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Despite its name, Trump’s Operation Economic Outcast does not block Beijing’s vital support for the regime in Tehran. In fact, at a recent summit, China and Iran jointly condemned and vowed to defy the new U.S. strategy.

Emboldened, Tehran is retaliating by attacking commercial shipping that attempts to skirt its control of Hormuz, and by firing missiles at U.S. bases and warships. These are not the actions of an enemy that thinks it is losing.

Even as U.S. sanctions reduce its revenues, Iran’s new leadership is focused on rebuilding its arsenal, with Chinese and Russian help. It is passing the economic pain onto Iran’s people, who fear that new protests would invite a swift repeat of the regime’s brutal January crackdown.

But the Islamic Republic is not invulnerable. Trump can use diplomatic pressure to hit the regime where it really hurts, in the form of an international coalition to enforce global U.N. Security Council military embargoes on Iran.

The embargoes, already on the books, were part of the “snapback” of U.N. sanctions invoked by France, Germany, and Britain in September 2025 over Iran’s violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal. What Trump has not yet done is turn them into a broad enforcement campaign to interdict the military and financial lifelines keeping Iran in the fight.

The impact would be significant, outlawing Iran’s arms trade and its missile and nuclear programs, as well as sanctioning the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders who increasingly run the government and economy.

Senior Iranian officials worried last summer that their country “does not have the financial or military capacity to endure” these sanctions — “they are more damaging than war.”

As Trump’s D-Day strategy shows, unilateral U.S. sanctions lose their punch when Washington avoids the costs of enforcing them against its own major trade partners, such as China. By contrast, U.S. snapback enforcement can force Beijing to choose between openly violating binding Security Council measures and helping Tehran rebuild its arsenal.

All U.N. member states — including China — are automatically required to enforce these sanctions and to do so rigorously, including using force if necessary. They must seize all relevant Iranian assets on their soil and prevent their companies, ships, aircraft, and financial resources from being used to aid Iran’s armed forces.

This would put the onus back on Beijing, which insists sanctions must have the force of international law and the U.N. Security Council’s blessing. Trump would have new leverage heading into his White House meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Sept. 24, where U.S.-led pressure on Iran will be among the biggest negotiating topics.

Properly executed, a campaign to enforce U.N. embargoes would spur our European and Asian allies, most of whom supported “snapping back” these measures last autumn, to expand and strengthen America’s blockade aimed at preventing the regime’s postwar recovery and ending its military aggression.

But the United States can only exploit this advantage if it asserts international leadership and builds a much broader coalition to enforce these U.N. embargoes.

Unlike the current D-Day approach, this should not fall primarily on Treasury’s shoulders. With support from Congress, the State Department and Pentagon must coordinate closely with countries worldwide to identify and interdict banned cargoes bound for and from Iran, as they did only briefly late last year.

Most importantly, Trump must make clear that the entire U.S government is working with allies and partners to isolate Iran’s regime from the outside world and undercut its most dangerous capabilities.

For the first time in either of his administrations, he must confront Iran and its supporters with diplomatic, economic, and military pressure all at once.

Originally published in the Washington Examiner.

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On August 4, media reports indicated that a major U.S. defense contractor is, for the first time, planning to source germanium and scandium—critical minerals used to build high-end defense items—from American firms. Here’s the problem: the prospective supplier does not have an operational mine—and will not until at least 2028. To highlight the scope of this challenge, consider the fact that the United States has not mined scandium since the 1960s.

Critical minerals are vital elements used in numerous defense platforms: warships, stealth bombers, fighter jets, missiles, sensors, and radars. Today the United States is import-reliant when it comes to critical minerals. China accounts for 90 percent of worldwide refining and processing capacity and is the top global refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals especially relevant to defense production.

Beijing’s critical minerals dominance is a threat to the national security of the United States and must end. For that reason, Washington is seeking to curtail critical mineral imports from China. It is also working to stockpile its own critical minerals. To that end, the Trump administration ordered the creation of the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve, or Project Vault, in February—a logical complement to America’s existing petroleum and uranium strategic reserves.

To create viable domestic stockpiles, the United States has looked beyond its borders. The Trump administration has recently signed nearly 20 bilateral framework deals, and created multilateral forums like Pax Silica designed to form U.S.-friendly critical minerals supply chains. Washington is right to pursue a multilateral approach to U.S. critical minerals security, but there are better ways to do so.

Relying on partners’ reserves to meet U.S. demand, however, is problematic. For reasons of geography alone, even the most U.S.-friendly countries cannot be relied upon to supply the United States’ needs in a true crisis.

