspension-could-derail-israeli-importers/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2024 17:00:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Cicurel]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[EastMed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel at War]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[<p>Turkey&#8217;s decision to suspend all trade relations with Israel due to its military offensive in Gaza could pose a setback for Israeli importers who had grown increasingly reliant on the Turkish market in the post-Covid era. Turkey has confirmed it<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Turkey&#8217;s</a> decision to suspend all trade relations with Israel due to its <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/05/03/turkeys-trade-ban-with-israel-driven-by-domestic-pressure-over-gaza-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="3">military offensive</a> in Gaza could pose a setback for Israeli importers who had grown increasingly reliant on the Turkish market in the post-Covid era.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="4">Turkey has confirmed it will stop all trade with Israel until the country allows humanitarian aid to flow uninterrupted into Gaza.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="5">“Export and import transactions related to Israel have been stopped, covering all products … Turkey will strictly and decisively implement these new measures until the Israeli government allows an uninterrupted and sufficient flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza,” Turkey&#8217;s trade ministry said in a statement late on Thursday.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="6">In response, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/tags/israel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="7">Israel&#8217;s</a> Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, has instructed the ministry&#8217;s director general to look for trade alternatives and focus on local production.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="10"><i data-reader-unique-id="11">The National</i> looks at the Israel-Turkey trade stand-off and its wider implications.</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="13"><b data-reader-unique-id="14">Why are Turkish imports important for Israel?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="15">Due to its close geographical proximity, competitive production costs and quality products, Turkey has emerged as a preferred exporter to Israel in the past couple of years.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="22">In addition to basic produce and goods such as eggs, vegetables and textiles, Turkey is a leading exporter of high-value products such as electronics, iron, plastic and steel to Israel.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="23">In 2022, iron and steel topped the list of Turkish exports to Israel, and were together worth $1.19 billion, according to data compiled by <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports/israel" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="24">Trading Economics</a>. In second place were vehicles ($562.98 million), followed by plastic ($516.24 million) and electronic equipment ($384.59 million).</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="25"><b data-reader-unique-id="26">Why is Turkey a better option than China?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="27">Following the Covid-19 pandemic, Israeli businesses started looking for alternative trade options beyond China, making Turkish facilities increasingly appealing.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="29">Gaash Worldwide, an Israeli logistics and supply chain firm, said in March last year that the main advantage of the Turkish market over China is that products produced in Turkish factories are of “better quality”.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="34">Factories in China can make products at a very high level, but the Turkish factories produce better quality and long-lasting products, it said in its analysis posted on its website.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="35">The proximity also helps traders to reduce transportation costs and shipping times.</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="36"><b data-reader-unique-id="37">Exporters look for alternative routes</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="38">Following the suspension of bilateral trade between the countries, Turkish and other foreign exporters with confirmed orders are exploring alternative routes to deliver their goods to Israel.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="39">“We have confirmed orders from Turkey as well as Israel,” Anuj Gulati, general manager of an Amsterdam-based food packaging and spices company, told <i data-reader-unique-id="40">The National.</i></p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="41">“Currently our shipments are at Turkish customs and we are not very clear about the situation … we might have to look for alternative routes through Egypt or Lebanon to supply our products to Israel.”</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="43">Mr Gulati said the trade suspension will have serious implications for goods intended for the Palestinian territories.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="44">“The trade suspension will potentially lead to a blockade on goods destined for the Palestinian territories, as they also have to undergo Israeli customs clearance,” said Mr Gulati, who ships his products to Palestine through Turkey-Israel route.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="45">Reuters spoke to the head of a Turkish chocolate and confectionery exporter that produces some products specifically for the Israeli market, with packaging entirely in Hebrew.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="46">“It is a big material loss for us,” he said.<i data-reader-unique-id="47"> </i>“There are companies in Israel from which we have receivables and to whom we owe money. What will happen to these receivables when trade stops?”</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="48"><b data-reader-unique-id="49">What trade value is at stake?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="50">Bilateral trade between <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/2024/04/09/turkey-restricts-exports-to-israel-after-ban-on-aid-drop/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="51">Turkey and Israel</a> stood at more than $6.8 billion last year, according to Turkish Statistical Institute data. More than 75 per cent of this was Turkish exports.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="52">While largest export from Turkey to <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/tags/israel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="53">Israel</a> was iron and steel last year, the primary import was refined oil products.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="54">Formed in 1993 to promote trade ties between the two countries, the Turkey-Israel Business Council includes companies selling goods and services ranging from digital payment technologies to metal packaging.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="55">In a statement on X on Friday, the Istanbul-based business council said it supported the Turkish government&#8217;s decision to stop exports and imports of all products.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="66">The two nations have had a free-trade agreement in place since 1997.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="67">Despite exchanges of bitter rhetoric since the Gaza war broke out on October 7 and the halting of flights between Istanbul and Tel Aviv, the two nations have remained economic partners.</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="68"><b data-reader-unique-id="69">What prompted the blanket trade ban?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="70">The latest actions came on the close heels of Turkey expressing its intentions to join South Africa&#8217;s case against Israel at the UN&#8217;s highest court, accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="71">Last month, Turkey announced it was <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/2024/04/09/turkey-restricts-exports-to-israel-after-ban-on-aid-drop/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="72">restricting some exports</a> to Israel amid strained relations between the two countries. It said it was imposing restrictions on a list of goods because of Israel&#8217;s refusal to allow Turkey to take part in aid drop operations over Gaza.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="73">The list provided by the ministry includes 54 items, among them construction materials such as marble, cement, steel and aluminium products.</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="74"><b data-reader-unique-id="75">Will the move derail co-operative initiatives?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="76">In August 2022, Turkey and Israel announced the restoration of diplomatic ties and the return of ambassadors to each other’s countries after years of tension.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="77">Both countries had also agreed to explore co-operation avenues.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="78">However, last year’s Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, which was followed by Israel’s massive offensive against Gaza, has led to the current hostilities.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="79">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also been a vocal critic of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli government&#8217;s policies towards Palestinians.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="84">He accused Israel of being a “terrorist state” and voiced his support for Hamas.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="85">In the past few months, Mr Erdogan has come under pressure domestically with protesters calling for him to <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/04/15/turkeys-erdogan-under-increasing-pressure-from-public-to-cut-trade-ties-with-israel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-reader-unique-id="86">cut off relations with Israel</a> due to the Gaza war, in which more than 34,500 Palestinians have been killed since October.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="87">Pro-Palestine demonstrations have also grown in Turkey in recent weeks.</p>
