Transcript: Webinar – Erdogan’s Break with Israel

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PANELISTS

Ambassador Eric Edelman

JINSA Distinguished Scholar; Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Alan Makovsky

Member, JINSA Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Blaise Misztal

JINSA Vice President for Policy

TRANSCRIPT

Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to today’s webinar from JINSA discussing the latest in relations, or lack thereof, between Turkey and Israel.

I’m Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy, and I’m delighted to be joined by two members of our Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project, but more importantly, long time scholars, followers and experts of Turkey, Ambassador Eric Edelman, a JINSA distinguished scholar, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, as well as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. And Alan Makovsky, a member of our Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project and a long time Turkey expert throughout government and a fellow with the Center for American Progress. Good afternoon to you both. Thanks for being with us.

Ambassador Edelman, maybe I could start with you to give us a rundown of what has most recently transpired between Turkey and Israel. As I understand it, there was this parliamentary session last week at which [Turkish] Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan delivered a bit of a fiery speech. What did he have to say? And why did he say it?

Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, Minister Fidan announced that in response to the government of Israel’s decision to go into Gaza City and its continuing operations in Gaza, that Turkey would close its ports and airspace to Israeli vessels and aircraft. He later, I think, modified that by saying it was only official government aircraft that would be affected by the air airspace closure. And in retaliation for that, actually, the Israeli government canceled the purchase of two tugboats from Turkey. So, you know, it’s a clear downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations, which have been pretty fraught for a long period of time. But this does seem to be a kind of new level of Turkish antagonism towards the Government of Israel.

Misztal:
Alan, could you maybe walk us through some of the previous rocky steps in this relationship? I mean, I can think back not too recently, when actually Turkey and Israel reestablished diplomatic ties, and it seemed that they were on an upswing.

Alan Makovsky:
That’s right.

Misztal:
What has happened since?

Makovsky:
Right, it did seem that way in 2022. They reestablished relations after a decade plus of up and down ties. They reestablished ambassadorial-level relations. The whole time, until very recently, trade relations continued to thrive and to grow, such that in 2023, I think total trade was about 7 billion, with nearly 5 billion of that, Turkish exports, [going] to Israel.

October 7 changed everything, really, and the Israeli response [to Hamas’ attack]. Turkey, the following year, announced that it was cutting all trade ties with Israel. It has formally done that, though many people believe that much of the trade continues through third countries. And polls show that Turks themselves overwhelmingly believe that trade ties continue through third countries, but at least on the books, direct trade ties have been cut.

Erdogan, I think, impressed himself most negatively on the Turkish public by his laudatory comments about Hamas. He has continually insisted that Hamas is not a terrorist organization, that they are freedom fighters, resistance fighters. He even compared them to the Ataturk forces that fought for Turkey’s independence, [and] said they were just the same. And that, of course, has created a lot of negative feeling in Israel, and I think that, you know, I think the trade ties are the main thing. Surprisingly, Eric mentioned the recent measures, surprisingly, perhaps not surprisingly, [that] diplomatic relations do continue, although ambassadors are not resident.

And of course, Blaise, you mentioned this session where Fidan gave the speech. A parliamentary session on August 29 – a unanimous resolution was passed by the Turkish parliament that day, which, among other things, called for Israel’s seat at the UN to be suspended until its, “genocidal activities in Gaza ended.” So, things are quite difficult. And of course, we haven’t talked about Syria, where … both Turkish troops and Israeli troops are present, and where Israel is very concerned about Turkish influence over the new government in Syria. I’m happy to go into that. I’m sure you’ll want to go into that more as we continue our discussion.

Edelman:
Blaise, if I could just add a little bit to what Alan just said. You know, I think it’s important to note that he mentioned Erdogan’s comments about Hamas. This is not new. I mean, this goes back 20 years, and I recall very well when I was ambassador to Turkey Erdogan’s public statements condemning Israel for the targeted killing of Sheik Yasin in 2004. So, there’s been a long history here of Erdogan, personally, and his government both trying to normalize Hamas, having Hamas representation, formal representation, in Turkey.

