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PANELISTS

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council

Elliot Abrams

Iran Policy Project Member, JINSA; Former U.S. Special Representative to Iran

Blaise Misztal

JINSA Vice President for Policy

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Associate Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel. 

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TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Ari Cicurel:

Thank you for joining us today, I’m Ari Cicurel, JINSA’s Associate Director for Foreign Policy. Today, we’ll be discussing what we know and what we still do not know about the deal between the United States and Iran that President Trump announced on Sunday. According to Vice President Vance, the deal has already been electronically signed, and there is a signing ceremony scheduled for Friday, although the text of the deal hasn’t been formally released yet. I’m joined by Ambassador Elliott Abrams, the former Special Representative to Iran and a member of JINSA’s Iran Policy Project, Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, and we hope to be joined later on by IDF Major General Yaakov Amidror (ret.), a JINSA Distinguished Fellow and the former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel. If you have questions for the panel, please submit them through Zoom. We’ll dig into each of the issues that the deal covers or avoids addressing. But, Blaise, I’ll start with you. For several days, U.S. and Iranian officials have been contradicting each other on sanctions relief, the nuclear file, the Strait of Hormuz, and Lebanon, and as I said, the text of this deal is still not released. How is each side spinning what is in the deal so far, and what’s your assessment of what has been discussed?

Blaise Misztal:

Yeah, thanks, Ari. First of all, I recommend to everyone watching the great infographic that JINSA put out, thanks to the hard work of Ari and the rest of the policy team. It tries to capture some of the different spins on what is in the deal that we started hearing, I think, as early as Friday of last week, with different reporting from Iranian sources and Israeli sources and U.S. sources on what was potentially in the deal. And I think it’s not surprising that each side tried to spin up the things that were most important to them, with Iranian sources focusing on the extent of sanctions relief that Iran was expected to get under the deal, including, I think, most importantly $300 billion in reconstruction assistance coming potentially from the United States or some coalition of the United States and its partners, in addition to the unfreezing of assets and the ceasing of the war entirely, and the withdrawing of U.S. forces from the region. Meanwhile, U.S. officials who were speaking on background or as anonymous sources to outlets were stressing more what it would force Iran to do, which is reopen the Strait and pledge to have no nuclear weapon. I think even though we still don’t know what’s in the deal, even though it technically has been signed, according to Vice President Vance, as you said, Ari, we’ve seen leaked text of the deal, and it seems like both sides were largely accurate, according to what we’ve seen. The deal, in fact, says that there will be $300 billion given to Iran for reconstruction. Iranian assets will be unfrozen at the same, as well as that within 30 days, U.S. forces will begin withdrawing from the area. The area is not well defined. We don’t know if that’s sort of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, merely the forces that are enforcing the naval blockade, and that all hostilities will cease, including in Lebanon. And in return, Iran pledges to allow shipping to resume through the Strait of Hormuz. It pledges not to have a nuclear weapon, and it agrees to a set of further talks that are supposed to lead to an agreement in the next 60 days on nuclear issues. In the meantime, while those talks are going on, Iran pledges to maintain the status quo of its nuclear program, which this is interpreted to mean make no further advances on the nuclear front. So, in fact, both sides, based on the reporting that we had as of last Friday, seem to have been giving accurate details, just more focusing on the things that were more important to each of them.

Ari Cicurel:

Thanks, Blaise. I would recommend two JINSA products to the audience. As you mentioned, JINSA released an infographic detailing those contradictory statements. JINSA CEO and President Mike Makovsky also released an analysis that you can find on JINSA’s website about how we arrived at this place with what appears to be a misguided deal after joint U.S. and Israeli military achievements during the war. General Amidror, thank you for joining us. I’ll move over to you. What’s the view from Israel about what has been reported in this deal so far?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

First of all, we don’t know, and we have to be very cautious when we say something about an agreement that each side leaked the details, which is important for it to be leaked and we don’t know what the text is exactly. It is clear that whatever the details are, the Americans are giving up the leverage that they had in the economic side, allowing money to come to Iran that way, another way. The details are not important. Nothing was given by the Iranians relating to the nuclear issue, and the negotiations will begin immediately, and theoretically, they will take 60 days. Don’t be surprised if, after 60 days, they will ask for another 60 days, and so on. From the Israeli point of view, it’s a bad agreement and we should not be misunderstood. Because whatever the details will be, the Americans are losing the leverage that they have. And during the 60 days, they will not have new leverage, and at the end of the 60 days, if they don’t achieve an agreement, Iran will be stronger, and another 60 days it will be even stronger. So, the process is clear. America is losing its leverage, the Iranians are becoming stronger and they negotiate. And from judging both teams of negotiators, it will not surprise you that I think that the Iranian team is not less competent than the American one. I speak very mildly. So, from the Israeli point of view, it’s a bad agreement. There is another element, which is very bad, and we begin to see it now. The Americans gave the Iranians the impression, and I don’t know what is in the agreement, and what was said between them, that the Iranians have a say in Lebanon, and this is against the American interest. The Americans, the Lebanese government, and Israel discussed the future of Lebanon under the American umbrella. What the Americans did is to tell the Lebanese and the Iranians, guys, Iran has a say in Lebanon. You think that you are the government of Lebanon. Very nice but take into account what the Iranians have to say. And they gave the Iranians the impression that they can say if Israel continues to wage a war in South Lebanon, the Iranian army will retaliate. So, it is leading to a totally different situation in which the Iranians lost the proxy leg of their strategy, and now they’re ready to commit themselves to defend the proxies. They believed that the proxies would do the war for them. They lost it. This is no question a huge, devastating situation for the Iranians. They lost the ability to have a ring of fire around Israel. And now they’re committing themselves to defend the proxies, and it might lead to war between Israel and Iran. And I hope that Americans will intervene immediately in telling the Iranians, guys, you’re not the sovereign in Lebanon. The Lebanese will have to take care of it. I don’t know what will happen. I think there is a lot of ambiguity around the region, but perhaps to assess with all the ambiguity the basis of the agreement, the structure of the agreement is a very bad one because the Iranians are getting a lot of economic support. It will allow them to be stronger in every field, and the Americans are going to begin the negotiations without the leverage. What will happen in the negotiations? I don’t know. There is one theoretical leverage that the President said. We have an alternative, meaning using force. You know better than me that it is not going to be easy after 60 days or 120 days to resume the war. It will be closer to the midterm elections in America, and I don’t see America resuming wars. It’s not going to be easy because theoretically, the alternative exists, and it might be used in the future, and maybe the Iranians will be stubborn enough to make the Americans understand, as the assessment of the CIA, that the Iranians are not going to fulfill the agreement. And remember, at the beginning of everything, this war was a result of the decision of the Iranians to destroy Israel. That was the mother and the father of the old strategy of the Iranians.

This is why they built Hamas, and they built Hezbollah, and they launched the war against Israel. It’s not Israel that initiated the war. It was initiated by Hamas, and then by Hezbollah, and of course, Iran twice. So, this is the beginning of the whole story, and something should be clear. The Iranians are now very strong in their words that they are committed to the destruction of the state of Israel. So, the basis of the whole situation in the Middle East, the aggressiveness of the Iranians was the basis, and now they’re saying our commitment to [destroy] Israel is still there. So, I don’t know what the Americans have in mind, how they’re going to change it or not going to change it, or are going to accept it. I don’t understand, and I don’t pretend that I understand. I’m not sure that Americans understand. But let’s see what will happen. From our point of view, Israel will have to keep the ability to defend itself. First of all, the highest priority in Lebanon is to continue the war against Hezbollah. We should not allow Hezbollah to rebuild itself near the borders of Israel, and if what I see is what is going to be agreed between America and Iran, Israel will have to make all the preparations for another war in 10 years.

Ari Cicurel:

I want to come back to Lebanon because we saw some critical developments there over the weekend, but Ambassador Abrams, President Trump carved out a strong anti-Iranian regime policy across both his terms in office. He made leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] and trying to get a better deal a feature of his election campaigns. Of course, you had a role in shaping that Iran policy in the first Trump administration. So, to the extent you can take us inside Trump’s thinking, how did we arrive at the Trump administration putting forward this deal? And based on what has been revealed so far, do you think we’re headed towards a good deal?

Elliott Abrams:

I generally agree with what General Amidror has just said. I think one can envision one better turn, which I’ll come to in a minute, but I think basically the president had another option, which was to increase the military pressure on Iran, and he did not want to take that option for a variety of reasons. I suppose he wants to be essentially a peace president. He wants to make deals like this. He’d like to make one in Ukraine. He does not like the idea of exposing American troops to fatal injuries and death. He does have an election coming in November, and he does have, I think, pressure from a number of Arab countries, not all, but a number of Arab countries, certainly from Oman and Qatar, to bring this to a close so that they are not hit again by Iran. The positions of others, particularly the Emiratis, may be a bit different. So, looking at all of this, at all these pressures, he decided he did not want to continue with the conflict, and was looking for a way out of it, if a good one could be found. Now, the one way that I can see that this arrangement isn’t so terrible, and I think it is pretty terrible, but I had been arguing, starting around May 1, that there was no good outcome here, and that what the president should try to do is go for a Hormuz deal only. We will end the blockade on Iran’s ports, Iran will open the Strait of Hormuz, and that’s all. And if he would announce, you know, we’ve obliterated their nuclear program again. If they start to rebuild it, we’ll hit it, but he didn’t do that. He kept talking about how we can’t stop unless we get that HEU [highly-enriched uranium]. The one thing that has occurred to me here is, I agree with the general, there’s no 60-day negotiation with the Iranians. If it’s 160 days, that would be short. So maybe the president figures, you know, I’ve got my Hormuz deal, we’re going to end our blockade, they’re going to open the straight, and we’ll start negotiating. After 60 days, we’ll continue to negotiate. Meanwhile, gas prices go down for the summer, and through the election, low gas prices, peace. Okay, then we get through the election, and then I’ll take another look at it. And if there’s no deal, or if they’re cheating on the deal, I can hit him. First of all, it’s probably not his view. It’s conceivably his view. I don’t think it works in part because the history of this is, in a sense, an arms control negotiation. This is what’s supposed to be about the nuclear program. The history of arms control agreements is that people who enter into them defend them, and defend them, and defend them. I go back to the arms control agreements we had with the Soviet Union, which they violated all the time. When they violated the agreement, there was a huge temptation in Washington to say that’s not really a violation, it’s not an important violation. The president today referred to a minor little drone attack by Hezbollah. That’s the temptation not to want to face up to what you will have to do if the agreement is violated and killed there by the other side. So, I don’t think my other idea here is going to work. I think what, in fact, is going to happen is the Iranians will use whatever monies they get out of this to rebuild everything. Now, some of it is to rebuild their economy, because significant damage has been done to their economy, to their defense industrial base. Some of it, obviously, as happened under the Obama deal, will go to the Houthis and Hezbollah and Hamas and Shia militias in Iraq. I think one question we don’t know is how much money they’re going to get. The $300 billion in my view, is an illusion. Whose $300 billion is this? In 2021, we heard about $400 billion that China was going to invest in Iran. It did not happen. How about all the money that’s being invested in Gaza? It’s an illusion.

I think that you can put out of mind. Where they will make money is number one, if the United States unfreezes billions and billions of dollars, and number two, oil revenue. Oil is now going for about $80 a barrel, roughly. Their first tanker passed through the Strait of Hormuz this week. They can now sell oil without a discount if there are no sanctions, so they will make tens of billions of dollars over the course of the next year. They produce 3 million barrels a day. 3 million barrels a day times $80 a barrel, add that up, multiply by 365. It’s an enormous amount of money that they would be getting. Forget the investment. I think the question here is partly, what are the exact terms of the deal, the way the general began, what we still don’t know, which is alarming in itself. The terms are apparently only a page and a half. Why haven’t we seen them? And then, secondly, will the United States be willing to enforce the deal? For example, no tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. For example, complete, I gather, access to all the nuclear sites, and no reconstitution of the nuclear program. I would end just by saying that two of the main criticisms of Obama’s deal were it didn’t cover missiles and it didn’t cover Iran’s support for its terrorist proxies, and apparently neither does this agreement.

Ari Cicurel:

That’s exactly where I wanted to take things next. So, thank you for that, that lead in. Blaise, even without seeing the final text, there have been a lot of comparisons made between this deal and the JCPOA. Based on what you’ve read about it, but also in the way the process is playing out with an initial agreement followed by later negotiations. Do you see those claims as valid?

Blaise Misztal:

Yeah, again with the caveat made by General Amidror and Ambassador Abrams that we haven’t seen the text of the deal, we don’t know what’s in it. I think that it certainly shapes up to be putting the United States on the path to negotiate something that is like, or perhaps even weaker, than the JCPOA. You know, before the JCPOA was struck in 2015 that was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We actually had the Joint Plan of Action in 2014, which sort of put a temporary freeze on Iran’s nuclear program and sort of allowed for some sanctions relief and set the stage for both more time for negotiations, which ultimately took a year, as well as perhaps confidence building by both sides that they could trust each other. I think there’s a lot of parallels in what is happening with this MOU to that earlier deal, in that apparently, at least in the text that we’ve seen online, it does have sort of a freeze, and maintains the status quo of Iran’s nuclear program. It does, as Ambassador Abrams said, give Iran some immediate sanctions relief by pledging the U.S. to put waivers on Iran’s sanctions on oil exports, meaning that it can start selling oil on the global market immediately, lifting all of those sanctions. But then there’s other things that suggest that if there is a final deal reached, whether it’s 60 days from now, 120 days or a year from now, that deal might actually be worse than the JCPOA in a couple of ways. Two that I’ll mention is, well, first of all, there’s a similarity. Yes, there’s no mention of missiles, there’s no mention of proxies, there’s no limitation, no suggestion that there’s going to be anything discussed beyond the nuclear program in the next round of negotiations. But then there are suggestions in the text that we’ve seen, if it is indeed the final and right text, that the U.S. is already giving up some concessions, greater concessions than it did in the JCPOA. The first of those is a pledge that the United States will not interfere in Iranian internal politics and activities. So, you know, this goes above and beyond saying, okay, we’re striking a deal with you, we may have our disagreements, but we have a nuclear deal that’s narrowly focused on the nuclear issue. This is in fact pledging that the United States is going to give up any hope of affecting support for human rights or internet freedom or support for protesters if there is another uprising in Iran like we saw in January. And so, this is really a stark turnaround from President Trump in January, saying ‘help is coming’, telling the Iranians ‘don’t kill protesters’, saying on February 28 when he launched this war that ‘this is your time’ to the Iranian people. He has basically done a complete 180, and this deal certainly suggests that the phrase that he’s used at various points over the last year and a half in office of “Make Iran Great Again” is really the operative idea behind this deal. But it gets worse, at least according to the text we’ve seen. If it is accurate, the United States pledges to lift all the sanctions on Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at least maintained the fiction that there were sanctions for nuclear issues and for terrorism and other issues, and that the JCPOA was only based on nuclear-related sanctions. That is, that the United States was lifting sanctions that were put in place as a result of Iran’s nuclear program, that other sanctions could stay in place, and other new sanctions for non-nuclear-related Iranian activities could be put in place.

This is getting rid of that entirely. If the text is accurate, it puts the United States in a place where it’s pledging to eliminate all U.S. sanctions of any kind and all multilateral sanctions at the International Atomic Energy Agency for Iran’s nuclear program at the United Nations and other international bodies. So, this goes much further in terms of getting rid of sanctions than the JCPOA did, and then there’s the matter of the frozen assets, as Ambassador Abrams alluded to. The deal, the text that we’ve seen, if it’s accurate, is not entirely very clear on what is at play, but it certainly suggests that all Iranian frozen assets are going to be given back to Iran, or Iran’s going to be given access to them, which would again be a step further than the JCPOA went, which only gave Iran access to about half of its frozen assets at the time. So, in a number of areas, particularly as it relates to sanctions relief, but also in this pledge not to meddle in Iranian internal affairs, to give up the idea of supporting the Iranian people. This could be setting up a final agreement, if it’s ever reached, that could be much worse.

Elliott Abrams:

Can I just jump in on that? I think the point about interfering in their internal affairs is important, and it’s important to remember there’s a long history here going back to the Cold War. The Russians, the Soviet Union at that time, were always complaining about American intervention in their internal affairs, and the American response all week was, wait a minute, you’re a member of the United Nations, you’ve signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, you’ve pledged all these things. All we’re doing is holding you to these standards. As the way it works now, I mean, the only people who are not able to interfere in their internal affairs are Iranians, who have no control of their own internal affairs. In the Soviet case, you all know we supported, for example, Andrei Sakharov, and the Committee on Human Rights in the Soviet Union. We supported the then Anatoly Sharansky and the movement for Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. So, again we’ll see if the United States takes the position that we are simply abandoning the people of Iran, which is the way it looks today, that we’ll have nothing to say about Iranian internal affairs. It is, first of all, in my view, a deeply moral position for the United States. Secondly, it’s very stupid, because in the long run, the only solution to the problem of the Islamic Republic and its aggression and repression is the end of the Islamic Republic, and you know this was Ronald Reagan’s view. It was not that he had to have a war with the Soviet Union, but it was that ultimately the Soviet Union would fall, and meanwhile we would do what we could peacefully to bring that day about. Remember, Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall. So, if this is the new position of the United States, it’s pretty amazing.

Blaise Misztal:

If I could jump in on that. Sorry to keep interrupting you, Ari, but just one quick point. You know, Ambassador Abrams raised one possible better path that this deal could put us on in his previous comments. Which is to say, all right, we sort of open up the strait, we push the economic pain away, get through the elections, and then evaluate where we are. There was perhaps another potentially available path to the United States, which is to say, okay, we open up the strait, we get past this conflict, but we learned the lesson that the past several administrations haven’t learned, which is the problem that we have is the regime of the Islamic Republic. And even if we can’t solve that problem or kick the can too far down the road today, then this is the point at which we invest in a long-term strategy to bring down the Islamic Republic, like we did in the 1980s and earlier against the Soviet Union, as Ambassador Abrams just said. Right, so we think back in 2009, Iran had the Green Movement, and President Obama basically ignored it because he wanted to negotiate the JCPOA. In 2017 and 2018, there were uprisings in Iran for economic reasons, and President Trump didn’t do much, although there was actually some reportable support coming from Secretary Pompeo and others in the administration, like Ambassador Abrams. At that time, there was a lot of pro-Iranian messaging coming from U.S. public diplomacy, but there wasn’t a lot of support or long-term strategy. In 2022, we had the death of Mahsa Amini and the massive women life freedom movement that was birthed in Iran, and President Biden did nothing because he was trying to negotiate JCPOA 2.0. So this time around, especially after President Trump pledged to come to the aid of Iranians after what happened in January, even if we couldn’t do it during this war, even if we had to accept this deal, we could say all right, let’s invest in the long-term strategy, so the next time the Iranians rise up, we actually have a plan. We’ve actually trained the opposition, we’ve given them the tools, and we’ve found the leaders, we’ve put them in a position to which they can actually execute and bring down this regime that would be our most potent weapon. In fact, as I’ve written with our President and CEO Mike Makovsky, the Iranians are our most potent weapon, and we’ve been ignoring them, and this just pledges that we’ll ignore them further, and I think that is really one of the weakest points of this deal.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Yes, but all your history of briefing and all of that is not connected at all, to disagree. It is going totally against the spirit of disagreement, so what are the chances that it will be changed? I don’t know, maybe you know better than me, but from what I see, the Americans are not doing what you are telling yourself that America should be.

Elliott Abrams:

No, I think that’s right, and if you look at the case of Venezuela, it suggests that the President is uninterested in this kind of approach. What he did in Venezuela was to decapitate the regime and then call it regime change. He never talks about actual democratization of Venezuela, real regime change. And we see that, I think, also in the case of Iran, so you know we’re trying to find here and there, a ray of light that suggests maybe things aren’t as bad as they probably are, and we won’t know for sure until Friday, I guess, But what we do know so far suggests a deal that is quite disadvantageous to the United States, I would argue to all our friends, partners, allies in the region, Arab and Israeli.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I think that what you’ve just said about the lesson in the Middle East now of all the leaders is that they cannot trust America, and you will see all the Gulf countries slowly, slowly will go to Iran to pay protection money and to buy the relations between those countries and Iran. Because if this is America, we have to [have] better relations with Iran, and if there is a need, we are ready to pay [for] the protection. It will make a totally different Middle East in the future, if that could be the result of the agreement. I am very pessimistic.

Elliott Abrams:

We saw at least two countries try to do this in a way, Oman and Qatar. Over the last 5 or 10 years, they were the ones who wanted to be the most friendly to Iran. Nevertheless, they were hit badly. I mean, the greatest single piece of damage was Qatar, with the Ras Laffan LNG.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

This is why the Qataris are now going to connect the electricity grid to the Iranian grid. That will guarantee a kind of reliance that no one can disconnect, and you will see it all over the Gulf and maybe the Middle East. The countries are going to buy the protection by paying the Iranians with something.

Elliott Abrams:

Well, I think there they will do more than that—that is, I think you’ll also see an effort to diminish the importance of the Strait of over the next 5 or 10 years.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Yes, that’s for sure. But they want to bypass Hormuz because they don’t want someone else to control their ability to export oil. You are right about it, but it’s not just oil. It’s the many productions which are connected to oil, and so on and so forth. It is not just oil, and it is not so easy to move all these productions and to bypass the Hormuz Strait. But it is two different issues. One, they will do whatever is needed to invest in a project that will bypass the Hormuz Strait, either to the Red Sea or even to Jordan and then to Syria and to the Mediterranean or Israel and the Mediterranean. But at the same time, and without any connection to that, they will try to edge and to buy protection because they understand that Iran is the strongest force, and the Iranians don’t hesitate, and America cannot be trusted

Ari Cicurel:

On the issue of regime repression, I would recommend another piece out from JINSA today by JINSA’s Sarah Havdala, documenting all the ways that Iran has continued to oppress the Iranian people, even as it faced fire throughout the war. Unfortunately, as it’s been mentioned many times, the Iranian people are not mentioned anywhere in what’s reported on these deals. As a reminder, if you have questions for the panelists, please submit them through Zoom. General Amidror, I’ll come back to you.

Elliott Abrams:

Before you do that, Ari, you just asked for questions. I have a question for General Amidror, and it’s about Lebanon. I mean, the President made a completely ridiculous statement today in France, saying that you know who would really handle Hezbollah correctly, Syria.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Yes, of course. If you bring these Syrians into Lebanon, what you see is kind of devastating pushing. I mean rape and killing, and between them, these Sunnis, which had been oppressed by Hezbollah for so many years, and Hezbollah, that will be done, no one in Israel will protest. But if you want to see a real genocide, give the Sunnis of Syria the ability to go into Lebanon.