<h2 data-reader-unique-id="88"><b data-reader-unique-id="89">Why analysts see it as the Turkish President&#8217;s attempt to appease voters?</b></h2>
<p data-reader-unique-id="90">After local elections in March in which Mr Erdogan lost votes to more conservative Islamist parties, Turkey’s leader has been under increasing pressure from the public to take more forceful action against Israel.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="91">Experts said the trade dispute is “all about Mr Erdogan and his interests”.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="92">“First and foremost, what are his domestic political needs? How does he recover from his stinging defeat in the local elections?</p>
<p><strong></p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="93">“Stoking tensions with Israel is great politics for him right now … he no doubt feels it is one of his best cards for re-mobilising many supporters who are otherwise getting very weary of his president-for-life schtick,” John Hannah, former White House national security adviser and senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, told <i data-reader-unique-id="94">The National</i>.</p>
<p data-reader-unique-id="95">For Erdogan, short-term political calculations have always trumped sound economic management, said Mr Hannah adding that eventually Israel will find other suppliers to replace most of what it imports from Turkey.</p>
<p class="headline">
<p></strong></p>
<p>Originally published in <span style="color: #0000ff"><a style="color: #0000ff" href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2024/05/04/how-turkeys-trade-suspension-could-derail-israeli-importers/">The National.</a></span></p>
</div>
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		<title>Watch Webinar &#8211;  Understanding Turkey’s Local Election Outcome</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-understanding-turkey-election-outcome/</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 16:12:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Event Content]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[<p>The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) is dedicated to educating Congressional, military and civilian national security decision-makers on American defense and strategic interests, primarily in the Middle East, the cornerstone of which is a robust U.S.-Israeli security<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>
<p style="text-align: center">On Sunday, a year after Recep Tayyip Erdogan won another term as president, Turkey voted in local elections. This time, however, Erdogan’s party did not perform well, with opposition candidates winning across the country, including in Istanbul and Ankara. This electoral setback comes at a time when the Turkey and the United States seem to be setting their differences aside, with Ankara finally voting to allow Sweden to join NATO and helping produce ammunition for the United States while Washington as agreed to sell Turkey new and upgraded F-16s.</p>
<p style="text-align: center">Join JINSA for a discussion of what dynamics effected the outcome of the local elections, what they mean for Erdogan’s hold on power, and whether it will impact U.S.-Turkish relations at all.</p>
</div>
<br />
<figure style="text-align: center"><iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2qYs4P8DnMc?si=C4WKon_y95mX-pwA" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></figure>
<br />
<hr />
<p style="text-align: center">The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) is dedicated to educating Congressional, military and civilian national security decision-makers on American defense and strategic interests, primarily in the Middle East, the cornerstone of which is a robust U.S.-Israeli security cooperation. JINSA believes that a strong American military and national security posture is the best guarantor of peace and the survival of our values and civilization.</p>
<hr />
<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-understanding-turkey-election-outcome/">Watch Webinar &#8211;  Understanding Turkey’s Local Election Outcome</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/erdogan-overcomes-opposition-prevails-in-pres-runoff/</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:54:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[<p>It’s not the economy, stupid – not in Turkey, anyway, where appeals to passion have trumped pocketbook concerns, at least in this election season. The May 28 runoff presidential election ended roughly 52% to 48%, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s not the economy, stupid – not in Turkey, anyway, where appeals to passion have trumped pocketbook concerns, at least in this election season. The May 28 runoff presidential election ended roughly 52% to 48%, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan coming out on top over competitor Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the secular, center-left Republican People’s Party, or CHP. The results were essentially as expected following the first round of the election, in which Erdogan missed by just a sliver of winning an outright majority. To parry a near-ruinous economy, diminished freedoms, and widespread criticism of his government’s role in the tragic consequences of the February 6 earthquakes, Erdogan relied on:</p>
<ul>
<li>The undying loyalty of Turkey’s sizable religious community, to whom he has brought equal rights, prestige, and a significant measure of prosperity.</li>
<li>A nationalist-populist appeal that sought to link his moderate left opponent, Kilicdaroglu, to both Kurdish terrorism and the despised West as well as, almost unfathomably, the LGBTQ+ community.</li>
<li>A more positive nationalist appeal based on Turkey’s enhanced diplomatic profile and expansion of its domestic military-industrial sector.</li>
<li>Largesse from the state treasury, including multiple increases in the minimum wage and reduction of the retirement age, among other government-bestowed benefits. To mark the extraction of natural gas from a 2020 find in the Black Sea, Erdogan promised every household limitless use of natural gas for one month; the bills indicating “nothing due” arrived just before the election.</li>
</ul>
<p>Of course, as widely reported, the election took place in the context of a campaign in which the opposition was effectively blocked from significant access to electronic and print media and in which many Erdogan opponents – including hundreds, if not thousands, of leaders and activists from a pro-Kurdish party (the Green Left Party, or YSP, formerly the People’s Democracy Party, or HDP) that backed Kilicdaroglu – were behind bars for nonviolent advocacy.</p>
<h3><strong>Polarization Persists</strong></h3>
<p>This was Erdogan’s sixth consecutive election to the leadership of the country – three times as prime minister under the previous, parliamentary regime and now three times as president, the last two under a “strengthened presidency” system formalized in 2018. And, in all three presidential contests, he won by virtually the same 52% total. In 2014 and 2018, he won against multiple candidates in the first round by 51.7% and 52.6%, respectively; in 2023, he was held to 49.5% against multiple candidates (although mainly Kilicdaroglu) in the first round but scored 52.1% going mano a mano with Kilicdaroglu on May 28.</p>
<p>Arguably, all three of Erdogan’s presidential elections were widely seen in Turkey as referendums on Erdogan. He has not been able to expand his appeal (though merely holding onto his support in the face of rampant inflation largely of his own making is remarkable); nor have his opponents been able to expand the anti-Erdogan “party.” This time almost the entire opposition united around Kilicdaroglu; in the end, however, the final result looked similar to those in the past.</p>
<p>Cleavages in Turkey remain stubbornly real – economic, social, ideological, ethnic, and religious. Erdogan deepens those cleavages by playing on them, fostering an “us against them” mentality, mainly directed at secular, Western-oriented Turks – the products of “the Ataturk revolution” – whose values previously ruled Turkey. Erdogan extols religious, working-class, Sunni Turks and praises the Ottoman heroes they venerate.</p>
<p>This produces what is often described as “identity politics.” However it is labeled, there clearly is little love lost between the camp that supports Erdogan and that which opposes him – and not much movement of voters between the two camps.</p>
<p>In his victory speech, Erdogan was anything but magnanimous. He gave lip service to wanting to serve “all 85 million Turks”; however, he also spoke scornfully of Kilicdaroglu, chiding him about his defeat and dismissing his backers as “LGBTQ supporters” who spurn Turkey’s mainstream values.</p>
<p>For his part, Kilicdaroglu also shunned the role of gracious loser. He neither congratulated Erdogan nor explicitly conceded defeat, although he did not contest the final results. He called the election “the most unfair in recent years” and promised to continue to lead the fight against “this oppressive system.” His junior coalition partner Meral Aksener, head of the IYI, or Good, Party, did congratulate Erdogan but only while also expressing hope that his greed would “not blind his vision once again.”</p>
<h3><strong>Kilicdaroglu’s Failure</strong></h3>
<p>Kilicdaroglu lost a desperate, “deal with the devil” gamble to make up a 4.5-percentage-point first-round gap with Erdogan. Following the first round, Kilicdaroglu received the backing of an ultra-nationalist ethnic Turkish party, the Victory Party (VP), which had won slightly more than 2% of the parliamentary vote. In exchange, he agreed to toughen his policies on removing Syrian refugees from Turkey and on removing from office elected Kurdish mayors convicted of association with terrorism related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Using particularly the refugee issue, Kilicdaroglu also vastly toughened his campaign tone, projecting an anger that stood in sharp contrast to the positive, inclusive tone of the first round, with its optimism and finger-formed hearts as central motifs.</p>