The geostrategic vulnerabilities are glaring. The United States signed a critical minerals deal in 2023 with Mongolia, a landlocked country surrounded by China and Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan, a Pax Silica member, shares long and arguably indefensible borders with both China and Russia. And the COVID-19 pandemic, Iran, and the Houthis have exposed the extant fragility of global supply chains more broadly.

During a great power conflict, depending on global shipping would become problematic—potentially jeopardizing America’s ability to import critical minerals. Key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through chokepoints like Asia’s Strait of Malacca and Europe’s Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap would be threatened by U.S. adversaries. Imagine the United States, in World War II, having to import defense production items through the same waters where it was fighting the German Navy.

Even in peacetime, overseas sources have perils. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has large cobalt, nickel, and lithium reserves, has become a focal point of U.S. critical minerals strategy. Washington likely seeks to counter China’s own strategic mining in the DRC. However, the country’s track record of corruption and instability—including its recent yearslong war with Rwanda—makes it a risky bet for U.S. sourcing.

Fortunately, low-cost alternatives are emerging. The Trump administration, on July 30, gave the Commerce Department authority to impose export controls on industrial waste, which is often shipped abroad despite containing recoverable minerals. Extracting those critical minerals requires considerable technical capacity and expertise—which is where America’s allies can help.

Washington should consider forming a critical minerals consortium with friendly countries to boost American extraction, recycling, and reprocessing capacity. Pooling that technology and know-how would accelerate the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve’s progress. In exchange, the United States could offer mutually beneficial defense arrangements. Such inducements can include new or expanded joint research and development (R&D) projects and defense co-production.

The timing is auspicious: several major U.S. bilateral defense pacts are up for renewal. For example, the next version of the soon-to-expire U.S.-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement could leverage Greece’s new advances in refining gallium. Currently, China enjoys a near-monopoly on gallium, which is reportedly used in over 11,000 U.S. military components. The upcoming expiration of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding presents another opportunity. Israel is making significant advances in neodymium-iron-boron recycling and accelerating state-backed critical minerals research.

This approach has several advantages. First, reducing U.S. dependence on foreign-based mining hedges against potential supply disruption. Second, utilizing cheap and plentiful American materials—like industrial waste—would boost U.S. stockpiles at low expense. Third, harnessing partners’ existing R&D efforts would reduce private-sector research costs. That could stimulate industry interest in those U.S. critical minerals projects for which, as Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) recently said, “no free market [demand] exists.”

With challenges come opportunities. By better leveraging its partners and allies in the critical minerals race, Washington can breathe new life into its defense industrial base. The United States is, unfortunately, in another interwar period; it is time to act accordingly.

MajGen Tracy King, USMC (ret). is former Commander of Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, and a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program Participant. MajGen King also has served as Director of Asia Strategy on the Joint Staff.

Yoni Tobin is a Senior Policy Analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

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For decades, a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish conflict was long seen as vital for Turkey’s full democratization. Yet last month’s development was met with widespread criticism from some of the most outspoken supporters of Turkish democracy. Their concern, which has been voiced widely in Turkey, is that the agreement is a cynical ploy by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to win Kurdish support for perpetuating his authoritarian rule. Moreover, many question whether the government will actually follow through and provide real political concessions to the country’s Kurds.

When it comes to Erdogan, suspicion is always prudent, and the concerns raised about the peace process are hardly unreasonable. It is true that Erdogan faces constitutional constraints on securing a third term that require him to navigate significant parliamentary hurdles. It is also true that he will seek to extract domestic political benefit from this process, as he does from most political developments.

Yet this is not the full story. The government’s willingness to make peace with the PKK is also driven by important national security concerns. Understanding the agreement on foreign-policy terms is crucial to appreciating why it will likely succeed—and ultimately prove beneficial for Turkey.

The primary drivers of this peace process have always lain beyond Turkey’s borders, in a cascading series of events that began with Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and led through the destruction of Hezbollah, fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, and the current war with Iran.

The fall of the Assad regime “is a direct result of the blows we have inflicted on Iran and Hezbollah,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed at the time. He was not wrong, and in Turkey, Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s coalition partner, agreed with him: “The fire that began in Gaza spread to Lebanon, extended its shadow over Syria, reached Iraq, and ultimately produced a shock wave that penetrated the heart of Iran.”