Elliott Abrams:

It’s crazy, and obviously the president is unaware that the Syrians were in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005 occupying and murdering, we think, 60,000 Lebanese over that 29-year period.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

This time it will be even worse because now they have to make some revenge on the war, which was waged by Hezbollah against them during the West. The war in Syria, it’s another toxic situation. They will kill them all.

Elliott Abrams:

Here is my question: there’s wall to wall support in Israel for continuing the fight against Hezbollah, for preventing Hezbollah from reestablishing itself, for example, in the south of Lebanon. That would suggest that the kinds of conflict we’ve seen in the last few weeks will continue, whatever I think, whatever President Trump says. What is going to happen here? Do you think Hezbollah is likely to escalate the fight, drone attacks, or to simply try in a more stealthy manner to move south toward the border?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I don’t know. The interest of Hezbollah now is to gain time because they understand that the more the IDF is pushing, they are losing. By the way, in most of the cases they don’t fight. In most of the cases they are retreating, and what we found before is something huge that they are losing. We are going to take all of that and to neutralize these facilities. And geographically we are now in a much better position to go down towards the Mediterranean, and I don’t see how Hezbollah can stop us meaningfully. And this is why the Iranians are so alarmed by this situation, and they are saying today, if you continue to [wage] war in South Lebanon, we will attack Israel directly. Because they understand that it is a battle about the existence of Hezbollah as a military organization. The more that we are pushing, the less they have alternatives regarding only the military. And on speaking about dismantling Hezbollah and all the political issues, which we are negotiating with the government of Lebanon, does it have any ability to do something against Hezbollah? And for sure now, when the Americans make the big mistake, the huge mistake, giving the Iranians the impression that they have a say in the future of Lebanon, I don’t understand, let alone the Iranian issue. Here, you have something that you are promoting. You brought us and the Lebanese to Washington, and said, guys, sit together and find a solution to Lebanon. What do you do, you bring the Iranians in. Which government in Lebanon will be ready to do something in this situation? Who in Lebanon will be ready to put pressure on Hezbollah when the Americans are bringing Hezbollah and Iran in? I don’t understand it. I don’t understand the logic. From our point of view, this is the area in which we should say to the Americans, no, it is our interest, and we’ll continue to degrade the ability of Hezbollah to attack Israel. I understand Iran is big. Your interest is in Iran and the Hormuz Strait. In Lebanon, you don’t have any interest. It is the interest of Israel. We thought that you are with us because you brought the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government wants Hezbollah to be disarmed, not us. What we are doing is the policy of the government of Lebanon, and you brought in again Iran, and you give Iran the position in the future of Lebanon. I really don’t understand it. It’s totally misunderstood. I mean, for all the mistakes that you can say, I don’t agree, but I understand. In Lebanon, I don’t understand Lebanon, let alone I don’t agree, and I think that this is the area in which is very high priority for us. And the reason which concerns us in Israel is that we should continue to degrade the ability of Hezbollah to Turkey, and I think this is the area in which the government should say to the administration, guys, enough is enough. Here is our interest, and we will continue if we have to disagree. This is the area in which we disagree.

Ari Cicurel:

Ambassador Abrams. You took the conversation exactly where I wanted to go back to Lebanon. So, I’ll prompt you with a question on the topic. As you mentioned, the President broke with Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly and in personal terms over the Israeli strike on Beirut. What do you think went into Trump’s decision? Of course, he has criticized Israeli strikes before, but this seemed to be on a different level. Is this a discrete issue, or does it potentially bode potential problems going forward?

Elliott Abrams:

I think it is not a discrete issue in the sense that it’s in the context of the Iran deal, and he wants the signing to happen on Friday. He wants the negotiations to begin, and he wants the conflict to end. So, he is saying to the Israelis, stop. No Israeli government, and I think I’m right in this that if Israel has a new prime minister after the elections this fall that policy toward Hezbollah will not change. And I think actually General Amidror is giving very good advice in the sense that what the Prime Minister and others in the Israeli government should now be saying quietly is we cannot do that, cannot do that. We cannot allow Hezbollah to operate freely in Lebanon, and we will never do that again. And so, if you continue to link this to the Iran deal, then you are creating, you Americans are creating excuses for Iran to get out of the deal, or break the deal, or, for example, to reimpose some kind of constraint on the Strait of Hormuz. So it is in the American interest, if you want that deal to survive to break the connection with Lebanon. Just say what happens in Lebanon will not stop us from the deal that is about the Strait of Hormuz, that is about the Iranian nuclear program, above all. I agree with the General, but I think from the president’s point of view, the linkage to Lebanon is not in his interest, and he does not seem, I think, to understand that if he wants this Iran deal to survive, he’s got to break that linkage.

Ari Cicurel:

We have a question in from [questioner] to both General Amidror and Ambassador Abrams. How damaging is the deal and the president’s rhetoric against Netanyahu for Abraham Accords, given that those countries won’t see an alliance with Israel benefiting them, and how should an Israeli leader who worked closely on the military campaign feel about this humiliation?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I don’t want to speak about humiliation. It’s not a story between, you know, friends in school. It’s two countries with different interests at the moment. We have to deal with it. About the Abraham Accords, I think it’s the end of the Abraham Accords. No leader in the Middle East will join the Abraham Accords when America is so weak, when the Iranians are so strong. So, if the Americans want to extend the Abraham Accords they have to negotiate in another way, during this 60 days, and to show that America is ready to put pressure on the Iranians, and to show the Iranians that America is strong. I mean, weak America, no one is doing an Abraham Accords extension. It’s a La La Land dream.

Elliott Abrams:

I would say I think that is correct with respect to the extension to additional countries. Now, I think the Accords will survive in the sense that the Arab countries that are in them, will not renounce them or pull out. I think from the point of view of the Emirates, in particular, the cooperation, the military, the high tech, the economic cooperation with Israel is valuable to them. So, the Abraham Accords, as we know them now, will survive, but if we’re talking essentially, I guess, about the Saudis, I don’t see why Mohammad bin Salman would want to join the Abraham Accords now.

Ari Cicurel:

General Amidror, Israel came out very strongly against the 2015 JCPOA with Prime Minister Netanyahu traveling to Washington, speaking in front of Congress against the deal. A very assertive diplomatic campaign against the agreement. Where do you see Israel going, both diplomatically, as well as militarily, going forward as the Trump administration pushes forward with this deal?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Israel didn’t make anything militarily after the agreement of President Obama. Probably will not do anything militarily now. Israel, diplomatically, the security is totally different because there is not any other alternative within the American Congress that will support Israel. So in this case, it’s a waste of time to speak in the Congress. Israel will have to learn how to secure its interests when the administration in America judges the situation in a different way. We had many years during which Israel didn’t see the situation as it was understood in Washington. We have to learn again to review this situation. How far the disagreement will go, and the steps would be done by the Americans, I don’t know. But at least two areas are very clear. We think that the issue of the missiles should be there, and if it is not in the agreement, it’s clear that the Iranians will produce all missiles, and we’ll have to stop it. I don’t know what will happen regarding the nuclear project. Americans are promising everything, but I don’t know what will happen after we [see] the shift in the position about the negotiation with Iran, and so and so forth. I don’t know what will happen about the negotiation regarding the nuclear issue, and about Lebanon. I don’t know what the Americans promised the Iranians, what the Iranians understood for what was said or was not said by the Americans. Israel should be very clear. There is no connection between the ceasefire in Iran and the situation in Lebanon, and if we have to retaliate, it will be attacked by the Iranians. We will do it with the Americans or without Americans,

Ari Cicurel:

Ambassador Abrams, how do you read the politics of the deal? Both in terms of domestic politics, and there appear to be divisions within the Trump administration, at least reportedly, about who is in favor and pushing the deal.

Elliott Abrams:

Well, there are different opinions within the administration. It’s not a surprise, and everyone obviously wants the president. I mean, he gets advice, and then he makes up his mind, and then people within the administration support the decision. I mean, it’s interesting that Secretary Rubio has been pretty quiet in the last few days about all of this, and the person who we associate with this is the Vice President. It is a bit odd, actually, that the Vice President was in Islamabad, you know. Normally, it would be the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, and it’s a little bit odd for the Vice President to be in Geneva, I guess, Friday to sign this. Odd, in part, because it’s not the traditional role of any Vice President, and because there is no equivalent person coming from Iran. I mean the equivalent representative would be Pezeshkian, the president, not the speaker of the National Assembly. So, this agreement is more associated with the Vice President, and, you know, you have to think about that in terms of how does the agreement roll out and what is the impact on American domestic politics and 2028? I do think the president is trying to get this whole subject off the table for our domestic politics. You know, you sign Friday, and then negotiations begin, not in the press. Secret negotiations, I assume, that will go on theoretically until the middle of July, but in reality, can extend well into the fall and past our elections. So, I think one of the things the president is going to try to do here is just get this off the center stage. It would help if he would stop talking about it, which he may or may not do, because as we have seen in this discussion today, and any website you look at, there are a lot of quotations from the president about it, about Iran, about Lebanon. And if he wants less attention to this during our summer and campaign season, he’s got to stop talking about it.

Ari Cicurel:

General Amidror, this is a question from [questioner]. Do you see a reconstitution of the Iranian missile inventory and air defense systems in the near future?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

No question. This is the first step that they will do. They promise not to change anything in the nuclear project. There is not any commitment regarding the anti-air systems and the production of the missiles. I’m sure that other countries, including China, will be more than happy to help them, and this is why I said that the negotiations will be done under different circumstances. Because Iran will be stronger every day, and the Americans are losing leverage every day. So, it is the interest of the Iranians that it will be a very long process. That even if the end would be a crisis in which the Americans, say, you know what, we are using the alternative, we will face much stronger Iran, because those, the missiles and the anti-air system will be there. I don’t know how long it will take the Iranians to rebuild the ability to produce missiles and what will be the number of anti-air missiles, which will be brought in from other countries, and will produce inside Iran. But no question every day Iran will be stronger and the Americans weaken.

Ari Cicurel:

Blaise, will President Trump need to submit this agreement to Congress under the terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and how will that shape the politics and policy of the deal?

Blaise Misztal:

Yeah, that’s an interesting question. I want to weigh in on Lebanon really quickly, just because General Amidror says we don’t know what’s in the deal. We don’t, but I’ve seen the same texts now leaked from multiple different sources, some U.S., some Arab. So I think what we’re seeing is probably right, and the very first paragraph says Iran in the U.S., together with their allies in the current war, declare upon signing an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. I mean, there’s various ways to parse that legalistically, but if you read that in the broadest sense possible, the United States is committing Israel not to engage in any hostile activities, or even the threat or use of force against Iran, or any of its proxies. Perhaps that’s a permanent end to war. Perhaps that is not a problem while President Trump is in office. Perhaps that will give Israel the wiggle room it needs to beat back threats in Lebanon, or continue operations in Gaza as needed, or do what it needs to do. But if this agreement remains in force and there is a democratic president, this will be used to constrain any and all Israeli action. And I think this is going to put Israel in a really tough spot in its relations with the United States. If, in fact, this language of their allies declares a permanent end to the war on all fronts is in the deal. Now, really quickly, to your question about congressional review. It’s complicated and legalistic. I think, in short, the answer is yes. In 2015, Congress passed a law called the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act [INARA], because they were so mad that President Obama negotiated the JCPOA and did not submit it as a treaty to Congress that required Senate ratification. And so they passed a law saying anything that is an agreement between the United States and Iran, no matter what form it takes, if it’s signed, if it’s unsigned, if it’s political, if it’s a handshake in the back room, any agreement that’s related to Iran’s nuclear program has to come up before a vote in Congress. By my reading, if this is in fact the text of the deal, as it’s been leaked, since it says that Iran pledges to maintain the status quo of its nuclear program. This is both an agreement, it’s related to its nuclear program, and the United States is a party to it. Therefore, it meets the very broad criteria of the INARA Act, which means that under the terms of that law, the president is required within five days of reaching, the text says reaching a deal, to submit it to Congress. I assume that that clock started when he sent his Truth Social post right after the UFC fight on Sunday night, which means about the time that it’s being signed in Geneva, it should be being transmitted to Congress. It has not yet. I think it’s telling not only that Israel hasn’t seen the text of this deal, members of Congress haven’t seen the text of this deal, but they’re, I would say, legally required to get it by Friday. President Trump said today he hadn’t thought of sending it to Congress, but he’s not opposed to it. So perhaps we will, in fact, see that happen. But I will also point out that the law is actually very weak, and maybe Congress can vote against the bill against the deal, but the president can veto it, so the chances of Congress stopping the deal are basically nonexistent. What will be interesting is the conundrum that this puts Democrats in. Do they vote for something that President Trump did, which they’ve refused to do on basically anything so far, or do they vote to bring an end to the war, which was presumably what they’re in favor of? So, it’ll be interesting to see how Democrats treat this, and how some of the Republicans who’ve been outspoken against a deal treat this. So, it’ll be politically interesting, but I don’t think it will change anything in terms of how we deal with Iran, or whether this deal goes through or not.

Ari Cicurel:

Well, we’ve run up against our time, we could talk about this much longer, and I’m sure there will be more coming out from JINSA on this as we do find out more what is actually in the deal. But thank you to our audience, to Blaise, Ambassador Abrams, and General Amidror for joining us. You can find all of JINSA’s work on our website jinsa.org. Please check your email inboxes for our next webinar and future publications, especially as we learn more about the details of this deal. I hope everyone enjoys the rest of their day.

The post Transcript: Webinar – U.S.-Iran Deal Reached appeared first on JINSA.

John Hannah, the Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, served as national security advisor to former Vice President Dick Cheney. 

Originally published in the Washington Examiner.

The post Trump Is Stuck and His Iran Leverage Is Spent appeared first on JINSA.

PANELISTS

Rep. Elise Stefanik (NY-21)

Member, House Armed Services Committee; House Committee on Education and the Workforce; and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The discussion was moderated by JINSA President and CEO Michael Makovsky, PhD.

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TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Michael Makovsky:

Hi, I am Michael Makovsky. I am the President and CEO at JINSA. Welcome. I am really pleased to have today join us Congresswoman Elise Stefanik, who is currently serving her sixth term representing New York’s 21^st District. Let me give you a little background on her. Of course, we’re going to be talking about her book. Congresswoman Stefanik made history as the youngest woman ever elected to Congress. She later served as the chair of the House Republican Conference. And she sits—which is very important obviously to JINSA and our supporters in particular—on the House Armed Services Committee, the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, among many other assignments. She is widely recognized for her work on national security and became a national figure in particular, well-recognized for her work on education and questioning of Harvard’s, Columbia’s and MIT’s presidents on the outbursts of anti-Israel and Antisemitic activity. And we’re going to talk today about her book, Poisoned Ivies—which is a great title—the inside account of the academic and moral rot of America’s elite universities and it talks a lot about her hearing and what led up to it and what has followed since then. Congresswoman Stefanik, it’s an honor to have you. I should say also [she is] a great supporter of Israel, which is very important to everyone in the JINSA community. So, thank you so much for all that.

Elise Stefanik:

Well, thank you so much. Thank you for all the great work that JINSA does. We have worked very closely with my Congressional office over the years and in addition to my work on the Education Committee, I serve on the House Armed Services and House Intelligence Committees and have done so throughout my time in Congress. But very excited for the opportunity to talk about this important book and really to dive into the “hearing heard around the world” with the university presidents from MIT, Penn, and Harvard, that really was the turning point in American higher education.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, I want to get into all the questions, but if I may just say editorially, I’ve watched that hearing and particularly those clips of you asking that—I watched it a number of times just to see your questioning and the reaction, including the facial expressions of these presidents. Just to make sure, I will never forget it. Really a tremendous job on that, and I want to delve into all that. I just want to say though, before we get into all the questions, I personally don’t read a lot of political books. I don’t read books by politicians, to be candid. They’re generally not that interesting, and all they do is self-serve. However, this is a really interesting book. I find it really compelling. You learn a lot of information—some of it is a review of what was publicized—but there’s a lot that was not publicized. And it really gives you an inside account, and it’s not just about the hearing. But the book reviews, which we will get into, a lot of the other universities, and what has been happening before and since that hearing. So really kudos on a really well-written, compelling book, Congresswoman.

Elise Stefanik:

Well, thank you. You’re right. It’s not a traditional political book, and usually for an elected official or a politician, the first book is often just the story of themselves. That’s not this book. I made a conscious decision that I wanted to talk about an issue that matters tremendously to the American people. And I do talk a little bit about my educational background and the hearing itself and how I conducted the Congressional oversight. But I really tried to do a deep dive into each of these schools and highlight many of the students who were unbelievable, extraordinary leaders and testified in front of Congress so I go into that in the Harvard chapter, in the Penn chapter, in the Columbia chapter. So, I appreciate you saying it’s not a typical political book, because it isn’t. It’s a book about an issue and it’s a subject matter. And that was my choice to publish this as my first book. And it’s an important one. There’s a reason why it debuted as the best-selling non-fiction book in America. Because people are really asking questions of how higher education lost its way.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah. And I think it’s a model for a lot of other books by elected officials, I would say. Because it’s so substantive. So really, kudos, which obviously reflects on the author, by definition. So let’s get into it. Before we get into some of the details, if we can step back, and you do address this in the book but I think it’s good for the audience to hear. Before we get into what happened in that hearing, how do you explain, broadly, what’s happening on college campuses? How did we even get to the point to what happened on October 7^th?

Elise Stefanik:

The book goes into this. So, we saw, of course, in the immediacy after the October 7^th Hamas attack against Israel, which was the bloodiest day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust. You saw an explosion of pro-Hamas encampments and Antisemitism on America’s elite universities. But my book goes into how this didn’t happen overnight. This was decades of decay that got to this point and there was this stunning rise in Antisemitism even prior to October 7^th. And the book chronicles that. And then, of course, it hit a fever pitch in terms of on October 8^th and beyond. So that not only is what the book discusses, but that was the pretext that led to the Congressional hearing. You saw this explosion and the public saw these takeovers of these university campuses by pro-Hamas encampments. You saw physical assaults against Jewish students, incessant targeting and harassment, and the breaking of the rules of the universities, and yet a failure of leadership to discipline and to make sure that students were protected on campus, particularly American Jewish students. That was what led to us having the hearing, and I encouraged my colleague to haul in the presidents of MIT, Penn, and Harvard. I myself graduated from Harvard. I was the first member of my immediate family to have that opportunity, and it was really unrecognizable to me what was happening on campus. It was not like that when I was a student there 20 years ago. So, somewhere along these lines, these schools lost their way, and the book does a deep dive into how this happened, why this happened, what is happening on these campuses, and how we can fix it. Which is the most important part of this—how we save higher American higher education.

Michael Makovsky:

By the way, to clarify, if I’m not mistaken, you’re the first person in your immediate family that went to college, is that right?

Elise Stefanik:

Yes, to graduate from college, and that was a big deal. I know that so many parents are listening, and when you focus, and my parents did very much, on giving better educational opportunities. I mean, that was a life changer. And I talk about this in the book. I had a very positive experience at Harvard. Of course, it was left-leaning, but it wasn’t like it is today, where you saw this specific targeting of Jewish students who face assaults on campus and a lack of leadership from the university. So, something happened in the last 20 years, and we got to dig out of it. We have to be vigilant on this issue.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, let me ask you, by the way, I got my PhD there around the time you, I think, graduated college, I’m a little older than you, but I didn’t see any of this either, and I used to wear a yarmulke. I don’t now, but when I did my first year at Harvard, I never had any problems. I can’t imagine doing that now, but it’s really a disgrace. Let me ask you, I know it’s not in the book, it’s not your focus. But before we just get into all of it, when you say what led up to it, I’m curious. You have young kids, right? You have two young kids?

Elise Stefanik:

One. I have one young son who’s four. Yeah.

Michael Makovsky:

Elise Stefanik:

Absolutely. You could write a whole other book, and I might do it, on K through 12, and the challenges in K through 12, we’re seeing that. Certain states are better than others. New York State, where I’m from, is moving in the wrong direction when it comes to K through 12, with the curricula that is in some cases Antisemitic, with allowing foreign dollars to flow into the K through 12—even the public system—that’s very concerning as well. Certain states are taking strong leadership at the governor’s level and state legislatures. Unfortunately, we’re not seeing that in states like New York. So, yes, there is a pipeline issue, even before you get to colleges and universities with what’s happening in our educational system. And the book also makes the case that this is not just about Antisemitism. Antisemitism is the “canary in the coal mine” for broader attacks on anti-Americanism and Western values, Western civilization. And that’s why I think the hearing resonated with so many people across the country. It was the most viewed hearing in the history of Congress, with over 1 billion views in a week, because it really captured the public’s attention and culminated with what’s so very wrong with the trajectory of our education system.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, I agree. I look forward to if you do delve into that book, because I’m seeing this with my daughter now in her school, and it’s very upsetting. Alright, let’s delve back into the hearing now. Maybe you could explain, if you don’t mind giving a little teaser, you know, because one of the things you say in the book is you almost weren’t there, right, at the hearing? I think that is interesting.

Elise Stefanik:

Well, yeah, I go behind the scenes into sort of what the preparation and what a day of a hearing looks like. And I had one of the worst flus I’ve ever had—and this is just a detail of prior to the hearing—and you can see in the video footage I had the box of Kleenex next to me in the hearing, and just was really run down. I knew how important this hearing was, and I had done so much research. I was one of the reasons why the hearing happened, was because I had encouraged my colleague; these are the schools we need to haul in. I had spent a tremendous amount of time talking to fellow alumni, as well as students who are currently on campus, and I had no idea that it was going to be as important of a hearing, but it was just important to me. Important to me based on the policy work, and also working and caring deeply about the education issue and crisis that this country is facing. So, I do talk about that. I talk about the question itself, how in the hearing, and this was very organic, my colleagues—you often hear it in Congressional hearings—they’ll yield time. The Republican members started yielding me time when they had a remaining two or three minutes, so I had six or seven rounds of questions. That was organic, not planned, and it was because my colleagues realized I had done so much preparation for the hearing and was asking very effective questions, and the question heard around the world also almost didn’t happen, because these day long Congressional hearings I had done my six rounds—you usually only get one round—we broke for votes when you go to the House floor, so I went to the House floor and voted, and I didn’t think I’d get another round of questions. And I remember my chiefs of staff and I were saying, “do we go back?” You know, I’ve asked more rounds than anyone else. And there was one member left, she was the most junior member, and she said, “if I have extra time, I’ll yield it to you,” so I went back. That’s why the video footage, you’ll see the hearing room is almost completely empty, and there’s only like two members left. She yielded me her last three minutes, and I thought, ‘how can I ask this in the most direct way possible to force them to answer correctly?” And the question was this: “Does calling for the genocide of Jews violate your university’s code of conduct?” I expected them to say yes. To my shock, and I was planning on following up what disciplinary action has been taken, to my shock, MIT, Penn, and Harvard, one after the other, after the other, said it depends on the context, and I couldn’t believe it. I knew it was going to be an important question that was very revealing. I would never have predicted that it would become the most viewed testimony in the history of Congress. It led to a complete earthquake in higher education that we’re still feeling reverberations of today. The resignation of the Penn president, the resignation of the Harvard president, preemptive resignations of other university presidents, because we are about to subpoena them. Eventually, the toppling of the Columbia president, so it has had a cataclysmic impact on higher education,

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah. I got to ask you. By the way, I’m just gonna say, as someone who lives in Washington, there’s nothing wrong with this, but it’s well known that members of Congress are very staffed up, and then some members are completely reliant on their staff, and maybe others less so. And it’s impressive that you, as you explain that this is just something you would think about, these questions were just coming out of your head that wasn’t pre-planned at all, which makes it even more, to me, impressive and interesting actually.

