Transcript: Webinar – Countering the Houthi Threat

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PANELISTS

VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.)
2018 JINSA Generals and Admirals Program Participant; Former Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command
LtGen Sam Mundy, USMC (ret.)
2022 JINSA Generals and Admirals Program Participant; Former Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command
IDF MG Amikam Norkin (ret.)
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Former Commander of the Israeli Air Force
Ari Cicurel
JINSA Associate Director of Foreign Policy

TRANSCRIPT

Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.

Ari Cicurel, JINSA Associate Director of Foreign Policy:

Thank you for joining us today. I’m Ari Cicurel, JINSA’s Associate Director of Foreign Policy. Today we’ll be talking about the continuing threat that the Iran-backed Houthis pose, and I’m pleased to be joined by a panel of former U.S. and Israeli military leaders.

Retired Vice Admiral Mark Fox is the former Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command and a 2018 Generals and Admirals program participant. Retired Lieutenant General Sam Mundy is the former commander of Marine Forces Central Command and was a 2022 JINSA Generals and Admirals program participant. Retired IDF Major General Amikam Norkin is a JINSA distinguished fellow and former Commander of the Israeli Air Force.

I welcome our viewers to ask any questions they have of the panel by using the Q&A function on Zoom. Admiral Fox, I’ll start with you. To set the table for the rest of the conversation, after nearly two years of war in the Middle East, why does the threat that the Houthis pose to Israel and Middle Eastern waterways still matter to the United States?

VADM (ret.) Mark Fox:

Well, thanks for having me on today. The Houthis are an international pest, and they’ve stayed that way for many, many years. International shipping through the Red Sea is way down based on the fact that the Houthis have been attacking civilian ships. They’ve been completely irresponsible and really just completely outside of any norms of behavior in terms of what they’ve been doing. And they don’t seem to respond necessarily to force all that well. You forget that the Houthis are up in the northern part of Yemen, and that’s exceedingly high terrain, big mountains.

I mean, Sanaa, I think, is an 8000- or 9000-feet elevation. And so, they’ve got some really, some really tough terrain to find them in. They have been launching against the Saudis. They’ve been obviously launching against Israel in the recent past. They’re an international threat, just based on their reckless behavior.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, how have the Houthis been attacking Israel and ships in the Red Sea recently? Especially since the 12 Day War in June, there have been reports of them using cluster munitions. Are these attacks more of the same that we have seen over the last two years? Or are they doing something different recently?

IDF MG (ret.) Amikam Norkin:

Well, thank you for having me, especially with two foreign generals.

As General Fox mentioned, they act against the Israeli ships, and because of that, the port of the city of Eilat is almost closed. So, there are no, let’s say, commercial activities in our southern port. And as you all know, the traffic in the Suez Canal is also a minimum traffic since the Houthis started to act more than two years ago. So, the effect is an international effect. It’s a global issue, and we need to understand it’s not just an Israeli or American issue.

And then, when we are talking about Israel, they are using the same, let’s say, weapons. The ballistic missiles and the drones and the cruise missiles. Those three different kinds of weapons, they already used [them] hundreds of times, and they keep using them. And in the last week, we defended Israel from two ballistic missiles and more than 10 UAVs that tried to penetrate the Israel airspace. Unfortunately, a week ago, one of them hit 20 meters from the Eilat airport. So those munitions, they [have been] using them since day one. It’s not, let’s say, the main threat in our seven-front war. But the Houthis are much more than a terror organization. They are, let’s say, more like a terror military.

And they forced us to defend our people, and every few days, hundreds of thousands of citizens need to get into a shelter because of the Houthis ballistic missile. So, this is something that we cannot accept in one end. The other end, because of the distance of 2000 kilometers from the Israeli border, it’s a challenge for us to hunt and to cut all each of the launchers, which is the main threat for Israel, the ballistic missiles. For that, we need to be there and to have much better intelligence. So, the way we are acting [is] by attacking targets that have some effect over the Houthis. The port, energy, headquarters, commanders, and, of course, the Houthis government. And by [doing] that, we try to reduce Houthis within Houthis capabilities. But I’m not sure that we can do it. And to avoid, let’s say, [pushing] it to zero launchers. They will always have another one, and they will try to launch another missile and another missile. So will be a challenge for Israel till the end of the war.

