Transcript: Webinar – Bad Deal Rising?
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council
Stephen Rademaker
Senior Advisor, JINSA; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security & Nonproliferation
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining us for another JINSA webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. We’re here to talk about the news that broke over the weekend that the United States and Iran might be close to completing a memorandum of understanding that would bring the hostilities that started on February 28 with Operation Epic Fury to a conclusion — perhaps only temporarily.
To discuss that, and to learn what we know about what might be in the deal, what it would mean for Iran, for the region, for U.S. interests, and for Israel’s security, I’m delighted to be joined by Steve Rademaker, a Senior Advisor to JINSA and former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, as well as Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, a JINSA Distinguished Fellow and former Israeli National Security Advisor. Thank you both for being with us.
Steve, let me start with you. Can you give us a rundown of what we know, and maybe just as importantly, what we do not know about the contours of this MOU?
Steve Rademaker:
I will explain what I know, but there is a lot that I am unsure of, because there have been conflicting reports about what is under negotiation and what has been notionally agreed. I think it is clear that, in broad concept, the meeting of the minds is that there would be a 60-day extension of the current ceasefire. During that 60-day period, there would be a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, consisting both of a relaxation of Iranian restrictions on transit through the Strait and a relaxation of the U.S. blockade of Iran.
During that 60-day period, negotiations would take place on other issues, most importantly the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Beyond those basic facts, there is a lot of disagreement.
When it comes to reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is signaling that it fully intends to maintain control. It says it is not going to charge a toll, but that it is going to charge for providing assistance to ships passing through the Strait — which sort of sounds like a toll.
I think the Trump administration would say, “No, there is not going to be a toll.” As best I can tell, there is not yet a clear position on that. It may not be hard for the United States to end its naval blockade of Iran. This is a new innovation in U.S. policy. But in addition to the naval blockade, the United States has maintained an economic sanctions blockade directed at Iranian oil exports for many years.
Iran is clearly negotiating for some relaxation of U.S. economic sanctions that have discouraged other countries from importing oil from Iran. If Iran gets some relief from those economic sanctions, that would actually be an improvement in Iran’s situation compared to the status quo before this war began. So it will be interesting to see if Iran gets any relief from the U.S. blockade in the area of economic sanctions.
The naval blockade, yes, presumably would be ended if Iran ends its restrictions on shipping through the Strait. But we will see about U.S. sanctions.
A related issue is frozen Iranian assets. The numbers are between $50 billion and $100 billion in frozen Iranian money around the world — frozen as a result of U.S. financial sanctions and threats against foreign banks if they transfer the money to Iran. There is a lot of reporting that Iran thinks it is getting $24 billion, and maybe half of that immediately upon signature of whatever MOU is being negotiated.
Again, that would be an improvement for Iran compared to the status quo that existed before the war, because all of that money was frozen up until the commencement of the war. So we will see whether Iran gets any benefits there.
When it comes to the nuclear program, again, there is great disagreement about what would be provided. The U.S. position had long been that all enriched material in Iran needed to be exported to the United States. Now there are indications that maybe it would be okay to downblend it, or maybe it would be okay to export it to Russia or China. Clearly, there is discussion going on about that.
Then there is what, to me, is actually an absolutely critical question: What is the future of enrichment in Iran? Will Iran be required to permanently terminate its uranium enrichment program? Or will this be more like the JCPOA, where Iran restrains or suspends its enrichment program only for a limited period of time, with the implication that upon the expiration of that period, Iran can resume full-scale enrichment?
Again, no details have emerged about this, and both sides seem to be taking quite inconsistent positions in their descriptions. So I think we have a lot yet to learn about what is actually being agreed here.
President Trump is taking a lot of criticism from Republicans in Congress, including some of his strong supporters, because they see some of these accounts and think Iran actually emerges from these negotiations as a winner in this war compared to where it was before the war began. Trump has been sensitive to those criticisms, and he has said that the senators saying such things do not know what they are talking about. Let’s hope he is right about that. Let’s hope Iran is not going to get benefits as a result of having fought this war with the United States.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I may add another benefit that the Iranians will get, according to what was leaked — I do not know if it is part of the deal — Lebanon will be connected to the ceasefire in Iran, and there will be a ceasefire in Lebanon as well.
