Transcript: Webinar – Gaza Ceasefire
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
Michael Makovsky, PhD
JINSA President & CEO
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Israel’s Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister
John Hannah
JINSA Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney
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TRANSCRIPT
Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.
Michael Makovsky, JINSA President & CEO:
I’m Michael Makovsky. I’m president and CEO of JINSA. I’m joined by my two colleagues, General Yaakov Amidror, JINSA distinguished fellow and former National Security advisor to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu, and John Hannah, the Charles and Randi Wax Senior Fellow at JINSA. Thank you very much for joining us. Obviously, we called this at the last minute, in response to the news last night of a deal. At least on the first phase of this hostage deal. I want to try to understand what we know and what we don’t know. General Amidror, let me start with you because we should clarify, and we’ll get into it, but what has been agreed to as far as we understand is the first phase which involves the freedom of all of the hostages plus hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, some of whom were sentenced to life in Israeli prisons.
But there’s not really a deal yet fully on the other phases. Before we get to the other phases, let’s just talk about what we did get to. I’d like to ask you General Amidror, it’s exactly two years and two days since October 7th, the hostages have been there for all of this time. Most of the hostages were released but of the 48 – or I’ve seen 46 –but I think it’s 48 hostages that are seen left and about 20 are believed to be alive. The rest unfortunately are not. But just to get to this point, and I think everybody watching remembers there’s been a few hostage deals but there’s been negotiations for hostages, there were talks about trying to free half the hostages, temporary deals of 45 days while they work on a longer-term deal. There’s been all sorts of formulations out there, but now President Trump really pushed this, all the hostages released. You had a spectacle of Qatar, it seems like Qatar and Turkey and Egypt, saying that this needs to happen. How did we get here? Is it just because Israel is in Gaza city? Is it partly the attack on Doha that got criticized? Is it the attack on these Hamas leaders that only killed some but not everyone Israel attempted to kill that got the Qataris so worried? How did we get here exactly, to this point?
IDF MG (ret.) General Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow
Good evening, thank you. I think it’s a very interesting question and I’m not sure that we have all of the answers, but I think that the Americans have been afraid to say the perfect storm. I think positively it’s the combination, nothing that stands for itself. I think first of all is the frame. We are after two years of war during which Israel succeeded to destroy the most aggressive force in the area, Iran. There is no, the whole Iranian strategy collapsed. They lost the proxies, they lost the bridge from Tehran to the Mediterranean, they are very vulnerable, and they understand that they don’t have any shield if the Israelis and the Americans decide to renew the war. They don’t have anti-air system to defend them. Israel was over Iran like it is Gaza, hunting launchers and so forth, killing scientists and generals. So, Iran is very weak, and unlike in the past it is not an alternative that Hamas or anyone in the Middle East can approach and say, guys we need help or pressure or whatever. They are out of the stage. They are not there. The second, in the future they might build it, but for today Iran is not an actor in the scene.
The second issue, it is clear today after Iran more than ever that the combination of cooperation between Israel and America is something that no one in the Middle East can cope with. If those two gentlemen, Prime Minister and President, President and Prime Minister, decide to go together to do something, no one can stop them in the Middle East. The international community is not involved. Israel is very, very, very strong. The Americans are ready to bring the munition and the support internationally. Who can stop it?
The third, unlike many people, I believe that the operation in Doha, which was not a success from the intelligence point of view – all the leaders probably got out of the operation alive – made something very, very, very strong. It shook the Qataris, telling them, guys, you lost your immunity. It’s the end. If we decide that this is going with the interest of Israel, we will do it. And it was understood, not directly, that even the Americans didn’t stop us when they learned about it. And I think that that was a lesson for the guys in Qatar and that was a lesson for the guys, the leadership of Hamas. The force is the Arab world.
I think that after Doha and after Iran, and probably the collapse of the Syrian regime as well, the Arab Muslim world looked for a solution. They understood that they should not continue and the bomb in Doha was very important to bring them to the table, almost together, to say to Hamas guys, enough is enough. We don’t want to pay the price for you. They have any interest vis a vis America, they have many interests vis a vis themselves domestically, and they didn’t want Hamas to be the one which will prevent them from achieving all that. Turkey wants F-35s, Qatar wants to be sure that they will not be attacked, the Saudis need the American guarantee. I mean, everyone needs something and is fed up from the situation. And I think that significantly, maybe the most important declaration for this Muslim world was the declaration of the President of Indonesia, who said, in the United Nations, there’s only one way to have a peace agreement – that Israel will feel secure. From Indonesia. I mean, and he finished his lecture with saying shalom. I mean, it’s the biggest Muslim country. It’s almost 300 million Muslims.