And I would add, you know, aiding and abetting the rise of, not the rise, but the strengthening of antisemitism in Turkey. I mean, when I first arrived in Turkey, shortly after I arrived, you began to see things you hadn’t seen for years, which included the publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, copies of Mein Kampf, [and the] publication of [other] very vitriolic anti-Israeli, antisemitic novels and films. And so, this is the culmination, I think, kind of [a] 20-year-arc on the part of the AKP [Justice and Development Party] leadership. Not to mention some of the really blood curdling speeches that we’ve talked about on previous webinars by Erdogan’s son, Bilal, calling for “Death to Israel,” et cetera. So, this is a long-standing development.

Misztal:
If we could just dwell on this for a moment before going to some of the wider points you raised, Alan, on Hamas. What is that relationship between Turkey and Hamas like today? Because I remember in 2022, when diplomatic ties were restored, Alan, you wrote a piece for JINSA that said that Turkey’s relationship with Hamas was going to be an irritant in the relationship, unless Turkey took steps to cut its ties and expel Hamas from inside of its borders. Did that happen? Are they still there? Are they back? Beyond the rhetoric, as problematic as that is, do we know what the relationship of Turkey and actually Hamas is like today?

Makovsky:
There have been reports over the years that Turkey has asked Hamas to leave, but Hamas leaders continue to pop up in Turkey and meet with senior officials, including Fidan. And so, I think the relationship remains strong. Generally, it is perceived as a relationship of logistics, let’s say, inside Turkey, and rhetorical support. But there are certainly examples of Hamas fundraisers doing their work inside Turkey. Some of them have been sanctioned by the U.S., and there have even been reports of shipments of weapons that have originated in Turkey sent to Hamas.

So, I think it remains a very troubled relationship, and actually, you mentioned Blaise, in the invitation to today’s event, … the fact that there have been a number of Turkey related amendments proposed to the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). I find it very interesting [that] some of them are linking U.S relations with Turkey to Hamas, which I believe would be the first time. Now, these are proposed amendments. They’re not yet in the House version of the bill, much less in the final bill itself. We’ll have to see, but a couple, I thought, that really caught my eye is one that would link Turkey’s eligibility to purchase fifth-generation F-35 jet fighters, which are already restricted because of Turkey’s possession of Russian air defense equipment. It would further link the possibility of U.S. sales to Turkey cutting all ties with Hamas.

I thought another interesting amendment is one that also mentioned Hamas, but also says that Turkey should become part of the formula for Israel’s qualified military edge. Right now, I don’t know if everyone knows it, but for the past roughly 20 years, when the U.S. makes an arms sale to an Arab state, it has to justify it in writing to Congress in terms of Israel’s qualitative military edge. This amendment, were it to pass, would make Turkey part of that formula.

Misztal:
That idea sounds very familiar, Alan.

Makovsky:
Well, you can elaborate on that, Blaise.

Misztal:
I believe it was included in the report that the two of you put out for JINSA—looking at Turkey’s request to reenter the F-35 program after having been kicked out of it in 2020. And I think one of the recommendations that you made was exactly for this, for there to be a QME, a qualitative military edge component, or analysis for some of these advanced weapon sales to Turkey. And so, it’s great to see Congress, in this case, I believe it’s Representative Dina Titus from Nevada, taking this up in an amendment.

Edelman:
There are also, I mean, it’s not just amendments about F-35s. There’s a parallel amendment on the ongoing effort to transfer newer F-16s to Turkey that has the same parallel set of requirements, including making the President, if he wants to waive the limitation, stipulate that ties with Hamas have been broken, but also [that] the [Russian] S-400s are not present in Turkey any longer, and there’s a whole list of other requirements, including the QME requirement.

Misztal:
So, just to walk us back a little bit to our previous topics on Hamas, I was struck [when] I saw over the weekend reports that the Shin Bet had broken up a Hamas plot to assassinate [Itamar] Ben-Gvir, the Israeli [National Security] Minister. It was apparently a Hamas cell out of the West Bank that had drones and had some sort of a plot that it was cooking up. But the report said that it was either the planning or the control of the cell [that] had happened in Turkey, which suggests, to me, that there is still this Hamas element in Turkey and these amendments that are being introduced to the NDAA are going to be important.

Taking another step back, back to this further breakdown of Turkish and Israeli relations, I guess, does it matter? Is this going to actually change anything? Alan, you said that trade seems to be continuing under the table through third parties, despite the official ban. Is this supposed block on official Israeli flights and port visits actually going to cause any trouble for Israel, or is it sort of a symbolic bluster?

Makovsky:
Well, I guess that remains to be seen, so I’m not sure I can give an authoritative opinion. That—I don’t know about.