Cicurel:

Thank you. I want to get back to how Israel has maybe changed its operations over time. But I want to first bring in General Mundy on a point you were just making, General Norkin, on deterrence. General Mundy, what does the Houthi threat continuing after us and Israeli strikes [mean]? Obviously, Israel is still conducting occasional strikes, and the U.S. launched a massive campaign over seven weeks from March to May. So, what does the Houthis continuing to fire reveal about abilities? How we should structure our efforts to degrade or deter a group like the Houthis?

LtGen Sam Mundy, USMC (ret.)

Thanks, Ari. It’s a pleasure to be here and join my other colleagues here. I’ll answer that, but before I do that, if I can just add on to what Admiral Fox said. I think there’s really four threats that he’s posed. The one that he mentioned, the obvious economic disruption to shipping in the Red Sea, the additional economic costs that folks have to bear. A second one is that there is some evidence that looks like that their influence may be metastasizing, if you will. Maybe that’s not the right word, but cooperation across the Red Sea with Al-Shabaab and other nefarious folks that you know, or al Qaeda offshoots, may be a marriage of convenience, a pragmatic relationship, but nonetheless, something that poses an even longer-term threat as we look at freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

Which, by the way, my first point, freedom of navigation, free flow of commerce and goods, has been in every national security strategy for at least the last couple of decades. I don’t know if it’s going to show up in the next one, but at least that used to be a high goal for the United States. A third one of these, these latter two, or maybe less, or something. I could be challenged on this. But, you know, China struck a kind of informal agreement, if you will, a pact with the Houthis, and they’ve been able to sail their ships at will without any threat through the Red Sea. And that, I think, if you’re looking kind of from a grand strategic perspective, they’re getting an economic benefit out of it, whereas we’re paying an economic cost. And then this is an interesting one.

And I’m not throwing this out for the environmentalists out there, necessarily, but the cost to the environment is fairly dramatic. Last year, I was doing some research on this, and the amount of carbon emissions that is expended by these large container ships going around the Cape of Good Hope is significant, considerable. And, you know, it’s interesting that the environmentalists haven’t risen up and said, you know, pounded their fist on the table and said, you know, we got to stop this. But anyway, those are just four things that I thought, you know, as I put some notes together for this.

Now, in terms of your question about, I think it was deterrence, right? It obviously shows that they have not been deterred by the Israeli strikes. Although I think the pain that the strikes are causing are having an impact, and we know from the US experience in the spring, from April through May, that if you hit them hard enough, they will eventually seek an agreement or seek some sort of compromise. So how you do that is the real problem here that we’re all struggling with, with this country, where they’re difficult to target, difficult to locate, as Admiral Fox talked about. Of course, in Israel’s case, it’s a long way to fly, it’s a long way to wage a campaign. And so I have some ideas on this, but I think that the additional focus on network, kind of tearing that work apart, or going after the network, the leadership that Amikam mentioned, and then broadening that to include additional operations personnel, additional government personnel, will have an impact.

The one thing that I would caution about this is based on my experience 10 years, more than a decade ago: the Houthis are very good at using any sort of collateral damage and turning that to their purposes. They’re good at turning any sort of civilian casualties. It’s unfortunate when that, when that happens, of course, but they are experts at using that to turn the narrative against whoever is conducting these strikes against them. And so I think that puts a premium on precision, obviously, very precise targets, that we make sure that we’re not causing Yemenis, who may not be happy with the Houthi leadership of the Houthi government right now, which I think is, at least to one source I talked to, perhaps growing. That there’s growing dissatisfaction with the Houthi leadership. In fact, I think when, when Israel started striking, conducting airstrikes in Yemen last year, in fact, I’ve been told that that was somewhat well received by some of the Yemenis there under control. So again, I just think it, as you look at putting all that together, you have got to be careful that we don’t, you know, cause people to tilt back toward the Houthi camp.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, I’ll bring you back in, first if there’s anything that’s been previously said that you’d like to respond to but also, how are the Israeli strikes now different than what it had done previously? In particular, going after Houthi leadership and recent strikes. And what are the Israeli objectives against the Houthis? What does Israel want to see happen from its strikes?