And I think that what was at the end was the operation of the IDF, which pushed Hamas to the corner, and they understood that if they don’t get the ceasefire now, they will not be there to get anything. They will be eliminated. Because clearly, under this pressure of the IDF was very slow but very heavy. And I think the combination of all that together, when the President said, okay, this is my initiative. It was accepted by the Arabs. It was, it was very easy for us to accept it, because at least the first stage is very Israeli stage, and that what you see now is the result of all these ingredients together. The 21 points plan is basically three plans. Stages. I mean, you don’t go to stage two before you have stage one, but you can finish in stage one, stage two.
And the stages are, the first one is very well defined, it’s very clear. Four, five elements. Release of the hostages, release of Palestinians, murderers, retreat of the IDF, few kilometers within the Gaza Strip and ceasefire and that’s all.
John Hannah, JINSA Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow:
Humanitarian aid.
Amidror:
And humanitarian aid, which, from our point of view, is not an issue. The humanitarian aid is going in, it’s good PR and so on and so forth, and they tried to play the situation with starving in Gaza. From our point of view, it’s not an issue. The four elements are very important, but this is the easy part of the plan because it’s very well defined. It’s easy to understand. We can argue this guy will be released, this guy will not be released. I mean the Palestinian list of terrorists that will be released. The main challenge is the second phase.
The second phase is very vague. Who will take responsibility? Who will take the responsibility to clear the street from Hamas? How Hamas, if Hamas members will say, we don’t want to give our weapon, who will take it, how it will be taken? Who will be responsible for that? Leave alone the very sophisticated, complicated international umbrella under Mr. [Tony] Blair, how that will work? Who will be responsible for what? What about Israeli ability to defend itself during the process? So, I think that this is the challenge. The negotiations after the first stage during which we have a ceasefire, but the IDF is inside and controls 50 percent of the Gaza Strip, something that I couldn’t imagine that they will give all the hostages when the IDF is still in the Gaza Strip. And this negotiation is supposed to begin next week, immediately after the release of the Israelis. The Israelis will release all the Palestinians, around 2000 and the Palestinians will release the Israeli.
You can say that till they will find all the bodies, it’s not stage two yet. But I believe that negotiations the Americans will put pressure to begin the negotiations, parallel to the search for the bodies of the missing Israelis. But that will be the real challenge, because not nothing, but too much, is very bland. It’s not understood what is the meaning of the words and how it should be implemented. And when you have such vague language, it’s the basis for long negotiations.
Makovsky:
All right. So, I want to get back to those other phases, General Amidror. Let me turn to John. John, let me ask you, I mean Amidror laid out what’s changed here. Let me see if you want to add anything because first of all you had the determination by the President of the United States to release these hostages. I think it comes across very clearly that it was something that moved him, what he watched in video, listening to the hostages that he met in the oval office, but still, you have Hamas always worried.
We always thought, would they really make a deal? Would they really do such a thing? Give up all of the hostages at once? Because in their mind there was a lot of pressure. Clearly in their minds they felt very isolated. I don’t know if you want to comment on anything General Amidror said. Also, I wonder what did the U.S. do? Did they offer anything to Turkey? Is there something they’re offering or was that security guarantee executive order by Trump, did that help convince the Qataris? I’m just curious how you read what the U.S. was doing to help make this happen.
Hannah:
Well first of all, I just, you know, I would even identify the central reason why we are where we are today. It’s the President of the United States. For the first time in two years, the President of the United States personally put the full faith and credit and power of the United States on the line behind a very specific plan because I think he finally made a determination that it was time to end this war. That it was hurting Israel. That it wasn’t good for the United States. I think he probably had questions whether or not one more military offensive really would end the war. So, I think he, and the hostages obviously, which he’s had all year. I wonder if he might not have done this after the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, if he could have made an initiative like this.
We won’t know for sure but I think the fact that you’ve had a president put his reputation, credibility on the line, a president who has as much sway and power as he does, not only with all of these key stakeholders in the Arab and Muslim world, in getting to an end finally of this conflict, but he has that same kind of sway and influence and confidence in Israel. Not only in the Prime Minister, but I think even more surely in the Israeli public body politics. And he’s obviously been willing to encourage very strongly in a way that I’m not sure other presidents have been willing to do when he thought the moment was right to really encourage a lot of not easy decisions on the part of the Israeli government, especially this Israeli government, with its complicated make up.
