Transcript: Webinar – Lebanon Ceasefire: Progress or Déjà Vu?
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former National Security Advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon everyone and thank you for tuning in for JINSA’s latest webinar update on the status of Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, and we’ve had quite a number of developments since our last webinar, including the declaration by President Trump, about six days ago, of a ceasefire with Iran, negotiations that happened on Saturday in Pakistan between the U.S. and Iranian sides that, at the time, Vice President JD Vance said led nowhere. But now, in recent days, we’re hearing they maybe did make a lot of progress. Then, most recently, President Trump’s declaration of a blockade of all ships entering or exiting Iranian ports that began yesterday.
So to discuss all of that, I’m pleased to be joined by JINSA distinguished fellow and former Israeli National Security Advisor, Major General Yaakov Amidror, and two of our U.S. Admirals, participants in JINSA’s Generals and Admirals Program. We have Vice Admiral Mark Fox, the former Deputy Commander of CENTCOM and Vice Admiral John Miller, former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, NAVCENT.
Thank you all for joining us so much. General Amidror, maybe I can just start with you, and going back to last Wednesday, when President Trump announced the ceasefire with Iran – supposedly lasting two weeks. We’ve heard various reporting about whether Israel was or was not consulted about the ceasefire, whether Israel was or was not caught by surprise by the announcement. Can you tell us – was Israel consulted? How is the ceasefire seen from Israel?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Israel was not surprised, I think. At the level of Prime Minister and President, the Israelis knew about the American idea. Immediately I was asked publicly what I thought about it, and I said that the ceasefire is not important. What is important is the result of the negotiations. The ceasefire in and of itself is a pause in the war, but it doesn’t determine anything. Yes, it stopped the momentum and allowed the Iranians to take out some of their launchers and missiles, but strategically, it didn’t change anything.
What is important is the result of the negotiations, and that the Israelis, are satisfied that the American side in the negotiation was very determined that enriching uranium should be taken out, and that Iran will not have the ability to enrich in the future. From our point of view, these are very important elements in any agreement with the Iranians. That the Iranians cannot rebuild what they lost during the war – it will take a long time – and the American decision to neutralize the threat of the Iranians, to close Hormuz, saying we can live with a closed Hormuz, and this is not a threat for America, and it is now your problem, not ours, because you succeeded to export your oil during the war and now you are losing it. It is now not just that you lost your industry, control system, missiles, nuclear project, and so on and so forth – now you are facing huge economic pressure, because most of the money coming into Iran comes by selling oil. Blocking the ability of the Iranians to sell oil is economically a huge disaster for the Iranians.
How long can they stand and live without it? I don’t know. But it’s a huge problem for the Iranians. And the Americans did it without putting boots on the ground in Kharg. The idea that the Americans will free the Hormuz Strait from the Iranian threat, all that was, from my point of view, was a very unprofessional suggestion, which didn’t consider the price. Trying to conquer the Hormuz Strait is possible, but at a very, very high price.
This is the best way to do it. It’s very easy. You don’t endanger any of your assets. Yes, the American fleet will have to defend itself if the Iranians try to launch missiles into Navy vessels, but I’m sure that even 1% of all the admirals know about what they can and cannot do. It’s clear that it is much, much, much cheaper than conquering the Hormuz Strait or Kharg Island, where everyone who goes there will be under direct fire from the Iranians. So I think it was a wise step.
And now the Iranians – I think what Vice President Vance learned is that the group which met in Islamabad couldn’t make any steps. They came with the belief that they won the war and that the Americans will compromise, and what they found is a group of Americans who are not ready to compromise and don’t see the war result as the Iranians do. I think that it was a meeting in which it was clear to the Americans that they should go back and clarify at home what the situation is from the American point of view. Maybe that will change some decisions in Iran.
I’m not sure that will be the result, by the way. But it was the only way to take the opportunity to make the Iranians understand that from the American point of view, America didn’t lose the war, and America can continue with this situation many, many weeks and months if needed. Yes, there is an economic price for America and the world, but that is not something that will stop America from demanding the basic demand that should be achieved in this negotiation.
I hope that the Americans will be determined about that in the future. I’m a student of disappointed and dissatisfied negotiations by the American side – when the Iranians and Americans were in the same room, it was clear that the Americans were going to compromise to the Iranian demand. I heard it from the Europeans, who said that they had been surprised by the readiness of the Americans to capitulate. I hope that this is not the situation today, and this group of Americans will be more determined than previously.
