Transcript: Webinar – Gaza War Update (8/7)
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow
Former National Security Advisor to Israel’s Prime Minister
Michael Makovsky, PhD
JINSA President & CEO
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TRANSCRIPT
Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
This is Michael Makovsky, President and CEO of JINSA, thanks for joining us.
I’m here with my colleague, IDF [Israel Defense Forces] MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, retired former national advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu and a JINSA distinguished fellow.
General Amidror, thanks for joining [us] at this hour in Israel. Look. The topic of the day is what’s going on in Gaza. The cabinet met this evening. Before we talk about what should not be done, please say what the cabinet is deciding, please.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Yes.
The first decision was taken by Hamas. Hamas decided to stop negotiations, and the option which many Israelis want to pick is the option of giving up Gaza, letting Hamas continue to control Gaza, but to get the 20 live hostages back.
For many Israelis, this is priority number one — and they are ready to take all the risks in [the] Gaza Strip in the future, because it is clear that if we are evacuating Gaza, Hamas will remain there as the only strong force. It is not strong enough to attack Israel, but [it] is strong enough to not let anyone enter Gaza. I don’t see any third party ready to come to Gaza.
But many Israelis thought that [this] should be done. First of all, high priority — we will take care of all the other issues. Later on, we will take the risk, bring us the hostages, and we will begin from the beginning. That is not an option because Hamas is not ready to negotiate.
Then the cabinet has two options: one which is recommended by the IDF and one that is recommended by the Prime Minister.
The IDF said, because they don’t want to get to the situation in which the IDF is responsible for the life in Gaza: education, sewage, police, whatever, everything. They said, we don’t want to take the whole Gaza Strip — what we want is to encircle the enclaves of Hamas in [the] north part of Gaza and the refugee camp in the center of Gaza, and then to raid in and out all the time, to make the life of Hamas inside impossible, but not to take control of the whole area.
That will be easier from another point of view — remember that the IDF is in a constant war in the last two years. The regular army is a regular army. The young people can continue, but more than half of the forces in Israel are reserve units. And in [a] reserve unit, you have many people which are learning in [the] university, so someone who made 200 days a year in Gaza, he will not finish the BA that he is learning in the university. The shop owner in Tel Aviv, if for 200 days he is not in the shop, he will lose the shop, the business, everything, and so on and so forth.
So, within half of the IDF forces, the reserve units, it’s a huge problem. How we can see it very clearly: at the beginning of the war, when we pulled the reserve unit into action, the pairing of the people was more than 100 percent. I mean, old people who were supposed to be out [of the army] came saying: “guys, I’m not going. I’m not leaving. If you are going to war, I’m with you.” And [the report rate] was more than 100 percent [for] one, 20 percent in some part of the brigade, [and] it was even 35 percent [in another brigade].
Today, it’s around 80 percent. Eighty percent is not bad. In many cases, the soldiers speak with the commanders, and the commanders are giving them the permission not to come because they understand the problem they are facing, whether it is [at the] university or in his business, and so and so.
But this is something that the chief of staff [says] that we have to take into account and to find the way in which we use less forces to achieve the same target. And it was very clearly clarified this morning to all those who had some hesitations that he said, in our system, the aim at the end, the mission at the end, is dismantling and destroying Hamas. But he is offering a different way.
The Prime Minister thinks that after so many days, we cannot continue to go in and out. We have to take the forces which are needed, probably four divisions, to go into the north part, including Gaza City, to the center, including the refugee camps. And it will take a few months, but after that, the north will be like Rafah without any establishment of Hamas, without weapon systems. We will have to go then and look for Hamas which will move with the civilians into the designated areas in which we want the civilians to move. But that is another story without tunnels, without all the facilities that they have in Gaza.
That will be decided today in the cabinet. The Prime Minister probably will say what he thinks. The Chief of Staff will present his concerns and his offer, and then ministers will have to make decisions.
Makovsky:
I got some specific questions, and then, overall, based on what you just said. One of the specific questions, I believe, general Zamir, the Chief of Staff at the IDF, said: by going into these cities, and I think Israel, the idea is that the idea for going to cities they haven’t been in because they think there are hostages there. Is that right?
MG Amidror:
Yes.
Makovsky:
The fear is that if you have soldiers going there, near where the hostages are, that the hostages will get killed by the Hamas terrorists because the Hamas…
MG Amidror:
But this is true about both offers. That is true about the raids, and this is true about taking the whole Gaza Strip. The raids will go into those areas in which we know that there are hostages.
Makovsky:
So, I mean, I guess the broader, and I know you kind of mentioned, referred to it, but, and we talked about this before on webinars, but just to ask this again: There are few folks, I mean, who thought: ‘okay, this was a good this was an important effort, but at this point, what is Israel going to gain? How do you kill every Hamas soldier?’ I know the fear is that if you don’t go in and you cut a deal and you do a full cessation of hostilities and hopefully the hostages will come out, that Hamas would reconstitute.