But I think the President decided he was going to cash some of his political capital on all sides to essentially bring the entire world together. It’s quite an extraordinary feat other than what he managed to do with Israel against the Iranian nuclear program. I’m almost certain that even if we don’t get past phase one, this will be so far in his second term the most important thing he does in terms of foreign policy and diplomacy. Getting this deal that as General Amidror said, if you’d asked us a month ago, 99 out of 100, if not 100 experts would have said no, that’s impossible for Hamas to surrender everybody with Israel still in 50 percent of Gaza and no concrete public guarantees that the war ends here. We would have said it’s impossible and yet Trump managed to do it as a result of many of the factors that General Amidror said.
And his own personal engagement, I mean, he really unveiled this thing to these Arab and Muslim leaders the last week of September. And here we are, on December 9th, with this first phase, this incredible achievement done it looks like in the next few days, God willing. That’s very fast I think to get Hamas to this place and if he’s, you know. And it’s a result of him, I don’t know how many phone calls he’s made, but he’s obviously personally invested in this now like he’s not been personally invested in almost any other foreign policy issue and diplomatic issue in recent times. And as General Amidror laid out, this issue with the second phase, I think it’s going to require an equal level of engagement and force of will to by the President with all sides to try and push these negotiations forward to some kind of successful conclusion.
In terms of what the payoffs were, the side payoffs to the Qataris, the Turks, maybe even the Egyptians, the pressure to bear… I don’t know other than we know what he’s given the Qataris. He delivered, or at least appeared to deliver, an Israeli apology for the breach of sovereignty and the one person, [the] Qatari security man who died. And then of course, he delivered this kind of preemptively before he had Hamas’ yes, he delivered this security guarantee. This unprecedented executive order without any internal discussion. The United States Congress or Senate, a decision to give an Article 5 like guarantee to a very, very deeply problematic country that I’m not sure even Qatar was asking for that, yet the President was willing to do it, I assume on the understanding that the Qataris in the end would now really put the hammer to Hamas and do everything they needed to do to get at least to this first successful stage. But that’s really just speculation without knowing for sure.
Michael Makovsky
Let me, I want to talk about this phase just a little more before we talk about the next one. But General Amidror, you mentioned something I want to go back to, which is, you said that with these two leaders together, Netanyahu and Trump, they really know the Middle East will not really oppose them. And I guess I think it’s important to kind of emphasize this, because what a contrast it seems like to only a few weeks ago, where you had, you know, the UK, the French, Portugal, Canada, recognizing the Palestinian state, which even the Trump administration, like Secretary Rubio said, is really a reward to Hamas and will embolden Hamas.
Trump is offering an alternative approach to resolving this problem with just standing by Israel, not just in what we see in the 21 points, which, not fully, but largely, mirrors a lot of Israeli objectives, but also he said, if Hamas doesn’t, you know, agree to this deal, I’m back in Israel to do whatever they’re going to do. And that seems to be a completely, let’s say, different, approach than the European [approach] which is: really go against Israel and recognize this fictitious Palestinian state.
Amidror:
No question that the support of the President during the war, this president, during the war, the fact that he finished immediately the boycott on Israel. That he decided that the Americans will destroy Fordo because Israel does not have the means to do it the same way that the Americans have. The fact that he gave Israel the free hand in Gaza and said do what is needed and the ability to combine his reputation of someone who is ready to go with Israel with the demand from Hamas. I think it was more about the Arab world than Hamas. Hamas was convinced more by the actions of the IDF on the ground which were very strong. I think that the Arab leaders, the Muslim leaders understood that if they say no to Trump, he will give Israel all the time that is needed and all the means which are needed and that will be very bad for the whole Muslim world to see the full destruction of Hamas in Gaza in a way that is unacceptable in the Arab street.
And it’s a combination, the President without the willingness of Israel couldn’t make it and Israel without the readiness of the President to invest couldn’t. But it was based on, as was said by John, the trust of the Israelis in the good will of the President and his administration. Which is very important. Which didn’t exist in many occasions in the past. Here there is a trust, they mean well for Israel. We might not agree about the details, but their heart is in the right place. And even the fact that this President stood against the foolish European Western countries policies was very important. Because it is very well understood in Israel that nothing good can come out of these declarations of Macron-ism around the world. Nothing good.