Blaise Misztal:
Let us hope so, General, and like you, I’m anxious to hear from Admirals Fox and Miller about the blockade and all the operational issues involved with the U.S. Navy imposing that blockade. But let me stay with you – I have two questions you can answer just quickly related to the ceasefire negotiations. Another contested issue in the ceasefire appears to have been whether it applied to Israel and the war in Lebanon. I mean, the fact on the ground is that Israel has continued its operations in Lebanon, and so I suppose that’s our answer, but is your understanding that that was explicitly excluded from the ceasefire agreement by the United States?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
It was excluded, but the President asked the Prime Minister to be less aggressive, and we are less aggressive in Beirut and in Bekaa. What’s important for us in this stage is to advance our defensive capabilities and to push Hezbollah in South Lebanon so Hezbollah will not be close to the border, and we are continuing with that in full gear. We had some soldiers and officers injured today, twelve of them, some severely, but we are pushing because it is very important for us to have South Lebanon totally clean from Hezbollah forces.
Blaise Misztal:
Got it, and I’ll return to you. I definitely want to ask more questions about those operations in Lebanon, and the negotiations going on with Lebanon today later in the webinar. But one more question for you, General Amidror, about the negotiations. Reports have come out that the United States was asking Iran to cease enrichment for 20 years, not indefinitely, but for 20 years. I just wanted to get your take. Is that a position that you believe has been coordinated with Israel? Is that a position or a deal that Israel would support – if there was an agreement that Iran would cease enrichment for 20 years?
IDF MG (ret.):
I would be very much surprised if that was coordinated. If it is true, first of all – I’m not sure if it’s true.
Remember, in these negotiations and throughout the whole war, we heard many, many, many rumors and remarks, and at the end of the day they were not connected to reality. I hope this is another example. If true, it is very, very bad. In a way, it would be the Obama agreement 2.0. That was the whole idea – a sunset is not an option from our point of view, when it comes to the enriching of uranium in Iran.
Blaise Misztal:
Got it. Thank you, General. So let me turn now to the admirals to learn more about the blockade that the United States has put in place for the last 24 hours, or so. And I guess, first and foremost, maybe Admiral Fox, we hear different terms being applied. There’s blockade, there’s embargo, there’s quarantine. Can you explain the differences between those different types of actions, and what a blockade is? That which is currently being imposed by the U.S. Navy.
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
Well, a blockade is an act of war. Those are all essentially the same, with small distinctions. Remember back in the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was an embargo, not a blockade, so therefore it wasn’t an act of war when we embargoed. So those are legal distinctions with little practical difference, at least from where I sit.
The one thing that I’d point out is, we the U.S. Navy, are certainly capable of this mission. But in the one-week period of time, our ships replenish at sea, but our surface combatants need to go pier-side to reload. So there has been a significant pause of those people who have been doing all of the shooting down of drones and ballistic missiles and so forth. And one of the impacts of this particular new kind of conflict is with the drones and the extended range that’s contested our logistics – at least as I understand it, we’re doing our re-arming down in Diego Garcia. And of course, the Iranians tried to shoot a couple of intermediate-range ballistic missiles there, and they were intercepted.
So you want to have a full magazine, is another way to put it, when you’re operating in or around the Strait of Hormuz. And the other piece that I think I would highlight is I would hope and expect that we -the U.S. and our partners – have got a very, very strong surveillance and reconnaissance picture, in understanding where things are. I’ve heard some reports that there might be some mines. I’ve also read that somehow the IRGCN has been spared – I don’t believe that, but I don’t know for a fact exactly the level of damage. Anytime you’re flying Apaches and A-10s in the Iranian littoral, I think you’re going to be doing good work against IRGC and small boats, but I’ll pass it over to Fozzie for his thoughts on that.
Blaise Misztal:
So Admiral, if I could just make sure I understood, you’re suggesting that the ceasefire could present an important opportunity for our naval vessels to restock their munitions, particularly their interceptors, but the act of having to impose this blockade might interrupt their ability to return to port in order to resupply?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
No. Any ship that’s going to be operating inside missile envelopes will be a full-up round. But this pause gave us a good opportunity to ensure that magazines are replenished in full, and we’re in a place where we can execute the task that the President’s given us.