It would seem to me that if Turkey implements it, it would certainly create some problems even if it’s only official flights. I imagine a lot of Israeli official flights [going] west do go through Turkish airspace. And of course, Turkey has close relations with Azerbaijan, which is a close, actually a bordering neighbor, of Turkey.

So, you know, I think it could. Now look, I do want to make [it] clear—I don’t know if trade has been cut off or not, but many people believe, and I’ve even heard this from a senior diplomat, from someone in the region, who I think has reasonably good relations with both sides. This diplomat was convinced that the trade continues. And of course, the Turkish public, as I mentioned, is very skeptical that it’s really been cut.

But even if it goes through third countries, it’s quite inconvenient and I’m sure it adds expense. And so, you know, it’s not a wonderful solution. It’s not meaningless, even if the trade continues through third countries. And I’m sure Israel doesn’t welcome these latest developments if they are to be implemented, about overflight rights and port visits.

Edelman:
And I would just add, even if this is, you know, just a performative act to demonstrate Turkish solidarity with Gaza and with other Arab opponents of Israel, rejectionist opponents of Israel. The truth is, while it may be pretextual, the deteriorating relations over Syria are much more serious and much more likely to lead to a clash between the two.

Misztal:
Yeah, so I wanted to go there next, in fact, thank you, Ambassador. I guess I was going to ask the sort of the direct pretext and reason that Fidan gave for blocking the air travel and the port visits and what else, [which] was obviously to do with Gaza. Do we think that is the only, only thing that’s going on? Is the tension over Syria part of it? Or also, I know something that we always bring up on these webinars, is the direct relation between Turkish foreign and domestic politics, and the interplay between those. How are these other issues perhaps contributing to the relationship with Israel?

Edelman:
I’ll take a start, and Alan will, as always, you know, revise and extend my remarks.

So, there are a couple of things going on here. One is a domestic effort, an outreach to the Kurdish population that is directly connected to Erdogan’s desire to extend his rule, and it’s coincident with [the] continuing breakdown of democratic norms in Turkey, and Turkey’s continued move in the direction of one man, rule of personalists autocracy. So, you’ve seen this effort to have a rapprochement, or, you know, a detente with the Kurds and with the PKK [Kurdish Workers’ Party], [and] [Abdullah] Ocalan[’s] statement about disarming the PKK. But that is bumping up against some realities in Syria, where the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] is wrapped up in this whole effort inside Syria to create a state out of the wreckage of the collapse of the Assad regime.

So, it’s running into some heavy weather in Syria, and Erdogan is running into heavy weather at home. So, he’s been trying to disqualify his opponents, because he keeps running behind them in the polls. So, the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, has been arrested and is being tried on a variety of different charges. I think they just found him guilty of one charge. And the courts have also now ruled that the leadership of the main opposition party, the CHP [Republican People’s Party], has to be vacated because of alleged irregularities in the internal party processes that led to the to the succession of Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who was the pretty hapless leader of the CHP before and who was defeated by Erdogan in the last presidential election, was replaced by Mr. [Ozgur] Ozel. Ozel has now been forced out, and, at least, Alan may have more on this, but, as I understand it, that means the chairmanship of the party would revert back to Kilicdaroglu, which would suit Erdogan’s domestic political ambitions perfectly.

So, you’ve got all of this, I think, as kind of context for ongoing efforts to shape the future of Syria that Turkey’s engaged in, and then are bumping up against Israel’s concerns about the future of Syria as well.

Misztal:
Alan, anything to add on the domestic situation? And maybe particularly on, before we delve into Syria, sort of, what is the status of Turkey’s attempts, of maybe the one bright spot in its domestic politics, the attempts to come to some sort of a peace deal with the PKK?

Makovsky:
Well, this is a very significant initiative. It started last year. It started last October when, surprisingly, Erdogan’s coalition partner from the nationalist right party called the … Nationalist Action Party, Devlet Bahceli, said that Ocalan, who has been in jail on an island in Turkey since 1999 could address the Turkish parliament if he announced the end of the PKK—the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK.

We now know that this announcement was preceded by discussions between the PKK and the Turkish Government. And some months later, in February, Ocalan did indeed call for that. And it’s been endorsed by the PKK on the understanding that there would be a settlement between the Kurds and Turkey, involving reform on the Kurdish issue. There’s ongoing discussion, there was a symbolic burning of weapons in July by a few PKK members. To my knowledge, there’s no fighting going on right now. Parliament has set up a commission to explore the possibility.