And the fact that the President was ready to stand and to say it, and the whole administration was clear about it, I think, was very important to convince the Israelis, including the Prime Minister, that these guys can be trusted, and if they can be trusted, we are ready to go the long way with them, even if someone is saying, as it was today in the cabinet, in the Cabinet meeting, you know, the price that we are paying releasing 2000 murderers is bad, the fact that we are giving from us the chance to survive in Gaza may be insane. Everything is clear and known. But if you have trust between Washington and Jerusalem, it’s much easier to go ahead.
Makovsky:
John, you want to go ahead?
Hannah:
Yeah, I would just, I appreciate all that in this sense that yes, Trump has this enormous political capital built up with the broader Israeli public that they trust him,
Amidror:
Leave alone the prime minister. This is a country in which the left is welcoming President Trump Plan, the only place in the world.
Hannah:
Yeah, but listen, I wouldn’t say it’s black and white. There were, I mean, Trump proved himself willing to talk in a way and to act in a way, about in a way that was full of love for Israel but saying some things that were probably not popular in parts of Israel. The only thing that the French and Brits and others did, as far as I can tell, with this talk about Palestinian state is stirred up and raised to a higher level to talk about annexation in Israel. And clearly after Doha, Trump was hearing from Arab leaders and was then prepared, after a long time of being very wishy-washy, not responding to the question about annexation, obviously, in fact, feeding that with his Gaza Riviera plan and the notion that Gazans would be moved out, which I think was a waste of months of his diplomatic efforts, but for him to say, come out and say, annexation, no way. It’s off the table. It will not happen. I will stop it if it tries to happen, that it’s an extraordinary way for any American President to talk in public about Israel, for him to say he was genuinely worried.
However much he dismissed and didn’t take seriously the French and British and Australian efforts, he took seriously that Israel was suffering a severe international backlash for the war continuing in the way it in the way it was, and it worried him on Israel’s isolation. You could tell from his phone call last night with the Prime Minister, saying you can’t fight the world, baby. Now everybody loves you because you’re going along with my peace plan. So, the fact is that, listen, I think this gets even more difficult if this is not just a prisoner hostage exchange and a temporary ceasefire until we see what comes next. But in fact, in the President’s mind, in the Arabs minds, and maybe in the minds of Hamas, because they’ve gotten some kinds of assurances, this is an end of the war.
It may well be the end of the war, in the President’s mind, we’ll see, depending on how Hamas handles the negotiations going forward on a new governing authority, on demilitarization, on disarmament, on allowing in an international stabilization force. But it’s possible that the President has come to a decision here that with all the hostages back, this war is going to conclude and everything else is subject to a lengthy negotiation that will be very, very complex and drawn out.
Makovsky:
Well, John, let me just pick up on that. I’ll start with you and then go to General Amidror. Look, just to remind everyone you chaired this effort JINSA did with the Vandenberg Coalition, with Elliott Abrams. So, on that you about a day after you started it, I think in late October 2023 you put out a plan. In late February 2024, you met with Netanyahu a couple times. You met with [Ron] Dermer. You met with all the senior folks in Israel. You’ve met with U.S. officials. What is the chance that the other phases of this, which you started to refer to, will see the light of day? Will Hamas disarm? Will there be this board of peace that actually forms? Will there be radicalization?
Amidror:
The radicalization.
Makovsky:
I’m sorry?
Amidror:
To try to minimize the radicalization.
Hannah:
A new technocratic, non-Hamas, non-PA, Palestinian, new Palestinian governing committee or something. Will there be Arab States willing to come in and actually do hard work inside of Gaza, fighting criminal elements, terrorists, anybody who tries to threaten Israel? These are all big, huge questions that are going to require a lot of work.
My answer in the end, is, you know, so many peace plans are lying in the ash heap of history. So many hopes about getting to a better day after having been dashed. Who can be optimistic about any of these things? But again, a month ago, I would have said where we are today, on the eve of getting back all of these hostages who have been stuck there in despair and dungeons for two years with Israel still in 50 percent of Gaza, I would have said, you’re crazy. What are you smoking? It’s never going to happen. And yet it’s, it’s about to happen. It looks like, God willing.