Norkin:

I would like to add that the Saudis fought the Houthis for more than two years, and out of those two years, the Emirates support them all. So, it’s not the first time that the state tried to reduce the Houthi threat. So now the Israeli strikes are aiming more to, let’s say, the chain of command of the Houthis. And from one month to another, we got better intelligence, because we are focusing on who can be [focused on the Houthis]. And now once we, let’s say, did our 12-day campaign in Iran. So, I’m sure that we are going to have, every day, a better intelligence [and] by that [we] can act against a better target. And as General Mundy mentioned, we should avoid collateral damage, to be more precise. So those activities are included.

In the very near future, we might think [about] how we can, let’s say, have better real-time intelligence over there. And this is a real challenge, and we might need some cooperation with our friends. And the strategic goal is to reduce the threat to a minimal threat and to open again the Red Sea for the Israeli civilian ships. And to open the Eilat port. Those are the strategic goals. I think that like with any other terror organization, we are reducing the threat, but you cannot avoid it or reduce it to zero threat. So it will always be there, but all our assets and all our traditional diplomatic capabilities will need to reduce it to the minimal threat, not just for Israel, also for the neighborhood.

Cicurel:

During the 12-Day War against Iran, Israel was conducting long range operations, long range airstrikes, refueling. Were there lessons learned for those kinds of long-range operations that it has applied into its campaign against the Houthis now?

Norkin:

Absolutely. You know, when I was a Squadron Commander, F-15 squadron commander, I flew to Yemen. It was the year of 2000 because we tried to have better intelligence against the Palestinian weapon ship at that time called Karine A. They tried to smuggle a lot of weapons from Iran through Yemen to Israel. So, it was a very special mission at that time, very long-distance mission. But today, for the Air Force to fly to Yemen, it’s almost becoming a daily routine mission, because most of us squadrons already been in Tehran. So, all the lessons that we learned, we are using them to be better, to do it in a better way. But it’s always not a simple mission.

And now [as] we are talking in this webinar, I can hear from my home window the noise from Gaza, because I’m living 30 kilometers from Gaza and the IDF is acting now in Gaza. At the same time, we attacked an hour ago in Lebanon. So, although we are almost two years after October 7th, we still manage more than one front. And it’s become even more complicated because there is also a diplomatic pressure over Israel and the legitimacy of our activities. There is a challenge with the legitimacy for Israel. So, we should consider all those parameters once we need to act against the Houthis.

Cicurel:

Admiral Fox, if the Houthi problem, at least for the foreseeable future, is one to be managed, but not necessarily entirely eliminated. How does that affect how the US should consider force posture in CENTCOM’s area of operations going forward?

Fox:

Well, we should always protect our own ships. There’s no question about that. You know, one of the things that I think that the Houthis have, I think, surprised all of us, I think, they’re producing these weapons themselves. Now, it’s not just a matter of them being smuggled or imported into Yemen from Iran. There’s no question that Iran has supported them, but it certainly appears to me that there’s an indigenous capability of building these weapons now in in Yemen.

So, you know, the Red Sea is, is narrow, and it’s long. So with them sitting right there on the Bab el Mandeb, that’s a choke point, and they can target ships. There was an Iranian vessel during a period of time where they were actually sending targeting information. There are essentially rules of the road, highways, if you will, down there where ships go one way and the other one’s coming the other way. And you know, the Iranians have been complicit in the anti-ship business, some as well.

So I think it requires, on our part, a posture in which we are able to protect our own vessels, protect anything that’s American flagged, certainly, and as General Mundy was talking about, freedom of navigation, has always been a high priority for the US writ large. And I hope it remains that way, because this is something that’s in the interest of everyone in the international community, the family of nations, that actually get along with each other and trade and to get back to the point where the Red Sea is safe for all mariners.

Cicurel:

General Mundy, I’ll bring you in to ask a question from the audience. And Admiral Fox may have partially answered some of this, but we have a question from [the audience]: where do they get their advanced weapons? Why have shipments not been stopped? Do you see, General Mundy, a role for expanding interdiction of Iranian support, and what are some of the limitations that have prevented that from happening?

Mundy:

Yeah, well, as Mark Fox just said, I mean, for years, we know that the Iranians have supplied advanced weapons and the components to Yemen and still were doing that fairly recently. I can’t remember when the last shipment was that we interdicted, but it hasn’t been too long ago. I also noted that the United States just recently put sanctions on China for some weapons or components that could be used in weapons, that’s probably a better way to say it. And I haven’t studied that issue enough in detail to know, but that is another effort to try and get after what the questioner just asked about, interdicting it.