Blaise Misztal:
Great, so Admiral Miller, let me turn to you and let me read this post on X that came out from Central Command today, which says that “More than 10,000 U.S. sailors, marines and airmen, along with over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft, are executing the mission to blockade ships entering and departing Iranian ports. During the first 24 hours, no ships made it past the U.S. blockade, and six merchant vessels complied with directions from U.S. forces to turn around and to reenter an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman. The blockade is being enforced impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, including all Iranian ports on the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. U.S. forces are supporting freedom of navigation for vessels transiting in the Strait of Hormuz to and from non-Iranian ports.”
Could you break that down operationally for us, Admiral Miller? What does that look like? Where are the U.S. Navy vessels operating in order to enforce this blockade? What sort of vessels do we know the U.S. Navy to be using, and how exactly do you stop ships from getting out?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
There’s a lot to break down there, so let me try to do it. Admiral Fox is right. From a practical standpoint, there’s not a lot of difference between a blockade or quarantine or embargo, but from a standpoint of customary maritime law, there is a difference. So the first thing to remember is that the CENTCOM statement reflects the legal requirements for a blockade. And so when, when we say there’s a blockade, legally, from a maritime law standpoint, that’s what CENTCOM just laid out that they’re doing. So practically, what does that look like?
We don’t have to have ships in the Strait of Hormuz. We don’t even have to have them necessarily too far up into the Gulf of Oman to do this mission. We can have those ships in the Arabian Sea. Admiral Fox talked about and it’s a great point – what does our maritime picture look like? The common operating picture? Do we understand the maritime and civilian traffic that’s around the region and headed into the Gulf? How much do we know through AIS? How much do we know through other intelligence collections? And that’s how we’re going to parse ships that are headed into the Gulf.
We’ll have, presumably, that same sort of operational picture in the Gulf, which allows us to know which ships are coming out of Iranian ports. So, the blockade specifically prohibits ships – and that’s all ships, regardless of flag or ownership – from going into Iranian ports to conduct trade, ostensibly, mostly oil, but not exclusively. And they cannot go in, and they can’t come out from Iranian ports and then go on their way. So they can’t pick up oil at Kharg Island and go to China. They’ll be interdicted and then taken care of, I’ll talk about that in a second.
So I think we have the picture to do that. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t going to be ships transiting to and from that don’t necessarily have the blessing of the U.S. because they’re not ships that are in any way involved in this blockade. So they’re not going to or coming from an Iranian port. When we see reports that there’s Chinese ships that have come out, for example, and they’re part of the ghost fleet, and they’re typically sanctioned ships, why wouldn’t we intercept that? Well, perhaps we don’t want to confuse other activities, sanction activities, that we’re involved in with this blockade activity. And I think that clears it up.
What happens when we seize a ship? A ship is informed it can’t go through the blockade, and we have to board it and seize it. We have that capability in the Marine forces that are there. We have that same capability to do an opposed boarding with our Special Operations Forces. The Coast Guard has teams – we saw those down in Venezuela a couple of months ago – so we have the ability to do it. But once we seize a vessel, we own it, and we own it for the duration of the blockade. And by own it, I mean we’ve got to take care of the vessel, we’ve got to make sure that the crew is taken care of in accordance with international conventions and that sort of thing. So that’s a potential additional administrative burden that we might take on if we start seizing ships.
I suspect for the most part, ships are going to do the same thing that ships that think they are under a threat from Iran are doing, which is not transit into or out of the Strait until all threats are gone. And so, what this does for us, practically, is it chokes off the regime, as General Amidror talked about, and keeps them having a revenue source.
And we can do this for some time, and presumably far enough away, not out of all the envelopes – the Shahed has got a pretty good range to it – but having tac air from Tripoli, from the carriers, having Air Force tac air overhead in support of the maritime activity, is going to be going to be really important, both in terms of any potential drone attacks – the occasional, I think, will be mostly out of the cruise missile envelope but maybe not completely – and then, of course, the occasional small boat, although being outside the Gulf limits the ability of those small boats to be a threat.