So, you know, if you’re able to sustain the momentum of this perfect storm in which, again, for the first time in two years, you have a president with real authority, with all sides, that all sides, to some extent, fear. They don’t want to get on the wrong side of, they don’t want to say no to. If he’s able to sustain his energy, attention, sheer force of will to stay after these parties and keep the second key ingredient, which is all of the key Arab stakeholders, maybe together with some major Muslim stakeholders, ready and willing, not only to cooperate and support and provide political and economic and diplomatic assistance, but actually to take on their shoulders for the first time, real responsibility for the future of what we used to call the Palestinian national movement. To see whether they can help it achieve some kind of constructive, positive future after so many decades of the PLO and Hamas, failing the Palestinians.
Those factors. If you can hold those two things together, together with the cooperation of the US and Israel, we’ve got a better possibility now than we’ve had, certainly in two years, if not in, you know, a couple of decades to achieve something minimally positive that we can say a year from now, gosh, the issue of Palestine. But not only that, the issue of the broader Middle East, and the possibilities for ending Israel’s war with the Arab States permanently through normalization and the Abraham Accords and then getting the broader Islamic world involved in that as well. I think there is good now, certainly, as they’ve been since the Abraham accords first crossed the threshold.
Makovsky:
General Amidror, do you want to address this?
Amidror:
No, I agree. I agree that the chances now are much better than any time in the past, and the combination of the success of Israel in the world, the understanding of the Arab world that they, the policy up till now, didn’t leave for something which is good for them, leave alone if it’s good for Israel, the frustration of the Palestinians that they didn’t succeed to achieve anything in their war. And the pictures are horrible, leading to another second Nakba for them. I mean all, all that, together with the determination of the President, who was not unlike people in leaders in the past, which were restricted by thinking within the box with known elements. Here he is going to do something different, and for Israel to have this situation of negotiating without the hostages will give Israel much more flexibility and ability to wait and to see and to give more time for it and chances to succeed in the negotiations. Without the pressure of okay, what about the hostages? To put a lot of pressure on the decision-making system in Israel, I think that the chances are much better than in the past, assuming that the first stage will end within few days.
Makovsky:
Let me ask you, though. What if, let’s say, they do the hostage release? The Palestinian prisoners are released, they start working on phase two, or whatever it’s called. What if you don’t have a lot of progress? Hamas says we’re not disarming. What if they try to even rebuild? I don’t know. What if you don’t have those other things that are in this plan?
Amidror:
I think that this situation will bring the Americans and the Israelis to discuss what should be done to open the bottleneck. And I will not be surprised that if we find ourselves in such a bottleneck, the way to open it will be to resume the war in Gaza. Because something with all the elements, which I mentioned and mentioned by John, the fact that the IDF was very close to eliminate physically, Hamas in Gaza City was, I think, a very important, if not the crucial point which led Hamas and the Arab states to understand that it is either you take the plan or you will be finished.
And if the Americans and the Israelis understand in six months that Hamas is wasting time, is not ready to compromise, is not ready to disarm itself. It’s not ready to take the structure of a system in which it doesn’t have any influence. It’s not just that he’s not part of the government. He doesn’t have an influence inside Gaza as a group as ideology and he sees the success of the international system we’re working in. I think if all that will bring to a stalemate in the negotiations, and it will be understood in Washington and in Jerusalem that it is intentionally decided by Hamas. I think that resuming the war is not an impossible alternative.
Makovsky:
So, you think, by the way, to point out, you know, Netanyahu in the cabinet went ahead with this idea of going into Gaza City, putting more pressure on Hamas, against a lot of opposition inside of Israel. Isn’t that right?
But the contention was this could help free the hostages, and actually, as you point out, you think it has contributed. Let me ask you. I don’t know if you meant that, just as a general example, you said six months or you think we’re right now going to be heading into a ceasefire of many months while they try to work this out? I mean, how do you?
Amidror:
I don’t know how long it will be, but I gave them the number six months as a point in which it will be clear that they are not serious. And they are trying just to gain time because they are waiting to the next elections in America, to the collapse of the Israeli government, whatever.
If it will be clear in Washington and in Jerusalem that it is not problems which are natural to have in a negotiation. But this is a system which is used by Hamas just to win time. Because, you know, something will happen. You know, the middle elections in America will make the President weaker, and Bibi will be closer to the two elections, and he will be with. I don’t know what will be the sense within the intelligence and the negotiators, but if it will be clear on both sides of the Atlantic, that they are not serious, I think that resuming the war is not impossible.