<p>Kilicdaroglu’s bet was that he would pick up more votes from a Turkish public fed up with the presence of 4 million Syrian refugees than he would lose from Kurdish voters alienated by his new alignment with the VP. His gap with Erdogan did shrink slightly compared with the first round, from 2.5 million to 2.2 million. However, in an election in which overall voter participation declined (compared with the first round), Kurdish participation appears to have diminished significantly more than the national average.</p>
<h3><strong>CHP’s Difficult Choices</strong></h3>
<p>Kilicdaroglu’s CHP faces a number of difficult decisions. First, will the Nation Alliance – led by the center-left CHP in partnership with the nationalist IYI Party and four smaller parties – endure in the wake of defeat? An IYI Party congress in late June may go a long way toward determining that. IYI leader Aksener was vocal, but late, in her opposition to Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy in early March and never seemed truly at ease in her support of his campaign.</p>
<p>Second, who will lead the party? Those who expected the 74-year-old Kilicdaroglu to resign after the election instead heard someone who sounds like he expects to continue to lead both the party and, more generally, the opposition to Erdogan.</p>
<p>Third, crucially, what will be the future relationship of the CHP – and, if it endures, the Nation Alliance – with the Kurdish movement and YSP? In 2019 countrywide local elections, unofficial cooperation with the YSP (then the HDP) helped produce CHP victories in several large cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, and Kurdish voters were seen as kingmakers. During that campaign, cooperation between the CHP and HDP was widely assumed but never publicly acknowledged by either party.</p>
<p>This year’s presidential election, however, was different. The YSP, rather than run its own presidential candidate, openly endorsed Kilicdaroglu – an unprecedented decision by a pro-Kurdish party on behalf of a mainstream Turkish party candidate. That created a new dynamic. Many, if not most, Turks see the YSP as something like the civilian face of the PKK – Sinn Fein to the PKK’s Irish Republican Army. The fact that the YSP – and, for that matter, some PKK officials – publicly endorsed Kilicdaroglu gave Erdogan the opening he needed for demagoguery, spurring him repeatedly to denounce Kilicdaroglu as one who supports terrorists, takes his orders from terrorists, etc. This became one of his primary campaign themes.</p>
<p>CHP leaders now must ponder the impact the relationship with the YSP had on the 2023 election and the impact it is likely to have in the future. Some in the CHP, which has its own ethnic Turkish nationalist faction, may conclude that cooperation with the Kurds was a mistake altogether: Kilicdaroglu took a rhetorical beating from Erdogan for his YSP support, yet many Kurds did not even show up at the polls, they may argue. Many in the YSP, too, may question the value of an alliance with a CHP that barely spoke of the Kurdish issue during the campaign, other than to say that it should be “solved in Parliament.”</p>
<h3><strong>Foreign Policy: A Look Ahead</strong></h3>
<p>Erdogan’s 2023 campaign was his most anti-Western and anti-United States ever. Erdogan is unpredictable, but, if the campaign is any guide, it seems likely that Turkey will continue to tighten its ties with Russia and prove disruptive in the Western alliance.</p>
<p>In a recent CNN International <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/05/19/becky-anderson-turkish-president-erdogan-interview-cnni-world.cnn" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">interview</a>, Erdogan praised his “special relationship” with Putin. At another point in the campaign, he <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/relations-with-russia-are-no-less-important-than-those-with-us-erdogan-183110" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">rebuked</a> Kilicdaroglu for criticizing Russia, reminding him that “relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, regarding the bilateral issue currently of greatest importance to the U.S. administration, it is unclear whether Turkey will ratify Sweden’s NATO bid before the July 11-12 NATO summit in Vilnius. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. made a congratulatory <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-he-erdogan-talked-about-f16s-sweden-2023-05-29/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">phone call</a> to Erdogan on May 29. Afterward, he said he raised the Sweden/NATO issue with Erdogan and that the Turkish president, in turn, reiterated Turkey’s desire to purchase F-16s from the United States. Some people see a potential trade-off in the making. Ankara has previously insisted the two issues are not linked, but, with a new context – Turkish elections in the rearview mirror – perhaps a deal will become possible. The issue remains complicated because of congressional considerations, Erdogan’s previous extreme demands of Sweden, and possibly the views of Erdogan’s junior alliance partner, the hard-nationalist Nationalist Action Party, or MHP.</p>
<h3><strong>Foreign Policy Autonomy?</strong></h3>
<p>Erdogan boasts of having made Turkey a more independent power, but Turkey’s financial situation suggests that it is far from independent. With its foreign exchange coffers virtually empty, Erdogan has acknowledged that unnamed Gulf states have provided emergency backing in the recent past. It is presumed that Qatar is one of those states, and some weeks ago Saudi Arabia announced a $5 billion transfer to Turkey. Russia deferred natural gas payments and reportedly provided significant additional aid as well. On the other hand, the European Union and United States absorb the majority of Turkish exports and provide the majority of its foreign direct investment, although the Gulf has become more active in the latter regard.</p>
<p>The Turkish economy will likely travel a rocky road in the months ahead. The Turkish lira has lost 90% of its value against the dollar over the past decade. On May 29, the day after the election, it fell to its lowest level ever, 20.1 to the dollar. It is unlikely that the Gulf and Russia would or even can keep it afloat indefinitely. Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-Western resentments.</p>
<p>For the most part, Erdogan probably will not seek to create new regional storms in the near term. Calm is what seems to be desired by the Turkish people, Turkey’s potential investors, and Turkey’s Gulf friends and benefactors.</p>
<h3><strong>Politics Ahead</strong></h3>
<p>In a country where politics almost never stops, the next campaign is already almost upon Turkey: Countrywide local elections are scheduled for March 2024. Erdogan will want to recover the mayoralties he lost to the CHP in Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps flip a couple of other major cities that the CHP took from his Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in 2019; should he succeed in all that, the opposition would have almost no prominent perch left in Turkish politics from which to address the country. Meanwhile, the likelihood is that Erdogan and the Parliament, in which his alliance holds a clear majority, will stay in office a full five-year term. Under Turkey’s presidential regime, it takes a 60% vote of Parliament or a simple presidential decision to declare new elections; neither seems likely.</p>
<p>The elephant in the room will remain inflation and Turkey’s overall economic turmoil. Erdogan has proved he can win a national election without a successful economy. But he may not be able to win back Istanbul and Ankara without it. And he knows he will not be able to begin to realize his vision of Turkish greatness – a “Turkish century,” as his campaign slogan had it – without achieving economic greatness as well.</p>
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<p><em><span style="font-size: 16px">Alan Makovsky is a senior fellow for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress. From 2001-13, he served as a senior professional staff member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he covered the Middle East, Turkey, and other related issues.</span></em></p>
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<p><em>Originally published in <a href="https://agsiw.org/erdogan-overcomes-opposition-and-economy-to-prevail-in-presidential-runoff/">Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington</a>.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/erdogan-overcomes-opposition-prevails-in-pres-runoff/">Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Watch Webinar: Greek Election Recap</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-greek-election-recap/</link>
				<comments>https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-greek-election-recap/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 May 2023 18:14:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Event Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Videos]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14843</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) is dedicated to educating Congressional, military and civilian national security decision-makers on American defense and strategic interests, primarily in the Middle East, the cornerstone of which is a robust U.S.-Israeli security<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-greek-election-recap/">Watch Webinar: Greek Election Recap</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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<figure style="text-align: center">JINSA President and CEO, Michael Makovsky, PhD, and Alexis Papahelas, one of Greece’s leading journalists, to discuss the outcome of Greece’s snap parliamentary election and its implications for the country’s growing roles as a critical U.S. and Israeli security partner, and as a keystone of regional stability in the increasingly important Eastern Mediterranean. Moderated by Alan Makovsky.</figure>
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<p><iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/moLelWjB48U?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