Elise Stefanik:

Yeah, it’s interesting. I mean, I’m in my sixth term, 12 years. I’ve been at the highest levels of Congressional leadership, and I’ve realized over time, and have a tremendous staff, they do extraordinary research and policy work. But I find that the traditional way of asking Congressional questions can be very, you know, more of a statement—a two-minute-long opening statement, and then a very dense question that’s not revealing. I’ve found and honed this over the years, that often asking the most direct, simple questions are actually the most revelatory and impactful and deliver the most change to pursue policy ends. In this case, I wrote the question and I do what’s called a “question tree.” I sort of write it real-time in the hearing. The other thing I talk about is that sitting in the hearing, in total, allows you to do follow-ups, and I’ve done that a lot over the years. Sometimes members just come in for their five minutes, and they move on to the other hearing. I get it, busy schedules, but I’ve just found that it’s important to listen, so that you can make adjustments on the fly. Interestingly, I talk about in the book how many newly elected members now reach out to me, and they have for years, about how to conduct Congressional questioning, and how you really make an impact at these hearings in a way that’s not traditional on Capitol Hill.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, good. I appreciate your mentoring of them on that. Do you, by the way, obviously Harvard given that you went there, and obviously that became the most famous case, I think, in the situation of Claudine Gay. But if I may just ask, because the story of MIT, and you write about it in your book but she’s still there, right? And by the way, I may add, she’s Jewish, as far as I know. And you lay out how bad it was at the MIT campus. How did she actually survive on this?

Elise Stefanik:

I’ve talked to many people, both who are on the board of MIT, but I have also spoken with her. She deeply regrets how she answered that question, and she was able to hang on to the position. They have made some changes at MIT—the elimination of the Antisemitic DEI program. She has stood up for various Jewish professors that were under significant assault and harassment, but there are still major problems at MIT. The interesting thing about the question is, I started that question with MIT, not because she was Jewish, but because MIT is a technical school, and I viewed it as not as forgone as the Penns and the Harvards of the world. She did not answer correctly, but then the answers got worse as you went to Penn, and then, of course, you went to Claudine Gay. And by the end, it was, it depends on the context, or it’s a context-dependent decision, and that was the reason why I think both, in the case of Harvard and Penn, they were forced out. The MIT portion of the book, I do go into really jaw-dropping detail of examples like the “mapping project,” where literally either Jewish-owned businesses or Jewish organizations or research centers that happen to be led by a leader who is Jewish, are specifically mapped and targeted. I mean, these are snapshots out of 1930s pre-World War II, and the fact that this is happening at America’s elite institutions is deeply concerning to me as an American. And also, I’m not Jewish, I’m Catholic. It’s very important for all Americans to speak out against Antisemitism, and I think that helped me demonstrate why this issue is important to every American.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, I appreciate that very much. And I want to ask you, you just said you’re not Jewish. But do you have many Jews in your district, if I may ask?

Elise Stefanik:

Well, New York, as we know, there are many Jewish families in New York State. In my district, I don’t have a large, large number, but I grew up with many Jewish friends. I went to an all-girls day school. It was right next to a synagogue. I grew up with many Jewish friends going to Bat and Bar Mitzvahs, and just was raised with very great parents who taught me, you know, the importance of moral leadership and right and wrong. I also had a great education where we learned about the horrors of the Holocaust, and one of the issues that I’ve worked on well prior to this hearing, is making sure that we are teaching the horrors of the Holocaust in K through 12. I was the lead Republican on the grant funding that’s run by the Holocaust Memorial Museum regarding Holocaust education in K through 12. So, I have a body of work in this space, and it really culminated in this hearing.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, you’ve also been a great supporter of Israel.

Elise Stefanik:

Yes, and I went to Israel as an undergraduate. I was a fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. That was my first trip. I also, in my capacity on the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee, am deeply understanding of the importance of the U.S.-Israel relationship when it comes to protecting American national security. It’s an important, incredibly important ally, as well as an intelligence-sharing partner, and we share values, and that’s very important. I think President Trump has demonstrated that tremendously in some of the really challenging national security decisions that he’s made, particularly in his second term.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, I might ask you about that at the end, if I may. Let’s get back to the hearing. You mentioned here, if you don’t mind, which was interesting, after the hearing, it seemed like Claudine Gay, as you indicated, didn’t really appreciate what happened, and that there was an internal discussion, because I guess your committee has subpoenaed all these documents, which has been very interesting. I hadn’t seen these things. And you write that her chief of staff wrote after October 7^th, as they’re deliberating internally at Harvard what to do. She said, ‘they should not say unequivocally that we denounce Hamas’ October 7^th massacre.’ And, as you point out, you know, the statements got a little better after there was more pressure on them. But were you even surprised by how entrenched this is—the rot—I guess, at Harvard?

Elise Stefanik:

Yeah, I was surprised. So, after the hearing, it set off the Congressional investigation, and we subpoenaed over 100,000 documents. And going through the internal discussions and really the handwringing in those days and months after October 7^th, and just the failure of leadership was very revealing. I talked about that in the book. I also talked about even after the Congressional hearing itself, which was obvious to anyone watching, that they had so fundamentally bombed that hearing. They were still, it still took four different statements for her to clean up, and she wasn’t able to clean up that hearing, but to fully condemn Hamas, and condemn the pro-Hamas encampment that had, in this case, at Harvard, physically assaulted a student. And yet they were equivocating. So, the book is really how to conduct effective Congressional investigation, but it’s also just a bombshell read about what’s happening behind the scenes at these institutions. Remember, in Harvard’s case it wasn’t just a moral rot, but at the same time, in the week after the hearing, it came out publicly that she had a major plagiarism scandal as the president of Harvard. That wouldn’t have been in the news were it not the Congressional hearing. So, I make the case that you also have the academic rot at these institutions as well.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah. By the way, I’ll just say, as a PhD, I never really looked into being a professor, but I was surprised. I mean, not only would she plagiarize, she never even published a book. I don’t know how you could even get tenure at Harvard if you didn’t publish at least one well-credentialed book by some Harvard Press or Yale Press or whatever.

Elise Stefanik:

Or like this [holds up Poisoned Ivies book].

Micheal Makovsky:

Or even that! You know, I remember when I was a grad student, the professors sometimes wanted two well-credentialed books before they would consider a candidate to be a junior professor. She didn’t publish one book, and whatever she published were articles, and they were plagiarized. I found that interesting, personally.

Elise Stefanik:

Yeah, that whole part of the scandal was jaw-dropping as well, because had you been a student, you would have been removed from Harvard, no questions asked. But she was allowed to make quote-on-quote “corrections,” and they covered it up. It was only until it was publicly revealed with investigative journalism, but they tried to cover it up. The Harvard Corporation attempted to cover this up, allow her to make those corrections again. Had you been a student, there would have been zero tolerance for that plagiarism. So, it shows to me the academic rot as well. And again, as I said, the book, it’s not just about Antisemitism, it’s broadly attacks on academic excellence on Western civilization and our American values.

Michael Makovsky:

Well, as you also pointed out in the book, the university already knew about the plagiarism.

Elise Stefanik:

Yep, and they covered it up.

Michael Makovsky:

That’s really something. I think you do say this here in the book, but I must say, as a Jew, one of the things that always stuck out of me, that if these were protesters calling for genocide of blacks, and there were whites attacking blacks on campuses, I can’t even imagine, which would obviously be horrible, I can’t even imagine the swift response by the university and the media and everything.

Elise Stefanik:

Well, I make the case in the book that if you put in any other demographic group, there would have been no hesitation to answer the question correctly and to mete out discipline according to the rules. It was only when you include the group calling for the genocide of Jews, that there is this moral equivocation. I then make the case that that’s the double standard—that really is the underpinning of Antisemitism—and it’s again people understand that inherently across the country how fundamentally these schools are off track because they are specifically refusing to condemn what every average American—I think of my constituents—understands that calling for the genocide of Jews is unacceptable, and that there should be disciplinary action. And yet you have the presidents of these most prestigious institutions failing to do that in a very public way. It doesn’t get more public than a Congressional investigation and Congressional hearing.

Michael Makovsky:

By the way, I gotta say, I commend you and the whole committee, and by the way, the Trump administration for all the work. It is worth more than all the tens of millions of dollars that have been poured into combating Antisemitism. And if you don’t mind me asking, you do talk about this earthquake, which I completely agree with you. When you look today, and I don’t want to skip over the history, but you know, when you look today, where we are, and what the administration has done, and what the university is the fighting that continues to get these universities to do the right thing, how do you see where we are today? Based on the time since that hearing with your questioning.

Elise Stefanik:

You know this didn’t happen overnight, so it’s going to take decades of vigilance to dig out of this. However, this was a real turning point. Remember, the hearing happened in December of 2023, so you had a year left of the Biden administration. There was no action taken, no investigations, and the schools continued to stick their heads in the sand. Counter that and compare that with day one of the Trump administration. You had numerous executive orders signed on day one, you had multiple investigations launched rightfully by the Education Department and the Justice Department, and you had, you know, some of these settlements forcing these schools, and that only resulted from the withholding of federal dollars. So, a lot of times I will be asked, you know, “is that the right approach to withhold federal dollars?” I argue yes, because these schools had the opportunity to fix themselves, they were incapable of doing that, and the only way they will wake up. So, where are we today? We still have a long way to go, but there are bright spots. Not only are there institutions like Dartmouth and Vanderbilt who are excelling and moving in a different direction than the Poisoned Ivies, but you also have recognition. For example, in the last month, the Yale report that was issued by Yale University, talks about a lot of the same issues: about why people are losing faith in these educational institutions, and how they need to find their way back to their founding mission.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, you cite polls in the book early on. I didn’t write it down, so I don’t remember. Pardon me. But, I didn’t really realize how you looked at polls like 20 years ago, 10 years ago, today, of how much confidence Americans have in universities. It’s been a precipitous drop.

Elise Stefanik:

Huge drop, even a huge drop in the last 10 years. I also look at sort of the ideological lack of diversity. These schools, at the same time that they are instituting the DEI agenda, diversity, equity, inclusion, they are doing everything they can to not have diversity of thought. So, you’ve seen the ideological delta, which used to be about one to one 50 years ago, more than 50 years ago, about 70 years ago. Now, in some cases, it’s 88 to one—if you even have one conservative or common sense in some of these departments. And that to me shows that faculty tenure needs to be reformed. I mean, it’s increasingly like-minded, very outside the norm ideological viewpoints. So, again, a long way to go, but an important earthquake that has restarted this conversation.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, why don’t you mention that? I know we don’t have time to talk about the book. I’m sorry that we’re kind of jumping.

Elise Stefanik:

No, it’s great! We are covering a lot of it.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, but the thing is, I really encourage everyone to go through it, the book really reviews and gives you information that you didn’t know, and it goes through a lot of the universities. So, I found it fascinating. Let me ask you two questions. So, you mentioned Dartmouth and Vanderbilt. You also mentioned Washington University, if I’m not mistaken, where I’m from. I grew up right nearby, and I have some relatives that went there. What distinguishes those schools? If your four-year-old was 18 today, are those the kind of schools that you would want them to apply to? And what are they doing differently than the Harvards and the Penns and so on?

Elise Stefanik:

Number one: they’re showing leadership. The chancellors and the presidents of those universities showed leadership at this very important time, and they understood the mission of their universities is not political indoctrination and bowing to the mob. Oftentimes, the loudest voices are not representative of the entirety of the student body or the viewpoints, and that’s a tough lesson that many of these university presidents didn’t realize. In the case of Dartmouth, in the case of University of Florida, Vanderbilt, you had strong leadership. Also, the enforcement of rules. They didn’t hesitate to enforce the rules and clear out the pro-Hamas encampments. They had zero tolerance for physical assaults, and you had some of these Poisoned Ivies where there was no disciplinary action taken, or very limited sort of slap-on-the-wrist disciplinary action taken for physical assaults of students on campus. So, leadership is one thing. The other thing is again the importance of ideological diversity in the case of Dartmouth, of Vanderbilt, and University of Florida, and no school is perfect, but there was more ideological diversity among the professors that I think played out in terms of how these schools handled it, or they didn’t handle it in the post October 7th era. So, I not only talk about the Poisoned Ivies, I try to also discuss schools that are getting it right. Because I get asked by parents every day, where should my kid apply to, and you really have to make that decision as a parent—what is the right institution for what your child and what your family is looking for.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, and you also have a chapter on how to fix this—which you just alluded to—but maybe you could just discuss a little more, if you don’t mind.

Elise Stefanik:

So, how to fix it? I identify foreign funding as one of the major driving issues. If you look at the billions of dollars flowing in from Qatar, billions from China—why are we allowing that to happen? Strings are attached to those foreign dollars, particularly in funding in the Middle Eastern Studies departments, it impacts the curricula, it impacts the type of professors that are hired, and that, of course, impacts the pedagogy of what’s being taught in these classrooms. So, I don’t support any foreign funding from adversarial nations or nations that are counter to American values and American principles. I also discussed the percentage of foreign students. You know, these universities were founded as American institutions, and they’ve lost that way, and they are consistently prioritizing foreign students over American students. We saw in some of these pro-Hamas encampments, it was foreign students on visas who were stoking this Antisemitism and organizing the encampments. First of all, they should be deported. Second of all, why are we prioritizing foreign students? We should have a cap on foreign students at these institutions. I also talk about the faculty tenure reform, that’s very important, and you know those are some of the solutions I’ve worked on legislatively. We’ve worked on executive actions with this administration, but we still have a long way to go.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, by the way, you, in your discussion of MIT, you cite this quotation, which actually I had remembered that the President Kornbluth mentioned, because it really stood out at the time, that they didn’t want to punish some of these demonstrators who were preventing kids from moving to areas on campus because they’d have visa issues. I mean, that was really something that basically protecting MIT—and I assume other universities—are protecting their foreign students.

Elise Stefanik:

Which really poses the question, it is not a right for foreigners to study in the United States of America. It is a privilege. And if you are wreaking havoc and starting these pro-Hamas riots, in the case of Columbia, then you have no place and that visa needs to be revoked. That was the correct decision, counter to the Biden administration, that Secretary Rubio and President Trump—I have said that decision is the right one in terms of the revocation of those visas.

Michael Makovsky:

Let me ask you on this foreign funding, because it’s obviously a big issue. I run a nonprofit, we’re a [501]c3—it’s a think tank—and we don’t take foreign money. I mean, legally we could, we certainly wouldn’t take money from Qatar. We don’t take it from Israel or Germany, either. But if we did, then our lawyers would say, “well you could, if you do some work, if you go to, I mean we wouldn’t go to Qatar, but let’s just use an example, and you go to Qatar, there could be FARA [Foreign Agents Registration Act] issues. How come these universities don’t have these issues with FARA? So maybe you could just explain what FARA is. But you know, should there be a rethink about universities taking foreign money? Should they be required to designate themselves a certain way?

Elise Stefanik:

So, I think there should be a rethink of this. I think transparency is key in this. One of the bills that I’ve worked on is the Deterrent Act, which closes some of the loopholes. Right now, foreign countries can give money to centers or professors or particular programs and not have those be disclosed. We need full 100 percent disclosure of any foreign dollars flowing into higher ed institutions. Now we saw the recent Department of Education report, which was very transparent, in billions of dollars from Communist China, billions of dollars from Qatar, going into these higher ed institutions. That’s been a wake-up call for the American people. And I do think you’re seeing a shifting perspective of why are we even allowing this? In the case of the CCP, for example, the Chinese Communist Party, they have set up what are called Confucius Institutes on campuses. We banned that in Congress, and of course, they’re going to try to circumvent it, but you have to really stay focused on it. And again, it goes back to making sure we’re focused on American students first and remembering that these are American institutions.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah. Do you think there is any resistance in Congress for having more transparency about donations to universities?

Elise Stefanik:

Well, Chuck Schumer blocked it from being brought up in the Senate because it passed the House, including with bipartisan support. And then Chuck Schumer, this is when he was the majority leader in the last term, blocked that from coming to the floor. We have a great partner in Senator John Thune, so you’re seeing more legislation passed through to address this issue, but again, it’s something that we need to continue to work on.

Michael Makovsky:

This came up, of course with the Columbia issue, we learned those texts and reports with the press, you’ll have a better memory on this than I will, of course. Where a university president or an aide said that you basically don’t have to worry, it’s the Democrats will be fine with the Democrats, but the Republicans take over, we’re going to have a problem. Do you think that the Democratic Party more aligned with the universities, because the universities are more on the left, and they generally try to protect the universities more? Or is it not so simply partisan?

Elise Stefanik:

Well look, it was only the House Republicans who conducted these hearings. The Senate, at the time, was controlled by Democrats; they didn’t have a single hearing on the crisis in higher education and the skyrocketing Antisemitism. That, in and of itself, I think shows the lack of prioritization. And then, politically, look at what’s happening in these Democrat primaries. You now have the leaders of the pro-Hamas encampments running for Congress, getting elected in these Democrat primaries. So, I make the case in the book that what happens on these campuses has a direct line into what’s happening politically.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, you know I would add, I know we don’t get too much on the politics here. You had President Biden – I have no evidence at all that he’s an Antisemite in any way, and I always thought he was generally naturally or instinctively pro-Israel. But he didn’t do or say almost anything. And then when you have these Hamas protesters, at one point I think he said—I can’t remember the exact quote—but basically he said they have a point or something.

Elise Stefanik:

There’s a huge challenge within the Democrat party right now with this rise of Antisemitism. I do highlight in the book—Fetterman was a really important voice that condemned without hesitation, and Josh Shapiro, again, he was governor of Pennsylvania. This happened. Penn was among the worst, and you had a very weak leadership from Liz McGill. He called for her resignation immediately as well. So there are a few examples, but that’s outside of the norm of what the Democrat party, what we’re seeing play out both in the public polling, but also in some of these primary elections.

Michael Makovsky:

Didn’t Liz McGill just get hired by Georgetown?

Elise Stefanik:

Yes, There’s also a revolving door in higher-ed that I talk about, where, while she was ousted as the Penn president, she had a parachute at Harvard first, and then now at Georgetown Law School as the dean. Same goes for Claudine Gay, removed as the president, but given a million-dollar parachute to be a professor at Harvard, so you do have this revolving door issue in higher education.

Michael Makovsky:

Which shows why this is going to be a long-term issue to fix. If you don’t mind, I would like to ask you, while we have you for just a few more minutes and we appreciate your time, if you don’t mind if I take advantage of your presence here just to talk about the Iran issue. Because obviously for the country and U.S. national security, it’s so important. How do you assess where we are with Iran? Do you think it’s possible to do a good deal with the Iranians, or should we be resuming military operations?

Elise Stefanik:

Well, first of all, we hold all the cards. Iran has no cards. President Trump correctly took very targeted military action in terms of targeting the terrorist regime and ensuring that, for example, in the last 24 hours, when you saw the Iranian drone striking a U.S. Apache helicopter, the President correctly took action retaliatory for that just egregious targeting by the Iranians. I think we have a very strong President who understands that the only way you bring peace to the Middle East and peace to the world and protect American national security is you have to get rid of the Iranian terrorist regime, and you have to ensure that they do not—and never have—nuclear weapons capabilities. And remember—take a step back. The strike that Iran conducted against the U.S. Apache helicopter was during these negotiations and discussions. So, they have shown time and time again that they cannot be trusted. They have disgraced themselves on the world stage. They are the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism that’s led directly to the deaths of Americans. So, again, we have a very strong “peace through strength” President. We’ve worked on this issue on the Armed Services Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, and I think we should continue utilizing all military tools that are in front of the President to make sure that we are protecting U.S. national security.

Michael Makovsky:

By the way, just so you know, we give President Trump tremendous credit for Midnight Hammer, and then initiating military action here, which I think was really triggered by his support for the Iranian demonstrators in January. I think he’s the first president to really be so vocal in support, of course. I do. Just so you know—where we are is that –we have never supported the ceasefire. We think our leverage has only diminished since the ceasefire began. And I think we view the president kind of as a bit stuck right now. I don’t think he’ll agree to a bad deal, but for whatever reason, he’s reluctant to get back into military action.

Elise Stefanik:

Well look, that changed this morning; look at what he sent out. I mean, again, it’s a whole different game when you have the Iranians targeting a U.S. Apache helicopter over the Strait of Hormuz, and the president correctly said that the Iranians had an opportunity, they blew it, essentially. I’m not going to get ahead of any decisions that he makes, but I have confidence that he will make the right decision in making sure that there’s no nuclear weapons capability, as well as removal of the greatest state sponsor of terror that has led to bloodshed around the world. And then also take a step back. This is a regime that targeted President Trump’s assassination. This is a regime that has tried to assassinate current U.S. elected officials, former U.S. elected and appointed officials. It has caused chaos and violence and terror around the world, and that’s the only way you solve this issue, is solve it for good, and that’s what President Trump is trying to do.

Michael Makovsky:

Yeah, well, look, we’ve taken up a lot of your time. We’ve actually now surpassed it. So, I want to thank you very much, Congresswoman Stefanik. I want to commend you again for all your tremendous work on the universities and on education, and obviously in support of a strong United States, and I look forward to your next book, and everything else you’re going to be doing going forward.

Elise Stefanik:

Thank you. Poisoned Ivies. Get it, it’s a really important book. Thanks for the opportunity, JINSA.

The post Transcript: Webinar – Poisoned Ivies: The Inside Account of the Academic and Moral Rot at America’s Elite Universities appeared first on JINSA.

Sander Gerber is a JINSA Distinguished Fellow, the founder and CEO of Hudson Bay Capital, and a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. All views expressed are his own.