The meaning of that is the end of the American attempt to build a kind of alliance within Lebanon. It is the end of talks about disarming Hezbollah. It goes against all the efforts of the Americans in the last few years, and it will be a very bad lesson for Hamas as well. I do not know why the Americans agreed that it should be connected. It is a huge strategic mistake.
Blaise Misztal:
On that point, General Amidror, thanks for raising that. I was about to ask Steve whether I am correct in understanding that what has been leaked, or the details that have emerged, do not include any provisions related to Iran’s ballistic missile program and do not mention anything related to Iran’s support for terrorism and its proxies.
But, General Amidror, you just made the good point that rather than asking Iran to curtail its activity with its proxies, it actually would potentially strengthen Hezbollah’s position if it includes this provision requiring Israel to end the conflict in Lebanon.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Yes, I agree that it will make Hezbollah stronger — not militarily, but politically. They can claim that they are the defenders of Lebanon. Would you need more than that to show that you are the defender of Lebanon?
What would President Aoun say when negotiations resume — that he is going against Hezbollah, which was part of the agreement with the Americans? The Americans are legitimizing Hezbollah’s existence in Lebanon, and then even, in a way, making it stronger. I do not understand why the Americans have written this connection.
Of course, I understand that they have to be flexible in the Gulf and so on. They were very successful in the war, but the Iranians did not capitulate. But what is the connection to Lebanon? It goes against what the Americans are doing in Washington now. I really do not understand it.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, is there any significance to this being called an MOU, a memorandum of understanding, instead of being referred to as a deal or an agreement?
Steve Rademaker:
I am not sure the terminology matters much. It is clearly not an agreement that will require approval by the U.S. Senate, so it is not a treaty. There is a U.S. law that requires congressional review of nuclear-related agreements negotiated with Iran, but it does not sound like this MOU would actually rise to that level because I am not sure it contains any provisions relating to the nuclear program — except an obligation on both sides to begin negotiating about the nuclear program, but no actual restrictions on the nuclear program that I am aware of.
So if those negotiations lead somewhere, there will be some sort of higher-level agreement that would require review by the U.S. Congress, although that probably would not be a treaty either. It would still be somewhere between an executive agreement and a memorandum of understanding. The JCPOA did not have any of those titles, right? It was just the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I do not know what status that was supposed to have under international law.
Blaise Misztal:
Is it fair to compare this deal to the JCPOA that you just mentioned, or would it be more appropriate to compare it to the Joint Plan of Action, the interim deal that preceded the JCPOA by one year? Is that how we should understand this — as an agreement to try to get to an agreement?
Steve Rademaker:
Yes, although the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did include agreed restrictions on nuclear activity in Iran, and I am not aware that any of the points in this current MOU would amount to restrictions on nuclear activity in Iran.
On the broader question of whether this is something similar to the JCPOA, there certainly have been descriptions of it that make it sound an awful lot like the JCPOA. The Trump administration is saying it will restrict enrichment in Iran for 20 years. The JCPOA was basically a restriction on enrichment in Iran for about 15 years. I think the Iranians replied, “No, we can only agree to a five-year restriction on enrichment.” So the compromise between 20 years and five years sounds like around 12 years. It is starting to sound a lot like the JCPOA.
I think the Trump administration has been sensitive to arguments that what it is negotiating here looks a lot like what President Obama came back with, because, of course, President Trump denounced the JCPOA as inadequate and withdrew the United States from it. It would be quite embarrassing if the result of this war were entry into a new JCPOA.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, you spoke about the provision on Lebanon that is in the reported deal. I was wondering about the view from Israel on the other details Steve talked about, including the unfreezing of frozen funds, the end of the blockade, and the agreement to keep negotiating on some of these details, whether about the nuclear program or sanctions relief.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
First, I do not know what the details of the agreement will be. What I can say is that at the end of the 60 days, Iran will be stronger. They will have 60 days to repair all the weapons systems that were hit by the Israelis and the Americans. They will have time to expose all the tunnels that had been closed by both our and U.S. air forces.