I’m not sure how good the sanctions will be over time. I think we can all question whether they have the impact that we’re looking for. But, you know, the Houthis have sort of perfected this over the years. One of the reasons it’s been tough to stop is that, you know, the ocean is a big place. And having sailed around there and helped Mark Fox’s successor, [VADM (ret.) Kevin] Donegan, with maritime intercept operations in 2018, I can – 2016, rather – I can just tell you it’s tough to find. If a small dhow or a small boat wants to get through, it’s going to get through. And so, for a long time, they were able to do that.

I mentioned al-Shabaab in eastern Africa there. I think the other reason why the Houthis are doing that is because they want to diversify their ability to get shipments in, get components in, and get weapons in. And so, they broadened the competitive space. It’s an operational approach that, I mean, I think we would admire, frankly. And I’m not saying that it’s as prolific as what the Iranians were supplying or providing them, but it’s certainly something has to be taken into account. So, we’ve got to look at that from a holistic perspective. But I do think we have been, at times, very focused on interdicting, and then at times, we’ve sort of taken our foot off the off the brakes, and that is something that we could probably do a better job of.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, another part of the question was on whether Israel’s attacks against Iran have limited Iran’s ability to supply the Houthis during the 12-Day War. How did Israeli efforts affect Iran’s ability to either provide weapons to its proxies or assist them in other ways?

Norkin:

Well to [target] support from Iran, it’s [been] a mission for a few years, it’s not a new mission for us, and, of course, for the American military. And we shared intelligence for, let’s say, the last 10 years about the Houthis. But unfortunately, I think that they already have some capabilities to produce their own weapons in Yemen. So, in the past, they used the Iranian industry. But today they got all the engineering knowledge [of] how to produce those drones or ballistic missiles inside Yemen. So we should avoid any weapon smuggling, but you should understand that they are producing those missiles and drones by themselves.

Cicurel:

Admiral Fox, the Houthi threat touches on multiple issues from air defense, maritime security, counterterrorism missions, just to name a few. There’s been exceptional integrated air and missile defense cooperation between the U.S., Israel and, to a limited extent, Arab states as well, against Iranian attacks. Do you see potential for a broader regional coalition on other issues that could be related to the Houthi threat?

Fox:

Well, you know, it’s been an interesting thing to watch. When I was Fifth Fleet Commander, I actually went to Sanaa one time when there was actually a government, when President Saleh was still around. But you know, Yemen is fractured as a nation. I mean, they had this civil war. They’ll come together, and then they’ll split, and they’ll come together, and they’ll split. But the Houthis, as I alluded to before, are up north, and they have Sanaa. We actually evacuated all Americans out of Sanaa back in 2014, or 15, as the Houthis took over that portion.

And so the other thing that was going on at the same time, you know, the Saudis traditionally have been exceedingly conservative and slow moving and almost inert. And then suddenly [Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman] comes along and says, hey, we’re going to have a campaign. And there was also the Emiratis who joined in this. I mean, so there was actually a coordinated Arab peninsula response to some of the Houthi activities that were going on. And then, you know, there was the bad press of the Saudis dropping bombs in the wrong places or whatnot.

The answer is, I don’t see much likelihood of having a coalition that will handle this, although everyone in the region has a beef against the Houthis. I mean, they’ve been irresponsible on the entire peninsula, but it’s only people who are willing to take action. You know, the Saudis have now, you know, what was it back in, I think it was in ‘23 or so when, you know, China sort of did this quasi-deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia and so it’s a region where I don’t see much cohesion right now, or the willingness to act in a collective sense.

CENTCOM is sort of the framework, though, that can create that. Because now you’ve got with Israel in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, there is an opportunity. And you saw that as you alluded to the incredible coming together and cooperation of defending Israel over the last, you know, 18 months or so, it’s been a remarkable thing with that’s been a kind of a real positive that’s come out of this, other than the fact that we’ve had to do it because there are ballistic missiles that are coming from Iran and Yemen towards Israel. So I don’t see much reason for hope of a coalition right now.