Shawn Chenoweth is the director of Cognitive Advantage at the National Security Council. All views expressed are his own.

Originally published in The Washington Times.

The post Social Media Deception Gives Iran A Weapon Against America appeared first on JINSA.

PANELISTS

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council

Amb. Eric Edelman

JINSA Distinguished Scholar, JINSA; Former Ambassador to Turkey

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.

—

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:

Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining us for another JINSA webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. We had actually originally scheduled today’s webinar and Ambassador Eric Edelman to talk all things Turkey, particularly the domestic political crackdown that’s happening there, but intervening events over the over the weekend last night made us shift focus to discuss the latest exchange of fire between Iran and Israel that happened over several rounds starting late yesterday, so to talk about that, I’m delighted to be joined by Ambassador Eric Edelman, a JINSA scholar, distinguished scholar, I should say, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Ambassador [to] Turkey. We are also expecting General Yaakov MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror to join us, a JINSA, distinguished fellow and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu. Hopefully he’ll be on the line soon, but I guess in the meantime, Ambassador Edelman, maybe you can tell us, where do we stand now? Are we back to cease fire? Are we on our way to a resumption of hostilities? How should we understand what transpired over the last 24 hours?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, I think this remains to be seen. I think what – what’s happened here is that the President has, over the course of several weeks, basically signaled to the Iranians in multiple ways that he is very reluctant to return to kinetic military activity, that he really, although he keeps saying they’re desperate for a deal, I think it sounds like he’s pretty much desperate for a deal, because of all the economic disruption that the war has created, and potentially more disruption to come as global energy stocks run down, and the I think Iranians sought to take advantage of that to take a much more forward position defending their proxies in Lebanon than they did earlier when Israel was reducing Hezbollah very significantly two years ago, and I think that’s what led them to fire at Israel on Sunday, and the exchange of fire we’ve had in the president’s behavior, his conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu, his public truth social post saying that, you know, we have to get back to a ceasefire. I think it just continues this pattern of suggesting to the Iranians that he really is very anxious for a deal, and I think that’s actually undercutting his leverage with them, because I think it only leads them to harden their positions and makes it harder, not easier, to get a deal.

Blaise Misztal:

Maybe backing up a little, if we could sort of dissect how all of this started, because at least the reporting in the [Intelligence Community] in America says it all started when Israel violated a ceasefire and launched a strike in Beirut, but how should what was the sort of the tick tock of events, and how should we understand what precipitated this exchange of fire?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, first of all, the Iranians have been insisting in their conversations with their U.S. interlocutors through mediators, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, others, Qatar, that they want to include Lebanon in the overall ceasefire package. Of course, the United States is not a party to the conflict directly in Lebanon, but the administration has gone out of its way to at least try to arrange a ceasefire in Lebanon between the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon. But the government of Lebanon is not really the party with which Israel is at war, it’s Hezbollah, and they’re not a party to these negotiations. And the government of Lebanon lacks the ability to really control Hezbollah in any significant way, so Israel has been subjected to continuing attacks in northern Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is obviously intolerable, and it’s led to continuation, despite the “ceasefire of military activity” in Lebanon. And the Iranians have chosen to use this as an excuse for, among others, not completing the negotiations for the extension of the ceasefire with which they have been engaged with the United States for several weeks now.

Blaise Misztal:

As you were saying, there’s a tense relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu in recent calls and social media posts, but we’ve seen various claims as to whether the Israeli strikes were coordinated with the United States undertaken in, and sort of in violation of President Trump’s telling everyone not to fire. What do we think of the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Obviously, there are tensions, and the interests are somewhat divergent between the Prime Minister and the President. I mean, but both have different political calculations to make with regard to their own respective domestic politics. I honestly don’t know whether the strikes were coordinated. I mean, there’s so much going on in the airspace that it’s kind of hard for me to imagine that CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] was not aware of what Israel was doing, but I don’t know that they were formally coordinated in any way.

Blaise Misztal:

What message does that send to Iran? I guess, as we’ve seen those public messages going back and forth between Washington and Jerusalem, how do you think they interpreted that relationship in the last 24 hours?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Now, obviously, anytime they can drive a wedge between the United States in Israel, they’re going to try and take advantage of that. I think they’ve been very active on social media here in the United States. I think they’ve been having some success, actually, in spreading anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic messages, and obviously this just feeds into that ongoing effort by the Iranians. We’ll have to see what the longer lasting effect is because that could be also quite considerable depending on how things play out.

Blaise Misztal:

What do you see as the impact of all this on the negotiations that President Trump sort of insists are ongoing or going well? The Iranians last week pulled out of talks, President Trump said they’re still continuing. Was this exchange of fire just negotiation by other means, or is it a signal that the negotiations are over?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

No, I don’t think it’s a signal that the negotiations are over. I mean, the Iranians actually kind of called a halt to this, or tried to call a halt to this, saying, okay, we’ve made our point, and let’s stop this round of military exchanges. The Interior Minister of Pakistan is in Tehran, has been while this has all been going on, so contacts are continuing. Obviously, there are a whole series of reports about different proposals to modify what had been agreed earlier, that the President has asked for with regard to the nuclear program. The Iranians are particularly anxious to get access to frozen funds, and that is a particular sore point, I think, for the President, because I believe he wants to try to persuade the American public that whatever deal this ends up being is going to be measurably better than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] that President Obama agreed to in 2015. In my view, that’s going to be a pretty tall order, but not giving the Iranians access to money before they perform whatever obligations they undertake as part of this deal will be a key part of that, so the president is very, I think. at pains not to be freeing up frozen funds or any other kind of funds that would flow to Iran as a result of this deal. But as I understand it, there are all sorts of workarounds being proposed, including a loan that Qatar would float to Iran, that would be in the amount of the frozen assets, with the idea that the frozen assets would be some kind of collateral to pay the loan back. I mean, if that is the case, if that’s where we end up, frankly, that’s just a difference without a distinction.

Blaise Misztal:

Do you think that issue of sort of unfreezing of funds or sanctions relief, what the dollar figure is sort of the primary thing that the President is focused on in terms of how a deal that he might strike compares to JCPOA, as opposed to something like the length of limitations or extent of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, first, let’s see what kind of limitations the Iranians actually agree to. I suspect that if the president can get some kind of undertaking by the Iranians to freeze all enrichment activity, he will tout that as being superior to the JCPOA, because the JCPOA did allow the Iranians to enrich up to 3.75 percent. But, we’ll have to see, because we just don’t know what’s actually in the agreement. The amount of money that we’re talking about, I mean, that I’ve seen brooded about, is $28 billion. Now, that is considerably less than the total amount that was potentially at issue when the JCPOA was signed, but it’s significantly more than the amount of money that was given to the Iranians as part of the hostage release deal in 2016 that President Trump frequently cites. So, it’s just going to depend on what numbers of people are using as a baseline. But it’s going to be important, however this comes out, to make sure that it’s an apples-to-apples comparison, and you’re not comparing apples to oranges.

Blaise Misztal:

What is the chance? I mean, as you understand it, where are we in the negotiations for the inclusion of a nuclear element? Because it seems like the reporting sometimes suggests that we’d be getting just a deal to cease hostilities, sort of end the mutual blockades of the Strait, and then negotiate something further. But President Trump’s statement seemed to suggest [that Iran’s] nuclear [program] will be included in a deal.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

It’s a little bit hard to say, and I think part of the problem here is [that] both sides are not being completely honest and straightforward about what’s going on. Each one has their own reasons for kind of obfuscating what horse trading is going on here. My fear is it’s not real concessions on the part of the Iranians. What they’re talking about is an extended ceasefire to be followed by ongoing negotiations. And there may be some statements about the parameters that will be negotiated that might appear to be they might make some statement about we’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon or we’re not trying to procure a nuclear weapon, but without really much specificity. So, I think that’s what the negotiation is about. But again, we’ll have to wait and see what actually comes out of this.

Blaise Misztal:

Well, let me welcome General Amidror. Thank you very much for being able to join us. When we spoke last week, General Amidror, just a couple of days ago, you discussed how Israeli operations in Lebanon were restricted, or were perhaps less than Israel might have wanted, due to an agreement with the United States not to operate, not to strike in Beirut. And then over the weekend, we did see an Israeli strike in Beirut. What changed, if I can ask?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

The agreement, which was put on the table by the Americans, was very clear. Hezbollah does not attack inside Israel, and Israel does not bomb Beirut. What happened is that Hezbollah violated the agreement, attacked inside Israel, and we said, okay. The obligation cannot be taken only by one side. If one side is violating the agreement, the agreement does not exist. And we hinted by bombing two empty apartments in Dahieh that we will not agree to a situation in which Hezbollah is violating the agreement, and we are going to keep it. What happened is that the Iranians who said that if Israel attacked Dahieh, they will attack Israel, and they did so. Immediately, it was clear for us that we cannot agree to this situation. In a way, the Americans should be blamed for this situation, because the Iranians – it’s not only the Iranians understood that the Americans accept the connection between the ceasefire in Iran and the ceasefire in Lebanon, something that, from our point of view, is unacceptable. We are fighting Hezbollah. We want to destroy Hezbollah capabilities to attack Israel. Hezbollah is attacking everyday Israelis, either inside Lebanon, the soldiers, or inside Israel, and the fact that the Iranians and others understood that it is America legitimizing the position, the standoff of Iran in Lebanon, is a huge mistake. And we said no. With all due respect to the needs of the Americans, we are going to attack, and that is what we did, and the Americans said no. But the question remains, what will be the reaction of the Iranians when we continue to bomb Lebanon to kill those Hezbollah members, and so on and so forth. We don’t have any reason to stop fighting Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is threatening our citizens and soldiers.

Blaise Misztal:

Was the strike in the Dahieh coordinated with the United States, or did the United States know that it was going to happen?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

I think that the Americans knew that it was going to happen, but we didn’t ask for permission.

Blaise Misztal:

And what about the retaliatory strikes against Iran? President Trump seemed to say very clearly that he didn’t want Israel to conduct those strikes. Was there a discussion beforehand, or was that a unilateral Israeli action?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

I think that the Prime Minister made it clear that we are going to attack Iran. We will take into consideration the American point of view, and it will not be a big one, but we will do it in spite of the fact that the Americans didn’t like it, because we cannot live in a situation in which the Iranians will retaliate or attack Israel. It’s not retaliation. It’s attacking Israel, initiating an attack on Israel when Israel is fighting Hezbollah. It’s an impossible situation from our point of view.

Blaise Misztal:

I guess one of the things that very much struck me in the exchange of fire was that U.S. Central Command put out a statement saying that U.S. air defense against the Iranian attack that happened yesterday and today [connection issue], but was that something that was known by Israel that was going to happen? Was that coordinated that CENTCOM was going to be involved?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

I don’t know. From our point of view, the Americans are well integrated into the Israeli system of defense against the missiles and vice versa, Israel is very well integrated into the American system in the whole Middle East, facing threats of missiles, and I don’t see how that cannot change by a decision by someone. It is so integrated into each other.

Blaise Misztal:

Ambassador Edelman, let me turn to you, but I’ll pose the same question to you as well, General Amidror. What is the strategic calculus by the Iranians for linking the Lebanon ceasefire to the ceasefire with the United States, and the status of negotiations?

I’ve seen some supposed Iranian commentators online saying that it’s just about sort of establishing whether they can trust America, whether America, whether the United States can deliver on its promises, and it’s just sort of a some symbolic ask by the Iranians to try to build confidence, is that all that’s involved here, or why are the Iranians so interested in what’s happening in Lebanon?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

For the Iranians it’s crucial. The Iranians are facing a very problematic situation, their strategy, one of the pillars of the strategy was to build a proxy system around Israel, and because of the results of the war, they came to a situation in which they have to defend the proxies that were supposed to be the one which will conduct the war against Israel and Iran will be immune because Iran is far away, not involved, and the proxies will do the dirty job to kill and destroy Israel.

What happened because of the war, they [Iran] are now involved in a war to protect the proxies that are supposed to be the ones which will do the war that Iran will not do. They have found that they are paying with Iranian currency to save Hezbollah in Lebanon, but they don’t have any other alternative, because Hamas is not any more relevant, and they are going to lose the main proxies that they build in the Middle East. Everyone in the Middle East understands that if you cannot save your proxy, you don’t have to be taken into account in the future.

So, for them it’s about their position in the Middle East without Hezbollah and without Hamas. What is Iran now? It is Iran versus Israel. The whole strategy that they have, nothing remains. I think that for them it’s crucial to show, and this is the big mistake of the Americans, that they allow them to believe that there is a connection between the two areas, and between the ceasefire in Iran and the ceasefire in Lebanon. In spite of the fact that since the beginning of the ceasefire in Iran, we fought in Lebanon, and there was a ceasefire in Iran, but during the negotiations they convinced themselves, or they understood from America, and from both, I don’t know. There is a connection, and for us it was very important to place a red line, and to say, in Lebanon, we are discussing Lebanon’s future in Washington and not in Tehran.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

I agree with General Amidror. The Iranian strategy of creating a ring of fire around Israel is in shards, thanks to the hard work of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and Israel’s intelligence services, and in really laying waste to Hezbollah over a period of years. I think, as the ceasefire went on, and as the Iranians perceived the president’s desire for an agreement, I think they came to believe, I agree with General Amidror, I think they came to believe that they might be able to rescue something out of the wreckage of that strategy. Which is why I think the term that they’ve been using is that they want to create a new strategic equation by linking, as I said at the outset before General Amidror joined us, the theater in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah with the conflict with the U.S. and Iran. Even though the U.S. is not a, a belligerent, as it were in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and so that’s what I think you’re seeing they’re trying to do and I think unfortunately the president’s desire for a ceasefire is playing into that.

Blaise Misztal:

In light of this Iranian attempt to keep its proxy strategy alive, how significant is the fact that the Houthis joined in and fired on Israel in this latest exchange? Is it sort of a demonstration that there’s still a potent proxy? Does the fact that they only fired one missile, that didn’t even make it to Israel, sort of show how largely symbolic that was.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, first of all, it’s very striking that we have not heard much from Houthis for some period of time, since February 28. I do think that this is indicative again of what General Amidror was saying, the Iranians want to show that their proxy network still exists even if it’s been reduced in large measure from what it was before last year or before two years ago.

It is sort of striking to me that this seemed pretty much like a de minimis effort by the Houthis, I mean, we’ll see. They’ve also apparently declared that they won’t allow Israeli ships through the Red Sea, so we’ll see what they do. But I suspect that at some point, if they continue this, they will face some retribution, and we’ll see how much stomach and appetite they have for continued conflict. I have my doubts.

Blaise Misztal:

So, given this attempt by the Iranians to create the strategic equation that ties the two theaters together, Ambassador Edelman, and the dangers of that, as General Amidror has pointed out, what can or should President Trump do now to try to make sure that that link isn’t established to try to break that equation.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, I mean, I think he could say, “Look, the government of Israel has done its part, it’s made a cease fire with the government of Lebanon, the reason that there’s not a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is because Hezbollah is continuing, as the General said, to attack northern Israel. If you want to continue these negotiations, tell them to knock it off, and then we’ll get back to that. But we’re not going to prevent Israel from defending itself.”

The problem, I think here, is that the President has telegraphed to the Iranians that he does not want to go back to kinetic military activity, he’s even been quoted as saying he won’t go back to kinetic military activity unless the Iranians kill Americans. Which unfortunately is a permission slip to kill other people in the region, notably including Israelis, but not just Israelis.

Blaise Misztal:

General Amidror, one last question for you, and then I want to open it up to questions from the audience. So, if you do have something you want to ask one of our panelists, feel free to submit it using the Q and A function in Zoom, and then I’ll read it out.

But General Amidror, given what we saw over the last 24 hours, is there a danger of the United States and Israel diverging and Israel returning to conflict with Iran without the United States or being isolated in some way or disagreeing with the United States. For example, an emerging deal and the two partners having trouble coordinating going forward on Iran.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I hope that it doesn’t happen. For us, the test will be the language of the agreement, if the agreement will be strong enough to bring all the enriched materials from Iran, and to bring out all the materials they enrich uranium from Iran and satisfy us with the continuation of the control on the on the ground that will not allow the Iranians to bring back or rebuild the nuclear project.

I hope that it will be a better agreement than the one which was achieved by the Obama administration. It will be a big shame if not because after the success of the United States forces, together with the IDF what we did together in Iran, we have cards in our hands, and I hope that the Americans will be smart enough to achieve a good agreement. Up till now, from all what was said by the administration, they still want to achieve such a good agreement, and I hope that that will continue. The problem that I see is that we cannot allow ourselves to sacrifice our ability to defend Israel from Hezbollah for the sake of a good atmosphere in the negotiation between America and Iran.

I understand the problem. I understand the tension and I hope that the Americans will agree that Israel has the right to defend itself, including fighting against Hezbollah in Lebanon as much as will be needed, judged on our needs and obligation for our citizens and soldiers. It’s not the first time that the situation is judged differently from Washington than it’s judged by the decision makers in Jerusalem; it’s natural. I hope that it will not lead to something, as you described, that Israel will be isolated, and so on and so forth. But, as you know, there were many years during which Israel stood alone against Iran and against Hezbollah. I hope that this is not the situation with this administration. I pray that it is not the situation of this administration.

We have agreement about the goal of the negotiations in Iran. It was agreed by both sides that it should bring an end to the Iranian military nuclear project, and I hope that Americans will not lose the cards that they have.

Blaise Misztal:

Sticking with that topic, General Amidror, we have a question from [Questioner], who asks, “Can we go over what Israel’s concerns about a U.S.-Iran deal are, where the U.S. and Israel diverge on what a good deal looks like? Is it just the issue of what happens with the highly enriched uranium that remains in Iran, or what are other sticking points that are important for Israel and for a good deal?”

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

First of all, we were very much surprised by the fact that the Americans did not put on the table the issue of the ballistic missiles at all. It’s like the Obama administration: it’s not in the agreement. We’ve been surprised by the Obama administration; we were surprised by this administration. The ballistic missiles are not on the table.

The second issue, which, as far as we understand, Americans and us are on the same page on, is about the nuclear [problem], exposing all the enriched uranium, and to build a system in which we can be sure that the Iranians are not resuming their efforts to achieve nuclear military capability.

Again, this is what we know. This is what the Americans said up till now, that this is their obligation. They committed themselves. The President, in his own voice, said the commitment of the United States of America. This one was part of the Israeli team which negotiated with the Obama administration about the agreement in Iran. I learned to be very suspicious. I think, I was the one of those who said Americans have an obligation, and they will come, and they are committed to this obligation, and this is at the end of the day, we found that it was changing the middle of the of the negotiations and instead of dismantling Iran nuclear project, the Americans moved to postpone and monitor. I hope that we are not facing the same problem with this administration again. It was promised by this administration that it’s not going to happen, and I hope that they will keep the word.

Blaise Misztal:

Ambassador Edelman. Let me just ask you, your opinion, since you’ve written extensively with us at JINSA about what would constitute a good deal, but also ask you, there were reports late last week that that [U.S. envoys Steve] Witkoff and [Jared] Kushner, the two main negotiators for the United States, traveled to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to meet with U.S. nuclear scientists, presumably to discuss nuclear elements of a deal with Iran, should we take that as a, as a good sign or a worrying sign?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, look, I think, having done a bit of diplomacy in my life, having expertise on your side is always a good thing. Since then, Witkoff and Kushner have been engaged in this negotiation with Iranian interlocutors for over a year. I do wonder why only now they’re sitting down and talking with experts on enrichment.

From my point of view, there’s been a lot of focus on the HEU [highly enriched uranium] that’s been enriched up to 60 percent for understandable reasons, 440 kilo[grams], which is [a] significant amount, and obviously not very far away from being able to be turned into bomb grade material. But there’s 9000 pounds of enriched material below 60 percent that needs to be taken care of as well, lest it serves as material for enrichment down the road after this conflict ends. If the regime stays in power and is able to reconstitute its enrichment capability.

Therein I think lies the concern about what kind of agreement you’re going to reach. Will there be in fact a moratorium on all enrichment, which would be a good thing, but how is it going to be verified? I mean, for a long time the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has not had access, even before this all started and I’m saying the 12-day war in May, to Iranian material. So, the chain of custody of all this material is very obscure right now, and so I think it’s going to require very intrusive verification. verification far beyond what was in the JCPOA, which basically allowed the Iranians to more or less degrade themselves with some oversight by the IAEA.

I’m very concerned about where this is headed and very concerned about the potential divergence between the United States and Israel. I agree with General Amidror that it would be a bad thing, were it to happen, but I’m quite concerned that we may be headed that way. Not least, because I see a trajectory of very serious erosion of support for Israel in the Democratic party, but in the Republican party as well, and if there’s a divergence, I worry that you’re going to really see the complete end of the traditional bipartisan support for Israel that’s been the hallmark of this relationship for a long time and that I think that would be bad for both countries.

Blaise Misztal:

Sticking with this topic of a good deal, John Hannah asks General Amidror, “What’s your suggestion for a good deal on Iran’s missiles, assuming it must take into account both Israel’s concerns about medium-range missiles, as well as the Arab Gulf’s concerns about short-range missiles?” And I’ll add, would you include drones in that agreement?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I think that we should add something else, because if nothing is done within five to 10 years, the Iranians will have the ability to launch missiles into the United States of America. Now they have the ability to launch it to 4000 kilometers. It’s half of Europe, give and take, and within 5 to 10 years they will reach the ability to launch missiles into the United States of America. There is nothing that will be done to stop it.

I think that the only way to change the situation is by the fact that we have to remember it is not on the table at all. The Americans didn’t put it as a demand from the Iranians. So, we are speaking about [a] theoretical question.

It should be a limitation on the ability of the Iranians to test and to manufacture big missiles. What is the range that we are speaking about? I don’t know. If you include the Gulf countries, it is 100-150 kilometers. I don’t see anyone succeeding to put such a limitation on the Iranians. In the end we didn’t succeed in bringing Iran to its knees. Iran is still a state which has the ability to resist, and I don’t see America ready to do what is [needed] to change the situation. So, I think it’s a theoretical question from the meaning that Americans didn’t put it on the table. It is not there.

Blaise Misztal:

Maybe picking up where that last point that you made, General Amidror, we have a question from [Questioner] for both of you.

Do you agree or disagree that four months into this war, U.S.-Israeli gains have been impressive tactically, but not strategically? The regime survives, there’s no evidence of fracture, they weaponize geography, threatening the Straits and Gulf states, and deterrence has been undermined because the regime has survived the combination of the world’s and the region’s most formidable powers. Ambassador Edelman, let me start with you.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Well, first, [Questioner] is an old, old colleague, friend, and someone for whom I have a lot of respect, who has toiled very hard in this vineyard for a long time. Look, I think in any war [that] turning tactical success into strategic outcome is not an easy thing, and it’s obviously the key objective.