They will be stronger economically because they will sell oil freely. If there is relief in the sanctions, they will be even richer because they will get cash. So everyone who is making the agreement should understand that at the end of the 60 days — and during the 60 days — Iran will be stronger. What leads to the assumption that when they are stronger, they will be more flexible than when they had been very damaged by you and us? I do not know.
The second phase is the agreement itself. As you said, there is nothing about the missiles, which I think is a big problem from our point of view. It very much depends on what the agreement will be. The Obama administration changed the policy from dismantling to postponing and monitoring. If it is for 20 years, what will be the difference between that and the agreement achieved by Obama, except five years? It does not make any sense.
So I do not know what will be at the end of the agreement, what will be exported out of Iran, and what will remain in Iran. But at this stage, it is clear to us that the connection to Lebanon is devastating. Ignoring the missiles is a huge problem from our point of view. As for the details regarding the nuclear issue, I do not know.
Blaise Misztal:
Certainly, General Amidror, your view is largely in keeping with JINSA’s. Our president and CEO, Mike Makovsky, issued a statement on Sunday in which he said, “If the reported details of a proposed U.S.-Iran MOU are broadly accurate, it would represent a loss of American nerve and damaging strategic reversal in recent American policy, abandoning many of President Trump’s prior red lines, undercutting many of the tremendous achievements of the military campaign, and undermining U.S. credibility.” You can find the rest of that statement on our website, jinsa.org.
Let me ask you, General Amidror: What is your understanding of how much this agreement and the negotiations with Iran in general are being coordinated with Israel? How much alignment is there between Washington and Jerusalem on this diplomatic track?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I do not know. I know there were a few conversations between the prime minister and the president. But I want to say something related to what was declared by Mike Makovsky. The lesson in the Middle East from American hesitation is very bad — very, very bad.
Today, someone from Saudi Arabia said that the Saudis are working very hard to create an alignment involving Pakistan, a nuclear state, and Turkey, as an alternative to Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Abraham Accords. If that is true, it would be a huge disadvantage to the main success of the Americans in the Middle East. If that alliance really materializes, I do not see any other Arab or Muslim country joining the Abraham Accords.
From that point of view, the Americans — as with connecting Lebanon to Iran — are taking steps that go against their own efforts over the last few years.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, since General Amidror mentioned the Abraham Accords, there has also been reporting alongside what we are hearing about the MOU that President Trump has been asking Arab leaders, or perhaps telling Arab leaders, that he expects them to join the Abraham Accords when this conflict ends.
What do we know about that? Should that be understood as some sort of extension of the potential deal with Iran? Are they part of the same diplomatic track? Are they separate efforts? How should we understand what is going on there?
Steve Rademaker:
You left out the detail that the president also said Iran would hopefully join the Abraham Accords as well, which would be quite astonishing, given that Iran — the Islamic Republic — since its inception has been dedicated to the destruction of Israel. For Iran, as a result of this war, to meet all the other U.S. conditions plus recognize the State of Israel would be an astonishing turnaround.
I was frankly confused by the president’s introduction of the Abraham Accords into the middle of this negotiation. It is fundamentally a bilateral negotiation between the United States and Iran. Why other countries in the region would feel that they needed to join the Abraham Accords as a result of a bilateral agreement — and attach conditions relating to Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank — is unclear. Those conditions, I do not think, are about to be satisfied.
The best sense I can make of the president’s comments is that they are aspirational. I do not see much likelihood that even if the negotiations with Iran prove to be an enormous success, that will immediately translate into the willingness of other Arab countries in the region, much less Iran, to enter the Abraham Accords.
Blaise Misztal:
One thought I had — because everything changes so quickly — is that if we think back just a week ago, President Trump put out a post saying that after talking to various Middle Eastern leaders — the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Qataris — he was calling off the resumption of attacks on Iran that I think were supposed to happen a week ago today. In the post announcing the MOU, he also listed a long list of regional leaders he had consulted with on the MOU.
Could it be that regional leaders are asking the United States to choose a diplomatic track rather than resuming hostilities, and President Trump is trying to leverage that by saying, “All right, if you really do not want me to go back to war, the price you have to pay is coming into the Abraham Accords”? Is that a source of leverage he can use here?