Makovsky:
If they resume the war, and I’m going to get to you, John on this, but if they resume the war with the hostages out, I assume we’ll see a different approach by the IDF or not, would you say in Gaza? With no hostages to worry about.
Amidror:
No question. It will be a different kind of operation, much more aggressive, less limitations on the ground. Because during the war, we were very careful not to use fire and not to send forces close to areas in which we knew or were suspicious that the hostages are there no questions. It will make the whole war much easier for the Israeli commanders and planners.
Makovsky:
John, let me ask you. And you know, we’ll end in a few minutes. But you know, if we get the hostages out, Palestine, you know, we finished. Basically, just brought phase one. Then how do you see the dynamics, say, in America, or maybe other other major countries towards Gaza?
Will you know what they’re trying to work out negotiations on phase two that drags on for a little bit? Will there be less of a spotlight on what’s going on? Maybe less pressure on Israel, by I don’t know, the Democratic Party and certain European capitals? How do you see the dynamics changing internationally is what I’m trying to get to.
Hannah:
Listen, if we’re all on the same side, as the President said yesterday, everybody loves you, Bibi, you’re going along, and it looks like we’re moving in the direction of potentially ending the war and maybe starting to build something better. So as long as we all seem to be on that page together, and Hamas is the odd man out. If it doesn’t cooperate, then I think, you know, Israel’s situation will improve if we actually achieve something in building a better day after, if we are able to move from a ceasefire and a war plan to actually building a framework for a better situation between Israel and the Palestinians, and then Israel and the broader region, then I think Gaza is very quickly, the war and problems and difficulties by the sensible people in the middle of politics and countries around the world will say, yeah, you know, this is great. Let’s make peace.
And I think a lot of the difficulties we’ve experienced will be forgotten. Just, let me just say on the question of negotiating this, I hope Hamas makes it easy and as simple and obvious that they’re the outlier. But I can see things beginning to happen on the ground in Gaza, in terms of you know, there’s a meeting today in Paris of Europeans and Arabs, and everybody beginning to figure, try and figure out some of the elements of how to get some new governance and start rebuilding. And you can see things beginning to happen on the ground. Yes, we’re talking to Hamas, we’re continuing to negotiate disarmament, but people start being present from Arab states and this new government, and it looks like progress, but Hamas isn’t totally disarmed yet.
And you know, very quickly, you’ll get to people making the kind of compromises that maybe a few months ago they would have said are completely, utterly unacceptable. It will be awful for Israel’s deterrent posture across the entire region. But, you know, some part it depends on the Israeli public. I don’t know. I’ve had the impression that most of them, actually, once they get the hostages back, would like to see this war deescalate and end. And I don’t know how high they will now hold the objective. Okay, if Hamas, there’s still some Hamas guerrilla fighters in Gaza, we got to go kill them.
I don’t know what the threshold will be for convincing the Israeli public. Maybe the Prime Minister goes back anyway, no matter what the public thinks. Certainly, the public in the United States and internationally and in the Arab world will want this to be the end to the war. And again, I’m very interested. I can only speculate, but my guess is the President has now got a situation where the Arab states and Hamas believe they have a Trump guarantee that this is effectively the end of the war. But it’s not written anywhere, spoken about too much publicly anywhere, and the Prime Minister is able to tell his cabinet that, as General Amidror says, this doesn’t work out, Hamas is recalcitrant. Sometime in the next six months, we’re going to be going in and out and getting these guys and finishing it militarily. So that’s just speculation on my part, but it’s what my gut tells me it might be in the President’s head here.
Makovsky:
Okay, let me just ask on a different topic that was raised earlier on. When I think John, you were talking about Iran, I wanted to bring up something that [audience member] asked again. There’s nothing to Gaza, but I think Iran was brought up. There was a question that either of you can answer. He says, does Israel have the free hand to take out any enhancement in air defense that the Iranians might be acquiring?
Amidror:
I don’t think anyone in the world is very [or] Israelis, thinking guys if you see something changing the air defense of Iran, you have the free hand. I don’t think that Israel is thinking [about] this in these terms. What we learned in this war is that if we are focusing on an issue like air defense, and we have time to prepare ourselves, with all reputation of the Russian and Iranian air defense systems, we succeeded to destroy 85 of them.
So, at the end, if nothing, if it is not something that changes the whole character of anti-air defense systems, we know how to cope with it.