I think [if] we do a net assessment of where we are, I think, [it] is a little early. I agree that we’ve had lots of tactical success, lots of degradation of Iranian military capabilities. With regard to the survival of the regime, I think it’s a little early to tell. The regime is still going to have a huge water crisis; it’s got to manage an electricity distribution crisis, a food distribution crisis, and a financial crisis, so it’s going to have a lot of very difficult problems to handle all at once. How successful they’ll be in doing that, I think, is an open question, but there’s no doubt in my mind that the Iranians have succeeded in doing several of the things that [Questioner] just suggested in this question. They have weaponized geography very effectively. I think the U.S. was very late to the issue of mines.

Admiral [Brad] Cooper, for whom I have a lot of respect, testified in open testimony that we destroyed 90 percent of the mines, but he also testified that the holdings were significantly higher by about 33 percent higher than the number unclassified that we had carried previously, which means they were still left with 800 mines. Frankly, one of the things Iranians have demonstrated is they don’t need to actually sow any mines necessarily to affect the strait and to create massive perturbations in the international economy.

To me, it’s to be determined exactly how to assess the strategic outcome. But right now, I think if this just stops and ends today where it is, and we don’t get any further, I don’t think you can say it’s been successful.

Blaise Misztal:

General Amidror?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I think that the right question is not what was asked by [Questioner], that I’ve known for many years, but what was the alternative, which was offered by some people, is to do nothing. Today we could find Iran with nuclear capability, so I prefer tactical achievement without great strategic achievement in the situation of North Korea. Which strategically probably was a great success but they have nuclear capability and if I have to do it again to gain very little and not very important tactical achievements, and to prevent Iran from having nuclear capability, and still facing the regime, and all the success of the Iranians, which I don’t see anyhow. I prefer it in the situation in which we do nothing, because we don’t have strategic achievements that do nothing and having nuclear Iran.

Remember, it is not just nuclear, the whole strategy of Iran collapsed. Where is the ring of fire? It does not exist. Now, the Iranians are fighting, paying Iranian currency to make sure that Hezbollah will survive. It’s not the ability of Hezbollah to attack Israel. Hezbollah is isolated. When the Syrian’s got out of the equation, the land bridge from Iran to Lebanon, does not exist anymore. They cannot provide Hezbollah with a weapons system; they provided them with money. They can come to the airport with suitcases with a lot of money, but they cannot provide a weapons system to Hezbollah.

Factories to manufacture [weapons] do not exist in Lebanon today. They can make drones in many basements, but big missiles, and so on, they cannot. Syria is not there to provide them with a weapon system. So, the scenario is totally different from the Israeli point of view, totally different, and Iran is not so close to reaching the point in which they can make the weaponization.

So, if you ask if the regime is there, the regime is there. Will we have to do it again in the next five years? Probably, yes, but we made huge achievements by postponing the ability of the Iranians to produce the warhead and by destroying the strategy against Israel. The whole Ring of Fire collapsed, and now the Iranians, instead of being out of the war, far away, giving the proxies the order to destroy Israel, they must fight against Israel. This is because they want Hezbollah to survive. I’m not sure that Hezbollah will survive, but this is the goal of the Iranians.

So, I don’t know what these strategic achievements are. I don’t like all of the names. What we did, we postponed the ability of the Iranians to get nuclear capability for how many years? I don’t know. We destroyed the very important part of the strategy, the whole ring of fire around Israel. The ability of Hezbollah to survive is under a huge question mark. This very much depends on what will happen in the negotiations in Washington, very much depends on what the ideas will continue to do in Lebanon, very much depends on what will happen in the future between Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. If all the three decide to squeeze Hezbollah, which is in the middle, I don’t know what will happen. From the Israeli point of view, this will be a much better situation, not just better, a much better situation. Yes, the regime still exists, but as Zhou Enlai [Former Chinese Premier] said it’s too early to judge.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

I agree with much of what General Amidror has said, but I would take issue with one characterization, which is I don’t think that having been involved in a good bit of the diplomacy with North Korea, I don’t think one can characterize how we’ve handled North Korea as either a tactical or a strategic achievement, it was a failure.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

One of the big failures of American diplomacy.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

Yes, absolutely.

Blaise Misztal:

Ambassador, another John Hannah question for you. Do you see a convincing Kinetic plan to restore the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz that could be achieved at acceptable military and economic cost, as well as be sustainable for the long term by being immune from future Iranian efforts to shut it down again at minimum cost?

Amb. Eric Edelman:

It depends on who’s doing the assessment of the costs. I believe if the United States Navy thought they could do this at an acceptable cost, they would have done it already because we’ve got plenty of capability in the theater right now to try and do this. Although we have certain deficiencies that make it hard to do this, so for instance, we have zero frigates in the United States Navy which would be the vessels you would want to have doing escort duty. It’s pretty clear that the President has decided he doesn’t think it can be done at least what he considers an acceptable political and economic cost.

I mean, could we theoretically, do it? I mean, yes, we could open the Strait. Could we keep it open in perpetuity without a huge commitment of the U.S. forces for the foreseeable future? I don’t think so. Actually, Ray Takeyh and Ruel Marc Gerecht and I had a piece in the dispatch about 10 days ago now on this and talked about exactly what it will take to post wherever we get an agreement to actually maintain anything even close to the status quo ante. It’s going to be a considerable investment of U.S. assets in the theater way beyond what not perhaps quite as much as we have in the theater right now, but it’s going to be quite a bit larger than what we had been doing out there for most of the last 10-15 years.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

I believe that investing in pipelines, which will bypass the Gulf, I think either down all towards Jordan, Israel, and so on, will be cheaper and better for the future, that the Hormuz Strait will lose its importance as the bottleneck of the export of energy by making other ways more viable.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

That is already happening. I mean, first of all, the Saudis and Emiratis already have pipelines, although the volume is not sufficient to make up for what comes out of the Gulf. The problem with pipelines is it will take a while for these to eventually organize. Although they, I think, will, as General Amidror said, alleviate a lot of the energy concerns, and you already see adjustments being made anyway, in terms of people getting electric vehicles and other things, I worry that it’s not just the energy.

I mean, one of the things that this has, I think, demonstrated is it’s more than just energy, it’s urea and ammonia for fertilizer, it’s helium and sulfur for manufacture of microelectronic chips and things like that that are crucial for the global economy. So, I agree with General Amidror that pipelines are going to be helpful here in mitigating some of the damage that the Iranians have done in reducing some of their economic weapons, but I don’t think it’s going to solve everything, because there’s still going to be some issues. I mean, there’s not a pipeline for some of those things, and land transport; it’s not an easy substitute for, for coming out of the Gulf in large ships.

Blaise Misztal:

All right, let’s finish up with a question from [Questioner], who asks, some commentators have said that this is a religious war and the Iranian regime literally cannot make the kind of deal we are pursuing without violating the principles of their religious obligations. How do you see those opinions, General Amidror?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I remember Khomeini saying that ‘there are times in which you have to take the poison because there is not any other alternative’, and he was as religious as the guys running to the Iranians. Very much depends on what the alternative that they are facing and how strong the threat that they know might be, and I think that it very much depends on the American side.

Amb. Eric Edelman:

I agree with General Amidror. I think it depends on their sense of their own vulnerability and what they need to survive, and I wouldn’t rule out that they can make an agreement, whether it’s a good agreement or not. It’s going to depend on a lot of other things. But as long as that regime is in place, I would say, given both religious and ideological makeup, as long as the regime is in place, it’s going to be a huge problem for Israel, and it’s a huge problem for the United States.

So, for folks who want to reprioritize and put all of our emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, for which there’s some argument, I don’t see how we are able to do that as long as we’ve got that regime sitting out there.

Blaise Misztal:

Ambassador Edelman, General Amidror. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you to the audience for tuning in. I look forward to seeing you at the next JINSA webinar, and please check out our website at jinsa.org for all our latest analyses. Thank you and have a good afternoon.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Thank you. Good night.

Blaise Misztal:

Good night, General.

The post Transcript: Webinar – War Back On? appeared first on JINSA.

Maj Gen Charles Corcoran  (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is former Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force, and a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program.
Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.

The post What the Iran War Shows About the Future of Warfighting appeared first on JINSA.

PANELISTS

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.

—

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to JINSA’s latest webinar update on everything going on in the Middle East. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. I apologize for the delay due to technical difficulties. I’m delighted to be joined by General Yaakov Amidror, a distinguished fellow at JINSA and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu. We were hoping to also be joined by General [Yaacov] Ayish; however, he’s unable to make it due to other commitments. So, General Amidror, it’ll just be you and me this afternoon.

I wanted to start with Lebanon and get an update from you on what exactly the situation is, because I think it looks different whether in Washington, in Jerusalem, or in Beirut. Here in Washington, there was a ceasefire, yet another ceasefire was announced yesterday. Hezbollah seemed to reject it. So, what is your understanding from Israel of what the current situation in Lebanon is?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Just to make it clear that it is not a ceasefire. We lost a captain from the Armored Brigade a few hours ago to an anti-tank missile and he was killed. We are fighting in South Lebanon. We crossed the Mitani in the northeast part of the river in the area before the castle, and we are now controlling the area, which is North of the Litani in the center of this area is Nabatieh, the biggest city in South Lebanon.

If an order is given, we can go move down from this area with the Litani in our left wing and it depends on how far and how deep the decision will go now. The meaning of this movement is that we are taking control of a big area, which is North of the Litani and the aim of such a step will be to neutralize the ability of Hezbollah to launch missiles, rockets, and drones from the area which is North of the Litani into Israel and against the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] still fighting South of the Litani on in the western side of the area. We are not doing it in the classical military way because of the restrictions that the Americans asked us to take upon ourselves.

I think it was a big mistake for the United States of America to connect the Iran issue with the Lebanon issue and to let Hezbollah get out of the situation, because the Americans think that might hurt their ability to negotiate with the Iranians. I think it’s a big mistake, I think Lebanon is an issue for itself and by giving the Iranians the ability to influence the situation in Lebanon; in a way the Americans in these negotiations are legitimizing the influence of Iran in Lebanon. Despite the fact that in the negotiations between us and the Lebanese in Washington, it is clearly the main obstacle for any agreement for any peace in Lebanon or for any future which might bring some life to this miserable people in Lebanon is if Iran will be kicked out of Lebanon and Hezbollah will be dismantled.

Without these two actions, there is no way that Lebanon will succeed to achieve any agreement with Israel that someone will be ready to risk his money and to invest in Lebanon, and so forth. The prerequisite for any arrangement which will bring Lebanon some help in the future of this devastating war is to get rid of the Iranians, they should be outside Lebanon. By the way, the Lebanese didn’t ask the Iranian ambassador to leave—they called him persona non grata and they asked him to leave Lebanon, yet he’s still in the embassy. So, to get rid of the Iranians and to dismantle Hezbollah, those actions cannot be taken if during the negotiations the Americans connect as they did this time between the movement moving on the negotiations with the Iranians and the situation in Lebanon. It’s a huge strategic mistake to connect between the two, I know the Iranians want to be connected, it’s their interest, they want to legitimize their influence in Lebanon, but I think that here the Americans had a fantastic opportunity to say, ‘Guys two different issues: one we are negotiating with the Lebanese government in Washington.’ And the second one is Iran, ‘We are negotiating with the Iranians through mediators.’ I think that this connection should be stopped and should not exist anymore in the future.

Blaise Misztal:

Is the current Israeli military operation in Lebanon a response to Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire, or is it sort of a proactive operation to achieve Israeli strategic objectives?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

First of all, the whole operation is in the action to the war, which was initiated by Hezbollah on February 28^th, when Israel and America attacked Iran. We didn’t touch Hezbollah, Hezbollah decided to help the Iranians by beginning to bomb Israel. So, the whole war in Lebanon was initiated by Hezbollah. Since then, you know, it’s a ping pong; you never know what came first.

What we try to do is to put Hezbollah to the North and they will not have the ability to launch missile rockets. At the beginning, it was anti-tank missiles, and later even to the North because of the drone threat which is coming from the North part of the Litani. It’s a war in which we are restricting ourselves because of the interest of the United States of America of regarding Iran, but we are pushing Hezbollah to the North

Blaise Misztal:

You said that it’s not a regular military operation because of restrictions that the United States has asked for. Can you give us more details about what those restrictions are and what that means for the IDF operation?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Yes, for example, the command-and-control system of Hezbollah, the headquarters, the decision makers are sitting in Beirut, and the Americans ask us specifically not to act in Beirut, so we don’t. The Americans don’t want it to be a full wage war that the old forces that we have in Lebanon or in the northern part of Israel will go into Lebanon, and we take control of the area South of Beirut. It can be done. It is not. We are not doing it. We are moving very slowly, because we do not want to put the Americans in the corner by doing something which is very big and very well understood as a big operation.

It is very moderate, very slow, and because of that, the movements are very short and very slow. As you know, it is very problematic for our forces on the ground to move slowly and to restrict themselves and to have some areas which are crucial to the ability of the other side to implement these plans that we will not touch because the Americans asked us not to do it.

Blaise Misztal:

You said that the operational objective is to prevent Hezbollah’s ability to fire rockets and drones. How far North does Israel have to go to achieve that all the way to the Dahieh, all the way to Beqaa? How far?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

No, not all the way to Dahieh, but South of Beirut somewhere. The exact point is the military technical issue South of the hourly area, which will be denied from Hezbollah, the ability of Hezbollah to launch missiles and rockets will be very limited. They can use very long-range missiles and rockets to launch them from the car. Most of the numbers that they still have are very minimal.

Here, I think it is a place to make a remark about the situation of Hezbollah. Hezbollah, we succeeded in the war before the end of 2024 to destroy between two-thirds to three-fourths of the capabilities of Hezbollah to launch missiles and rockets. It is about reducing the number of missiles that they have, and the number of launches that they have. People are used to saying, but with the time moving on, Hezbollah will rearm itself, and I think that it is people who don’t understand how significant the change on the ground since has been since the end of 2024.

The land bridge, which was probably the most strategic achievement of Iran to build a land bridge from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and into the Mediterranean Beirut. This bridge does not exist. Syria was taken out of the region without the cornerstone of Syria in the bridge. The bridge does not exist. The Iranians do not have a way to rearm Hezbollah, they can smuggle through Syria here and there, something, but not in the numbers that had been before the part of the efforts before the war.

Syria itself, which was the backyard of Hezbollah, provided Hezbollah with a weapons system which was the hub for transferring weapon systems that came from Russia and from Iran into the hands of Hezbollah. All of that system does not exist, of course. The Iranians can bring money to Lebanon, and if the Americans, based on the agreement, will lift the sanctions, more money will come to Lebanon and more money will go to Hezbollah. Hezbollah will add more resources to recruit more members to Hezbollah, but that cannot bring with the money and does not bring the weapon system, which is supposed to come somehow. In the past, it was clear coming from Iran and Syria. There is a direct connection between Iran and Lebanon. There is Syria which is the backyard of Lebanon and supplying Hezbollah. It does not exist anymore. It’s a totally new situation; Hezbollah was squeezed between Israel and Syria. The new Syrian regime hates Hezbollah more than us, ready to kill more Hezbollah members and affiliated families, and so and so forth, more than us. We are restrictionists, a democratic country. They aren’t, and these people know that the main force which butchered them during the war inside Syria was Hezbollah. The number of casualties on the Sunni side is not known; it’s somewhere between a half and one million. More than five million had to leave their places and became refugees inside Syria and outside Syria, thanks to the efforts of Hezbollah and Iraq. With help from the Russians, which have been the air force of those boots on the ground for Hezbollah and the Iranians.

So, Hezbollah today, is between Israel and Syria and cannot rearm itself. It’s a legend. Yes, here and there, probably they do succeed in smuggling something from Syria into Lebanon, and maybe somewhere, some place they are making some effort. What is newly made and this is the new threat that Israel is facing, is drones. Not in big numbers but smart drones and they use the fact that the IDF is moving inside Lebanon, and mainly IDF facilities or forces have hit communities on the other side of the border inside Israel, but this is the minority. We are making huge efforts to produce good answers to this threat. Within three months, you will see that we have some new ideas, which will be implemented on the ground. Will it be a 100 percent solution? Probably not. But it will reduce the number of casualties, the number of Israelis that will be heard by the drones, and you know it’s a kind of race between the defender and the attacker, and we are learning, we made a mistake and we didn’t prepare. Right now, we are making huge efforts.

Blaise Misztal:

To play devil’s advocate, General Amidror, if Hezbollah has been cut off from the Iranian weapons supply, as you just said, they can’t rearm. Why is an operation of this size going this far needed now when the IDF has gone further into Lebanon than it did during Operation Northern Arrows in 2024, there was a year of a ceasefire where Israel seem to believe that whatever degradation of Hezbollah was accomplished during Northern Arrows was sufficient, didn’t require further military action at the time. So, why is this big operation needed now?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I don’t think that someone in Israel thought this was sufficient. I remember meeting with one of the commanders of the IDF, in which we exchanged our views. It was almost a year and a half ago, immediately after the ceasefire, before the first attack on the Iranians, and it was clear in this conversation that we will have to make chapter two in Lebanon because yes, we succeeded to derogate the capabilities of Hezbollah, but Hezbollah was stronger than Hamas before the war. They had around 60,000-200,000 missiles and rockets, and even if we succeeded in destroying two thirds of them, of that meaning it is to understand between 20,000 to 30,000 rockets and missiles that remain in their hands. So, it was understood in Israel that chapter two will be needed. We did not take into account the situation in which the Americans are making such a big mistake in connecting the negotiations with the Iranians with the situation on the ground in Lebanon.

We try to help as much as possible to resume the negotiations in Washington, because we think it’s very important to bring the Lebanese to make the commitment, and if Hezbollah will be dismantled by the Lebanese, it’s the best solution. I’m very pessimistic about will and capability, but if that is achieved, it is a fantastic situation, but if not, it should be done by force.

Blaise Misztal:

You said that peace will not come to Lebanon until Iran is kicked out and Hezbollah is disarmed. You just sounded pessimistic about the Lebanese being able to do it themselves, is that something that Israel can accomplish by itself militarily? Is that the ultimate objective of this operation?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

The answer is no. We understand our limitations. It’s not Gaza. In Gaza, we can say we will not finish till Hamas will be obliterated totally. People will remain there, but the organization will not exist, not a military organization at least. We cannot say the same about Hezbollah. We are not going to launch a ground operation in Lebanon, in Beirut, or in Beqaa and many parts of Hezbollah are focusing on Beirut and in Beqaa.

What we can make and should make is to make the organization weak enough that we can act in Lebanon as we did since 2012 in Syria. Every time that we had intelligence, we bombed the facility which we learned from the intelligence about and by that we stopped the Iranians from building Hezbollah to zero under their direct control. That was the idea of the Iranians to build another organization under their direct control in Syria. So, the ring of fire around Israel will be something that Israel will deal with. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian organization in Syria, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in the South. Since 2012, we have been very active in Syria. We succeeded in destroying any attempt that the Iranians made to build a facility, a false capability inside Syria.

I think that we should be in the same situation regarding the future of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Whenever we will have an intelligence about the factory of Hezbollah, weapon systems of Hezbollah, training of Hezbollah, whatever we will feel enough confidence and will not be deterred by the capabilities that Hezbollah has. We have to destroy and to kill them, and so on.

So, for that, we have to make Hezbollah much weaker, and that can be done by the IDF. In some areas, we will take control on the ground, in some areas it will be by the air force, in some areas it will be by special forces, but at the end of the day we should end the war with a clear situation in which whenever there is a need the IDF can and will act inside Lebanon. Of course, the Lebanese government will do what they promise to, and they will disarm Hezbollah, and we will have an agreement with Lebanon that will not be needed. But assuming the pessimistic option that the Lebanese army is not doing what is supposed to do and the Lebanese government cannot control Lebanon, Israel should be in a position to prevent Hezbollah from rearming itself.

Blaise Misztal:

Will creating that condition require maintaining Israeli troops inside of Lebanon, and if so, in what part?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

The answer is yes, and probably it will be from the Litani’s south.

Blaise Misztal:

I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has suggested the creation of a new international force to replace UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon] to secure Lebanon and I guess disarm Hezbollah. Would that be a suitable arrangement for Israel?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I hope to hear better jokes from a very important guy like the Secretary of the United Nations. UNIFIL did not contribute anything to the security of Lebanon or to the security of Israel. It was an organization which was used by Hezbollah to hide behind it. It’s a huge mistake to have another organization. We should get rid of this organization.

You know, I was very young soldier in 1967 Six-Day War, I was in the Paratrooper Brigade which was responsible to take the higher area of the Gaza Strip, Ali Muntar, and when we moved into Gaza we got an order to stop to cease fire because the United Nations were evacuating their forces from the Gaza Strip. So an Indian force going with rifles down to the land to show that they are not going to use it, they marched up very nicely, by the way, like a parade, but it was the first example in my long history in the Middle East wars that I saw how the United Nations forces are irrelevant to the situation when they are really needed.

Blaise Misztal:

You told us about some of the ways that the IDF is restraining itself at American request in the way it’s conducting this operation, but what is your sense of the general United States position in regards to IDF operations in Lebanon specifically, given that we heard reports about the testy phone call that happened this week between President [Donald] Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, where President Trump seemed to be not particularly happy about Israel’s role in Lebanon.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I can understand the American position, but I don’t agree with it. I don’t think it is a wise position, but I can understand. The Americans try now to achieve an agreement in which those threats will be open, and then the negotiation will be focused on the nuclear issue in Iran. That’s what the Americans are saying, and I believe that this is what they want. The Iranians can use and probably will use the war in Lebanon as an excuse to not sign the agreement. Saying okay, we have an interest, you have an interest in the war, we have an interest in Lebanon. What about our interests? I think that the answer of the Americans should be, it’s not connected. The war in Lebanon will continue, Israelis will do what they think they have to do to secure their security. It was initiated by Hezbollah and Hezbollah will pay the price. You don’t have any interest in Lebanon. It’s a sovereign state with the government, we are negotiating with the government, the Israelis are negotiating with the Lebanese government. Don’t interfere and don’t put yourself in the neck of the Lebanese, what you are doing with Hezbollah.

The Americans did not say the Americans allowed the situation to move towards a kind of a connection between the two fronts and of course, the Iranians are using it, and when the Iranians are using it, the pressure is on the Americans, which want a negotiation and an agreement.