Steve Rademaker:
I suppose he could try that. I personally worry that everyone in the region has taken away from U.S. policy over the last month or so that Trump is reluctant to resume full-scale war against Iran. Most importantly, I think the Iranians have concluded that. If they believe that, then they are liberated to be more difficult and less accommodating in the negotiations.
The first thing necessary for your suggestion to work would be for everyone to believe that Trump was actually prepared to go back to full-scale war with Iran. I think there are increasing doubts about that in the region.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I may add to your answer, which I agree with, in a way the Iranians succeeded in creating a North Korea situation. The advocates against attacking North Korea years ago were the South Koreans, because they were afraid it would lead to the destruction of Seoul and so on.
What happened here is that, according to the declarations, countries in this region do not want the war because they are afraid of Iran — not because they like Iran, and not because they want Iran to be nuclear. But at the end of the day, you might find yourself in a North Korea situation. Because of the nations, you do not act, and you will find Iran at the end of the day.
Blaise Misztal:
Staying with you, General Amidror, given that, do you think it is possible for President Trump to use this situation to expand the Abraham Accords? Is this a moment to press for it?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
He can try, but the sentiment in Saudi Arabia is not positive. Broadly, for the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia is the most important country. Will they do it? I have many doubts. But the Americans have their own way to convince a country like Saudi Arabia to do it. It depends how much pressure you are ready to put.
Blaise Misztal:
How about Qatar? That was, I think, the other country that President Trump suggested should immediately join the Abraham Accords.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Qatar should not be legitimized. It is an enemy of Israel. It is a supporter of terrorists. It hosts half of the leadership of Hamas. The other half is in Turkey. That should not be legitimized.
It is a negative state that is doing everything to ignite the Middle East through Al Jazeera. It is a country that should not have any position to determine the future of the Middle East.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, maybe we could drill down a little bit on some of the technical details regarding the potential nuclear component of this agreement. One of the things we have heard from the administration is that, as part of this deal, Iran is giving a written commitment that it will not pursue a nuclear weapon. Is that new or meaningful?
Steve Rademaker:
We would have to be fools to take that as a significant step by the Iranians. The Iranians have been a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for decades. I have not gone back to look at the year they ratified that treaty, but probably the 1970s. That treaty is not just a verbal commitment. It is a solemn treaty commitment on the part of Iran never to produce a nuclear weapon.
If we took comfort from that obligation Iran assumed decades ago, then for the last 30 years, I guess we have been worried about nothing. If they were enriching, if they were doing covert nuclear activities — no problem, because we have a treaty that forbids them from producing a nuclear weapon, and they are party to it, and they have not denounced it.
We do not trust those words. We think Iran intends either to ignore them or eventually pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the same way North Korea did. To accept further assurances from Iran that it will never produce a nuclear weapon, on top of the assurances we already have, is just more potentially meaningless words.
Our position has long been that we need more than verbal assurances. We do not need to be told there is a fatwa against producing a nuclear weapon in Iran. What we need to see is evidence that the state policies of Iran are not adapted to the production of a nuclear weapon. Everything we see is that they are, in fact, adapted to the production of a nuclear weapon. That is why we have been alarmed about this problem for so long.
Blaise Misztal:
If I recall correctly, the JCPOA included a very similar written attestation from the Iranians that they would not pursue a nuclear weapon. If we believe that deal was not sufficient to prevent a nuclear Iran, then a new written attestation would not be much better.
Steve Rademaker:
I think they will give us 20 reiterations of their commitment not to produce a nuclear weapon if we are going to attach some value to them. But I do not know why we would attach any value to Iranian verbal assurances. What we need is practical evidence that they are no longer committed to the production of a nuclear weapon.
Blaise Misztal:
On the enrichment front, the major issue is what is going to happen with the roughly 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent that Iran has. There have been various permutations discussed. You mentioned some of them: shipping it out to the United States, shipping it out to a third country — I think China has been the latest one mentioned — or downblending it, reducing its level of enrichment but keeping it inside Iran.
Are all those options functionally equivalent in terms of reducing the threat or danger of that enriched uranium stockpile?