But, what has really not happened in any meaningful way, is any preparation of public opinion, for the sorts of changes that the Kurds consider minimal, such as the right to do education in their own language and [to] some degree, a greater degree of local autonomy. And polls continuously show that most Turks oppose these types of reforms.

Turkey itself has not really promoted it as a major effort at reform. They called it an initiative for a terrorsuz [terror-free]—a Turkey without terrorism, and just put it in the context of ending terrorism, rather than political reform. Now, to be completely fair, one of Erdogan’s advisors made a very interesting statement the other day, saying that Turkey might have to consider changing the definition of a Turk from an ethnic one to a legal one, which is one of the Kurds demands, and that it may have to start allowing education in languages other than Turkish. But that is a pill that will not be easily swallowed by the Turkish public, including the Turkish public that votes for Erdogan and for his coalition partner who started this ball rolling.

Misztal:
Could the sort of virulent anti-Israeli rhetoric be seen as a means of appeasing that part of his constituency, if, in fact, Erdogan needs to move ahead with a political reform and peace process with the PKK that’s not going to be proved popular? Is this sort of a bait and switch on that?

Makovsky:
Look, I think there’s no doubt that the Israel issue, the government’s approach to it has widespread support in Turkey, not always necessarily the Hamas component, But the criticism of Israel is widely supported, and we saw that this resolution last week in Parliament was passed unanimously In polls, consistently, Turks say that Israel and the United States are the biggest threats to Turkey. So yes, using the Israel issue, does score points domestically.

However, my guess is that the feelings about the Kurdish issue and going to the core of what Turkey is, what it means to be a Turk, is the Turkish state a state of the Turks, I think those are much deeper issues. … Anti-Israelism can buy off a bit of the Turkish public, but I think that [if] the Turks, the Turkish Government, if it is going to follow through on this initiative with the Kurds, it’s going to do a lot of other hard selling to make the reforms go through.

Edelman:
And it’s probably worth recalling, as I know Alan does, that there was an earlier effort by Erdogan to do this back about 10 years ago, in 2015, which came a cropper. So, it’s not an easy lift at all in Turkey, as Alan has just been saying.

Makovsky:
I think Erdogan’s strategy this time around, if he’s serious about it, and by the way, people argue about whether or not he is serious, but if he’s serious, it seems, rather than doing it in as public a way as was done back, you know, in 2015 in that era, in 2013-2015, he wants to come to some agreement between himself and Ocalan, and more or less bring it on the Turkish public, on the belief that he could carry the day that way. Because, to the extent step by step, reform by reform, public opinion would have to be won over, [and] that would be a very, very heavy lift. But perhaps they could do it, at least I think that’s what he’s trying to do, all at once, sell it [as] an entire package [and] as a necessary reform that will bring peace to Turkey, and of course, would win him Turkish votes in Parliament. We didn’t get into that.

But what the motive is for all of this, [is that] there are really two schools of thought. One is [that] it involves international affairs. Turkey wants to get its house in order as things are chaotic in the region, but I think most people believe that a significant element behind this initiative is that Erdogan needs votes in parliament in order to run for another term, and if he can bring the pro-Kurdish party down to his side, he will have enough votes to do that.

Misztal:
Do you want to briefly say what the mechanism would be? Because under the current constitution, he is term-limited out. He has run for his two terms that the Constitution allows for, which ends in 2028, and so his options are to amend the Constitution, which he’s done before, or there’s this one quick trick to get a third term, which I think is what you’re referring to, Alan. Can you just briefly elaborate?

Makovsky:
With a vote of 60 percent of Parliament calling for early elections, a president in his final term can run for another term.

Misztal:
And how much does his current coalition, how many seats does his current coalition control?

Makovsky:
His current coalition is below 60. There’s 600 in the Turkish Parliament, and so he has 272 of his own and his coalition partner is 47. You can do the math. But if you add in the 56 that the pro-Kurdish party has, that would put it around … 375 if my arithmetic is right, and he only needs 360 to get 60 percent. So right now, he’s below it, [but] with the Kurds, he would have it. And I think without the Kurds, it would be hard for him to buy off enough other votes in Parliament.

Now he might decide that he’s going to keep the presidency anyway, but he would much prefer that it be done in a legal way.