So, I can understand the Americans’ position, I don’t agree with it, I think it’s a bad position. Bad for America, bad for Lebanon, and bad for the Middle East, because it legitimized the involvement of Iran in Lebanon, which I think is a big mistake. So, I can understand the Americans. I don’t agree and I think that the Prime Minister had to make it clear that it is in the interest of Israel. We are losing soldiers almost every day, we have at least one soldier or officer killed in Lebanon. It is our interest to move on, not to win a position in which they can identify us and kill us, because we are not moving.

Blaise Misztal:

Well, General, I have a couple more questions for you, but I also want to open up to the audience, so if you have any questions you want to pose to General Amidror, please feel free to submit them using the Q & A function in Zoom, and I’ll read them out. General Amidror, I guess in light of what you just said, under the Biden administration, we used to talk about the U.S. bear hug of Israel, which was both supportive and constraining at the same time. Is there a danger of the relationship with the Trump administration developing into a similar bear hug?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I don’t think. I think that with violence, will the strategy yield a technical issue? The Americans need quietness when they’re negotiating with the Iranians, and they believe that what they are negotiating is about the exporting of all the nuclear materials from Iran, something which is one of the most important interests of the State of Israel. So, they can think that it is wise to say to the Israelis, don’t put yourself in a situation because of you, we will not have an agreement with the Iranians, when at the end of the agreement we can take out all the nuclear materials. I think that this is the big difference between the law of the Biden administration and the law of the Trump administration. I think that this is also a big mistake. Americans should not give the Iranians the benefit of connecting with Lebanon anymore.

Blaise Misztal:

How would you interpret what we saw from Iran on Monday and Tuesday at the launching of 35 missiles and drones and claiming that they had walked away from negotiations. How should we understand what they’re trying to accomplish with that?

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I have been in negotiations with the Iranians since the 90s. I think that I had a very important role in bringing the Iranians to the negotiations. When everyone told me about their nuclear project and that they were not going to negotiate, I think we had a lot of help from America. America made their main efforts to bring them to the table. We helped from the outside with our intelligence and ideas, and so on, and so forth. But in the end, it was done by the Americans. I was part of the Israeli Team, coordinated the negotiations with the Americans when they negotiated with the Iranians, and I was there when the Americans decided to lie to us and not tell us that they are negotiating directly with Iranians and that they are giving up and changing the policy for dismantling to spawn and monitor.

So, I have a lot of experience. I didn’t by myself make the negotiations, but I was there when the Americans and others, such as when the P5 +1 negotiated with the Iranians. I think that the Iranians try to do something and apparently, they are succeeding. First of all, they want to gain time. The more time they are gaining, they will be better prepared for the next round, if it comes. They are taking out all the missiles and the launches that have been in tunnels which we succeeded to destroy access to, so they will have much more. They are reorganizing themselves; they learn many lessons and they are using that to enhance their capability, so they need time to be better prepared.

Second, they understand that the closer we get to the midterm elections, the more the chances that the President resumes the war go down. By achieving and by getting time to reorganize themselves and postpone the war to maybe to the point in which it will not be resumed forever. I think that they are playing very well, and they understand that America is working in agreement, and they are not ready to risk the negotiations, so they can be freer to act against allies of the United States of America. They understand there’s some red lines that should not be crossed, for example, they didn’t attack Israel. But you know, those little countries or big countries which are much weaker than Israel, they can threaten Americans indirectly.

In a way, if you want to understand, it is the North-South Korea situation. Who was all the time against forming North Korea, South Korea. Why? They understood because the North Korean gave them the opportunity to understand that if the Americans are bombing the nuclear facilities, they will destroy Seoul and they didn’t want to take the risk. What the Iranians are doing is the same. They are telling the Americans, and they are telling the neighbors to tell the Americans, not to resume the war because we will suffer. We, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and so on. So, in a way the Iranians tried to build a Korean situation, and you know what, they didn’t fail in a way they succeeded to do it.

Blaise Misztal:

If you want to read JINSA’s take on the current situation with Iran, I recommend to you Mike Makovsky and my recent insight that should be in your inboxes today or on the JINSA website, arguing that Trump is at risk of losing the war on Iran and needs to act forcefully to reverse that. But General Amidror, let me turn now to a question from JINSA’s John Hannah, who asks, ‘Would you support a well-resourced and dedicated program under CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to train, equip, and advise the best forces of the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] for the specific mission of confronting Hezbollah? Could it succeed?’

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I don’t know if it succeeds or not, but if someone in Lebanon says guys do that and we will do the job, I think that we should take the risk.

Blaise Misztal:

All right. Well, thank you very much for your time this evening General Amidror, thank you to everyone who tuned in. Please check out jinsa.org for all of our latest analysis, and with that, General, have a good night, and wishing everyone else a good afternoon. Thank you.

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Thank you very much.

The post Transcript: Webinar – The Fog of Ceasefire: Escalation and the Uncertainty Ahead appeared first on JINSA.

PANELISTS

Michael Knights

Chief Product Officer, Horizon Engage; Author, Back to Basics: U.S.-Iraq Security Cooperation in the Post-Combat Era (2023)

Joel Rayburn

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; Former Senior Director for Iraq Policy, U.S. National Security Council

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.

—

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:

Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to another JINSA webinar. We are here to discuss what seems to be a rare moment of U.S. and Iranian agreement, which is the support for the current recently created new Iraqi government.

Here to discuss whether in fact that is a good thing or a bad thing, or something that Washington and Tehran should be in agreement on, I am delighted to be joined by the two foremost experts on everything Iraq in Washington, Michael Knights who is the Chief Product Officer at Horizon Engage, and Joel Rayburn, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and previously the Senior Director for Iraq at the National Security Council, and the author of a two-volume history of the Iraq war.

Welcome, thank you for being with us.

Joel, maybe I could start with you. Iraq held parliamentary elections at the beginning of November of last year, and yet the prime minister was selected, and the government was formed just two weeks ago. What was the process and why did it take six months to go from the election to government formation?

Joel Rayburn:

Well, good to be with you, Blaise, and also good to be with Mike.

One of the reasons that it took so long is that it always takes so long. The Iraqi system is pretty clunky and even as written in the constitution, all the constitutional timelines get thrown out the window. Procedurally, what the Iraqis would do, [is that] they would elect a parliament, the parliament would be seated, the parliament would then elect a president of Iraq in a slate of vice presidents, and then the president would task the largest bloc in the parliament with nominating a prime minister. Then there would be a certain amount of time for the prime minister-designate to be able to form a cabinet, which then comes back to the parliament for ratification.

Actually, I skipped the very first step, which is that the parliament, once it meets, has to elect a speaker. In Arabic parlance, there’s a president of the parliament, a president of the republic, [a] president of the country, and then a president of the government. So, Iraq has to go through three elections. They have the elections of parliament, and then three elections after that for the leadership.

The way things have emerged is politically, that’s what’s written. What’s unwritten is that each of those three presidents is allocated to a different communal bloc within Iraq. So that the speaker of parliament has come to be designated for the Sunnis of Iraq, the Sunni political blocs. The president of Iraq has come to be allocated, de facto, for the Kurdish blocs, and the president of the Republic, or the prime minister, has come to be allocated for the Shia political blocs.

Now, there’s a fight, then there’s a competition within each of those communal blocs for who is going to get those positions. There’s a protracted political battle for that, because each of those communal blocs are subdivided in different political groupings that are competing with one another and they’re shifting alliances.

In reality, just as is the case in Lebanon, this is exactly the kind of consociational arrangement that’s in Lebanon. In Lebanon [it] is written into the constitution and the governing law. In Iraq, it’s just de facto the practice, but it may as well be written in law. I mean, it’s as firm a constitutional element as any. In the same way that the British constitution is not really written down, but there is a very clear set of constitutional guidelines, that is what is happening in Iraq. It’s a consociational arrangement. It would be very difficult for anybody to change that, and what it also means is just as in Lebanon, none of the positions is agreed until they’re all agreed, because all of the blocs are jockeying for their influence over each of the three positions.

So, the Shia political blocs will line up on one side or the other of who will be the president of the parliament among the Sunnis, and so on. So, the Shia and the Kurds will weigh in and have an impact on who will be the Sunni, which Sunni bloc gets the speakership of the parliament. The Sunnis and the Shia will weigh in on which Kurdish bloc and nominee get to be the president of the parliament. Then everyone weighs in on who gets to be the prime minister, which comes from the Shia bloc. That is the arrangement, and that’s why it would take very long, even if it were perfect wartime, prosperous conditions, and the whole region were in a state of stability.

If you layer in that the Iraqi election took place at a time of regional conflict, and then there were outside powers also competing to influence the shape of the formation of the Iraqi government. Then it slowed down even further. I mean it’s a miracle that the Iraqis ever see any government at all, so it certainly wasn’t unusual that this one took as long as it did. Let me stop there, because Mike probably has some thoughts as well, but that’s the general backdrop.

Blaise Misztal:

Yeah, thanks, Joel.

So, Mike, let me turn to you. Maybe tell us a little bit about the outcome of the elections, and who the major players were in this process of jockeying for government formation.

Michael Knights:

Thanks so much. It’s great to be here with you both.

To add on to some of the things Joel said, and he literally wrote the book on Iraq, ‘Iraq after America’, which is still a great read, I’d say this. First of all, it’s a miracle they form a government, but it’s a miracle that happens every time, right? So, it’s kind of something that they’ve got very used to doing. Even though they do stretch a lot of their constitution, definitely the spirit of it is stretched. Often, they are very focused on having elections roughly on time, and in this case forming the government roughly on time.

They took about the maximum time they could to do some of the stages of it, but you could see they were keen to keep it on track. One of the reasons for that, I think, is that the Shia religious parties and militias who run the country gain enormous benefit from running it. They don’t want it to collapse into complete chaos, e.g., for instance, constitutional time frames don’t mean anything anymore, when the prime minister can just stay in position as long as he likes. No. There’s reasons why they try and keep things roughly on the train tracks, even if the train tracks are heading somewhere pretty bad.

I don’t tend to talk a lot about the Kurdish or the Sunni political groupings in Iraq, because they’re not the ones who are running Iraq. They’re not the ones who are picking the prime minister, which is traditionally, as Joel said, a Shiite role. They’re not the ones who are ultimately running the most powerful posts in the country, such as finance, interior, the prime ministership itself, the intelligence agencies, the central bank, and things like that.

So, the key parties within what we call ‘the coordination framework’, which is the pan-Shiite bloc in parliament that agrees who the prime minister is going to be, and they have a majority of the seats in parliament, so if they want to, they can pass pretty much anything if they work together. Those guys have split into a number of factions. Even the Shiite part, which is about 60% of parliament, is split at least 10 ways. So, you can imagine this is a pizza. The Iraqi parliament is a pizza that has about 32 slices in it, and nobody’s going to get much of a mouthful with 32 slices. It takes an awful lot of pulling people together into coalitions. They’re very fragile.

In this particular case, the reason why we’ve got Ali al-Zaidi as the new prime minister of Iraq, a banker, a money changer, a businessman, from a major southern tribe who everybody in the system has made money with at some point or the other. It’s because none of these coordination framework players could agree who would be prime minister. They all said, “We want a say in who will be the prime minister designate”, but nobody wanted to accept everybody else’s compromised candidates that they were putting up, who were in fact the candidates they themselves had in their pockets.

So, in the end, out of pure inability to break the deadlock, they reached somewhat outside of themselves to a candidate. Not to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who Donald Trump said cannot be the next prime minister of Iraq, he was no good last time, he can’t do it again. Not to designated terrorists like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), who have 26 seats in parliament out of 329, one of the largest Shiite blocs. Not to Badr, that was formed by the Iranians, that has about 20 seats in parliament. [They are] not yet sanctioned, but very close to the Revolutionary Guard, not close to former prime minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani, who had 46 seats, but his bloc has already split into two pieces, and so they’re both smaller factions now.

None of them could push their compromise candidate forward. Instead, the Supreme Court judge of Iraq and a number of other factions said “Let’s see if this businessman can be somebody that we can all work with”. At the moment, that’s what they went with. The Gulf states embraced him, mostly. The Jordanians embraced him. Ultimately, the US embraced him, and after that the Iranians embraced him, and the Turks, and the Pakistanis, and others.

So, the creation of this prime minister is a very important thing to understand. How a person comes to the throne in Iraq is the most important thing about them. Who put them there? What did they offer those parties? In this case, it would appear that [the] prime minister has not necessarily offered any of the key Shiite parties anything in particular yet. He might have made certain assurances that some very negative outcomes from their perspective wouldn’t happen, like complete removal of all the militias. He might have made some of those assurances to the Iranians too. I think the Gulf states and the U.S. probably had more of a role in shaping the introduction of this prime minister-designate than has been the case in the past. So, in the past, the Iranians went first, and we said, okay. This time I think we went first, and they said okay. I don’t know if Joel would agree with that at this stage.

Joel Rayburn:

Yeah, I think that’s right. I mean, there’s been a pattern of all but really one. I think every prime minister that’s come out of the Shia bloc consensus since 2005 has gotten the mandate because they were viewed as non-threatening to the interests of the major Shia political blocs and to the Iranians. So, every prime minister that’s gone in since 2005, the other blocs have assumed that [the] prime minister would essentially be under their either control or heavy influence. [They] wouldn’t have a mind of their own, wouldn’t have an independent power base, wouldn’t be able to make decisions without consensus support.

That’s been largely true for all but one, and that was Nouri al-Maliki, who was able to get into office and develop his own power base, organize in a very Stalin-esque way, and seize control of the government apparatus in an unprecedented way. Also, since Maliki’s prime ministership ended, all the other parties have said, “Well, we don’t want another Maliki. We can’t have that. We need to make sure that whoever we choose can’t do what Maliki did and consolidate power.

So, the blocs that wind up agreeing to the prime minister then will take all the steps possible to prevent the prime minister from consolidating enough control and power to be able to actually execute policies over their heads. I think that is what they’re banking on with Ali al-Zaidi in this case. He’s a bit of an unknown quantity, he’s not a politician, so we haven’t seen him in leadership. Whether he will be able to consolidate the kind of power basing and control that he would need in order to strike an independent policy line from the rest of the Shia parties.

It’s somewhat unpredictable for those political blocs, because he comes from the business community. [He is the] first person to come in from that community. Everyone else that’s been prime minister of Iraq has come from the Shia Islamist political world, maybe with the possible exception of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, but he was in that milieu in the opposition in the pre-2003 opposition galaxy of Shia blocs. So, he was very well known to them.

So, [it’s] a bit of a gamble by these other political blocs. Also, the fact that he is perceived as having, as Mike said, a very close relationship with the Supreme Court judge Faiq Zidan. [He is a] very powerful figure in Iraqi politics, probably the most powerful figure in Shia politics, for sure. So that’s what I would say to extend Mike’s points.

Blaise Misztal:

Joel, maybe just sticking with you and staying with Maliki for a second. It did seem like in January there was talk that Maliki was going to be the prime minister candidate. Then, as Mike said, I guess President Trump shot that down or threatened to not waive sanctions on Iraq if they went through with the Maliki nomination. Was that actually a serious attempt to put Maliki back in power after that experience that you just described?

Joel Rayburn:

Yeah, that was a serious attempt by Maliki to put himself back in power. So, I think what’s happened [is that] since Maliki left office, he remains a very powerful leader [of a] very powerful bloc. Essentially with the state of law, which is kind of like his ‘Dawa Party +’ within the Iraqi parliament. This is a big bloc, and he is the head of it, and so he has banked on being a kingmaker. Since he couldn’t return after 2014 as prime minister, for the last 12 years, his influence has come from being one of the kingmakers.

He’s one of the people that had to agree to who would be the Shia premier, who would get the mandate from elsewhere in the Shia bloc, is essentially how Mohammad Shia al-Sudani became prime minister.

He was fully backed by Maliki, came from that state of law kind of coalition. Sudani, as soon as he got into office, then began trying to do what Maliki had done, which was to consolidate his own control and be independent. It wasn’t very long before Maliki and some of the other Shia political grandes who had put Sudani there said, “Well, when it comes to the next government, that guy for sure will not be returning over our dead bodies”. So that was the immediate.

Then Sudani won the largest electoral bloc and attempted to get the mandate for himself, but these other blocs, having already said “over our dead bodies,” then were in a stiff-arm wrestling match with him to deny him the mandate. The United States was de facto supporting Sudani for continuity’s sake, and because Sudani had made commitments to the U.S. on curbing militia power and doing things to expand the U.S.-Iraq relationship. Not just the security relationship, but the economic relationship in particular.

But when it became clear that the other blocs were going to essentially block Sudani from returning, and the question went to, “Well, who then comes forward?” At first, Maliki then thought of nominating someone else from within his bloc, and so there were some names floated on who that would be. But, when things started aligning, I think Maliki then began saying, “Well, maybe this time I don’t have to just be a kingmaker, I don’t have to just send a proxy in to nominate a prime minister. Maybe I can just do it myself.”

He seemed to have Iranian support for that, and he seemed to have the support of some of the militias. That got very far down the road, with the U.S. having a quiet opposition to it, but Maliki not really getting the message, or not believing the messages that he was getting, which tended to be diplomatic and nuanced and not very straightforward. Until it had to go all the way basically to the Oval Office for President Trump to clarify the U.S. position and say, “Over our dead bodies will that guy return as prime minister,” and then that ended his candidacy.

At that point, Prime Minister Sudani then first tried to come back in to get himself the mandate again, and then, as that was still essentially checkmated by the other Shia blocs, then it became a competition of proxies. Maliki then put forward a candidate from his block. Prime Minister Sudani then countered with his chief of staff. So that essentially, each of them vying to be kingmakers, the Shia parties deadlocked between those two, and then that threw the way open for an outside candidate going off the board. Faiq Zaidan came in, and some others came in and supported Ali al-Zaidi.

That was the Shia political bargaining and positioning that went on. Now, during this entire process, the United States was weighing in, and Iran was weighing in. But just among the Shia parties, that’s essentially what happened.

Maliki and Sudani canceled each other out, and then that left the way open for the outside candidate, which was Ali al-Zaidi, almost by default. I think the rest of the parties, though, what they will be hoping for, is to have the same kind of arrangement with Ali al-Zaidi as they’ve had with previous prime ministers. Which is to say “All right, we will agree to your mandate. as long as you agree to the following laundry list of things that will render you not a threat to our bloc’s interests,” and the Iranians will have done the same thing.

Blaise Misztal

So, Mike, how should we think of Zaidi? I mean you said that there’s not much known about him. He doesn’t have a political background. Does that mean he’s a political blank slate? Do we think he has an agenda or an ideology?

How much is he likely to be controlled by the various factions that put him in power versus be independent. What should we expect from him?

Michael Knights:

Anyone who has owned a bank in Iraq and in the world is not a blank slate, the US Treasury knows him very well. So do, for instance, U.S. grain importers, because he is the biggest aggregator of foreign grain coming into Iraq, and a lot of that is American. So, whether it’s our business community, whether it’s our banking regulators, whether it’s our intelligence community, we know Ali al-Zaidi a bit better than it might appear.

I think he’s somebody whose own bank was, for instance, banned on U.S. instructions from the Iraqi dollar auction, their way of getting dollars into the hands of Iraqis, in theory, who need them to cover import costs. But in actuality, [it is] the way that the militias divert a lot of dollars to Iran.

So, he’s had to have those negotiations with the U.S. government about how to fix his bank, how to work with U.S. law firms, regulators, lobbyists to fix that. So, in some ways there’s more track record there for the U.S. than some people might think.

He’s a relatively gentle person. In other words, he’s quite well mannered. He’s not a political fighter; he’s a businessman who always tries to come to some arrangement with people. He has worked with pretty much every key faction in Iraq in the kind of banking money exchange – to put it in a polite way. As a result, he’s somebody that they’ve all found to be workable, and the U.S. has as well. So, in many ways, he’s a guy with no overwhelming black marks on him, which is difficult to find in Iraq.

Whether he’s a guy who, as Joel pointed out, has any experience running large bureaucracies. No. Does he have any experience having to look someone in the eye and tell them, “Do what I say, you’re going to prison?” No, he doesn’t really.

Iraq is a place where business is tough, it’s hard-edged. But at the same time, he’s not one of the more hard-edged businessmen. So, he’s entering a world now–and you can see it sometimes on his face in the photos–where he knows he’s in, I won’t say over his head, but right up to his nose, and you know he can just, he’s just about staying above water now.

Now, the good thing is, I don’t think Zaidi is a standalone individual. He has no team of his own. He’s going to get the team that’s given to him by political factions, and also by the judiciary, and by the military and intelligence services. The strength of that team, and where they help him to lean, or pull him to, will be what really tells us what kind of government we’re going to get with Zaidi.

We’ve had good men run Iraq, I think like Mustafa al-Kadhimi, prime minister from a few years ago. But they were not necessarily hard enough to do the things required to break the power of militias and corruption networks. We’ve had bad men run Iraq, like Nouri al-Maliki, and a couple of others, Shia’ al-Sudani, and not everything they did was wrong.

So, it’s really about how he came to the throne, and that’s encouraging. This time, he was not picked by Iran, which is rare in Iraq, and then it’s what kind of team you build around you. That’s up in the air still, but it’s getting slightly encouraging. We’re seeing, particularly in the intelligence and security realm, individuals getting rotated out who are very bad news and are very tight with the Iranians or with the militias or both, and we’re seeing other people rolled in who might not be quite that way.

So I might be hopeful. When you say, “How should we view Zaidi, the prime minister?” I think we should very much view him as an opportunity. I’m happy to discuss in a little bit more depth why the moment right now is so potentially transformative for Iraq if the U.S. leans into supporting this prime minister. But also disciplines him and the broader system if they fail to do the things they need to do to get Iraq back on the right track,

Blaise Misztal:

That is definitely something I want to dig into, but let me get Joel’s take on Zaidi, and how we should understand him.

Joel Rayburn:

My take largely accords with Mike’s. Coming from the business community, he’s had to maintain business relationships with all of these political blocs and not make enemies. So, I don’t think he has enemies right now, which sets him apart from probably all the other candidates that were out there. He’ll have a bit of a honeymoon period with the United States.

But each one of these blocs in the United States and the Iranians have set very firm expectations for him to deliver on, and he’s going to have to make some choices because some of the expectations are mutually exclusive to one another.

He’s not going to be able to satisfy everybody, and as Mike pointed out, he’s going to have to be administering a state, and a vast one. The Iraqi state is enormous. Its military security apparatuses are vast; the ministries of Iraq are gargantuan. He’s going to have to be running them. There’s a budget, I mean, my goodness, to come into the seat at a time when the Iraqi government budget is so bloated. It’s so large, and the state provides so many services, and has so many Iraqis on the payroll. The break-even point for oil has to be very high, and that’s if you’re exporting it.