Steve Rademaker:
I believe any of those steps would diminish the threat. But I have less confidence today that the transfer of that material to Russia would be a permanent guarantee that the material will never be utilized by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, just because the relationship between Iran and Russia today is very different from what it was 10 years ago. I am less confident that Russia would have no reason to return that material.
If we could get it out of Iran, that would be good. But some of these solutions are better than others. Transferring it to the United States would probably be the best solution. Downblending it would be helpful. But I do not know why Iran needs any enriched material. It would be nice to get rid of all of it — not just the highly enriched material, but all of Iran’s enriched material.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I may add, from the Israeli point of view — and I am sure that our experts have spoken with the American experts — it is not just the highly enriched uranium, not only the 450 kilograms of enriched uranium. Iran has an amount of enriched uranium at lower levels. But as you know, when you are at 20 percent enrichment, you have already done much of what is needed to enrich uranium to weapons grade.
So it is very important that all enriched uranium, not just the highly enriched uranium, be exported from Iran. The best option is America. I am ready to take the risk that it could be exported to China with the strong commitment of President Xi that it never leaves China. But I prefer that it be in America, or in a country where we can understand that it will be kept within its own borders and not re-exported.
Blaise Misztal:
Just to put a finer point on that, General Amidror, I think enriching to 20 percent is something like 90 percent of the work needed to get to weapons grade. So it is very far along, even though it is only 20 percent enriched. There are quite a lot of stockpiles of enriched uranium beyond the 60 percent material that are dangerous and would need to be addressed by a deal.
Steve, sticking with the details here: Would it be sufficient, even if we got rid of the enriched uranium in some way, to then have Iran say it will suspend enrichment for whatever the term is, between five and 20 years? Would that give us confidence that its nuclear program has gone dormant?
Steve Rademaker:
What you are describing begins to sound a lot like the JCPOA, and I never took much confidence from the JCPOA. The JCPOA was sold to the American people on the basis of false rhetoric that it closed all pathways for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. That was partially true for a limited period of time, but at the end of that period of time, it was completely untrue. In fact, the opposite was true: all pathways were opened at the end of that period.
To me, it would be critical to know whether the ultimate agreement here provides for some limited period during which Iran is prohibited from, or has suspended, its enrichment program, and what happens at the end of that period. Is the suspension fully ended, and is Iran free to do whatever it wants? That was what the JCPOA provided, and that was, to my mind, the greatest single weakness of the JCPOA: it basically opened all pathways to the production of fissile material upon expiration of the restrictions.
Let’s be clear: Iran is not going to make those kinds of commitments for free. It will get something in exchange. I think what it will get is probably the exact same thing it got under the JCPOA, which is sanctions relief. The economic sanctions that America has applied to Iran over its nuclear program will be lifted, just as they were under the JCPOA. Iran will get an economic shot in the arm as a reward for these temporary restrictions.
That was the problem with the JCPOA. They would keep the economic reward even when they were no longer abiding by the restrictions. It was completely mindless: permanent sanctions relief in exchange for temporary restraint on enrichment. President Trump recognized that this was a defective formula when he pulled out of the JCPOA. Let’s hope he still recognizes that.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I may add, I think it is even worse than the previous agreement because the Iranians today have much better centrifuges that they can produce and use. Unlike during the agreement in 2015, today enrichment will be very, very fast. If there is no limitation after 20 years on enrichment, we will face Iran with material ready for a warhead within six months.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, General. I want to open it up to questions from the audience.
But first, I wanted to stay with you, General Amidror, and pivot a little bit to the first topic you mentioned, which is Lebanon. We have seen an increase in IDF activity in the last 24 hours, with, I think, greater ground operations and strikes into the Bekaa Valley as well. Can you give us a little more information about what is going on?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Yes. It is not a bigger operation. We continue to operate in southern Lebanon. We are pushing north. It is a very limited one. The air force is more aggressive, and we have gone into areas that are far away from the border.
I understand there are some limitations. I understand that from the fact that the Dahiya was not hit by the air force. The reason to escalate was the fact that Hezbollah succeeded — because the IDF was in an area very close to Hezbollah, but it did not move. If there is something very dangerous for military forces on the ground, it is not to move; it is to be stuck in one place.