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<p style="text-align: center">The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) is dedicated to educating Congressional, military and civilian national security decision-makers on American defense and strategic interests, primarily in the Middle East, the cornerstone of which is a robust U.S.-Israeli security cooperation. JINSA believes that a strong American military and national security posture is the best guarantor of peace and the survival of our values and civilization.</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-greek-election-recap/">Watch Webinar: Greek Election Recap</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Israel-Lebanon Agreement: A Model For Eastern Mediterranean Energy</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/israel-lebanon-agreement-model-for-mid-east/</link>
				<comments>https://jinsa.org/israel-lebanon-agreement-model-for-mid-east/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:38:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EastMed]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14467</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Israel and Lebanon recently agreed on a landmark deal to demarcate most of their maritime border, an agreement mediated by U.S. Senior Advisor for Energy Security Amos Hochstein. The waters between the two countries are only part of the increasingly contested Eastern Mediterranean, where longstanding<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/israel-lebanon-agreement-model-for-mid-east/">Israel-Lebanon Agreement: A Model For Eastern Mediterranean Energy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/09/what-would-iran-do-if-israel-attacked-their-nuclear-facilities/">Israel</a> and <a href="https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-lebanese-civil-war-explained/">Lebanon</a> recently agreed on a landmark <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-the-maritime-border-deal-agreed-between-israel-and-lebanon/">deal</a> to demarcate most of their maritime border, an agreement mediated by U.S. Senior Advisor for Energy Security Amos Hochstein. The waters between the two countries are only part of the increasingly contested Eastern Mediterranean, where longstanding territorial disputes involve potentially lucrative offshore natural-gas deposits. Meanwhile, Turkey has refused to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, which establishes a legal framework to resolve such disputes.</p>
<p>It was only through extensive American shuttle diplomacy that the <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/israel-trades-future-gas-for-drilling-and-possible-security-today/">Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement</a> became possible. The deal could provide a model for more concerted U.S. engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean. It offers a path toward incrementally improving security, stability, and commerce throughout the region.</p>
<p><b>Troubled Waters</b></p>
<p>The maritime agreement enables further offshore natural-gas development in both countries. The potential for territorial changes probably discouraged energy companies from investing. So did the fear of threats and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-07-06/ty-article/.premium/another-hezbollah-drone-shut-down-over-israeli-waters-last-week-military-says/00000181-d474-d974-afbd-fd768ac80000">drone incursions</a> from the Iran-backed terrorist group Hezbollah. The deal may boost Lebanon’s ailing economy if it discovers gas in the Qana field.</p>
<p>Hochstein’s diplomacy also helped both sides reach an agreement over a contested area near the coast that could have disrupted the maritime resolution. Israel was able to achieve limited recognition that its five-kilometer buoy line near the two countries’ land border is part of  the status quo – this was its top security concern during the negotiations. Israel’s security <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-719477">establishment unanimously</a> approved the deal because recognition of the buoy line prevents line-of-sight from the Lebanese side of the border onto Israel’s mainland. It also gives Israeli forces enough tactical depth to respond should Hezbollah launch an attack.</p>
<p>The Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary agreement shows the potential for innovative diplomacy to yield incremental but groundbreaking agreements. The deal enables energy development even while it acknowledges that key issues remain outstanding.</p>
<p>Building on this success, U.S. President Joe Biden should direct Hochstein’s shuttle diplomacy to the north, where Turkey has a longstanding dispute with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. In 2019, Turkey and Libya signed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya-eastmed-tensions-explain-idUSKBN1YT0JK">delimitation deal</a> in energy-rich waters. The two sides reached a separate <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221003-turkey-and-libya-sign-maritime-hydrocarbons-deal-1">hydrocarbons deal</a> in March of this year, and both agreements flagrantly contradict Greek and Cypriot offshore claims that are demarcated according to UNCLOS. Under the air and sea protection of the Turkish Navy, Turkish <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkey-to-resume-drilling-for-gas-near-cyprus-potentially-inflaming-tensions/">drilling ships</a> have repeatedly explored for energy in areas that Cyprus claims, and it has threatened to do the same in Greek waters. Turkish aircraft also routinely <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-ups-rhetoric-over-alleged-greek-airspace-violations/a-63011534">violate</a> Greek airspace and overfly Greek islands. Turkey in turn has <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/greeces-violation-of-turkeys-airspace-unacceptable">claimed</a> that Greek aircraft violated its sea and airspace, based on Ankara’s interpretation of the boundaries.</p>
<p><b>American Presence Needed</b></p>
<p>Aside from the Israel-Lebanon negotiations, the United States has been notably absent from efforts to promote peaceful energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean. The region hosts some of the world’s largest recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/totalenergies-eni-announce-major-cyprus-gas-find-2022-08-22/">offshore energy</a> discoveries and resides at the strategic nexus of the increasingly contested European, Middle Eastern, and African theaters. Yet the Biden administration has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/international/article-693866">removed</a> its support for the EastMed pipeline, which would bring much-needed Cypriot and Israeli natural gas to Europe via Greece. It has done so without engaging on viable <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/us-must-support-east-med-energy-security/">alternative solutions</a> such as expanding Egyptian and Israeli natural gas facilities to ship more gas.</p>
<p>With Europe now urgently looking for alternatives to Russian energy sources, the Biden administration should revive the 3+1 format in which the U.S. engages in the existing Israel-Greece-Cyprus diplomatic, energy, and defense trilateral. Washington should also participate in the similar Egypt-Greece-Cyprus trilateral to promote the development and transfer of offshore energy to partners in Europe. Finally, the U.S. should consider joining existing venues like the East Mediterranean Gas Forum to coordinate regional gas development.</p>
<p>Partners in the Eastern Mediterranean need the same U.S. security assurances the Biden administration <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-10-11/ty-article/.premium/lebanon-maritime-deal-u-s-offered-guarantees-if-hezbollah-challenges-the-agreement/00000183-c7e8-d8cc-afc7-ffec25b30000">gave to Israel</a> as it made its deal with Lebanon. U.S. messaging should make clear that its <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/10/us-dismisses-turkish-criticism-imbalance-mediterranean">partnerships</a> with <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/strategic-potential-for-us-at-greek-port/">Greece</a> and Cyprus, and its support for their peaceful and legal energy development, will not bend in the face of Turkish bellicosity. While Ankara has not yet agreed to mediation over its maritime boundary disputes, American officials should also signal that Turkey, like Lebanon, has a diplomatic avenue available.</p>
<p>By sending these much-needed and overdue signals of America’s commitment to regional stability, a more proactive U.S. approach also can work to seal off the dangerous inroads that <a href="https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Eastern-Med-NatSec-Brief.v4-3.pdf">Russia and China</a> have made in recent years.</p>
<p>Israel and Lebanon reached an important deal to resolve much of their maritime border through proactive U.S. diplomatic engagement. These two countries have not resolved all their issues, but they each stand to benefit economically because of their diplomacy. The Israel-Lebanon deal should be a launching point, and not the conclusion, to greater U.S. mediation efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean.</p>
<p><i>Retired Vice Admiral <a href="https://jinsa.org/person/vadm-herman-shelanski-usn-ret/">Herman Shelanski</a> served as the U.S. Navy’s naval inspector general and was a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (<a href="https://jinsa.org/">JINSA</a>) 2019 Generals and Admirals Program. <a href="https://jinsa.org/person/ari-cicurel/">Ari Cicurel</a> is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.</i></p>
<p><em>Originally published in <a href="https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/israel-lebanon-agreement-a-model-for-eastern-mediterranean-energy/">19FortyFive</a>.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/israel-lebanon-agreement-model-for-mid-east/">Israel-Lebanon Agreement: A Model For Eastern Mediterranean Energy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Arming Cyprus is the Next Step to Deterring Putin and Erdogan</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/arming-cyprus-next-step-to-deterring-putin-erdogan/</link>
