It’s unfortunate that the recent uproar over the use of the Signal messaging app by senior leadership in the Trump administration has obscured the importance of the event they were discussing: a strike against the Houthis on March 15. The attack marked the beginning of a necessary military campaign and a potential turning of the page for the United States in the Middle East.
The Biden administration mostly chose to ignore the growing threat to world commerce posed by the Houthis, an Iran-backed group that President Trump has designated a terrorist organization. Its responses were telegraphed and thoroughly watered down to avoid any possibility of escalation by Iran, and, concomitantly, any lasting damage to the Houthis. As a result, the impact on the group was ephemeral at best.
It’s important to know that striking the Houthi position in Yemen serves United States interests first and foremost. By trying to assure safe passage through Bab el-Mandeb, the strait that leads into the Red Sea and is critical to international shipping routes, we’re doing much more than simply aiding European commerce. Instead, we’re pursuing several broader goals: First, we’re asserting the importance of free passage on the global commons; we are the world’s greatest maritime nation, and the concept of uncontested transit is fundamental to our security. Second, China is watching us, and will draw conclusions from our actions with Yemen about what we will or will not tolerate happening to Taiwan.
Finally, striking the Houthis weakens the one still-fully functional arm of Iranian malfeasance in the region. Hezbollah, Syria and even Hamas are already significantly degraded; now the Houthis, too, are under attack for their reckless actions.
Meaningful success will not come easily. Using air power alone to defeat militias has traditionally been difficult. In this case, though, there’s a distinction that has been overlooked by many critics: The goal is not to eliminate the Houthis, or create good governance. Instead, it is to force them to cease using high-technology missiles and drones to attack ships at sea. This is a much narrower and more achievable mission. The Houthi attacks have an electronic and visual signature that is uniquely discoverable, and it plays into our high-tech approach.
It is quite likely that the Houthis will use the Yemeni population as human shields, just as Hamas has done with civilians in Gaza. This means that despite our very best efforts, there will be civilian casualties. Those are regrettable, and our forces will work hard to minimize them, even as the Houthis will almost certainly work to maximize both the actual casualties and the anti-American messaging about them.
It won’t be an overnight campaign, but we’ve always had the military capability to solve this problem. What was lacking until now has been the political will. Certainly, the Biden administration had its reasons for not taking effective action against the Houthis. Perhaps most significant was the fear of Iranian escalation. But this is a hollow threat. Iran’s military response has been on display several times over the past year, and it has been underwhelming.
The Trump administration’s operations against the Houthis are the opening act in what could be another very bad year for Iran. To be sure, 2024 was perhaps the worst year in recent history for its leaders: Their allies and proxies were depleted, their ballistic missile force were exposed as ineffective against their major adversary, Israel, and they were unable to defend their skies against highly effective Israeli counterstrikes.
As such, we need to think beyond the Houthis, to the ultimate source of the problems they present: Iran. Mr. Trump knows this, and his social media post last Monday captures his thinking completely: “The choice for the Houthis is clear: Stop shooting at U.S. ships, and we will stop shooting at you. Otherwise, we have only just begun, and the real pain is yet to come, for both the Houthis and their sponsors in Iran.”
Mr. Trump comes to this moment with three large achievements from his first term. While they are forgotten by many in the United States, these accomplishments still resonate powerfully in the Middle East. First, his decision to strike and kill Iran’s key military leader, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, in January 2020. Second, the pursuit of the Abraham Accords, which established Israeli relations with two Arab states and opened a diplomatic, economic and cultural pathway for further Israeli integration into the region. Finally, his decision to shift oversight for Israel from the European Command, which focuses on Russia, to Central Command, which is responsible for Iran.
While the last might seem like a purely bureaucratic move, it aligned Israel with a command center facing the same problem set. That created the structure and processes that have enabled Israel to work with the United States and regional neighbors to successfully defend against two major Iranian attacks last year. This is a big deal.
Iran respects force. The Suleimani strike five years ago and now the strikes against the Houthis clearly show the United States has a president who isn’t paralyzed by the potential for escalation.
Because of these developments, we now have an opportunity to bring Iran to the table for substantive negotiations over its nuclear ambitions — negotiations that must be conducted directly, not through third-party interlocutors, and with no scene-setting preconditions or concessions. Even as we strike back against the Houthis, the time is also ripe to pressure Iran to renounce any potential pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Tehran has so far resisted direct talks with the United States. Why would it now be open to them? Because it recognizes that the possibility of a U.S. or Israeli strike on its nuclear program is closer to reality than at any time in recent history. The highest goal of Iranian statecraft is regime preservation. If the survival of the clerical leadership is directly and credibly threatened, Iran will modify its behavior. We now have the tools and the will to create this threat in a meaningful manner.
This is a window of vulnerability that won’t last forever, but it is very real. I believe from my previous interactions with President Trump that he does not seek war with Iran. I also know that he is willing to press Iran hard to negotiate, and he brings with him credibility about the use of force that has been absent from our position for several years.
Gen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC (ret.) is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and former Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Originally published in the New York Times.