Blaise Misztal:
So, a lot to unpack there, a lot of questions that come to mind. So let me try to break it down. But thank you for all that information, Admirals. The first one is, if the difference between a blockade and a quarantine is largely a semantic one about whether one is being applied in a time of war or not, does calling this a blockade mean that the ceasefire is de facto over? Any opinions? Admiral Fox?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
I don’t think so. The ball is now in the Iranian’s court. Do they want now to challenge our imposition of a blockade? If they do, as Admiral Miller talked about, if we interdict a ship, then we will own it. We’ll probably park it off someplace, and it’ll be basically there until the end of the conflict, or until, you know, resolutions are obtained. So, there’s a lot of things that we just don’t know right now, but the fact that we’re exercising a blockade does not mean that the ceasefire is not in effect.
Blaise Misztal:
Admiral Miller, you referred to the reports circulated that maybe two Chinese-owned ships, sanctioned ships, have made it through the Strait, which some see as an indication that the blockade isn’t effective. But if I understood your point, your point was that if those ships aren’t coming from Iranian ports, even if they are sanctioned, even if they have in the past, carried Iranian oil, if they are not currently coming from Iranian ports, they would not be subject to the blockade. Was that correct?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
Yeah, that was correct. That’s the point I’m trying to make, and I believe that to be true, with the caveat, though, that these are early days, right? So there’s going to be some adjustments made to this as operationally, CENTCOM settles in and understands exactly what they should and shouldn’t be doing. But presumably, clearly, we knew about the ships. So it’s not like they ran through the blockade at night and we didn’t see them. I have to think that the reason that they weren’t interdicted is they didn’t meet the criteria set forth from CENTCOM – that’s reflected in their own statement – to be part of the ships being blockaded. So, having come from an Iranian port, I would think we’ll find out, is the reason those ships were not interdicted.
Blaise Mistzal:
Admiral Miller, you referenced the sort of similar blockade of Venezuela. In that case, it seems that we did a fair bit of chasing Venezuelan ships, catching some of them only, I think, in the Indian Ocean. Is it operationally easier to enforce this blockade and keep ships out of Iranian ports? Or could we face similar potential trouble keeping ships from getting out and having to chase them down, sort of all over the world?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
Well, one of the unique things about the Strait of Hormuz and the geography that surrounds it is the fact that it naturally funnels you. If you’re outside, going in, you get funneled into the Strait. You get funneled from the Indian Ocean into the North Arabian Sea, into the Gulf of Oman, into the Strait, and then into the Arabian Gulf, or the Persian Gulf, and the same thing coming out.
So presumably, we don’t have to chase ships that have violated the blockade halfway around the planet or into the middle of the Indian Ocean. We should know if there’s a ship today that’s in an Iranian port, is that Kharg Island, for example, and it comes out, we should know long before it gets to the Strait that that it’s in violation of the blockade and then interdicted at a time and place of our choosing, I would guess, sooner rather than later, because that that keeps us from stretching our forces across too great an area.
Blaise Misztal:
And then I wanted to ask you to give us a little more clarity on how we should understand how CENTCOM describes this blockade. They say it’s being enforced impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas. So the first question is, does that just mean civilian or commercial shipping, or does that mean any ship of any size leaving Iranian ports, whether it be an IRGC Navy fast boat or a fishing ship? What is the target set here? Do we have an idea? Admiral Fox?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
Well, as Admiral Miller pointed out there are still some things that we’re going to be sorting through. In my mind, a ship is a vessel that actually displaces a certain amount and so forth. So I don’t think we’re necessarily applying small boat criteria to this kind of blockade. The Iranian coast is 800 nautical miles long, and so there’s a lot of littoral there, as we’ve discussed. We know when a ship enters the Gulf, we don’t know necessarily – unless they’ve declared that they’re going to go to an Iranian port – they may change, and they might, might wind up going over somewhere else, up to Iraq or over to Kuwait, or Bahrain.
So it’ll be very easy to keep tabs on vessels that were in an Iranian port and heading towards the Gulf, because, as Admiral Miller pointed out, this is naturally funneled. We’re not going to be all over the Indian Ocean, or all over the world, they’re going to have to come to us. And so, the implementation and the enforcement of the blockade, I think, will evolve over time, but if it’s an oceangoing vessel, I think the blockade criteria will be applied to it.