				<comments>https://jinsa.org/arming-cyprus-next-step-to-deterring-putin-erdogan/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2022 13:37:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14293</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this month, the Biden administration lifted the three-and-a-half-decade-old ban on the sale of U.S. arms to the Republic of Cyprus. With the ban in place, America had tied one arm behind its back in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States already arms Israel<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/arming-cyprus-next-step-to-deterring-putin-erdogan/">Arming Cyprus is the Next Step to Deterring Putin and Erdogan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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<p>Earlier this month, the <span class="person-popover" data-nid="13658"><a class="person-popover__link" href="https://thehill.com/people/biden/">Biden </a></span>administration <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-antony-blinken-cyprus-ec7bfc0ad527a56da5eec88836d0cb2f" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">lifted</a> the three-and-a-half-decade-old ban on the sale of U.S. arms to the Republic of Cyprus. With the ban in place, America had tied one arm behind its back in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States already arms Israel and Greece but, until now, had not extended a similar hand to Cyprus, a critical partner in deterring Russian and Turkish aggression.</p>
<p>The increasingly contested region hosts massive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/totalenergies-eni-announce-major-cyprus-gas-find-2022-08-22/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">offshore energy</a> discoveries and sits at the intersection of the chaotic European, Middle Eastern and African theaters. With the Biden administration making the important decision to remove the arms ban for one year, Washington can bolster this vital region’s stability by providing the Republic of Cyprus with much-needed American-made arms&#8230;</p>
<p><em>Read Full Article in <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3663249-arming-cyprus-is-the-next-step-to-deterring-putin-and-erdogan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Hill</a>.</em></p>
<p>Vice Admiral Mark I. Fox, USN (ret.) served as deputy commander, United States Central Command and is a member of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Eastern Mediterranean and Abraham Accords policy projects. Ari Cicurel is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center"><em>This op-ed was made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation and a portion of the research was conducted on the </em><em><a href="https://jinsa.org/policy/?tab=benjamin-gettler-policy-trip">Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip</a>.<br />
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/arming-cyprus-next-step-to-deterring-putin-erdogan/">Arming Cyprus is the Next Step to Deterring Putin and Erdogan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Without Alexandroupolis, Transatlantic Security Is Dead in the Water</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/without-alexandroupolis-transatlantic-security-is-dead/</link>
				<comments>https://jinsa.org/without-alexandroupolis-transatlantic-security-is-dead/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Aug 2022 13:12:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14211</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is rapidly raising the strategic profile and potential of Alexandroupolis, a once-overlooked Greek town on the northern Aegean Sea adjacent to Turkey and Bulgaria. Emblematic of Greece’s growth as an energy hub and U.S. security partner, Alexandroupolis<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/without-alexandroupolis-transatlantic-security-is-dead/">Without Alexandroupolis, Transatlantic Security Is Dead in the Water</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is rapidly raising the strategic profile and potential of Alexandroupolis, a once-overlooked Greek town on the northern Aegean Sea adjacent to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/gas-wars-turkey-tries-push-russia-aside-14665">Turkey</a> and Bulgaria. Emblematic of Greece’s growth as an energy hub and U.S. security partner, Alexandroupolis offers unique opportunities for achieving shared transatlantic objectives to reduce European dependence on Russian natural gas, strengthen NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank, and ensure Ukraine’s harvests can continue feeding the world.</p>
<p>But the United States must act with purpose, in concert with its allies, to secure these goals for the short and long term. Europe can neither go cold turkey nor wean itself off slowly from Russian hydrocarbons without liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from and through the eastern Mediterranean, which boasts significant—and growing—offshore reserves.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 16px">Given serious logistical bottlenecks extending eastward from the heart of the continent, combined with Turkey’s abandonment of its historical role as the alliance’s southeastern anchor, NATO needs new routes from the south to project power against Russia and China—both of whom are making serious inroads across the </span><a style="font-size: 16px" href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/false-hope-eastern-mediterranean-gas-through-greece-cyprus-10577">eastern Mediterranean</a><span style="font-size: 16px"> and the Black Sea. At the same time, Ukrainian grain needs to circumvent a Russian naval blockade and the Turkish Straits as it heads south to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.</span></p>
<p>Alexandroupolis is ideally situated to help, as a <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/strategic-potential-for-us-at-greek-port/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">new report</a> from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) explains. Ships docking at its deep-water port can unload directly onto, and load from, rail lines running through Bulgaria and Romania and as far north as Poland. In addition to an airfield and military facilities, the city is also the hub for a network of highways, as well as a U.S.-backed LNG import facility linked inland to an expanding lattice of natural gas pipelines.</p>
<p>This infrastructure enables NATO to bypass the Bosporus and Black seas and more effectively surge forces northward through Bulgaria and Romania up to the Ukrainian and Moldovan borders. In addition to creating an outlet for Kyiv’s food exports and new commercial alternatives to the Chinese-run port of Piraeus near Athens, it could also reduce the Balkans’ and Italy’s deep dependence on Russian energy by shipping <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/azerbaijani-natural-gas-can-help-europe-transition-renewable-energy-178499">more reliable supplies</a> from the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.</p>
<p>While American support has been crucial for Alexandroupolis’ growth to date, more must urgently be done to capitalize on its significant potential. To expedite southeastern Europe’s energy independence from Russia, the United States should promote the expansion of the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pipeline-politics-what-will-energy-diplomacy-look-after-german-elections-189675">Trans Adriatic Pipeline</a> (TAP) and the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) pipeline, as well as explore the feasibility of reversing the massive Trans-Balkan pipeline to carry natural gas northward from Greece through Bulgaria, Romania, and possibly Ukraine and Moldova. In tandem, Washington should make clear it backs the development of additional Greek capacity to feed these lines with imported LNG, beyond the floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) currently under construction at Alexandroupolis.</p>
<p>These steps can form the core of a <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/us-leadership-needed-on-east-med-energy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">much-needed</a> campaign to underscore U.S. support for, and concretely advance, the peaceful development of the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/return-geopolitics-mediterranean-70851">Eastern Mediterranean’s</a> abundant natural gas as a direct replacement for Russian supplies to Europe. This should include appointing a U.S. special envoy to build on recent European Union efforts to bring LNG into the continent from Egypt and Israel.</p>
<p>American involvement also must deepen on the defense side. Working with its allies, the United States should explore extending NATO’s fuel pipeline in Greece from Kavala to Alexandroupolis, and into Bulgaria and Romania, to simplify logistics for the alliance’s expanding presence in the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-balkans-will-be-america-russias-next-virtual-battlefield-20088">Eastern Balkans</a> and the Black Sea littoral. Washington also should ensure the looming privatization contract for Alexandroupolis port is awarded to an American company—both to block Russia from securing the bid and to reassure allies that the United States is countering Moscow’s and Beijing’s growing control of critical infrastructure across the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/return-geopolitics-mediterranean-70851">eastern Mediterranean</a> and southeastern Europe. In light of NATO’s ambitious new goal to expand its high-readiness forces, the U.S. military should view Greece as an ideal location, both geostrategically and topographically, for combined and joint exercises.</p>
<p>To reach Alexandroupolis’ high ceilings on the energy and security fronts, specifically by developing better pipeline, rail, and road infrastructure to interconnect Eastern Europe, the Biden administration should also increase its <a href="https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-and-three-seas-initiative-investment-fund-agree-term-sheet-300-million" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">June 2022 loan</a> of $300 million to the Three Seas Initiative’s Investment Fund, known as 3SIIF. Fortuitously, many of these actions will contribute directly to global food security by building up Alexandroupolis as a key terminus for overland Ukrainian grain shipments.</p>
<p>Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine already is transforming transatlantic security and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Fortunately, the United States and Europe have a readily available asset in Alexandroupolis to ensure the alliance can meet these momentous challenges.</p>