Edelman:
At least the simulacrum of a legal way.

Makovksy:
Simulacrum, yes.

Misztal:
So maybe we should pivot to the topic and the country we’ve been dancing around, which is Syria, since sort of all the issues that we’ve talked about do seem to converge there.

Alan, I think, as you mentioned, both Turkey and Israel have troops there. The Kurdish peace issue, obviously, is relevant to Syria as well, where the Turks see the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which were a U.S. partner in fighting ISIS, they see as an extension of the PKK. And there’s questions about how and if they would be integrated into the new Syrian regime. And on top of all of that, we have perhaps competing agreements with Turkey having already signed a defense agreement with the new Syrian government, [and] Israel supposedly negotiating some sort of a security arrangement. What is the potential here for friction? Or what would the sources of friction and Syria be between these two U.S. partners, Ambassador?

Edelman:
Well, so first of all, the agreement that the Turks and the Syrians have signed is really, it’s an MOU, it’s a Memorandum of Understanding, and it’s really a kind of reciprocal training, I would say, you know, MOU, which the Syrians requested, actually, after some of the breakdowns in public order that they’ve had to deal with. So, they’ve asked for training that would, according to the announcement that was made by the Syrian Arab News Agency, … enable the two sides to operate together, [conduct] counterterrorism training, some demining, peacekeeping kinds of things, as well as some technical assistance from Turkey to help them organize their new military, including command structures.

It’s not quite, I think, as far reaching a defense agreement as Turkey’s ambitions [would] probably include which, when [Syrian President Ahmed Al-] Sharaa went to Ankara in May, there was a lot of reporting that there were advanced discussions about a defense pact that would include the potential for Turkish bases in Syria.

Now, Turkey already has a number of military outposts in Idlib Province, which was home to HTS [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham], which overthrew Assad in December of last year. But [the defense pact] would [include] new bases, and it would include an air component at the T4 base near Palmyra in Syria. That’s been reported to be the level of ambition. It hasn’t happened yet, and I think it’s in part because the Sharaa government has so many other balls in the air right now that I think to undertake something like that, knowing that it could engender a lot of opposition, not just from Israel, but potentially others, that Sharaa is not ready to go that far. But it’s clearly something that Israel is concerned about. I mean, the Israelis have actually had about 1000 airstrikes since December in Syria, including some in the vicinity of T4.

So, they’ve certainly sent a strong message that, you know, a Turkish Air Base, there would be a problem for them. I mean, from Israel’s point of view, their concern here is to make sure that you don’t get a return of the kind of threats that they’ve had to deal with from Syria since the Syrian Civil War broke out, which includes the fact that it was a transit route for Iran to resupply Hezbollah, that you had Hezbollah able to store weapons there and transit weapons there from not just Iran, but other places around the world.

So, Israel is trying to create a buffer zone in the south. They’ve told the Syrians they’d like to see all of the area from Damascus [to the] south to be demilitarized. They want to prevent, as I said, any other threats, but they also want to limit Turkish influence, which they see as potentially malign. And given all the rhetoric that we’ve talked about in the kind of announcement that we started this discussion with by Hakan Fidan, it’s understandable that they would want to limit it. So therein lies the potential for a clash.

We also haven’t mentioned yet that the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, my successor, several times removed, Tom Barrack also has been designated by President Trump as his envoy for Syria and Lebanon. And so, he has been trying to broker some kind of arrangement that would help Farouk Al-Sharaa pull together some kind of stable government in Syria, and obviously he’s in the middle of all of this.

Misztal:
Do we think that Syria can contain multitudes in this way, sort of, keep its relationship with Turkey, but [also] satisfy Israel’s concerns that it’s not going to be the source of violence or threats towards it? Are those sort of two compatible or is Syria ultimately going to have to choose, do we think, between its northern and southern neighbor, Alan?

Makovsky:
Yeah, I think they are. It’s a difficult balancing act, but I think it’s sustainable, at least in the near term. Israel has, I think made clear, its main concerns are that Syria be demilitarized, as Eric said, south of Damascus. And it is concerned about the Druze population, the welfare of the Druze population, which, of course, recently underwent a massacre. It was partly at the hands of Sharaa’s security forces, as well as local Bedouin [tribes].