Hezbollah succeeded in killing around 10 of our soldiers using drones and other means. It was well understood after such a problematic situation that we cannot be like a sitting duck anymore. We have to move. We have to move, and we are moving — north, I hope, to the Litani. On the eastern side, even beyond the Litani, because the Litani in the east is very close to our communities, less than five kilometers there — between two and three miles.
So we have to do it militarily, and we understand there are limitations. That can be judged by the fact that the Dahiya is out of reach.
Blaise Misztal:
Is this a violation of the ceasefire?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
What ceasefire? After attacking us with drones and firing on our soldiers on the ground, I do not see any ceasefire.
Blaise Misztal:
What would the impact be, do you think, on the negotiations that have been happening between the Israeli and Lebanese governments here in D.C.?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think the situation in Lebanon, together with the situation in Iran, is much more problematic for the Lebanese negotiators. Some of them probably think that what the IDF did will help them, because it puts more pressure on Hezbollah and the Shiite community. But an agreement with America in which America legitimizes the influence of Iran in Lebanon would do huge damage to the Lebanese negotiators.
Blaise Misztal:
So you are suggesting that if this MOU with Iran goes forward and includes a provision saying that there has to be an end to the war in Lebanon, that would effectively stop whatever incentives the Lebanese government has to negotiate with Israel and perhaps take serious action against Hezbollah?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Look at the situation. The Lebanese anti-Hezbollah forces have said: “You are damaging Lebanon. You are fighting Iran’s war, and we are paying the price inside Lebanon.”
What are they going to say now? “Guys, there is no more war, and those who stopped the war are the Iranians with Hezbollah.” Will that make the government of Lebanon stronger or weaker? That is, for sure, the situation that the agreement will lead to.
The Americans say, “Guys, we want time. We are negotiating with the Lebanese. We hope that they will disarm Hezbollah. We have to stick to these American efforts and try not to disturb their diplomatic efforts.” But by linking this to Iran and Hezbollah, the Americans are giving them leverage. That is the end of the courage of the government of Lebanon to do something against Hezbollah.
Blaise Misztal:
Should this IDF operation, whether big or small, be understood as Israel rushing to take advantage of whatever time might be left before this MOU is agreed to and tells Israel to stop?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think it is much more connected to the IDF’s ability to defend itself in Lebanon. It was professionally understood that we should move on, at least until the Litani. It is a professional judgment of the situation. The damage of the agreement in Lebanon will be more because of the political side, not because of the military side.
It will not make Hezbollah stronger militarily, but it will allow Hezbollah to say: “I succeeded. I defended Lebanon.”
Blaise Misztal:
Let me turn to a question from the audience. Please, if you have any questions, feel free to submit them using the Q&A function. Roger Gerber asks: Would you agree that the very process of negotiating a vague MOU that is merely preliminary to future negotiations is counterproductive? In addition, isn’t the 60-day negotiating period after weeks of negotiating the potential MOU absurd?
Steve, let me ask you first.
Steve Rademaker:
I think that is a very good question. They have been negotiating about nuclear issues. The Biden administration negotiated with Iran about nuclear issues. The Trump administration, through Witkoff, has been negotiating about nuclear issues. Then we had a war. Since the ceasefire, we have continued to negotiate.
And now, having failed to reach any agreement in any of those previous negotiations, we are going to give 60 days to negotiate. Why do we expect a different outcome, especially — and I think this is General Amidror’s question — if we relieve the military pressure that they have been under? Why are they going to be more incentivized now to come to an agreement with us on the nuclear program than they have been up until now? I do not have an answer to that.
If you ask me to predict what is going to happen during the 60-day period, I would say that at the end of the 60-day period, unless there has been a collapse in the U.S. negotiating position such that we are prepared to agree to things with Iran that previously had been unacceptable, the negotiations will be deadlocked. I see no indication that Iran is prepared to be flexible here.
Objectively, they should be flexible. They are increasing the hardship that has been imposed on the Iranian people, but I do not think they care. This nuclear program has been an article of faith for the Iranian regime for 30 years. They have been prepared to pay an enormous price, and they remain prepared to pay an enormous price, to persist with the program. I do not see anything changing in the next 60 days that will give us a different result.