<p><i>Jonathan Ruhe and Ari Cicurel are director of foreign policy and senior policy analyst, respectively, at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).</p>
<p></i><em>This op-ed is made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation. A portion of the research for this report was conducted on JINSA’s 2019 and 2021 Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trips to Greece.</p>
<p>Originally published in <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/without-alexandroupolis-transatlantic-security-dead-water-204440" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Interest</a>.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/without-alexandroupolis-transatlantic-security-is-dead/">Without Alexandroupolis, Transatlantic Security Is Dead in the Water</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>Tanker Troubles: America Needs a Plan B Iran Strategy</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/tanker-troubles-america-needs-plan-b-iran-strategy/</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jun 2022 17:52:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14044</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>One day after Greece seized Iranian oil at the end of May, Iran detained two Greek-flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. Any doubt as to why vanished when Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed “They steal Iranian oil off the Greek coast &#8230;<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One day after Greece seized Iranian oil at the end of May, Iran detained two Greek-flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. Any doubt as to why vanished when Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/6603537.html">claimed</a> “They steal Iranian oil off the Greek coast &#8230; we took it back.”</p>
<p>This highlights the challenges and urgency of stronger enforcement of Iran sanctions, especially with U.S. attention concentrated on Ukraine. It also points to the necessity for a more comprehensive and credible U.S. policy and pressure campaign to effectively counter and prevent Iranian aggression.</p>
<p>On May 26, 2022, it was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-seizes-iranian-oil-cargo-near-greek-island-sources-2022-05-26/">reported</a> that Greece, at the request of U.S. and European authorities, had seized the crude oil cargo of an Iranian-flagged tanker, the <em>Lana</em>. The ship was reportedly sailing in the Mediterranean since at least September 2021 in search of a buyer for the over 100,000 tons of Iranian crude oil in its cargo, constituting a violation of sanctions against Iran that went unchallenged for over eight months.</p>
<p>The ship’s recent history demonstrates the challenging deceptions that America and its partners face to enforce sanctions. The <em>Lana</em> was named the <em>Pegas</em> before March 1 and flew a Russian flag until May 1, when it changed to an Iranian flag. Greece first temporarily detained the <em>Lana</em> on April 15 under suspicion it was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-seizes-iranian-oil-cargo-near-greek-island-sources-2022-05-26/">violating</a> EU sanctions against Russia. After Greek authorities ordered the ship’s release, it sailed in the Mediterranean until Greece detained the ship again, this time over alleged debts to another shipping company. Though Greece planned to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/iranian-oil-tankers-cargo-seized-in-greece-after-us-request/2022/05/26/0b71909e-dd15-11ec-bc35-a91d0a94923b_story.html">transfer</a> the Iranian oil to the United States, it released the <em>Lana</em> and its cargo on June 14 after a Greek court order, resulting in another setback to preventing Iranian oil sales.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/iran-escalates-after-oil-tanker-seized/">strange case</a> of the <em>Lana</em> is remarkable for what it reveals about Iranian sanctions evasion. The <em>Lana</em>’s failed search to offload its cargo indicates that European buyers are adhering to U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil even as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exacerbates global supply issues. Still, that it spent eight months sailing suggests that efforts to interrupt Iranian oil shipments are limited, at best.</p>
<p>In response, Iran did what it always does when facing limited, merely economic pressure—it ramped up its own counterpressure. On May 27, Iran <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-military-seizes-two-greek-oil-tankers-in-persian-gulf-11653679153">seized</a> two Greek-flagged oil tankers in Persian Gulf waters, the <em>Delta Poseidon</em> and <em>Prudent Warrior</em>. The former was <a href="https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1141049/Two-laden-Greek-tankers-seized-by-Iranian-forces">reportedly</a> carrying <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/greek-oil-tanker-seized-iran-holds-oil-was-headed-us-rcna32852">U.S.-bound cargo</a> from Iraq, including thousands of barrels of oil worth over $100 million, while the latter was traveling from Iraq to Greece.</p>
<p>This demonstrates how, whenever the United States has responded to Iranian malign activity with sanctions alone, or even limited use of force, Tehran sees a green light to escalate.</p>
<p>So far, Iran’s counterpressure strategy has largely succeeded. While President Joe Biden ordered airstrikes in Syria in February 2021 and again in Syria and Iraq in June 2021, in retaliation for attacks on U.S. personnel, Iranian-backed Shia militias <a href="https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Memo_Bombings-in-Iraq-Despite-Biden-Retaliation-4.pdf">further escalated</a> shortly afterward with no U.S. follow-up. This is not surprising, as decades of U.S. interactions with Iran show that only when Tehran perceives a threat of military action in response to each attack can its leadership be compelled to abandon regional aggression.</p>
<p>Without the backing of credible military options, U.S. efforts to bolster sanctions enforcement encourage further Iranian tit-for-tat counterpressure, especially at the negotiating table. Meanwhile, during the protracted, open-ended nuclear negotiations, Iran continues funding its proxies and regional aggression. A more assertive approach that both enforces existing sanctions and boosts military readiness, offers the best prospects for reducing instability.</p>
<p>What the United States urgently needs and has lacked is a comprehensive <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/iran-project-report-release-may-2022/">Plan B strategy</a>, where the administration declares a “Biden Doctrine.” This strategy should state that the United States will use all elements of national power, including rigorous sanctions enforcement and military force, to defend vital interests in the Middle East, with the highest priority being preventing a nuclear Iran. U.S. naval forces should emphasize interdicting illicit Iranian oil shipments and prepare for the inevitable Iranian counterpressure at sea by strengthening maritime domain awareness and cooperation among America’s partners through joint training and planning. The U.S. Fifth Fleet should also continue to conduct patrols in the Arabian Gulf and freedom of navigation operations alongside regional partners to ensure safe passage through international waterways. The expansion of initiatives with unmanned systems, like the <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/10/06/fifth_fleets_task_force_59_is_a_good_start_797673.html">Fifth Fleet’s Task Force 59</a>, would enable the United States to surveil and protect a broader range of the maritime domain.</p>
<p>Iran’s latest actions demand a new U.S. approach. The United States and its partners must act quickly and decisively to prevent Iranian aggression like its latest retaliatory seizure of oil tankers, or its destabilizing escalations will continue.</p>
<p><em>Retired Vice Adm. Herman Shelanski served as the U.S. Navy’s naval inspector general and was a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2019 Generals and Admirals Program. Ari Cicurel and Andrew Ghalili are senior policy analysts at JINSA.</em></p>
<p>Originally published in <em><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/tanker-troubles-america-needs-plan-b-iran-strategy-203124" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Interest</a></em>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: center"><em>This op-ed was made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation and a portion of the research was conducted on the </em><em><a href="https://jinsa.org/policy/?tab=benjamin-gettler-policy-trip">Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip</a>.</em></p>
<hr />
<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/tanker-troubles-america-needs-plan-b-iran-strategy/">Tanker Troubles: America Needs a Plan B Iran Strategy</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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		<title>What Erdoğan Has Wrought?</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/what-erdogan-has-wrought/</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jun 2022 19:26:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis & Commentary]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=14029</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has continued to hold Finland and Sweden’s potential membership in NATO hostage to his stated demands. He wants concessions from the two aspirants on issues connected to Kurdish terrorism and has an unstated agenda of<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has continued to hold Finland and Sweden’s potential membership in NATO hostage to his stated demands. He wants concessions from the two aspirants on issues connected to Kurdish terrorism and has an unstated agenda of distracting Turks from his catastrophic economic mismanagement, pleasing his Russian “competimate” Vladimir Putin, and making himself the center of attention at the forthcoming Madrid Summit of the North Atlantic alliance later this month, as well as greasing the skids for the potential sale of advanced U.S. F-16 aircraft to Turkey.</p>