Blaise Misztal:
And Admiral Miller, let me ask you about another part of that sentence: “impartially enforced against vessels of all nations”. Does that set us up to potentially broaden this conflict if we do have Chinese- flagged vessels that are trying to enter or exit Iranian ports, or Russian flag vessels trying to run the blockade and we try to take action against them? Could that be a source of conflict beyond just with Iran?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
That could be a source of conflict. It’s written that way, and clearly the legal minds at CENTCOM have done their homework, and they have put their fingerprints onto this document. If you look at the Newport Manual, for example – there’s a couple of manuals that cover the customary international law for blockades – it requires that the blockade be applied impartially. And this is one of the reasons why there wasn’t a blockade in Cuba – you can quarantine ships carrying war material, but if you’re going to use the term blockade, which we have done, then it applies to all vessels.
Now, could that widen the war? There’s a very real possibility that that’s the case, because one of the first questions you ask when you hear about this blockade is, well, if a Chinese flagged vessel is entering the Gulf with the intention of going to Kharg Island, are we going to interdict it? According to the CENTCOM statement, the answer to that is yes. Or if it’s coming out of Kharg island with Iranian oil, headed back to China, where their intent is very clear. They’ve gone to an Iranian port. They’ve come out of the port. They have Iranian material on them. Are we going to interdict it? And does that set up a potential conflict with China? It does, I think.
That has to have been a consideration when we put this blockade into place. It’s also a consideration, of course, for China, which watches this whole thing with a great deal of interest. They’re interested in the oil, that’s important to them. And they’re not just interested in Iranian oil, they’re interested in a lot of the oil that comes out of the Gulf. More than half of their oil comes from that part of the world. So they’ve got interest there, which gives them an interest in a free and open Strait of Hormuz. They also have an interest in a toll scheme in the Strait of Hormuz, because that satisfies some of their interests, for example, in the South China Sea, where they would like to refer to the South China Sea as Chinese territorial water, and they’d like to control that. So there’s some interesting second and third order effects that this blockade could potentially have.
Blaise Misztal:
Just staying with that, because you said something that tripped my curiosity there. You said, “if the vessel has a declared intent to go to an Iranian port.” Is one way around this blockade for ships coming into the Gulf just to not say they’re going to Iran and then once they’re inside the Gulf, since the U.S. Navy isn’t in the Gulf currently, they can just go wherever they want once they’ve been let through?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
Unless Admiral Fox sees that differently, I think the short answer to that is yes, they can lie. We’re not going to the bar, we’re going out of the bowling alley, and then they go to the bar, but we’ll know that. And you know, part of what has been clear since the upbringing of hostilities is we have very good intelligence, both U.S. intelligence and incredible intelligence from the Israelis. So if it goes into an Iranian port, any ship, even though they said they were headed to Bahrain, for example, we’re going to know that, and we’re going to know when they come out.
Blaise Misztal:
So I suppose that might make it difficult for a ship to go into Iran, load up on oil and then sail back out. But if, for example, there was a ship that was delivering armaments or some sort of resupply from China, for example, we’ve heard China saying that it might ship MANPADS to Iran, it could still potentially get through just by lying about its destination, and then whether it gets out or not seems less material. So that could potentially be a loophole here.
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
International ships declare, they basically file what we in the aviation world would call a flight plan. They say, we left here, we’re going there. And so obviously you can determine whether or not someone is adhering to their plan or not. And it’ll give you the opportunity to take appropriate action. We’ll always have the opportunity if and when they leave the Gulf, and if they’ve declared to go into an Iranian port, then that would be criteria to prevent them from going in.
Blaise Misztal:
Last topic here, just sticking with the CENTCOM post, the last sentence – we have most of the post talking about the blockade. But then the last sentence says, “U.S. forces are supporting freedom of navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to and from non-Iranian ports.” What sort of activity would be required to support freedom of navigation? Is it the same activity as sitting outside the Gulf to blockade? And have we actually seen the U.S. Navy doing that to support freedom of navigation? Admiral Fox?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
Well, we sent a couple of guided missile destroyers into the Gulf over the weekend, which is another place where you would say, we know if there are threats or if we thought it was mined, we would not have done that. I think we have a pretty clear idea of where the threats, at least in the water, are. So obviously, to be able to ensure freedom of navigation, you’ve got to be able to respond to whatever threat occurs with the Iranian IRGC or whatever their drones and attacks might be.