There is some question [as to] whether Sharaa intended that to happen, or whether he simply couldn’t control the forces. I think most people think he couldn’t control his own forces, which is dangerous enough. But I think those are Israel’s two main concerns, in addition to which, I think it’s also made clear, it does not want Syria to be a protectorate of Turkey, politically or militarily. Now, where does it draw the line? That, to me, at least, isn’t really clear.

As Eric said, Israel bombed in the T4 area just as construction of a base was starting. Turkey really has not reacted strongly to that. T4 is not south of Damascus, it’s northeast of Damascus. So somewhere on the map, Israel doesn’t want to see Turkish troops too far south.

Now, currently Turkish troops, et cetera, et cetera are in Idlib, and they’re also across most of northwestern Syria. In fact. I mean, it gets very little publicity, but between 2016 and 2019, Turkey occupied an area of Syria that’s the equivalent in size to Lebanon. I mean, and as far as I’m aware, you know, they still control these areas. Israel has really not raised an issue about that, to my knowledge. So where exactly Israel is going to draw the line, I don’t know.

I do take some hope from the fact that Turkey didn’t react too strongly to the bombing of T4. And I think Turkey, at least at this point, with all its economic problems and other issues, is really not looking for a confrontation with Israel. And of course, the U.S. has been mediating talks between Israel and Turkey, which I think has helped to calm the situation a bit, make it less tense than it was this spring, and Israel is also talking directly to Syria.

So, I think those are positive things. I don’t think Israel can hope for Turkey to be totally removed from Syria. I think that’s just not realistic, as long as Sharaa and his team are in power. Turkey has a long relationship with these guys, and Turkey is there, and when reconstruction finally starts, I think it’s almost inevitable that the Turkish construction sector will get a huge share of the business.

But I’ll just finish with this. I mean, I’m often struck talking to Israeli officials that they really see Turkey as a purveyor of jihadi Islam, and that, I think, is really at the root of it. They fear that Sharaa is a jihadist, and they fear that Turkey supports jihadism. … Somehow, some balance will have to be found. But I don’t think Turkey’s leaving, and I don’t see Israel leaving anytime soon. So, I think it’s important what comes out of these security talks that the U.S. has been quietly mediating.

Edelman:
Yeah, I mean, the only thing I would add to what Alan said is, I don’t envy Ambassador Barrack, his task, because I would say it’s kind of like a diplomatic Rubik’s Cube that he’s got to try and manipulate here. I mean, the Israelis, as have we, called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syria. In part to Alan’s point, they don’t want a failed jihadi state on their border, and they already have suspicions about Sharaa, and they certainly have suspicions about the foreign fighters who flocked to Syria during the Civil War and before, frankly. They’ve been flowing through Syria since the U.S, invasion of Iraq in 2003.

So, there is that. That’s difficult for Sharaa, because a lot of those guys are the guys who put him in power back in December of 2024. You have the divisions, the confessional and ethnic divisions in Syria, among Druze, Kurds, Alawites, Sunni Muslims, Sunni Arabs, and so, Sharaa’s got to try and put all that together. There’s the question of, even when you get the foreign fighters out, if you could, you still have other militias that need to be integrated into some kind of national force. And then there’s the question of how strong the central government can and should be, and that’s before you even get to the other players, the two most important of which we’ve just been talking about, Israel and Turkey. But you also have the Qataris, the Saudis, and others who have an interest in what happens in Syria, and they’re all playing. And the Russians.

So, you’ve got all of these pieces that have to be manipulated in order to get to what Alan was rightly suggesting, ought to be the hope for an end state, which is, you know, a stable Syria that is kind of at peace with its own people and its and its neighbors. And if you could get that, then you could maybe get to what the Israelis also would like, which is, you know, an Abraham Accords-like peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon as well, that would round out the Abraham Accords, which are now being jeopardized by other developments that we probably don’t have time to address.

Misztal:
Well, speaking of time, I have just sort of one last round of questions for both of you, and then I’m happy to throw it open to the audience. If you have questions for our panelists, please feel free to submit them using the Q and A function in Zoom, and then I’ll be happy to read them out.

But let me go back to, sort of, a conversation we were having earlier about U.S. government views of Turkey. We talked a little bit about Congress and some of the tough stances it seems to want to take against Turkey. But what about the executive branch and this administration? Have we seen them be concerned about any of this rhetoric and action against Israel? Or Turkey’s actions in Syria? How is Turkey being viewed by the Trump administration?