<p>In the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, moving swiftly to incorporate Finland and Sweden into NATO is imperative for the geopolitical and military benefits it brings to European security. It is almost certain that a reluctant President Joe Biden will have to get involved, and it is equally likely that, at the end of the day, Erdoğan’s objections will be assuaged and the NATO enlargement process will move forward. But the damage that Erdoğan has done to Turkey’s standing in Europe and its long-term geopolitical interests (as opposed to his short-term domestic political interests) will be profound.</p>
<p>The damage is thrown into sharp relief by a recent domestic political crisis in Sweden and an extraordinary interview granted by Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö, one of Europe’s few statesmen of any vision or stature. The combination of the two demonstrate both the bad faith of Erdoğan, the unintended consequences of his recent hostage-taking diplomacy, and the potentially long-lasting aftereffects of the Turkish strongman’s strong arm diplomatic tactics.</p>
<p>Sweden’s path to NATO candidacy was not as direct as Finland’s, where the debate on NATO membership had been much more advanced for years. Moreover, the political situation in Sweden was more fraught since the Social Democratic government had a very narrow margin in the parliament, the country is facing elections in the fall, and the broad political consensus that existed in Finland was not in place—in fact the governing Social Democratic Party was divided over NATO membership. The Finns coordinated very carefully with the Swedes after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, mindful that while public opinion had rapidly and radically transformed in Finland, the change in Sweden, also profound, was not on the same order of magnitude.</p>
<p>The recent Swedish government crisis had almost nothing to do with Turkey’s demands on NATO accession, but rather originated in efforts by opposition parties to force a vote of no-confidence on the minister of justice and interior because of rising gang violence in Sweden. The no-confidence motion fell one vote short and that vote was Left Party member Amineh Kakabaveh, a Swede of Kurdish origin, whose support keeps the Social Democratic government in office. The price she has extracted for her vote in this instance, however, was a commitment that the Swedish government would not cave in to Erdoğan’s demands that Stockholm turn over various Kurds that Turkey has accused of terrorism. Some observers are already suggesting that this episode comes close to “derailing” Finland and Sweden’s applications for the <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/swedens-nato-bid-trouble/367877/" rel="">moment</a>. Although that judgment seems premature, the entire episode demonstrates that Erdoğan’s extortionate diplomacy could lead him to miscalculate in ways that lead to a train wreck at the NATO summit.</p>
<p>Which brings us to President Niinistö’s <a href="https://twitter.com/jmkorhonen/status/1534408606984114176?s=20&amp;t=xi-uqRvzQZH9PnYF7XtiUQ" rel="">interview</a> in<em> Ilta-Sanomat</em>. Niinistö walks through in detail the extensive consultations undertaken by the always careful and thorough Finns as well as the more tentative Swedes before announcing their application for NATO membership. He specifies that the contacts went beyond the April 4 phone call between Niinistö and Erdoğan that had previously been reported and included exchanges between the foreign ministers and at lower levels of the ministries as well. The assurances of Turkish support for a Nordic round of enlargement were repeated in Brussels to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Niinistö made clear that although Finland is willing to address Turkish concerns about terrorism (and indeed pointed to the fact that Finnish anti-terrorism legislation is consistent with European standards) and even the arms embargo (although not as a “condition” for membership), extradition of individuals will have to be dealt with through normal legal channels (the same position that the U.S. has taken with regard to Turkish demands for the extradition of cleric Fetullah Gulen for allegedly plotting the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey). Despite his typically laconic manner of expression, Niinistö’s anger at Turkish duplicity drips through the interview noting that had the Turks indicated they would raise an objection, Finland and Sweden wouldn’t have applied since being in a security limbo is the worst possible position for them.</p>
<p>The irony in all of this is that Finland and Sweden have been for the past 25 years among Turkey’s strongest advocates and supporters in Europe. In the late 1990s President William Jefferson Clinton nominated me to serve as the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Finland. When I arrived in the summer of 1998 I found my Finnish diplomatic colleagues at the Foreign Ministry and in the office of the president and prime minister (who both have responsibilities for the conduct of Finland’s foreign relations) hard at work preparing to assume the rotating presidency of the European Union which they had only recently joined in 1995 The extremely thorough, hardworking, and talented Finnish diplomatic leaders had concluded from their studies of past EU presidencies that an unexpected issue would always crop up during the presidency and dominate it. Although they recognized that it was impossible to predict just what that issue might be, they decided that the possibility of renewed crisis or negotiations over Cyprus might be such an issue and set to work preparing themselves to handle it if it emerged as an issue during their presidency. This entailed lots of diplomatic contact with Greece and Turkey, needless to say.</p>
<p>As the Finns settled into their first EU presidency, however, what greeted them was not geopolitical tremors but real, no-shit earthquakes of significant magnitude in first Turkey and then Greece in the late summer of 1999. The geological phenomena led in short order to massive efforts at humanitarian relief in the Eastern Mediterranean that brought, in its wake, a rapid and unexpected improvement in the Greek-Turkish relationship. The Finns’ hard work and anticipatory diplomacy put them in an excellent position to capitalize on this. Although there was no Cyprus crisis for them to resolve, they suddenly found themselves in a position to put the question of Turkish accession to the European Union on the agenda at the December 1999 Helsinki EU Summit.</p>
<p>EU membership had been a longstanding goal of Turkish statecraft dating back to the initial application by Turkey in 1959 for associate membership in what was then called the European Economic Community. Anchoring Turkey in the economic structures of Europe to complement its important role as a NATO ally had also been a key bipartisan objective of U.S. European policy through the administrations of nine different U.S. presidents, from Eisenhower to Clinton. Hence, I was actively involved, as U.S. ambassador, on the margins of the EU Summit that December in helping the Finns work out a formula acceptable to the Turks. Despite intensive efforts with my then colleagues in Ankara, Ambassador Mark Parris and his deputy, Jim Jeffrey, it ultimately took a phone call from Air Force One by President Clinton to the then-Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to get the Turks to take yes for an answer to something that they had been seeking for 40 years—the prospect of opening accession talks to join Europe. Finland’s early preparation and assiduous efforts paid off and Turkey’s potential candidacy was now clearly on the EU agenda.</p>
<p>Five years later I found myself in Ankara as George W. Bush’s ambassador to the Republic of Turkey when the EU faced the decision of whether to actually open accession talks with Turkey on all of the chapters of the Acquis Communitaire—the steps that Turkey would need to take to adapt its economic, social and political institutions to enable it to actually undertake the responsibilities of membership in the EU.</p>
<p>The Finns had remained strong supporters of Turkish candidacy. Former Finnish President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Marti Ahtisaari became chairman of an independent commission on Turkey (supported by funding from George Soros’ Open Society Foundation) that lobbied for Turkey’s candidacy before the December 2004 Brussels EU Summit. Sweden also had emerged as a key supporter. My Swedish counterpart in Ankara, Ann Dismorr, was a particularly active advocate and sympathetically described Turkey’s reform efforts in her 2005 book <em>Turkey Decoded.</em> Working with her, British Ambassador Peter Westmacott (later Her Majesty’s Ambassador to France and the U.S.) as well as other American colleagues, we pushed for the EU to open the process to Turkey. At the end the invitation was offered—albeit with some caveats that were hard for Turkey to swallow. Once again Western leaders—in this case, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac—had to cajole Erdoğan for hours into taking yes for an answer. It should have been a moment of triumph for Turkey, but Erdoğan’s reaction betrayed at best ambivalent feelings about the prospect of firmly grounding Turkey in European institutions.</p>
<p>In short order, European leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel emerged who were much less sympathetic to Turkey, and Turks have long since written off the EU accession process as Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism has taken Turkey farther and farther away from European standards of democracy and rule of law. But even without an active EU accession process, alienating traditional supporters in Europe is foolish and short-sighted by any standard. The anger and hostility this has engendered in Northern Europe (and not just in Sweden and Finland) is palpable and will not be forgotten for a long time. Moreover, Erdogan’s insistence on using the Nordic candidacies for bargaining purposes will reinforce every existing bad stereotype that regards Turks not as Europeans but as Middle Easterners more interested in haggling in the souk than in policy outcomes. It is a high bill to pay for the autocrat’s several minutes in the sun at Madrid and his pathetic efforts to demonstrate his relevance and importance to Turkish voters in the run-up to elections in 2023 at the expense of Europe’s larger security needs as it faces the biggest war on the continent since 1945.</p>