This goes back to having very strong surveillance and reconnaissance posture, very strong rapid response forces that are available to prevent either IRGC small boats from trying to board or capture, so I would expect us to be in a very forward-leaning posture that would ensure that anyone that is complying with our freedom of navigation goals will be part of the umbrella which we’re going to provide. And it takes ships, and it takes airplanes, and it takes Marines. So I mean, it’ll be a very well-coordinated effort, but it’s going to take ships that are operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Blaise Misztal:
So Admiral Miller, to that point, would you expect to see more U.S. Navy vessels transiting the Strait, going into the Gulf? Should the U.S. be pursuing that in order to support freedom of navigation?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
Before I answer that specifically, I do want to highlight that part of the ceasefire agreement was that the Strait of Hormuz would be open and that the Iranians would not impede transit. And clearly that has not been the case. So that’s another one of the measures regarding the ceasefire that we ought to keep in mind. I think what the destroyers that Admiral Fox was referring to have done is set the conditions. I think the CENTCOM statement really specifically intended to state – as part of this blockade statement – that what the U.S. favors is a free and open Strait of Hormuz, where traffic can transit without fear of being impeded or attacked by the Iranian regime.
And so these two destroyers are, I think, a precursor to that, and I think we’ll see additional activity. Part of what I think, practically speaking, we need to keep in mind is in order for the ships that are trapped inside the Gulf to get out, and the ships that are outside the Gulf that want to get in – that are going to the GCC, or have been part of the GCC trade activity – in order for them to go they’re going to have to be confident that it’s safe. And part of that is sort of an implicit, well, prove it’s safe. And part of doing that is by having a U.S. presence, and that’s a maritime presence, and as Admiral Fox spoke to, it’s also a pretty robust airborne presence that can interdict anything that IRGC might have left in terms of small boats or other military hardware.
Blaise Misztal:
I believe the USS George Bush aircraft carrier is on route to the Gulf or the region, along with its Carrier Strike Group. Would that give the U.S. more options for supporting freedom of navigation through the Strait, or trying to open up that waterway? Admiral Fox?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
We’re not in a place right now where we can necessarily dictate where ships are going to go. We’re not in that place. But obviously, when you have more resources, it gives the Fleet Commander, and it gives the CENTCOM commander, and it gives the Secretary, and it gives the President more options. And so therefore, I’ve seen the reports now that Gerald R. Ford has left Crete; she’s back in the Eastern Mediterranean. So where the George H.W. Bush goes will be driven by the mission that they’re tasked with.
Blaise Misztal:
All right. Well, thank you, admirals for that, I think, exhaustive discussion of current operations in and around the Gulf. If any of our audience has further questions on that topic, I encourage you to submit them using the Q&A feature in Zoom, and I’ll read them out. But let me turn momentarily back to General Amidror to talk about Lebanon, because I believe Israeli and Lebanese sides were supposed to be meeting here in DC to negotiate a potential agreement. So let me ask you, General Amidror, what is Israel looking to get? What sort of deal would it consider to be a good deal with Lebanon that would end the fighting there?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that first of all, the meeting ended successfully. I mean, both sides came out alive and continued to their embassies. And I think that it’s a premature question, already securing an agreement. We need huge patience, and it will take a very long time, because both countries come from two different approaches. The Iranians are coming from an Iranian point of view: ceasefire, and then we will negotiate. And what we are saying, in the last few years, is that we have been attacked by the Iranians twice: the open fire on Israel on the eighth of October 2023, and at the beginning of the last operation in Iran without any Israeli reaction or anything action by Israel.
So we cannot live with this situation in the future, and we are determined to disarm Hezbollah and to destroy it one way or another. We are still in a defensive posture. We didn’t move to an offensive one. What we are doing is to push Hezbollah out of South Lebanon, so Hezbollah will not have the ability to launch ground assaults on Israel, and will not have the ability to use the anti-tank missiles they got from the Syrians – the Russians’ new Kornet – to attack Israeli villages along the border.
And look at the map, it’s around the Litani River line, and in the east, it is maybe behind the Litani River, because the Litani River is very close to some Israeli communities. We are not doing anything with ground forces north of the Litani yet. Most of the missiles launched by Hezbollah against Israel since the beginning of this stage of the war came from areas north of the Litani. But we are ready to give the Americans and the Lebanese the time that is needed. But it should be clear at the end of the day, Israel will not retreat from Lebanon unless Hezbollah is totally disarmed.