The Iraqis aren’t exporting oil very well right now, because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. It hurts them just about more than anybody else, because their alternatives are quite meager. So he’s going to be coming into office at a time when they’re going to be at a big cash flow deficit, so he’s immediately going to have a budgetary crisis that he’s going to have to negotiate with.

And guess what, if you’re cutting down different parts that you’re having to cut back on the budgetary expenditures. The political economy is so thick in Iraq that he’s immediately going to have to be negotiating, strong arming, cajoling different political blocs, which say, “Well, wait, not my share of the budget, not our share. That ministry, that’s ours, that budget comes to us, or that governorate,” and so on. So, it’s going to be tough.

He’s in an even more difficult, I think, probably the most challenging environment confronting any new prime minister, probably since Haider al-Abadi walked into office at a time when ISIS owned a third of Iraq. I mean, can you imagine? So, it’s certainly the toughest task of any new premier since then.

Blaise Misztal:

Joel, I could just ask you to expand on that a little bit, because you said he’s going to be pulled in multiple directions by competing interest groups or factions. So, I wanted to ask you to tell us a little more about the sort of issues facing Iraq that he’s going to have to confront or be pulled on. You talked about the economic challenge with the closure of the strait. What are the other areas in which there’s going to be pressure on him to move one way or the other.

Joel Rayburn:

I think the biggest one is that the government revenues for a decade and more, because it’s vast oil production and export and revenues, along with in gas. For quite some time an increasing portion of the government’s oil revenues have been diverted or been siphoned off by political block in Iraq. So it’s reduced the share that the government writ large is able to use to finance itself. So if he’s going to balance the budget, [if] he’s going to keep the state functioning, he’s going to have to claw some of that back.

Which of the political blocs does he claw it back from? How, which actors, and so on. That’s going to be that’s the first minefield in which he has to walk. The other part of the budget, the functioning of the state, is the payroll. It is vast and hyperinflated and full of non-actually working people. So, ghost employees, ghost soldiers, ghost policemen, and so on.

All the political blocs get a share of the budget of this ministry or that security service or this government, and so on, by having a certain share of people on the payroll. He’s going to have to reduce and rationalize that. Every prime minister that has come into office in the last 10 years has tried to grapple with that and reduce the payroll, or reduce it in one area and expand it in another, based on the politics.

But every prime minister’s come in and said, “My God, we cannot support this payroll, we can’t keep millions of people on the government payroll. It’s got to be reduced.” That’s huge. That’s a huge share of the political largess, and he’s certainly in a time of constrained resources, which is going to be for quite a while in Iraq. Then he’s going to have to fight that. But I’d say those are the two biggest ones, are the revenues from the energy sector, and then what do you do with the budget, what do you do with the government money.

The Iraqi state contracts for everything under the sun all across Iraq, and so there’s a huge political competition to get the contracts. So, it’s the revenues from the energy sector, it’s the payroll, and then it’s which of the political blocs gets this or that contract. If he really wants the functioning state, and a state that has viable finances, he’s got to get those under wraps, and those are very, very difficult. They’re also all interconnected.

Blaise Misztal:

Alright, Mike. I’m eager to hear why you think this is a potentially hopeful moment, and how the United States can make the most of it.

Michael Knights:

In the past, when new Iraqi prime ministers have come in, I’ve traditionally had a moment of hope with them. Sudani was a bit of an exception. I didn’t like how that started. I understood better what kind of audition process he went through to get the job with the Iranians. Likewise, with one of the ones before him, Adil Abdul Mahdi.

I feel more hopeful in this case for a couple of reasons. The big breakthrough moment for me in understanding Iraq and its governance, is this idea that it’s how a person, it’s how a man comes to the prime ministership, that matters. It really sets the tone for what follows. It’s hard to break out of a very subordinate relationship with the Iranians and with Iraqi Shia militias, who are in many cases U.S. designated terrorists, if that’s the position you started from.

I think this guy starts from a slightly different position, which is that other forces, except the Shia militias, have had a role in picking this guy. One of them is Judge Faiq Zaidan, Supreme Court judge in Iraq. One is probably Thomas Barrak, the U.S. Super Envoy for the Middle East.

I think some of the people behind Zaidi are people who care quite a lot about what the Gulf states think, the Emiratis, the Saudis, and others. Put those three things together with this current moment, you have a very particular opportunity. The U.S. has just demonstrated, for all of its hemming and hawing about Hormuz, that it is pretty serious about the threat posed by the Iraqi militias.

It said, “We don’t want Nouri Al Maliki as a prime minister.” He said, “We don’t want Iraqi militias and terrorist leaders in the cabinet,” and that’s held until this moment. Then during the war, we have mounted more strikes on the Iraqi militias than we ever have at any stage, right back to when we were physically in the country pre-2011 and even then further back. I mean, this is like 2008 levels of striking that we’ve been doing in this last war against Iraqi militias firing at both the U.S. and at the Gulf States and Israel from Iraq.

So, we’ve demonstrated that we’re pretty annoyed with these militias, and against the backdrop of everything that’s happened with Iran, everything that’s happened this year, everything that’s happened with Iran and Lebanese, Hezbollah and the Houthis in the previous couple of years. These groups are recognized as being a dangerous enemy, and in this war they’ve been more dangerous than they’ve been at any point in the past.

Why do I say that? In the past, Lebanese Hezbollah was the heavy lifter for the Iranian regime in terms of its external proxy rocket and missile force. Then the Houthis took over for a while. In this war, it’s been the Iraqis. They’re the ones who have received the most up-to-date missile, rocket, drone systems. They’re the ones who have done the most attacks on the Gulf states and on U.S. forces.

These guys, if we look, we just saw Mohammed Baqer al-Saadi, one of the members of the Iraqi militia, seized by the U.S. in Turkey, brought back to the U.S. because of terrorist attacks he was planning against the continental U.S. in North America, and had already planned in places like Europe and the UK. So, these guys were going international and even threatening key U.S. leaders and their family members.

All these things mean that the Iraqi militias are somewhat in the spotlight right at this exact moment that the Iraqi government is taking shape. There are moves in countries you can see where the people who want to reduce the power of the militias are starting to move chess pieces on the ground, because they may feel that they have U.S. and Gulf support ultimately.

I think this is an opportunity, but it’s also a moment that we could easily flub, and how do we flub this moment? The only real risk right at this exact second is that the U.S. government’s Middle East policy community is out to lunch on Iraq. One wouldn’t necessarily blame them for being out to lunch on a country like Iraq. They’ve got Iran, they’ve got Israel, Lebanon, they’ve got Gulf States, they’ve got all sorts of things going on. But I’ll just say this, Iraq is not a small place, as Joel said. It’s not Lebanon. It’s seven times the population, it’s seven times the income, it’s one of the largest oil producers in the world, top five.

But also, more importantly, with the amount of effort it would take to push Iraq in the right direction, if you applied that same amount of effort to Iran, you wouldn’t get a result. You wouldn’t get that result with Israel-Lebanon, probably. You wouldn’t change fundamentally your relationship with the Gulf states. Iraq’s a place where, with one unit of effort in how its prime minister acts, or actions they take against militias, whether they let any militiamen into the cabinet ultimately. We can actually put the place on quite a different track, potentially, or at least put their foot on the path to a new track. That, for me, says efficiency-wise, that’s something the U.S. might want to put some effort into right now, because it’s a fleeting opportunity, and it’s a place where you can actually achieve a lot more bang for the buck diplomatically. That’s my feeling for why this is a moment of quite significant opportunity.

Blaise Misztal:

All right, well, I have a couple more questions for both of you, but wanted to also open it up to the audience, so if you do have any questions for Mike or Joel, feel free to submit them using the Q and A function in Zoom, and then I’ll read them out.

But for now, Mike, let me stay with you. You mentioned the role of the Gulf States and helping choose Zaidi, and also the attacks of the militias on the Gulf States. We’ve also had the Gulf States, according to reporting, the Emiratis and Saudis, striking those Iraqi militias that have been attacking them inside of Iraq.

Does that create either new interest from Gulf States, or new leverage from the Gulf States, that can also be brought to bear to try to limit the strength of the militias inside of Iraq? Or is it principally still going to fall on the United States to try to break that stranglehold?

Michael Knights:

I think the Gulf states can alter the situation in Iraq on their own, but what they are signaling is they’re very, very upset with the number of attacks that have come out of Iraq during this war, especially considering the fact that the Gulf states at the start of this war did not base U.S. forces, were not involved as an offensive partner, but we’re attacked anyway.

When it comes to being attacked from Iraq, they’re not being attacked by Iran across the Gulf. They’re being attacked by an Arab neighbor next door that also has no part in the war. So, it’s kind of doubly offensive from them.

Iraq is also a place where the Gulf states can strike back in a way that sends a signal to Iran and to pro-Iranian elements in Iraq, but doesn’t have quite the same risk attached to it as attacking mainland Iran, which it appears at least the Emirates have done, even during this war.

But you know, in this next phase, as we’re into a sort of a weak ceasefire, messy ceasefire, in the Gulf, to some extent, it’s a lot easier to do cross-border stuff into Iraq, and the Iranian-backed groups have found that they can get away with firing stuff into the Gulf from Iraq in a way that perhaps direct attacks out of Iran would have been more difficult to accept, and might have affected the ceasefire or brought a U.S. response.

So, I think the proxy war involving Iraq and the Gulf is going to get more interesting. It’s not that the Gulf States played a role in picking Zaidi. It’s that a businessman like Zaidi, who’s a true international businessman, not just some militia front company who has to do most of their business in the shadows, but basically a respectable businessman like Zaidi understands that you cannot get on the wrong side of the U.S. and the Gulf States if you want to be connected to the global financial system, and if you want to have a chance of fixing some of the stuff wrong with Iraq’s economy, which is a state killer.

The way the economy is structured, the over dependence on oil, the massive deficit every year, the fact that the oil prices could go low and then double or triple that deficit at some point in the future. All of these things mean the survival of Iraq as a modern industrialized nation requires international support, including connection to the global financial system and the U.S. and the Gulf states.

So, what it means is we’ve actually got some people inside the system now in Iraq who are not looking narrowly, saying “I will never go on vacation in Europe, I will never openly have a bank account or a business in Europe, because I’m an Iraqi militiaman that’s been sanctioned by the U.S., or might be.”

No, this is the people who actually want to be a part of the world saying we should not upset the Gulf States in this manner. We should, at the very least, stop attacking them and maybe bring some of those people to justice, or at least disempower them in a way that the Gulf states can recognize. So, that would be some comments on the Gulf side of this.

Blaise Misztal

Thanks, Mike. Joel, let me turn to you and get your thoughts on what the U.S. could be doing to try to positively influence the situation in Iraq, to try to strengthen Prime Minister Al-Zaidi and get a good outcome here, in particular when it comes to trying to sideline the militias.

Joel Rayburn:

Well, first, just to extend Mike’s point. In the same way that the Lebanese government eventually had no choice but to declare its opposition and for all of the non-Hezbollah political blocs to band together and say “We cannot tolerate a state-within-a-state threat to our neighbor when our neighbor is capable of, and willing to, defend itself by striking Lebanon”.

The Iraqi government faces something very similar now, because in the past it’s just been a one-way street. At the direction of Iran, the Iraqi Shia militants have been attacking the Gulf countries without any response other than what the United States would do on behalf of Gulf States. But in this war with the Saudis and Emiratis and others being willing to support those kind of direct strikes into Iraq, Zaidi and his government now have to come to the same point, and they probably already have to say, “We cannot tolerate a state-within-a-state threat that’s going to just going to provoke a war with our neighbors when our neighbors are militarily pretty capable.”

But the Emirates and the Saudis have air forces that are quite potent, that the Iraqis can’t match, and that would be very damaging for Iraq. Iraq can’t win that war. Also, as Mike said, Iraq can’t afford to be, not let alone at war, they can’t afford just to be politically at odds with the Gulf. They need access to the Emirates for their fuel, for their oil and derivative exports, and for their finances. They need access to Qatari capital and support. They need that kind of investment from the Saudis as well in their energy sector. They’re not going to be able to grow without that. They also need a constructive relationship with Turkey.

Another thing that’s been hit, that’s hitting home to the Iraqi government, and this is a place where the United States really can play a constructive role, is that the Iraqis have let the Iranians and their proxies inside Iraq veto the development of all alternatives for Iraqi oil exports other than Strait of Hormuz. The oil needs to flow south in order for the Iranians and their proxies to siphon it off and to parasitically draw from it. So, pipelines to the west, pipelines to the north, all those kinds of infrastructure projects, the Iranians have used their influence to prevent the Iraqi government from doing this.

This crisis now shows even I think some of the Shia Islamist parties, that means death for Iraq. If they have no alternative, if it comes down to a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it means it’s an existential problem. So even those parties in Baghdad that are pretty Tehran-aligned know we can’t put all our eggs in the Iranian basket here.

So I think you’re going to see Iraq really developing these alternatives. The Iraq-Turkey pipeline, which already exists, but which is underutilized. An energy export channel through Syria, through Jordan, and so on. Maybe even in conjunction with Kuwait, which doesn’t have any other outlet of its own. You could see that kind of thing. That’s where the United States can help both economically and politically, to broker the political economy of these kinds of alternative projects.

If I were advising the US government, that’d be one of the things that I would focus on. We are allies of Iraq, we’re allies of the Gulf, we cannot have a war among our allies. So not just for our own purposes, but for the interest of all our allies, we’ve got to insist and maintain a very hard line about diminishing, and really trying to try to remove altogether, militia influence in the government and in the Iraqi economy.

Beyond that they’ll wither on the vine if they don’t have a place in the government, and they can’t participate on a large scale in the economy. So, we have an interest in that, not just for ourselves, but also in the interests of our allies. I think it’s those two things: keep pushing on the militia presence and involvement and their revenue stream, and then help to broker these alternatives and Strait of Hormuz for Iraq and its other neighbors.

Blaise Misztal:

All right, to wrap up, I wanted to ask both of you what you’re going to be watching for in the coming weeks or months as early indicators of how this government in Iraq is going. Whether in fact it is a hopeful moment, as Mike said, or whether it’s Iraq returning to previous patterns.

But Joel, let me stay with you. What are you going to be watching?

Joel Rayburn:

So I’d keep a watch on if the United States will be able to continue its hardline stance on no militia presence in the government. Then if you wind up having militia frontmen or someone sort of infiltrate in here and there, will the U.S. have the will to take action about that?

Secondly, will the Secretary Bessent and the Treasury have started to take actions against facilitators of militia revenue streams, especially in oil in the energy sector in Iraq. Will that continue? Is that just a flash in the pan that’s connected with the confrontation with Tehran? If the confrontation winds up getting resolved, does that mean an end to Economic Fury, which Treasury Secretary Bessent has done as the economic pressure analogue to Epic Fury? A lot of the focus there has been on Iraq. Will that focus stay in place after the military confrontation with Iran dissipates? So I think those are the two things to keep an eye on.

Blaise Misztal:

Thanks, Joel. Mike, what about you? What are you going to be looking out for to judge how things are going?

Michael Knights:

Once we get into June, after the Eid religious period in Iraq, we will start to get answers to some of our key questions. We’ll get the cabinet finished off, as Joel said, in Iraq, and we’ll see if they manage to hold the line on non-militia presence in the cabinet.

I think that one of the things I’m going to be watching for, we’ll see a couple of efforts to pull the wool over the U.S. eyes.

There will be an initiative in June where a number of militias say, “Oh, look, we’re handing off our weapons to the state, and there’s no problem anymore. You can de-list us as terrorist groups, or you cannot list us in the future, and now we are good to join the cabinet, right?” The U.S. at that moment either is going to get suckered or it’s going to know what it’s doing, and that’s a key moment. They think they can do cosmetic disarmament, and we won’t notice, and that’s going to be a very important one.

The other thing is we’re going to see where Zaidi goes on his first foreign visit. In the past, often the earliest foreign visits of a new prime minister have included Iran. Let’s see if this one does. I think not. I think he’s going to go west, he’s going to go south. He’s going to go to the Gulf, and he’s going to try and come to the U.S..

But the fact is, even if you’ve got a blank sheet, we need to see some things done before you get admitted to a White House visit or a Mar-a-Lago visit. So, again, I want the U.S. to stay tuned in.

I think one of the key indicators for me is how many times Thomas Barrack visits Iraq, has high-level interactions with Iraqi leaders, and how much he’s paying attention to the details. The devil is in the detail on all this stuff, and if he’s dialed in, and if he’s taking action against the right Iraqi leaders, and watching the right indicators rather than fake ones, then we’ll be okay. This moment, we can take advantage of it.

Blaise Misztal:

Mike, Joel, it is very clear that both of you are paying attention to the details, and very much appreciate you sharing them with us. Thank you for your expertise. Thank you to everyone who tuned in from the audience. Have a good afternoon and I look forward to seeing you on the next webinar. Thank you.

The post Transcript: Webinar – New Leadership in Baghdad: Implications for U.S. Interests and the Broader Middle East appeared first on JINSA.

PANELISTS

IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council

Stephen Rademaker

Senior Advisor, JINSA; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security & Nonproliferation

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.

—

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:

Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining us for another JINSA webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. We’re here to talk about the news that broke over the weekend that the United States and Iran might be close to completing a memorandum of understanding that would bring the hostilities that started on February 28 with Operation Epic Fury to a conclusion — perhaps only temporarily.

To discuss that, and to learn what we know about what might be in the deal, what it would mean for Iran, for the region, for U.S. interests, and for Israel’s security, I’m delighted to be joined by Steve Rademaker, a Senior Advisor to JINSA and former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, as well as Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, a JINSA Distinguished Fellow and former Israeli National Security Advisor. Thank you both for being with us.

Steve, let me start with you. Can you give us a rundown of what we know, and maybe just as importantly, what we do not know about the contours of this MOU?

Steve Rademaker:

I will explain what I know, but there is a lot that I am unsure of, because there have been conflicting reports about what is under negotiation and what has been notionally agreed. I think it is clear that, in broad concept, the meeting of the minds is that there would be a 60-day extension of the current ceasefire. During that 60-day period, there would be a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, consisting both of a relaxation of Iranian restrictions on transit through the Strait and a relaxation of the U.S. blockade of Iran.

During that 60-day period, negotiations would take place on other issues, most importantly the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Beyond those basic facts, there is a lot of disagreement.

When it comes to reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is signaling that it fully intends to maintain control. It says it is not going to charge a toll, but that it is going to charge for providing assistance to ships passing through the Strait — which sort of sounds like a toll.

I think the Trump administration would say, “No, there is not going to be a toll.” As best I can tell, there is not yet a clear position on that. It may not be hard for the United States to end its naval blockade of Iran. This is a new innovation in U.S. policy. But in addition to the naval blockade, the United States has maintained an economic sanctions blockade directed at Iranian oil exports for many years.

Iran is clearly negotiating for some relaxation of U.S. economic sanctions that have discouraged other countries from importing oil from Iran. If Iran gets some relief from those economic sanctions, that would actually be an improvement in Iran’s situation compared to the status quo before this war began. So it will be interesting to see if Iran gets any relief from the U.S. blockade in the area of economic sanctions.

The naval blockade, yes, presumably would be ended if Iran ends its restrictions on shipping through the Strait. But we will see about U.S. sanctions.

A related issue is frozen Iranian assets. The numbers are between $50 billion and $100 billion in frozen Iranian money around the world — frozen as a result of U.S. financial sanctions and threats against foreign banks if they transfer the money to Iran. There is a lot of reporting that Iran thinks it is getting $24 billion, and maybe half of that immediately upon signature of whatever MOU is being negotiated.

Again, that would be an improvement for Iran compared to the status quo that existed before the war, because all of that money was frozen up until the commencement of the war. So we will see whether Iran gets any benefits there.

When it comes to the nuclear program, again, there is great disagreement about what would be provided. The U.S. position had long been that all enriched material in Iran needed to be exported to the United States. Now there are indications that maybe it would be okay to downblend it, or maybe it would be okay to export it to Russia or China. Clearly, there is discussion going on about that.

Then there is what, to me, is actually an absolutely critical question: What is the future of enrichment in Iran? Will Iran be required to permanently terminate its uranium enrichment program? Or will this be more like the JCPOA, where Iran restrains or suspends its enrichment program only for a limited period of time, with the implication that upon the expiration of that period, Iran can resume full-scale enrichment?

Again, no details have emerged about this, and both sides seem to be taking quite inconsistent positions in their descriptions. So I think we have a lot yet to learn about what is actually being agreed here.

President Trump is taking a lot of criticism from Republicans in Congress, including some of his strong supporters, because they see some of these accounts and think Iran actually emerges from these negotiations as a winner in this war compared to where it was before the war began. Trump has been sensitive to those criticisms, and he has said that the senators saying such things do not know what they are talking about. Let’s hope he is right about that. Let’s hope Iran is not going to get benefits as a result of having fought this war with the United States.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

If I may add another benefit that the Iranians will get, according to what was leaked — I do not know if it is part of the deal — Lebanon will be connected to the ceasefire in Iran, and there will be a ceasefire in Lebanon as well.

The meaning of that is the end of the American attempt to build a kind of alliance within Lebanon. It is the end of talks about disarming Hezbollah. It goes against all the efforts of the Americans in the last few years, and it will be a very bad lesson for Hamas as well. I do not know why the Americans agreed that it should be connected. It is a huge strategic mistake.

Blaise Misztal:

On that point, General Amidror, thanks for raising that. I was about to ask Steve whether I am correct in understanding that what has been leaked, or the details that have emerged, do not include any provisions related to Iran’s ballistic missile program and do not mention anything related to Iran’s support for terrorism and its proxies.

But, General Amidror, you just made the good point that rather than asking Iran to curtail its activity with its proxies, it actually would potentially strengthen Hezbollah’s position if it includes this provision requiring Israel to end the conflict in Lebanon.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Yes, I agree that it will make Hezbollah stronger — not militarily, but politically. They can claim that they are the defenders of Lebanon. Would you need more than that to show that you are the defender of Lebanon?

What would President Aoun say when negotiations resume — that he is going against Hezbollah, which was part of the agreement with the Americans? The Americans are legitimizing Hezbollah’s existence in Lebanon, and then even, in a way, making it stronger. I do not understand why the Americans have written this connection.

Of course, I understand that they have to be flexible in the Gulf and so on. They were very successful in the war, but the Iranians did not capitulate. But what is the connection to Lebanon? It goes against what the Americans are doing in Washington now. I really do not understand it.

Blaise Misztal:

Steve, is there any significance to this being called an MOU, a memorandum of understanding, instead of being referred to as a deal or an agreement?