In October of 2024, shortly before the rebel assault that brought down Assad, Erdogan spoke at the opening of the Turkish parliament. In his speech, he warned that “Israel’s next target will be Turkey” and called for the “strengthening of the home front.” The very same day, Bahceli shook hands with pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party representatives in parliament—something that he had previously refrained from doing with members of a party that he had called to be banned on multiple occasions. This action alone immediately ignited talks of a new peace process between Turkey and the Kurds.

Amid these geopolitical dynamics, Erdogan’s domestic political concerns played a more complicated role in the process. While he no doubt ultimately hopes to secure Kurdish support for a new term in office, any concessions to the PKK or the Kurdish movement also risk an intense nationalist backlash. Erdogan has consistently appeared uncertain about how the process would be received by Turkish nationalists and whether the Kurdish support he may be banking on will be sufficient to carry him over the line in the next election.

Indeed, it was precisely the same fears that led to the collapse of the last significant peace process between the two sides more than 10 years ago. In this context, Bahceli himself has often taken the lead in publicly promoting the process, working to overcome the delays by pushing for several measures that the government had been slow to implement.

Initially, as Turkey’s regional anxieties overrode Erdogan’s political hesitations, the peace process got off to a hectic start. Numan Kurtulmus, the speaker of the Turkish parliament and a senior figure in Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, framed the urgency of the new peace process through a familiar conspiratorial trope in Turkish nationalist and Islamist traditions: the belief that external powers seek to weaken and ultimately partition Turkey. Warning that “in the so-called ‘Greater Israel’ project, Turkey is seen as the primary force to be absorbed,” he argued that this reality requires Ankara to “fortify its home front.”

Since the outset of the process, fortifying the home front against “global imperialist conspiracies and Zionist ambitions” has emerged as a central organizing concept across the Turkish government’s public messaging. While the Palestinian cause is an ideological issue for Erdogan, the widening instability in the region—and its implications for Kurdish aspirations—is a unifying concern for the entire Turkish political and security establishment.

With Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025, a major fear for Turkey had become reality. Iran—the country with the second-largest Kurdish population after Turkey—was now in the crosshairs, and, after Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2011, the Kurds once again appeared to be poised to take center stage. In both Syria and Iran, the most capable forces on the ground are PKK-affiliated groups—the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), respectively. In an attempt to get ahead of the curve, the Turkish government turned to negotiating with the person whom both organizations see as their leader: Abdullah Ocalan.

Ankara’s main concern was that regional upheaval, especially in Syria and Iran, could strengthen Kurdish autonomy or political leverage in ways that eventually reverberate inside Turkey. A second concern is the prospect of Israel deepening ties with Kurdish actors—again, especially in Syria and Iran.

From Ankara’s perspective, closer Israeli-Kurdish relations would not only empower Kurdish movements in ways that complicate Turkey’s own domestic challenges but would also alter the regional balance of power by enhancing Israel’s reach and capabilities in the emerging Turkey-Israel regional rivalry. While it was widely reported last year that Syrian Kurdish officials had met with Israeli counterparts, such contacts remained far removed from the kind of sustained and institutional engagement that Ankara fears. Ankara regularly hosts Hamas, but we remain far from seeing the PKK in Tel Aviv.

In effect, the presence and operational capabilities of the SDF and PJAK have given Ocalan more leverage in his negotiations with the Turkish government than the PKK ever possessed within Turkey alone. It is no coincidence, then, that the earliest and most visible outcomes of the negotiations have so far materialized in these two arenas. Ocalan reportedly intervened in Syria to help peacefully resolve the fighting between the SDF and the new government in Damascus at the beginning of this year, leading to the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian state.

The Turkey-PKK peace process’s impact on Iran has yet to fully manifest itself, but Turkish columnist Abdulkadir Selvi—widely seen as a conduit for government messaging—recently argued that it prevented the United States from deploying PKK-affiliated groups into Iran during Operation Epic Fury, forcing Washington to instead engage with less-capable Kurdish organizations.

The chain of regional events set in motion on Oct. 7, 2023, coupled with a need to transcend Turkey’s historic vulnerabilities, have both energized and unified Turkey’s ruling elites around a new Kurdish policy. Even the main opposition party has backed the peace process, despite its leading presidential contender, Ekrem Imamoglu, being imprisoned in what is widely viewed as a politically motivated trial.

This exceptionally rare political consensus reflects a deeper, if paradoxical, reality: No other country has grasped the significance of Kurdish agency in the Middle East quite like Turkey has.

In a recent statement, Bahceli characterized the peace process as “not merely a matter of security, but one of strengthening brotherhood, national unity, and solidarity.”