I hope that by the time the Hamas problem in Gaza is settled that will also, I think, remove one of the regional irritants that would kind of create, perhaps the impetus for people to work more closely together. But I don’t see that right now.

Cicurel:

General Mundy, you’ve previously written, including for JINSA, about developing a possible rapid reaction force with Gulf states or Israel in the Middle East. So I think, on a similar note to the question I asked Admiral Fox, what do you see as the potential for cooperation along those lines?

Mundy:

I share the same skepticism about whether or not they will come together. Right now, Saudi Arabia is focused on implementing the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030, I think you know, and that is a comprehensive transformation effort of all facets of the Saudi government and their military, for example. And so they have prioritized that over getting involved in another coalition effort, for example, or getting sucked into the tar pit there and Yemen, which they, you know, have already done.

And then I think they’re related to that. There’s kind of a once bitten, twice shy aspect of this, certainly for the Saudis, having been condemned by just about everybody for their actions there. And, you know, in some cases it was, you know, the strikes were errant strikes, and we coached them up on, you know, trying to accept responsibility for that, and they did, although it took a while. But I think there’s an aspect here. You know, why do we want to get back into this again, when we should be focused on the priorities that the Kingdom set forth in its in 2030 Vision.

In terms of a rapid reaction force, I mean, I still hold out some hope that that might appeal to the Gulf countries in particular. I still think there’s merit to it, but, but that Yemen would probably not be a likely place for them to use it, if you will. I think, you know, there’s a lot that has to be done to put that into play. And right now, the peninsula shield tends to be the answer or the solution to any problem that that they think they have where they need to come together with a quick reaction force. But in the long term, perhaps the rapid response force will live again. So thanks for reminding me and asking the question.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, Iran’s proxy network has suffered serious setbacks over the last two years, especially the last year, or in the case of Assad, gone entirely. Do you expect the Houthis, as a terrorist organization still firing, to play a more central role in Iran’s proxy strategy going forward? Or where do you see Iran looking to prioritize its proxies?

Norkin:

Well, before I’m going to answer your question, I would like to speak about the coalition that Admiral Fox mentioned. In that case, when we are speaking here about the coalition, it’s not black and white, it’s not 01 there are, let’s say, gray zones. And as you all know, we built a regional defense coalition against the drones and the cruise missiles, and we support each other in several ways under the umbrella of CENTCOM. So I think that we should try to build some cooperation. And I’m not dreaming about Saudis’ F-15 flying together with the Israeli F-15s above Yemen. But maybe there are some gray zones that we can share interests, because the interests are the same interest for all the nations here, considering the Houthis threat. So, I’m sure that the military is acting in those areas, and I think that we should understand that there is a gray zone. So, this is about the regional coalition.

About the Iranian proxies, I’m not sure that the Houthis are going to be the new Hezbollah, because Iran’s got many other challenges today in many areas, like energy, water, economic issues and the sanctions out there. And we should act as an international community against Iran and to avoid any activities that might strengthen Iran. But the Houthis are not going to be like Hezbollah. They might be a pain in the ass, and we should act against them. And as Admiral Fox mentioned, once, we are going to achieve our goals in Gaza, and there will be a ceasefire, I think that the Houthis are going to stop launching those missiles and bombs to Israel.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, we have a question in from [the audience]: are the Houthis turning to using drones more to conserve their strategic missile stockpile? And will they be significantly growing their missile stockpile as Hezbollah did over the years?

Norkin:

So as I mentioned, I’m not sure that they’re going to develop 100,000 missiles like Hezbollah did. And I’m sure that they will try to have more and more, but they have] some challenges to do it, and we are going to push them and to avoid any, let’s say, industrial capacity. But the drones, it’s much easier to produce those drones, and I think that they are willing to keep their storage, ballistic missile storage, and because of that, we are going to see more and more drones in the next few days or weeks being launched from Yemen.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, another question, this one from Timothy Keating: are you optimistic that we can implement weapons that are much cheaper than our current arsenal? Using a multimillion-dollar missile against an inexpensive drone or missile is not a viable long-term solution, so how can we help turn the cost curve better in our favor?

Norkin:

Well, as you also can see in the media today, most of the drones are intercepted by Apache, by Apache helicopter, and not by a missile, [but] by a gun. So, we use those Apaches with 30-millimeter gun to intercept the drones, and it’s a quite cheap answer for the cruise missile and drones. Of course, from time to time we are using our combat fleet.