Makovsky:
Okay, I don’t know, if John, you want to add anything on that.
Hannah:
Nothing on that other than, I kind of wish, I think we said in a report that we thought, you know, at least one of the triggers might be if they started receiving or recreating advanced air defenses that would threaten Israel’s establishment of air supremacy again. But when we went to Israel in August and spoke to people, it became pretty clear to me that nobody was eager to get back into another major fight, and that the threshold was going to be set at a point where the entire world would understand this, and Israel would understand this. This makes sense for us, if we’re going to restart and have, you know, [the] potential of hundreds of missiles coming at our homeland again, we’ve got to have pretty good reason. And maybe air defense reconstitution doesn’t quite cross the threshold.
Makovsky:
It might be more on either the nuclear [or] the ballistic missile.
Hannah:
Yeah, I think so.
Makovsky:
All right, well, why don’t we conclude? I just want to ask either of you, I’ll start with the General Amidror, do you have any concluding comments you want to address that I didn’t ask you?
Amidror:
I think it’s very important to understand that [we are] now entering a process in which the first stage is clear and the second and the third one are very vague. And it will take time to determine if we are moving on or we are staying in a place that Hamas decide that they don’t want to go ahead. And then that will be the challenge for us and for the Americans, how to react to such a situation.
By the way, with one remark, if I can, unlike what was hinted from what John said, in Israel, there are many Israelis who said, let’s take back the hostages, and then it will be easier to store Hamas. I’m not sure that that is the mood now when we are facing the implementation, but I don’t think that it will be problematic for decision makers in Israel if it will be clear that Iranian Hamas is not moving ahead to convince the public opinion that war is a good option.
Makovsky:
John?
Hannah:
Yeah, two separate things. First, on the on the deal, I have to say that even, even if I can see this moving forward, I still worry, and I don’t understand, because it’s not part of the deal, what Israel’s ultimate security responsibility will be in Gaza, if things, bad things happen, and I suppose that’s an American Israeli separate understanding, but the thought that you’re going to build some kind of international force and Palestinian Police that, at least under the plan, you kind of assume, okay, those are going to be the guys and ultimate oversight of security in this area, and the IDF is kind of out of the game that that makes me a little bit uncomfortable. And I hope we can work out that arrangement about, you know, maybe without publishing a plan about it.
Second thing is just to underscore what an achievement this is for the United States, for the President, it’s hard to imagine Russia, China, in their wildest dreams ever being able to do something similar to this, what the President has done over the last several weeks to bring the entire world together behind this project, and to give the entire world some kind of sort of sigh of relief after two years of watching, watching this agonist struggle with these hostages stuck in dungeons and in Gaza. So, it’s a great achievement for America, America in the Middle East, its own diplomatic power, influence, strength, backed up by this relationship with Israel, along every domain.
And then you’ve got to say that it’s hard to take the personality of Trump out of this and the stature that he has developed in the Middle East with all sides, that combination of people wanting to be on his side, but a little bit of fear of being, real fear, being on the on the bad side of Trump. Again, you can be with or against Trump in all kinds of different areas of what he does, but what he’s done in the Middle East five years ago with the Abraham Accords first and now, what he’s done with this quite extraordinary achievement, and getting us on the eve of, through this phase one, even if we, you know, hopefully we’ll get to phase two. But even if we don’t, this was a great achievement to get these hostages back after these two awful years.
Amidror:
I agree with you, John, but don’t forget the good partner that he had on the other side.
Hannah:
Yeah, no, I think the American Israel relationship is absolutely critical.
Makovsky:
Yeah. I assume you mean, particularly the IDF. Is that what you mean, General?
Amidror:
The IDF achievements and the decision makers in Jerusalem, yes. The combination of the Prime Minister and Ron Dermer is very good partners for the ideas of shaping the new Middle East based on the capabilities and the achievement of the IDF. Without it, nothing could be done.
Makovsky:
I agree. A lot of kudos to Dermer and Netanyahu, and Ron Dermer learned everything he knows [from] being a distinguished fellow at JINSA.
Look, on that note, I want to thank you, John, and General Amidror, for joining. It’s obviously almost midnight in Israel, as always, we appreciate you staying up late to do these webinars, General. We thank everybody for joining us, and we hope next time we do a webinar that the hostages will all be free, hopefully no later than early next week. So, wish everyone a good rest of the week and pray for a full release. Thank you.