In a country where a significant portion of the population has been willing to take up arms in pursuit of ethnic rights, there is a lot to do for true unity to be achieved. It will ultimately require legal and constitutional reforms that allow Kurds to govern their towns and their local economies without the risk of arbitrary intervention by the government. What’s more, it is unrealistic to expect Kurds to feel secure in their rights unless Turkey’s authoritarian downtrend is reversed and members of other political parties are no longer being systematically jailed.

That said, the PKK’s immediate expectations are more limited and pragmatic than a wholesale democratization of Turkey. At the outset of negotiations, Ocalan made it clear that he had no cultural or ethnic preconditions for ending the armed struggle. At this stage, the process rests on the PKK’s confidence that it can transition from an armed movement into a legitimate political and civil actor without being dismantled or excluded from public life.

The most immediate test for Ankara will be Ocalan’s status. The PKK expects improvements to his working conditions in prison and, crucially, greater access to the outside world so that he can communicate freely with the movement and play an effective role in managing its transition away from armed struggle.

None of this necessarily requires Erdogan to stop repressing political opponents or suddenly embrace liberal democracy, and Ocalan’s willingness to bring the process this far without such commitments suggests that he does not regard broader democratization as a prerequisite for taking the first steps.

But for the process to advance beyond disarmament, the PKK will need evidence that laying down its weapons creates political space rather than simply eliminating the only leverage that it has possessed for half a century. In that sense, the immediate question is less about whether Erdogan is prepared to democratize Turkey than whether he is prepared to accommodate the PKK’s transformation into a legitimate, exclusively civilian actor.

Peace does not guarantee democracy, but it is a prerequisite for it. Pro-democracy critics of the current process should recognize that even while the fate of Turkish democracy will remain dangerously uncertain whatever happens with the Kurds, ending the state’s military conflict with the PKK is an important achievement in its own right. The PKK has now laid down its arms. If Turkey permanently ends its military operations against all Kurdish organizations, including those in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, then the process will have succeeded on geopolitical terms. This will measurably improve the lives of all people in the region and set the stage for the fight for democracy to continue on more favorable terrain.

At a moment when the Middle East appears to be poised for prolonged turbulence, stabilizing the Kurdish question at home may prove to be Turkey’s most consequential strategic investment in its own future.

Giran Ozcan is Fellow for Kurdish Affairs at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).

Originally published in Foreign Policy.

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On August 18, Israeli fighter jets struck the Abu al-Duhur military airbase in Syria’s Idlib province, citing intelligence that Damascus was prepared to permit the stationing of Turkish troops there in violation of a security understanding with Israel. Israel said it had warned Syria repeatedly before striking and claims to have shared intelligence with the United States; current U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack disputed this, saying Washington received no advance notice. Turkey—which already posts troops in northern Syria—denied any intention to establish a military presence at the base, called the strikes “reckless,” and warned Israel against further actions. Washington has since scrambled to establish a deconfliction mechanism among the three parties.

The episode has exposed a deepening competition between Israel and Turkey over Syria’s future. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, Turkey has emerged as Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s principal backer, formalizing military cooperation agreements and expanding its footprint across the country. Israel views Turkish military infrastructure—particularly air defense systems—as a direct threat to its freedom of action over Syrian airspace, including for its operations against Iran.

To discuss the Israel-Turkey-Syria triangle and its implications for U.S. policy and regional stability, JINSA hosted a webinar featuring JINSA Distinguished Fellow IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, Israel’s former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and JINSA Distinguished Scholar and former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Amb. Eric Edelman. Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, moderated the discussion.

Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, moderated the discussion.

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IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a Distinguished Fellow at JINSA. Prior to joining JINSA, MG Amidror was the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the head of Israel’s National Security Council. MG (ret.) Amidror also has served as Director of Israel’s Intelligence Analysis Division.

Click here to read full bio

Amb. Eric Edelman Amb. Eric Edelman is a Distinguished Scholar at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy and the Co-Chair of its Iran Policy Project and Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project. Amb. Edelman served in senior positions at the Departments of State and Defense as well as the White House where he led organizations providing analysis, strategy, policy development, security services, trade advocacy, public outreach, citizen services, and congressional relations. Click here to read full bio

Blaise Misztal Blaise Misztal is the Vice President for Policy at JINSA. Misztal previously was a Fellow at the Hudson Institute, and has held roles as the Executive Director of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States and Director of the National Security Program at the Bipartisan Policy Center. Click here to read full bio

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The post Watch Webinar – Collision Course? Israel, Turkey, and the Future of Syria appeared first on JINSA.