The ballistic missile – there is no other option. We need to use the Arrow or THAAD, because the laser is not the right technology to intercept missiles in space. The laser is a very good option for, let’s say, medium and short-range rockets or missiles, but not for long-range ballistic missiles. So we need to attack those launchers in Yemen or intercept those missiles with the defense systems. It’s much cheaper to attack the launchers, so the challenge there is to have the real time intelligence [to find] the launchers.

Cicurel:

And as a follow up, General Norkin, how has Israeli intelligence – I think you mentioned, it’s improved month to month – but what has that enabled on an operational level in terms of Israel’s ability to target better?

Norkin:

Well, I’m not sure that the Zoom platform is the platform to speak

Cicurel:

Yeah, obviously, without revealing capabilities.

Norkin:

I’m sure that the intelligence capabilities in Israel are focused on Yemen, and we are acting with our friends. Of course, the American intelligence shares with us some capabilities, and by that, we have a better intelligence [picture] over there.

Cicurel:

General Mundy, we’ve talked a lot about operations from the air. The Saudis and the Emiratis had their campaign that was supporting also ground forces. So, over the long term, do you see a need for some kind of ground campaign in Yemen? If not, I don’t know that there’s any political will in the United States for U.S. forces there. But how should we be thinking about long term, potentially uprooting the Houthis from Yemen?

Mundy:

It’s a great question, and the answer, the short answer is yes, in two, really two facets. I think perhaps not enough has been done, or not enough effort has been focused on eroding the support for the Houthis from within. So that kind of was part of my first point there that, you know, an unconventional approach, or an asymmetric approach, might seek to peel away some of the tribes that are not, you know, completely in line with the Houthis, and so that that might cause them to, it might weaken them. For sure, they’re pretty, pretty brutal and repressive, as you know. So I think the other component it is, is some sort of ground action, some sort of pressure, whether that’s from tribes on the perimeter or from the forces Yemen, for Yemeni, forces that are part of the PLC, for example.

And if you go back in time, it was 2016, I think, when Emirati, Bahraini forces, and Saudi forces were maneuvering from Mahrib toward Sanaa, they got held up there, just because the terrain is, as Admiral Fox talked at the beginning, so difficult. But the Houthis had, they were fighting in about, you know, 10 different directions at once. And it really got their attention. And similarly, before the failed Stockholm agreement, which we all know about, the Emiratis with their forces, Yemen forces were moving up the coast from Moca toward Hodeida, and nearly succeeded in taking Hodeida. So this pressure from ground forces, acted to create what we military guys like to talk about in terms of a combined arms effect. So we had airstrikes from above, but there was also pressure from ground forces.

So I think, you know, the PLC, this may be where Amikam’s point about, you know, shades of gray here. You know, cooperating, cooperation with the PLC to cause them to pressure the Houthis, you know, externally, while there’s some effort internally to peel away the tribes, or, you know, factions that are not, not necessarily supportive of the Houthis, I think that is absolutely going to be part of the success going forward.

Cicurel:

Admiral Fox, the United States leads a number of Multinational Task Force task forces in the region, including the Combined Maritime Forces, and has set up, I think, at least two task forces for the Houthi threat in terms of offense and defense. Are these task forces effective? How can we, if there’s limitations on them, how can we expand our multinational cooperation to better deal with these threats?

Fox:

Well, the keystone of the multinational maritime force has always been a consortium of those that are willing to work together. And sailors do that pretty well. I mean, the sea is a pretty unforgiving place, but you’ve got to have some political maneuver room to say, I want my ships to do this, or I want them to operate here. And, you know, the multinational maritime force, its posture is, you will never ask a nation to do something that you don’t have the okay for. So, for example, some people, when we were dealing with the Somali pirate problem, you know, some nations didn’t want their ships to go into territorial waters in pursuit, let’s say, of a ship that been hijacked or something like that. But the point is, there is room for people to work together. And this is much more of a closer to a shade, a light shade of gray, where it’s not that hard, really for navies to work together, but there’s got to be some political will to do that from the nations.