How far we are ready to go in, and where will the line be at which the IDF will present itself at the end of the offensive state, I don’t know. We are not speaking about it. There are many plans at the headquarters.
Now, we are focusing ourselves on preventing the ability of Hezbollah to launch missiles and rockets into Israel, and that we haven’t succeeded in stopping it. We want them to stop launching drones into Israel, but every day they’re launching drones into Israel. We have more sophisticated ways to deal with drones. But still, drones are a huge challenge. And we cannot say yes to the Lebanese demand for a ceasefire first and then negotiations.
It is impossible, from our point of view, after two different occasions in which Hezbollah decided that it is a good time to launch missiles into Israel and open fire without any Israeli action. This is the situation today. Negotiations are very important, but it will take a very, very long time to get an agreement, and I believe that before, Hezbollah is not going to suffer a huge blow from the IDF. Hezbollah will not agree to any agreement that would be implemented in Lebanon and cannot be forced by the Lebanese Government.
The Lebanese government declared that the Ambassador of Iran in Lebanon is persona non grata. He is still in Beirut, and they cannot take care of an ambassador of Iran in Beirut. Are there expectations that they disarm Hezbollah? It’s not going to happen in the near future, and probably Israel will have to do the job. If we will be wise, and there is a demand from the Americans, we will agree to a ceasefire. But for how long? Months? Two months? Okay.
But it should be agreed that if Hezbollah is not disarmed by the government of Lebanon within these two months, the Lebanese government and the administration in Washington agree that Israel will continue fully attacking Hezbollah with ground and air forces. We can wait, but at the end of the day, this organization will not, should not, have the ability to launch missiles and rockets into Israel.
Blaise Misztal:
So let me ask you to give us a little more detail, General Amidror. When you say that an acceptable deal for Israel would require the total disarmament of Hezbollah, what does that mean? That would mean removing their rockets and missiles, their drones, but would that also mean making sure that there are no Hezbollah members with small arms, with rifles anywhere in Lebanon? How realistic is that?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Unlike Hamas, a small weapon in the hands of Hezbollah is a problem in Beirut but not in South Lebanon. We probably will have a buffer zone in South Lebanon, in which we will prevent any move of forces into the area that might be used to attack our communities south of the border. And Kalashnikovs are not the problem, we are speaking about everything from RPGs on. That should be taken by the legitimate government of the State of Lebanon, unlike Gaza, in which there isn’t any alternative.
That is why In Gaza our demands from Hamas are much more about totally disarming the organization. In Lebanon, there is a government, there is an army, and Hezbollah should not be an organization making decisions in Lebanon.
The government should make the decisions on government in Lebanon, the parliament should make decisions in Lebanon, not Hezbollah as a terror organization. And Hezbollah will not have the ability to launch rockets, missiles, anti-tank missiles, and so on and so forth into Israel, partly because Israel will have buffers inside Lebanon, and partly because the organization will be disarmed by an agreement or by force.
Blaise Misztal:
And then let me follow up to ask – if I understand you correctly, the Israeli position is that Israel will not withdraw from Southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. You said getting a deal would be a long process, but presumably disarming Hezbollah would be an even longer process. So is Israel preparing to stay in the South of Lebanon for an extended period? Months? Years? How long?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
My view, and I don’t know the view of Israel is, my view is that Israel should not withdraw from Lebanon till Hezbollah will be disarmed. We cannot allow a situation in which Hezbollah can launch missile rockets from Lebanon into Israel. And for that, we have to control a big part of Lebanon. How much to the north is a good question. It’s not a defined line that we decide today. Very much it depends on what will happen in Lebanon.
Blaise Misztal:
If there is no deal, is Israel capable and prepared to disarm Hezbollah itself? To launch ground operations all the way to Beirut and Bekaa?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
We cannot reach Beirut and Bekaa with ground forces. This is ridiculous, but somewhere between the Litani and Beirut will be the line reached by ground forces. The whole area will be cleaned up by the IDF, and the Air Force will make whatever we can based on intelligence to destroy facilities which belong to Hezbollah.
Blaise:
Can you disarm Hezbollah from the air?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, we can’t disarm Hezbollah from the air. What we can do is to minimize the ability of Hezbollah to launch missiles and rockets into Israel. And remember, unlike in the past, because there is no land bridge from Tehran to Lebanon, the ability of the Iranians to rearm Hezbollah is minimal. The ability of Hezbollah to produce inside Lebanon is also close to zero, because every facility that we know about we are bombing and destroying. And as I said, the connection between Iran and Lebanon can be made only by flying into Lebanon from Iran or through other places.