]]> https://jinsa.org/watch-webinar-collision-course-israel-turkey-and-the-future-of-syria/feed/ 0 https://jinsa.org/irans-other-nuclear-weapons-option-plutonium-bombs/ https://jinsa.org/irans-other-nuclear-weapons-option-plutonium-bombs/#respond Sun, 16 Aug 2026 07:55:32 +0000 https://jinsa.org/?p=24248 Excerpt Below: As the conflict with Iran continues to oscillate between combat operations and diplomacy, it is worth remembering why we are doing this. The goal is to end Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon, and while we don’t…

Read more ›

The post Iran’s Other Nuclear Weapons Option: Plutonium Bombs appeared first on JINSA.

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Excerpt Below:

As the conflict with Iran continues to oscillate between combat operations and diplomacy, it is worth remembering why we are doing this. The goal is to end Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon, and while we don’t know if diplomacy can achieve this, it is never too early to plan for success.

Plenty has been said about how Iran could build a handful of uranium bombs. Less has been said about the hundreds of bombs Iran could make using the plutonium located at its nuclear-power reactor in Bushehr. This is a major oversight.

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Stephen Rademaker is a Senior Advisor at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation.

R. Scott Kemp is Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

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Read the full piece in The Hill.

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Click here to read transcript.

Almost three years after the devastating October 7, 2023, attack, the Board of Peace announced that Hamas had agreed to give up its weapons and relinquish any role in Gaza’s governance and security. The achievement of a deal with Hamas was shared by President Donald Trump on July 30, who wrote that “the Board of Peace reached a HISTORIC agreement for the COMPLETE DISARMAMENT of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza.” 

Yet the Board of Peace’s Roadmap for moving to Phase II of Trump’s Comprehensive Plan for Gaza also calls for Israel’s eventual full military withdrawal from the territory. Its text is at best ambiguous as to whether Israel’s phased withdrawals should begin before or after Hamas is completely disarmed. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s top spokesman said on August 3 that Israel has shared a number of “serious security concerns” with the White House over the agreement. In addition, how the deal will be implemented is far from clear. Hamas under stress has long dangled cooperation in a bid to relieve pressure and gain time, only to breach its commitments. It almost certainly will seek to do so again.

To assess the deal, and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead, JINSA hosted a webinar featuring JINSA Distinguished Fellow IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Ahmed Alkhatib, and JINSA Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow John Hannah.

JINSA Research Associate, Rena Gabber, moderated the discussion.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror IDF Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy Distinguished Fellow. General Amidror was formerly the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the head of the National Security Council, from 2011-2013. Click here to read full bio

Ahmed Alkhatib Ahmed Alkhatib is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and leads Realign for Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse and develops a new policy framework for rejuvenated pro-Palestine advocacy. Click here to read full bio

John Hannah John Hannah is JINSA’s Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow. He served as former Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Security Advisor from 2005-2009 and as Vice President Cheney’s Deputy National Security Advisor for the Middle East from 2001-2005. Click here to read full bio

Rena Gabber Rena Gabber is a Research Associate for JINSA Senior Fellow John Hannah. She formerly worked as a Research Assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, focusing on Arab-Israel relations. Click here to read full bio

The post Watch Webinar – A Better Future for Gaza? Challenges, Risks, and Opportunities for the Gaza Roadmap appeared first on JINSA.

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The Iranian regime is reportedly nearing an interim deal with Oman and the United States for a new security model in the Strait of Hormuz. History—including recent events—shows that the Iranian regime will almost certainly attempt to violate this proposed deal, as well as any future ones. However, that’s just one part of the problem, JINSA President & CEO Michael Makovsky, PhD argued in an August 6 interview with Fox News Radio.

Dr. Makovsky stressed that, in his view, constantly seeking negotiations with Iran “comes with a cost” of its own, including repercussions reaching far beyond the Middle East. The indefinite U.S. pursuit of diplomacy, not military pressure, has “weakened our credibility,” including in the eyes of “the Chinese and the Russians,” Dr. Makovsky stated.

Therefore, Washington needs an Iran policy reset, according to Dr. Makovsky. That should involve America conducting large-scale military operations against Iran’s nuclear facilities, anti-ship capabilities, internal energy sites, and other high-value targets to threaten the Iranian regime’s existence.

The post JINSA President & CEO Michael Makovsky: Fruitless Iran Talks Hurt U.S. Deterrence Against China and Russia appeared first on JINSA.