Blaise Misztal:
Maybe I can play devil’s advocate on that, Steve.
Steve Rademaker:
Please. Prove that I am wrong. I would love to be proven wrong.
Blaise Misztal:
I think I am only going to prove your case. But one of the things the Iranians keep saying is: “How can we trust you, the Americans, to make a deal with us? Especially President Trump, after you withdrew from the JCPOA, the last deal we had. Then you bombed us twice in the last 12 months. How can we trust you? A deal that you sign is not worth the paper it is written on,” the Iranians say of the Americans.
Maybe what is needed, in diplomatic speak, is a confidence-building measure. We need something that will bring both sides to the point where they are willing to believe that the other side is actually going to follow through on what it says it will do. Maybe, rather than more pressure, we need to relieve some of the pressure to enable diplomacy to flourish.
Steve Rademaker:
They can say that. I just have trouble believing that over the next 60 days, if all of that is true — if the only thing standing in the way here is a lack of confidence that America will abide by its commitments — I do not know what will change in the next 60 days that will give them that confidence that they lack today.
Personally, I think arguments about lack of confidence are really just a pretext for the fact that they do not want to give up uranium enrichment. They do not want to export their highly enriched nuclear material. They want to be a threshold nuclear weapons state, and that is essentially what they are today, and they want to remain one.
Blaise Misztal:
Next question. General Amidror, if you had to put a percent chance on whether we are going to see this MOU materialize and actually happen, what would you say?
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I am not a prophet. I do not know.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, any guesses?
Steve Rademaker:
I think — and I am not the first person to observe this — that one consequence of this war is that most of the people in Iran who might have been able to commit Iran and its political system to an agreement have been killed. What is left are, in many cases, hardliners.
But among those who are left, there are power struggles and confused lines of authority. I think it is hard to find Iranians who can actually sign a piece of paper and not worry about being removed from power immediately as a consequence of doing that.
So I think it is very hard for the Iranians — not because it is not in Iran’s interest, but because their political situation today makes it hard for anyone to exercise the kind of authority needed to sign a deal with the Great Satan.
I have been skeptical all along that any deal could be found here, just because of hesitation on the Iranian side or inability on the Iranian side to actually forge a consensus in favor of the deal. It is a characteristic of Iranian negotiating — you can read this in Wendy Sherman’s book about negotiating the JCPOA — that they are constantly coming back. The U.S. side thinks it has a deal, and then the Iranians constantly come back and say, “Oh, just one more thing. We just need one more thing.”
Wendy Sherman actually describes how she was crying at one point when the Iranians came back yet again with one more thing. She just could not bear the stress and the disappointment. I think we are seeing that now. Why has a deal not been reached? The Iranians keep coming back for more.
But I think they need to come back for more because they cannot actually take yes for an answer. Then they might actually have to sign the deal. And I think any Iranian who signs a deal worries about what happens when he goes home afterward.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
By the way, I do not think these people are more radical than Khamenei. They have experience, and maybe they do not have the authority that he had. But from all the information that I learned about him, he was one of the most radical people within the Iranian system.
So I do not think the present leadership is more radical. Maybe they have less authority. That might be true. But radicalism was part of Khamenei’s attitude toward Iran, Israel, and the United States of America.
Steve Rademaker:
I do not necessarily disagree with that point. I am talking about the old Khamenei — the elder — not the younger, who may or may not be in charge of anything. I do not think we know what his status is.
But the elder Khamenei could have delivered a deal. If he had blessed it, there would be authority to deliver a deal. In fact, it is not clear there is anyone in Iran who can do that today. His son ostensibly is now the Supreme Leader. But is he actually making decisions? Is he actually exercising power? There is very little evidence of that. I do not know.
Blaise Misztal:
All right. Whether there is a deal or there is no deal, we will be glad to have you both back on, Steve and General Amidror, to discuss whatever happens next. Thank you so much for your time.
Thank you to the audience for tuning in today. Please be sure to check out our website, jinsa.org, for all our latest analysis. Thank you, and have a great day. General Amidror, good night.
Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Good night.
Steve Rademaker:
Thank you.