Steve Rademaker:

I am not sure the terminology matters much. It is clearly not an agreement that will require approval by the U.S. Senate, so it is not a treaty. There is a U.S. law that requires congressional review of nuclear-related agreements negotiated with Iran, but it does not sound like this MOU would actually rise to that level because I am not sure it contains any provisions relating to the nuclear program — except an obligation on both sides to begin negotiating about the nuclear program, but no actual restrictions on the nuclear program that I am aware of.

So if those negotiations lead somewhere, there will be some sort of higher-level agreement that would require review by the U.S. Congress, although that probably would not be a treaty either. It would still be somewhere between an executive agreement and a memorandum of understanding. The JCPOA did not have any of those titles, right? It was just the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I do not know what status that was supposed to have under international law.

Blaise Misztal:

Is it fair to compare this deal to the JCPOA that you just mentioned, or would it be more appropriate to compare it to the Joint Plan of Action, the interim deal that preceded the JCPOA by one year? Is that how we should understand this — as an agreement to try to get to an agreement?

Steve Rademaker:

Yes, although the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did include agreed restrictions on nuclear activity in Iran, and I am not aware that any of the points in this current MOU would amount to restrictions on nuclear activity in Iran.

On the broader question of whether this is something similar to the JCPOA, there certainly have been descriptions of it that make it sound an awful lot like the JCPOA. The Trump administration is saying it will restrict enrichment in Iran for 20 years. The JCPOA was basically a restriction on enrichment in Iran for about 15 years. I think the Iranians replied, “No, we can only agree to a five-year restriction on enrichment.” So the compromise between 20 years and five years sounds like around 12 years. It is starting to sound a lot like the JCPOA.

I think the Trump administration has been sensitive to arguments that what it is negotiating here looks a lot like what President Obama came back with, because, of course, President Trump denounced the JCPOA as inadequate and withdrew the United States from it. It would be quite embarrassing if the result of this war were entry into a new JCPOA.

Blaise Misztal:

General Amidror, you spoke about the provision on Lebanon that is in the reported deal. I was wondering about the view from Israel on the other details Steve talked about, including the unfreezing of frozen funds, the end of the blockade, and the agreement to keep negotiating on some of these details, whether about the nuclear program or sanctions relief.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

First, I do not know what the details of the agreement will be. What I can say is that at the end of the 60 days, Iran will be stronger. They will have 60 days to repair all the weapons systems that were hit by the Israelis and the Americans. They will have time to expose all the tunnels that had been closed by both our and U.S. air forces.

They will be stronger economically because they will sell oil freely. If there is relief in the sanctions, they will be even richer because they will get cash. So everyone who is making the agreement should understand that at the end of the 60 days — and during the 60 days — Iran will be stronger. What leads to the assumption that when they are stronger, they will be more flexible than when they had been very damaged by you and us? I do not know.

The second phase is the agreement itself. As you said, there is nothing about the missiles, which I think is a big problem from our point of view. It very much depends on what the agreement will be. The Obama administration changed the policy from dismantling to postponing and monitoring. If it is for 20 years, what will be the difference between that and the agreement achieved by Obama, except five years? It does not make any sense.

So I do not know what will be at the end of the agreement, what will be exported out of Iran, and what will remain in Iran. But at this stage, it is clear to us that the connection to Lebanon is devastating. Ignoring the missiles is a huge problem from our point of view. As for the details regarding the nuclear issue, I do not know.

Blaise Misztal:

Certainly, General Amidror, your view is largely in keeping with JINSA’s. Our president and CEO, Mike Makovsky, issued a statement on Sunday in which he said, “If the reported details of a proposed U.S.-Iran MOU are broadly accurate, it would represent a loss of American nerve and damaging strategic reversal in recent American policy, abandoning many of President Trump’s prior red lines, undercutting many of the tremendous achievements of the military campaign, and undermining U.S. credibility.” You can find the rest of that statement on our website, jinsa.org.

Let me ask you, General Amidror: What is your understanding of how much this agreement and the negotiations with Iran in general are being coordinated with Israel? How much alignment is there between Washington and Jerusalem on this diplomatic track?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I do not know. I know there were a few conversations between the prime minister and the president. But I want to say something related to what was declared by Mike Makovsky. The lesson in the Middle East from American hesitation is very bad — very, very bad.

Today, someone from Saudi Arabia said that the Saudis are working very hard to create an alignment involving Pakistan, a nuclear state, and Turkey, as an alternative to Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Abraham Accords. If that is true, it would be a huge disadvantage to the main success of the Americans in the Middle East. If that alliance really materializes, I do not see any other Arab or Muslim country joining the Abraham Accords.

From that point of view, the Americans — as with connecting Lebanon to Iran — are taking steps that go against their own efforts over the last few years.

Blaise Misztal:

Steve, since General Amidror mentioned the Abraham Accords, there has also been reporting alongside what we are hearing about the MOU that President Trump has been asking Arab leaders, or perhaps telling Arab leaders, that he expects them to join the Abraham Accords when this conflict ends.

What do we know about that? Should that be understood as some sort of extension of the potential deal with Iran? Are they part of the same diplomatic track? Are they separate efforts? How should we understand what is going on there?

Steve Rademaker:

You left out the detail that the president also said Iran would hopefully join the Abraham Accords as well, which would be quite astonishing, given that Iran — the Islamic Republic — since its inception has been dedicated to the destruction of Israel. For Iran, as a result of this war, to meet all the other U.S. conditions plus recognize the State of Israel would be an astonishing turnaround.

I was frankly confused by the president’s introduction of the Abraham Accords into the middle of this negotiation. It is fundamentally a bilateral negotiation between the United States and Iran. Why other countries in the region would feel that they needed to join the Abraham Accords as a result of a bilateral agreement — and attach conditions relating to Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank — is unclear. Those conditions, I do not think, are about to be satisfied.

The best sense I can make of the president’s comments is that they are aspirational. I do not see much likelihood that even if the negotiations with Iran prove to be an enormous success, that will immediately translate into the willingness of other Arab countries in the region, much less Iran, to enter the Abraham Accords.

Blaise Misztal:

One thought I had — because everything changes so quickly — is that if we think back just a week ago, President Trump put out a post saying that after talking to various Middle Eastern leaders — the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Qataris — he was calling off the resumption of attacks on Iran that I think were supposed to happen a week ago today. In the post announcing the MOU, he also listed a long list of regional leaders he had consulted with on the MOU.

Could it be that regional leaders are asking the United States to choose a diplomatic track rather than resuming hostilities, and President Trump is trying to leverage that by saying, “All right, if you really do not want me to go back to war, the price you have to pay is coming into the Abraham Accords”? Is that a source of leverage he can use here?

Steve Rademaker:

I suppose he could try that. I personally worry that everyone in the region has taken away from U.S. policy over the last month or so that Trump is reluctant to resume full-scale war against Iran. Most importantly, I think the Iranians have concluded that. If they believe that, then they are liberated to be more difficult and less accommodating in the negotiations.

The first thing necessary for your suggestion to work would be for everyone to believe that Trump was actually prepared to go back to full-scale war with Iran. I think there are increasing doubts about that in the region.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

If I may add to your answer, which I agree with, in a way the Iranians succeeded in creating a North Korea situation. The advocates against attacking North Korea years ago were the South Koreans, because they were afraid it would lead to the destruction of Seoul and so on.

What happened here is that, according to the declarations, countries in this region do not want the war because they are afraid of Iran — not because they like Iran, and not because they want Iran to be nuclear. But at the end of the day, you might find yourself in a North Korea situation. Because of the nations, you do not act, and you will find Iran at the end of the day.

Blaise Misztal:

Staying with you, General Amidror, given that, do you think it is possible for President Trump to use this situation to expand the Abraham Accords? Is this a moment to press for it?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

He can try, but the sentiment in Saudi Arabia is not positive. Broadly, for the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia is the most important country. Will they do it? I have many doubts. But the Americans have their own way to convince a country like Saudi Arabia to do it. It depends how much pressure you are ready to put.

Blaise Misztal:

How about Qatar? That was, I think, the other country that President Trump suggested should immediately join the Abraham Accords.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Qatar should not be legitimized. It is an enemy of Israel. It is a supporter of terrorists. It hosts half of the leadership of Hamas. The other half is in Turkey. That should not be legitimized.

It is a negative state that is doing everything to ignite the Middle East through Al Jazeera. It is a country that should not have any position to determine the future of the Middle East.

Blaise Misztal:

Steve, maybe we could drill down a little bit on some of the technical details regarding the potential nuclear component of this agreement. One of the things we have heard from the administration is that, as part of this deal, Iran is giving a written commitment that it will not pursue a nuclear weapon. Is that new or meaningful?

Steve Rademaker:

We would have to be fools to take that as a significant step by the Iranians. The Iranians have been a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for decades. I have not gone back to look at the year they ratified that treaty, but probably the 1970s. That treaty is not just a verbal commitment. It is a solemn treaty commitment on the part of Iran never to produce a nuclear weapon.

If we took comfort from that obligation Iran assumed decades ago, then for the last 30 years, I guess we have been worried about nothing. If they were enriching, if they were doing covert nuclear activities — no problem, because we have a treaty that forbids them from producing a nuclear weapon, and they are party to it, and they have not denounced it.

We do not trust those words. We think Iran intends either to ignore them or eventually pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the same way North Korea did. To accept further assurances from Iran that it will never produce a nuclear weapon, on top of the assurances we already have, is just more potentially meaningless words.

Our position has long been that we need more than verbal assurances. We do not need to be told there is a fatwa against producing a nuclear weapon in Iran. What we need to see is evidence that the state policies of Iran are not adapted to the production of a nuclear weapon. Everything we see is that they are, in fact, adapted to the production of a nuclear weapon. That is why we have been alarmed about this problem for so long.

Blaise Misztal:

If I recall correctly, the JCPOA included a very similar written attestation from the Iranians that they would not pursue a nuclear weapon. If we believe that deal was not sufficient to prevent a nuclear Iran, then a new written attestation would not be much better.

Steve Rademaker:

I think they will give us 20 reiterations of their commitment not to produce a nuclear weapon if we are going to attach some value to them. But I do not know why we would attach any value to Iranian verbal assurances. What we need is practical evidence that they are no longer committed to the production of a nuclear weapon.

Blaise Misztal:

On the enrichment front, the major issue is what is going to happen with the roughly 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent that Iran has. There have been various permutations discussed. You mentioned some of them: shipping it out to the United States, shipping it out to a third country — I think China has been the latest one mentioned — or downblending it, reducing its level of enrichment but keeping it inside Iran.

Are all those options functionally equivalent in terms of reducing the threat or danger of that enriched uranium stockpile?

Steve Rademaker:

I believe any of those steps would diminish the threat. But I have less confidence today that the transfer of that material to Russia would be a permanent guarantee that the material will never be utilized by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, just because the relationship between Iran and Russia today is very different from what it was 10 years ago. I am less confident that Russia would have no reason to return that material.

If we could get it out of Iran, that would be good. But some of these solutions are better than others. Transferring it to the United States would probably be the best solution. Downblending it would be helpful. But I do not know why Iran needs any enriched material. It would be nice to get rid of all of it — not just the highly enriched material, but all of Iran’s enriched material.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

If I may add, from the Israeli point of view — and I am sure that our experts have spoken with the American experts — it is not just the highly enriched uranium, not only the 450 kilograms of enriched uranium. Iran has an amount of enriched uranium at lower levels. But as you know, when you are at 20 percent enrichment, you have already done much of what is needed to enrich uranium to weapons grade.

So it is very important that all enriched uranium, not just the highly enriched uranium, be exported from Iran. The best option is America. I am ready to take the risk that it could be exported to China with the strong commitment of President Xi that it never leaves China. But I prefer that it be in America, or in a country where we can understand that it will be kept within its own borders and not re-exported.

Blaise Misztal:

Just to put a finer point on that, General Amidror, I think enriching to 20 percent is something like 90 percent of the work needed to get to weapons grade. So it is very far along, even though it is only 20 percent enriched. There are quite a lot of stockpiles of enriched uranium beyond the 60 percent material that are dangerous and would need to be addressed by a deal.

Steve, sticking with the details here: Would it be sufficient, even if we got rid of the enriched uranium in some way, to then have Iran say it will suspend enrichment for whatever the term is, between five and 20 years? Would that give us confidence that its nuclear program has gone dormant?

Steve Rademaker:

What you are describing begins to sound a lot like the JCPOA, and I never took much confidence from the JCPOA. The JCPOA was sold to the American people on the basis of false rhetoric that it closed all pathways for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. That was partially true for a limited period of time, but at the end of that period of time, it was completely untrue. In fact, the opposite was true: all pathways were opened at the end of that period.

To me, it would be critical to know whether the ultimate agreement here provides for some limited period during which Iran is prohibited from, or has suspended, its enrichment program, and what happens at the end of that period. Is the suspension fully ended, and is Iran free to do whatever it wants? That was what the JCPOA provided, and that was, to my mind, the greatest single weakness of the JCPOA: it basically opened all pathways to the production of fissile material upon expiration of the restrictions.

Let’s be clear: Iran is not going to make those kinds of commitments for free. It will get something in exchange. I think what it will get is probably the exact same thing it got under the JCPOA, which is sanctions relief. The economic sanctions that America has applied to Iran over its nuclear program will be lifted, just as they were under the JCPOA. Iran will get an economic shot in the arm as a reward for these temporary restrictions.

That was the problem with the JCPOA. They would keep the economic reward even when they were no longer abiding by the restrictions. It was completely mindless: permanent sanctions relief in exchange for temporary restraint on enrichment. President Trump recognized that this was a defective formula when he pulled out of the JCPOA. Let’s hope he still recognizes that.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

If I may add, I think it is even worse than the previous agreement because the Iranians today have much better centrifuges that they can produce and use. Unlike during the agreement in 2015, today enrichment will be very, very fast. If there is no limitation after 20 years on enrichment, we will face Iran with material ready for a warhead within six months.

Blaise Misztal:

Thank you, General. I want to open it up to questions from the audience.

But first, I wanted to stay with you, General Amidror, and pivot a little bit to the first topic you mentioned, which is Lebanon. We have seen an increase in IDF activity in the last 24 hours, with, I think, greater ground operations and strikes into the Bekaa Valley as well. Can you give us a little more information about what is going on?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Yes. It is not a bigger operation. We continue to operate in southern Lebanon. We are pushing north. It is a very limited one. The air force is more aggressive, and we have gone into areas that are far away from the border.

I understand there are some limitations. I understand that from the fact that the Dahiya was not hit by the air force. The reason to escalate was the fact that Hezbollah succeeded — because the IDF was in an area very close to Hezbollah, but it did not move. If there is something very dangerous for military forces on the ground, it is not to move; it is to be stuck in one place.

Hezbollah succeeded in killing around 10 of our soldiers using drones and other means. It was well understood after such a problematic situation that we cannot be like a sitting duck anymore. We have to move. We have to move, and we are moving — north, I hope, to the Litani. On the eastern side, even beyond the Litani, because the Litani in the east is very close to our communities, less than five kilometers there — between two and three miles.

So we have to do it militarily, and we understand there are limitations. That can be judged by the fact that the Dahiya is out of reach.

Blaise Misztal:

Is this a violation of the ceasefire?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

What ceasefire? After attacking us with drones and firing on our soldiers on the ground, I do not see any ceasefire.

Blaise Misztal:

What would the impact be, do you think, on the negotiations that have been happening between the Israeli and Lebanese governments here in D.C.?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I think the situation in Lebanon, together with the situation in Iran, is much more problematic for the Lebanese negotiators. Some of them probably think that what the IDF did will help them, because it puts more pressure on Hezbollah and the Shiite community. But an agreement with America in which America legitimizes the influence of Iran in Lebanon would do huge damage to the Lebanese negotiators.

Blaise Misztal:

So you are suggesting that if this MOU with Iran goes forward and includes a provision saying that there has to be an end to the war in Lebanon, that would effectively stop whatever incentives the Lebanese government has to negotiate with Israel and perhaps take serious action against Hezbollah?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Look at the situation. The Lebanese anti-Hezbollah forces have said: “You are damaging Lebanon. You are fighting Iran’s war, and we are paying the price inside Lebanon.”

What are they going to say now? “Guys, there is no more war, and those who stopped the war are the Iranians with Hezbollah.” Will that make the government of Lebanon stronger or weaker? That is, for sure, the situation that the agreement will lead to.

The Americans say, “Guys, we want time. We are negotiating with the Lebanese. We hope that they will disarm Hezbollah. We have to stick to these American efforts and try not to disturb their diplomatic efforts.” But by linking this to Iran and Hezbollah, the Americans are giving them leverage. That is the end of the courage of the government of Lebanon to do something against Hezbollah.

Blaise Misztal:

Should this IDF operation, whether big or small, be understood as Israel rushing to take advantage of whatever time might be left before this MOU is agreed to and tells Israel to stop?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I think it is much more connected to the IDF’s ability to defend itself in Lebanon. It was professionally understood that we should move on, at least until the Litani. It is a professional judgment of the situation. The damage of the agreement in Lebanon will be more because of the political side, not because of the military side.

It will not make Hezbollah stronger militarily, but it will allow Hezbollah to say: “I succeeded. I defended Lebanon.”

Blaise Misztal:

Let me turn to a question from the audience. Please, if you have any questions, feel free to submit them using the Q&A function. Roger Gerber asks: Would you agree that the very process of negotiating a vague MOU that is merely preliminary to future negotiations is counterproductive? In addition, isn’t the 60-day negotiating period after weeks of negotiating the potential MOU absurd?

Steve, let me ask you first.

Steve Rademaker:

I think that is a very good question. They have been negotiating about nuclear issues. The Biden administration negotiated with Iran about nuclear issues. The Trump administration, through Witkoff, has been negotiating about nuclear issues. Then we had a war. Since the ceasefire, we have continued to negotiate.

And now, having failed to reach any agreement in any of those previous negotiations, we are going to give 60 days to negotiate. Why do we expect a different outcome, especially — and I think this is General Amidror’s question — if we relieve the military pressure that they have been under? Why are they going to be more incentivized now to come to an agreement with us on the nuclear program than they have been up until now? I do not have an answer to that.

If you ask me to predict what is going to happen during the 60-day period, I would say that at the end of the 60-day period, unless there has been a collapse in the U.S. negotiating position such that we are prepared to agree to things with Iran that previously had been unacceptable, the negotiations will be deadlocked. I see no indication that Iran is prepared to be flexible here.

Objectively, they should be flexible. They are increasing the hardship that has been imposed on the Iranian people, but I do not think they care. This nuclear program has been an article of faith for the Iranian regime for 30 years. They have been prepared to pay an enormous price, and they remain prepared to pay an enormous price, to persist with the program. I do not see anything changing in the next 60 days that will give us a different result.

Blaise Misztal:

Maybe I can play devil’s advocate on that, Steve.

Steve Rademaker:

Please. Prove that I am wrong. I would love to be proven wrong.

Blaise Misztal:

I think I am only going to prove your case. But one of the things the Iranians keep saying is: “How can we trust you, the Americans, to make a deal with us? Especially President Trump, after you withdrew from the JCPOA, the last deal we had. Then you bombed us twice in the last 12 months. How can we trust you? A deal that you sign is not worth the paper it is written on,” the Iranians say of the Americans.

Maybe what is needed, in diplomatic speak, is a confidence-building measure. We need something that will bring both sides to the point where they are willing to believe that the other side is actually going to follow through on what it says it will do. Maybe, rather than more pressure, we need to relieve some of the pressure to enable diplomacy to flourish.

Steve Rademaker:

They can say that. I just have trouble believing that over the next 60 days, if all of that is true — if the only thing standing in the way here is a lack of confidence that America will abide by its commitments — I do not know what will change in the next 60 days that will give them that confidence that they lack today.

Personally, I think arguments about lack of confidence are really just a pretext for the fact that they do not want to give up uranium enrichment. They do not want to export their highly enriched nuclear material. They want to be a threshold nuclear weapons state, and that is essentially what they are today, and they want to remain one.

Blaise Misztal:

Next question. General Amidror, if you had to put a percent chance on whether we are going to see this MOU materialize and actually happen, what would you say?

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

I am not a prophet. I do not know.

Blaise Misztal:

Steve, any guesses?

Steve Rademaker:

I think — and I am not the first person to observe this — that one consequence of this war is that most of the people in Iran who might have been able to commit Iran and its political system to an agreement have been killed. What is left are, in many cases, hardliners.

But among those who are left, there are power struggles and confused lines of authority. I think it is hard to find Iranians who can actually sign a piece of paper and not worry about being removed from power immediately as a consequence of doing that.

So I think it is very hard for the Iranians — not because it is not in Iran’s interest, but because their political situation today makes it hard for anyone to exercise the kind of authority needed to sign a deal with the Great Satan.

I have been skeptical all along that any deal could be found here, just because of hesitation on the Iranian side or inability on the Iranian side to actually forge a consensus in favor of the deal. It is a characteristic of Iranian negotiating — you can read this in Wendy Sherman’s book about negotiating the JCPOA — that they are constantly coming back. The U.S. side thinks it has a deal, and then the Iranians constantly come back and say, “Oh, just one more thing. We just need one more thing.”

Wendy Sherman actually describes how she was crying at one point when the Iranians came back yet again with one more thing. She just could not bear the stress and the disappointment. I think we are seeing that now. Why has a deal not been reached? The Iranians keep coming back for more.

But I think they need to come back for more because they cannot actually take yes for an answer. Then they might actually have to sign the deal. And I think any Iranian who signs a deal worries about what happens when he goes home afterward.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

By the way, I do not think these people are more radical than Khamenei. They have experience, and maybe they do not have the authority that he had. But from all the information that I learned about him, he was one of the most radical people within the Iranian system.

So I do not think the present leadership is more radical. Maybe they have less authority. That might be true. But radicalism was part of Khamenei’s attitude toward Iran, Israel, and the United States of America.

Steve Rademaker:

I do not necessarily disagree with that point. I am talking about the old Khamenei — the elder — not the younger, who may or may not be in charge of anything. I do not think we know what his status is.

But the elder Khamenei could have delivered a deal. If he had blessed it, there would be authority to deliver a deal. In fact, it is not clear there is anyone in Iran who can do that today. His son ostensibly is now the Supreme Leader. But is he actually making decisions? Is he actually exercising power? There is very little evidence of that. I do not know.

Blaise Misztal:

All right. Whether there is a deal or there is no deal, we will be glad to have you both back on, Steve and General Amidror, to discuss whatever happens next. Thank you so much for your time.

Thank you to the audience for tuning in today. Please be sure to check out our website, jinsa.org, for all our latest analysis. Thank you, and have a great day. General Amidror, good night.

Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:

Good night.

Steve Rademaker:

Thank you.

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