I don’t remember how long the coastline of Yemen is, but it’s long. And as Sam pointed out earlier, smuggling [interdiction], it’s a very ISR – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance – intensive business. And when you’ve got ISR focused in one place, it’s not at another. So it’s really key. I do believe that the key to this is having good intel that is actionable so you can either get the launchers before they launch, shoot the Indian before he shoots the arrow kind of thing.

But you also got to have, I mean, this requires tremendous amount of planning and execution that heretofore we, the US, did this seven-week thing back in March and April and into May. And now, Israel is certainly in this, you know, based on the fact that they’re having to deal with the attacks from Yemen, and so they’re, they’re very focused on it. And I’m not sure, truthfully, I don’t know whether or not there, there’s the political will to, you know, is the juice worth the squeeze to do this kind of thing? It’s, you know, you hear some talk in our political circles of well, you know, we don’t have that many ships that go through there anyway. So why should we have to do that? I want us to continue to lead the US to be the kind of the framework-builder for people to be able to cooperate, because that’s the key to success there. But very good question and a very meandering answer that is not satisfactory.

Cicurel:

Thank you. I think you hit on the key issue, and as we wrap up our time, I just want to turn to our panelists for any final remarks that they have. General Mundy, I’ll start with you.

Mundy:

When I served as the senior military advisor to the Saudi led coalition, there were a lot of folks that dismissed the threat from the Houthis. They were just a poor, misunderstood mountain tribe. I heard one prominent humanitarian say, and others, you know, were somewhat divided on how much influence, and you’ve heard this before, how much influence Iran had. There’s Zaydi Shia as opposed to or the Iranian Twelver Shia, and that sort of thing. So, you know, we here, we are, more than a decade later. And look at what has happened here, with the Houthi threat. And so I think this is a prime example – if you don’t deal with problems, you know, in their infancy, they’re just going to continue to get worse over time. And this is clearly one that has and so this is not going to be a problem that goes away, either.

I remain skeptical that even once Israel completes its operation in Gaza, and there are no military actions taking place there against Hamas, I am skeptical that the Houthis—having, sort of like a shark, tasted blood in the water—will not try and continue to use the means and the leverage that it’s now gained in the Red Sea to extort others in the future. So I’ll just leave it at that.

Cicurel:

Thank you. Admiral Fox, any final words?

Fox:

I agree with the comments that were just made there by General Mundy. This is not an unsolvable problem, but it’s a really, really difficult problem. And at the end of the day, you know, Yemen is not a country. And so easy for a military guy to say, well, actually, they need to get their act together and become a nation and, you know, sort out their problems. Yemen has about a 2000-year history of not getting it right, and I don’t see any encouraging signs whatsoever.

The Houthis are brutal and they are, I think, as Sam just put it,they’ve tasted some power here, and they’re influential, and the world is kind of having to deal with them. And I think that that’s a heady thing for, you know, a bunch of tribesmen that have now learned how to build ballistic missiles and fire them around the region. So it’s a hard problem. We’ve got to protect ourselves. We’ve got to protect our friends, and we ought to be postured to do that. I hope that we have the political will to do so.

Cicurel:

General Norkin, I’ll leave the final word with you.

Norkin:

Yeah, once we are not dealing with problem when there are small problems, we are going to [encounter] them as huge problems. [That’s the] first [point]. Second, too many countries in the Middle East, they are not a [real] country. Too many. So we need to be able to defend our nations against a very wide spectrum of threats. On one hand, it’s nations with military and ballistic missiles and air force and navy and et cetera, and the other end, those terror groups.

I’m not sure that we are going to solve the Yemen issue and Houthis, I believe will be there for a long time. But as the Western world, we should reduce the threat to a minimum threat that can allow us to have our freedom of action in our ports, our ships, our aerial, civilian aerial traffic, and there will be no weekly threat toward Israel. This is at least the level of threat that we can accept, and we should build a plan for that. Today. It’s not the first priority for Israel, but it’s, let’s say, from one week to another, it’s climbing to the top three because we solved most of our problems in other forms.

So, I think that we are going to see and to deal with Houthis also in the next few months, unfortunately, and this is the right time also to thank the American military, especially CENTCOM, for their support.

Cicurel:

Well, I want to thank you. I want to thank you, our panelists, our audience, for joining us. You can find all of JINSA’s work on our website, jinsa.org. Please check your email inboxes for our next webinar and future publications. I hope everyone enjoys the rest of their day.