<p><em>Eric S. Edelman is a former U.S. ambassador to both Finland (1998-2001) and Turkey (2003-2005) and was undersecretary of defense for policy (2005-2009).</em></p>
<p>Originally published in <em><a href="https://thedispatch.com/p/what-erdogan-has-wrought?utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_source=direct&amp;s=r" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Dispatch</a></em>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center"><em>This op-ed was made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation and a portion of the research was conducted on the </em><em><a href="https://jinsa.org/policy/?tab=benjamin-gettler-policy-trip">Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip</a>.<br />
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		<title>The Strongman Cometh</title>
		<link>https://jinsa.org/the-strongman-cometh/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 18 May 2022 13:53:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nolan Judd]]></dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://jinsa.org/?p=13963</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p>Despite the fulminations of the Kremlin’s television propagandists and Russian bureaucrats seeking to anticipate the dictator’s views, it appears that Vladimir Putin has “no problem” with Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Despite earlier threats by a variety of Russian officials<span class="ellipsis">&#8230;</span></p>
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				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite the fulminations of the Kremlin’s television propagandists and Russian bureaucrats seeking to anticipate the dictator’s views, it <a href="https://fortune.com/2022/05/16/sweden-finland-join-nato-putin-no-threat-russia/" rel="">appears</a> that Vladimir Putin has “no problem” with Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Despite earlier threats by a variety of Russian officials that the Nordic neutrals joining NATO would provoke “military-technical” reactions, including the possible deployment of nuclear weapons, it seems that Putin has bowed to the inevitable after a calm, respectful phone call with Finland’s impressive and statesmanlike President Sauli Niinisto. Despite Putin’s retreat, Turkey’s authoritarian boss Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has suddenly interposed his own objections, saying at first that Turkey was “not favorable” to Finland and Sweden’s membership in NATO and subsequently doubling down, arguing that, “We will not say ‘yes’ to those [countries] who apply sanctions to Turkey.”</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s view seems to represent a change of heart from earlier Turkish support for Finnish membership, conveyed to Niinisto in an April 4 phone call and in bilateral diplomatic contacts, not to mention Turkey’s traditional support for NATO’s enlargement since the end of the Cold War. The Turkish <em>volte face</em> reportedly has left diplomats at NATO headquarters in Brussels furious with the Turks, despite the public statements that all is well and the clear expectation that the alliance ultimately will move forward with Finnish and Swedish membership.</p>
<p>In this regard, the Turkish authoritarian and kleptocrat seems to resemble no one more than former Illinois governor and convicted felon Rod Blagojevich who, when he found out he could appoint Barack Obama&#8217;s successor to the U.S. Senate, famously said, “I&#8217;ve got this thing and it&#8217;s f&#8212;ing golden. I&#8217;m not just giving it up for f&#8212;ing nothing.” Erdoğan sees the Finnish and Swedish application for membership as an opportunity to accomplish multiple objectives—burnishing his domestic position by highlighting the important international role he plays and gaining leverage with both the West and his difficult and complicated Russian neighbor.</p>
<p>In the first instance, we should recall that Erdoğan and the Turks have done this before in the NATO context. First in 2009, when then-Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was on the verge of being appointed NATO secretary general and then again in 2019 when Turkish diplomats blocked NATO defense plans for the Baltic states and Poland. The pretext for threatening to veto Rasmussen was the “scandal” over the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed published by the Danish newspaper <em>Jyllands-Posten</em> four years earlier. President Barack Obama’s first NATO summit ended up almost entirely consumed by negotiations with Erdoğan over measures to placate the Turkish leader’s alleged rage over Rasmussen’s insult to Muslims worldwide because of his defense of free expression. It turned out that Erdoğan’s concerns were perhaps more prosaic than principled: He later told Turkish television that he had relented after President Obama had promised that Rasmussen would have a Turkish deputy and that Turkish general officers would be better represented at NATO headquarters.</p>
<p>In the second instance, NATO had drawn up defense plans for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland at the latter’s request in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014. The alliance approved the plans at the December 2018 NATO London Summit, but Turkey blocked implementation, demanding that NATO recognize the Kurdish YPG militia in Syria as a terrorist group. After six months of intransigence Turkey finally lifted its objection under pressure from the rest of the allies.</p>
<p>Erdoğan&#8217;s “strongman” need for constant attention and his failure, so far, to secure a bilateral meeting with Biden or to establish the kind of access he enjoyed to the U.S. president under both Obama and Trump undoubtedly explain the Turkish leader’s initial reaction. Just as it took Obama’s persuasive efforts in 2009 to talk Erdoğan off the ledge regarding Rasmussen, I suspect President Biden will have to spend a disproportionate amount of time sweet-talking and jaw-boning Erdoğan to drop his opposition to Finland and Sweden. The opportunity cost will be high since the NATO summit in June should be focused on responding to Russian aggression and NATO’s new strategic concept in the light of rapidly changing security conditions in Europe.</p>
<p>Recognition by foreign leaders of Erdoğan’s international role serves more than to stroke his ego: It also serves an important domestic political need. As Turkey approaches elections in 2023, Erdoğan’s poll numbers have been sagging. He is undoubtedly calculating that the NATO spotlight will not just reinforce his international importance to the Turkish public the but tying the issue to Sweden’s support for Kurdish nationalists will predictably whip up Turkish nationalism. That can handily also serve as a distraction from the economic management disaster that Erdoğan has created in Turkey by his insistence on keeping interest rates low. The result has been a 70 percent inflation rate and enormous hardship for the Turkish public and businesses.</p>
<p>Erdoğan, however, is also looking for international leverage with both the U.S. and Russia and not just personal recognition. As is well known, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system created a crisis in Turkey’s bilateral relationship with the U.S. and NATO. It led to Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program and the imposition of sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). In the wake of the F-35 cancellation, Turkey has recently approached the Biden administration seeking both upgrades to its existing F-16s and a request to purchase new, more advanced F-16s and associated weapons packages. A preliminary sale of upgrade kits and missiles worth about $300 million was recently informally notified to the Congress. Erdoğan may think that holding Finland and Sweden hostage will provide the Biden team with arguments on the Hill to proceed with these arms sales packages (both the preliminary package and the larger F-16 package that the Turks have requested). Erdoğan needs to proceed with caution, however, because as Mitch McConnell indicated in Helsinki on May 16, there is broad support for Finland and Sweden in Congress, and many members would like nothing better than to trade Turkey as a member for the two Nordic states. (There is no mechanism for kicking member states out of NATO, but this sentiment reflects Turkey’s loss of any real backing on Capitol Hill—which represents the toll that Erdoğan’s creeping authoritarianism and reflexive anti-Americanism has taken on Turkey’s much more robust support in the past).</p>
<p>Finally, Erdoğan may also calculate that creating a ruckus in NATO serves the purpose of endearing him to Putin and may redirect Russia&#8217;s attention away from the ongoing supply of TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine (one of the most effective weapons in Kyiv’s arsenal in destroying Russia’s invasion force), thus helping Erdoğan manage the complicated minuet he has been dancing with Putin—his closest “competimate”—for several years now.</p>
<p>It is almost certainly the case that Erdoğan and Turkey eventually will yield in the face of both blandishments and pressures from the other 29 allies in NATO and allow Finland and Sweden to take their place as capable and responsible allies, but not before he has reminded the rest of the alliance—once again—that an authoritarian Turkey remains an unpredictable and unreliable ally in a crucial geo-strategic location in the midst of Europe’s most serious crisis since the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p><em>Eric S. Edelman is a former U.S. ambassador to both Finland (1998-2001) and Turkey (2003-2005) and was undersecretary of defense for policy (2005-2009).</em></p>
<p>Originally published in <em><a href="https://thedispatch.com/p/the-strongman-cometh?s=r" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Dispatch</a></em>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center"><em>This op-ed was made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation and a portion of the research was conducted on the </em><em><a href="https://jinsa.org/policy/?tab=benjamin-gettler-policy-trip">Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip</a>.<br />
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<p>The post <a href="https://jinsa.org/the-strongman-cometh/">The Strongman Cometh</a> appeared first on <a href="https://jinsa.org">JINSA</a>.</p>
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