You cannot bring weapon systems on flights. You can bring money, of course, but with the situation today in Iran that I’m not sure that the Iranians will have enough money to compensate the Shiites in Lebanon for the damage they suffered in the war. Probably most of the Shiites from South Lebanon, from the border of Israel to the Zahrani, are refugees now in North Lebanon.
So, no, we cannot destroy Hezbollah totally as we can to Hamas in Gaza. We can minimize the ability of this organization to launch rockets and missiles into Israel. The defensive system that we have in Israel, if there aren’t many rockets, we know how to deal with it. It’s not very convenient, but we know how to deal with it. And remember that after the operation in 2024, Hezbollah lost around 75-80% of its capabilities. So at the end of the day, if we clean the area south of Beirut, the number of missiles which will remain to launch into Israel will be very minimal.
Blaise Misztal:
One last question for you, General Amidror, do you believe that the Lebanese Government, and more importantly, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF, have the capability currently to disarm Hezbollah?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I don’t know where the fine line is between will and capability here. I really don’t know. I know that it is not an easy decision, because what they have to face is a kind of a war between Hezbollah and the Lebanese arm. In today’s situation, after the blow that we made to Hezbollah in 2024 I think that the balance of power is not as bad as before the war. Is it going to be easy? No. Is it going to be necessary to prevent a devastating war that might destroy Lebanon again? The answer is yes, because we as Israelis cannot agree to the existence of long-range missiles and rockets that can reach Israel in the hands of a terrorist organization under the flag of Lebanon.
By the way, the weaker Iran will be, the easier it will be to reach the point where Hezbollah can be disarmed by the Lebanese army. The chances are not high, but will be higher than if Iran was strong as it is today. The capitulation of Iran versus the Americans will be very helpful to convince Hezbollah that they are going to lose. Will it be enough? I don’t know.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, General Amidror. Admirals, let me turn to you to close things out in our remaining four minutes, and just ask what you’ll be watching for as U.S. naval operations for this blockade continue. What should we be watching for to gauge their effectiveness? What sort of responses might we expect from the Iranians? What will you be paying attention to? Admiral Miller?
VADM John Miller, USN (ret.):
Blaise again, thanks for having me, and I’ve appreciated the discussion. I have confidence that we can perform this blockade, and Admiral Fox said it right at the very beginning – this is within the operational capability of the Navy. We have the forces there to do this. I think it’s fairly clear that if there are Iranian flag vessels that are trying to get into or out of Iranian ports and through the Strait on their way to conduct trade that that’s not going to happen, and there may be some fighting about that.
And there’s some risk associated with us taking ships that are potentially armed with security detachments from the IRGC. I think we’ll be watching for that. And then, of course, I think we’ll want to watch for any kind of widening of the conflict here, in particular with Chinese vessels – whether or not the Chinese want to press an issue here and potentially escalate horizontally in a very big way. I don’t really expect that to happen, but that’s certainly something for us to be on the lookout for.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, Admiral Miller. Admiral Fox, final word goes to you. What will you be watching for?
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.):
I’m just reading all of the clips that I get from CENTCOM and just listening, paying attention. It’s hard to have a fingertip feel from so far away, and Admiral Miller and I have been in that position, but we’re not there now. We are the guys now that are talking about stuff when we truly don’t know what the details of the operational plan are. We understand the concepts, so we just need to be patient.
It will be very interesting to see the impact on the Iranian economy once their oil exports end. That will be something that I think will traumatize their regime. I’d be keeping an eye on the Houthis and the Bab al-Mandeb. Now a couple of different clocks are ticking. One is an economic clock – how much pain can the world endure with the rising price of oil. The other is how quickly and effectively can we bend the Iranian regime to our will. We’ll have to see how it goes.
Blaise Misztal:
Well. Admiral Fox, Admiral Miller, thank you so much for your insights. General Amidror, always a pleasure to have you on and get your take on everything. Thank you to everyone who tuned in. And please stay tuned to JINSA.org for all our latest updates and analysis. Thank you everyone. Admirals, good afternoon. Good night to you, General Amidror. Thank you.