Edelman:
Well, I think first of all, the President has met with Erdogan, and the President has said that he has a good personal relationship with Erdogan, and that certainly was the case in the first term.

But what you’re seeing, I think, to some degree, is a continuation of what we saw in the first term, which was less a state-to-state relationship and more of a family-to-family relationship. In the first term, it was mediated through the two sons-in-law, Erdogan’s son-in-law, and Jared Kushner. This time around, it seems like Tom Barrack is playing that role because he’s an old friend of Trump’s, and so there’s a personal connection there that runs very deep, in which the Turks are clearly aware of.

The President and Ambassador Barak have both suggested that they would like to see Turkey back in the F-35 program. That is going to be a pretty steep hill to climb, I think, with Congress, because there’s a lot of, you know, kind of water under the bridge there having to do with the Turkish purchase of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. And so, we’ll have to see what happens, and whether they’re able to move it in the direction that they’ve suggested.

As you pointed out Blaise, and as Alan discussed earlier, there are a number of amendments to the NDAA that would clearly get in the way of that. And so, it’s not at all clear to me that that’s where we’re going to end up.

Misztal:
Alan, maybe we can end on this. You’ve served in the State Department and on Capitol Hill. Any sense of why there’s this seemingly divergent view between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue about Turkey, and sort of which branch is going to win out, or how this difference might get resolved?

Makovsky:
Yeah, and look, I think fundamentally, an executive branch looks at the world through the lens of realpolitik, and Turkey is obviously a very important country. You just look at a map, and it’s obvious. Richard Holbrook once said, “Turkey is at the center of every issue of importance in the United States on the Eurasian continent,” and that’s pretty much accurate. I mean, lots of issues that the U.S. gets involved in are happening around Turkey, and Turkey can be useful as a friend, if it will be a friend.

Congress is where the views of the American public tend to play out more. I mean, maybe [it would] be too crude to say that the State Department is the head and Congress is the heart, but I think emotions, which are [a] very legitimate aspect of foreign policy, tend to play out more in Congress which is closer to the public. So, I think that’s in a nutshell where the division comes from and where it has always come from.

That said, there have been times when Turkey actually was quite popular in Congress. Now, there have been more times when it wasn’t. But certainly, in the years when I was first working on the hill, the first decade of this century, many people saw Turkey, a democratic Turkey, and particularly one led by Erdogan’s AK [Justice and Development] Party, as the answer to the United States’ problems with the Islamic world. They thought Turkey could be a democratic model, and …, this is an inexact measure, but it’s not insignificant, the Turkey Caucus of Congress at one point, was actually significantly larger than the Hellenic Caucus, the pro-Greek Caucus.

Some people join caucuses for different reasons, but they don’t join if membership is a political liability. So, you know, if Turkey pursued policies that were more gratifying, let’s say to the American public, it could be, once again, I think, more popular in Congress, certainly than it is today. But today its offended many constituencies in the United States and many congressmen who feel that Turkey has veered too far off its pro-Western course.

[Cross-talk]

Makovsky:
Regarding the question about this administration, I do want to give them credit. [I]n my understanding is that, you know, they really did step in, in a quiet way, to help to calm tensions in Syria between Turkey and Israel. But where I think they have to get an F minus grade is on human rights. It’s just of no interest to this administration. And while, Eric raised a lot of important points about the treatment of the main opposition party, I mean all the arrests of getting rid of Imamoglu, who is overwhelmingly leading Erdogan in the polls. Now the new leader, Ozel, they’re about to get rid of him, it seems, through judicial mechanisms.

Dozens of opposition mayors, big city mayors and district mayors, have been removed, and hundreds of workers from the municipalities controlled by the opposition have been brought to court on corruption charges for which they haven’t really presented evidence yet and it’s obvious they’re trying to undercut the opposition. And I really fear that Turkey is sliding into a Venezuela-type situation where, yeah, they may have elections, but the opposition has no opportunity whatsoever to win those elections, and they’re just being crushed by the central government.

I think it’s really a low point in the history of Turkish democracy, and it’s very sad, and I wish the United States would comment on it. But so far, with only the slightest exception, has really said nothing.

Misztal:
Well, that’s why we’re so fortunate to have both of you to inform us about it and lead JINSA’s efforts on this important topic. Ambassador Edelman, Alan, thank you for joining us. Thank you to the audience. I look forward to seeing you on our next webinar. Thank you. Have a good afternoon.