But I guess the question is one: do you even think a deal like that is possible? That if Israel said: ‘we’ll stop the war,’ that Hamas would actually release all the hostages? That’d be question one. Question two is: how confident are you that Israel could succeed in what it seems like it wants to achieve in this?
MG Amidror:
Okay, about the first question: from what we hear from the Egyptians, the Qataris, and the Americans, [who] are going between us and Hamas, not directly, but through Qataris and Egyptians intelligence [services] — Hamas now is not ready to negotiate. So, it’s not an option. It’s a theoretical option which I believe does not exist. I believe, my assessment is, that if Israel declares we are accepting all Hamas demands, Hamas will agree. But I don’t see anyone in Israel which would be…
Makovsky:
Sorry, you said they will agree? I couldn’t understand.
MG Amidror:
Yes, they will. My assessment is that they will agree. If Israel declares publicly and says we are accepting all Hamas demands, and the President says, I guarantee that Israel will not attack — I believe that they would be ready to. I don’t know, because what these representatives of the moderates say is that they are not ready to negotiate, but it’s not negotiation, it’s capitulation.
About the second question. Now, after we did it in Rafah, in Jabalia, we believe that it can be done. Gaza City is not Jabalia. It’s something much bigger, much complicated, with much more underground tunnels and so on and so forth. But if you take these two examples — at the end we can do it at the end, the land looks like the moon land, but we can, we can do it. Based on the experience in Rafah and Jabalia. It can be done.
It’s a long process. First of all, we have to gain operational control of the area. It will be an intensive war against the organized remnants of Hamas. And then, I don’t know, a few months to clean it underground, under the ground. This is a very specific war, very slow. You know, there is no center of gravity that you go to. You have to go from place to place, and to clean it, and then to be sure that no one is coming back. It is complicated, and this is why we need many units on the ground to fulfill the mission.
Makovsky:
How many, I guess, well, before I ask about the operational stuff, well, I mean, who are the, who is the US really negotiating with? And you know, given that Israel has decapitated Hamas and killed a lot of their leadership. Is it, what confidence is it that the leaders in Qatar or in Turkey of Hamas are reflecting the wishes of Hamas on the ground?
MG Amidror:
In other states, there is one senior commander who was the only one [who] remained from the first echelon of the first and second echelon of Hamas. He was the second. He was a commander of the north part of Gaza. He’s now in his own area, controlling Hamas in the Gaza Strip. He was the commander of Gaza state in the beginning, at the beginning of the war. He is someone who went a few days before the war from Gaza as part of [a] negotiation, [a] team. And of course, there are the leaders who are living in Qatar. This is the group which is making the decision. But at the end of the day, it’s the guy from Gaza who has the last word, and the communication is done through Qataris and Egyptians, more Qataris but a few Egyptians, to those guys of Hamas outside Gaza, and they are communicating with their people in Gaza.
Makovsky:
Look, you know, I don’t know, those who say, and I could name names — they supported the war until recently, and said: look, you know, the cost is just too great going forward, and you’re going to kill more IDF soldiers, you’re going to put the hostages there is [at risk], and it’s an impossible mission. It’s not like what Israel did [against] Iran or Hezbollah. You didn’t try to wipe out the whole country or the whole organization. Here, Israel’s trying to wipe it out. And is, you know, is it really possible, and is it, I guess, worth the cost in the near term?
MG Amidror:
About the cost, it’s a question of what is, what you have in mind about the future of the State of Israel. Remember that the whole war began with these people of Hamas. The argument of those who are preaching for going after every Hamas member and taking control of the whole Gaza Strip is, [that] if we go out when Hamas is still controlling Gaza, the feeling around us would be Israel failed to fight against these terrorists.
Terrorism is a good way to achieve what the Palestinians need. Look what happened around the world, many countries [are] because of the war, recognizing the Palestinian state. It is a price for those who initiated the war. It’s a price for the terrorists. It’s a price for the atrocities which were done on the Seventh of October. Israel must show the Arabs, our neighbors close to Israel and far from Israel, and enemies of Israel who are not Arabs, that someone who did something like what [was] done by Hamas on the Seventh of October — will not exist. He should be eliminated from Earth.
Otherwise, many people might think in the future, and many leaders might make decisions based on this assumption that at the end of the day, Israel cannot fight terrorism. Cannot win against terrorism. And this is the way to eliminate Israel. Okay, it was not a great success after the Seventh of October, but Israel didn’t win. Israel lost the war against Hamas. That will be the atmosphere around Israel.
And if we speak about the future of Israel — not about tomorrow, tomorrow, you are right, tomorrow it’s a high price, it’s a long wait, the Europeans don’t like it, many people in America don’t like it. Huge problem. But this is very short range. If you look at the long range, the ability of Israel to eliminate Hamas — and it can be done — if we will take control of the whole Gaza Strip. It’s the entrance that they will run to. We slowly, slowly, we [will] find every one of them, either they will be arrested or will be killed, and it will be clear that Hamas is not an organization which is controlling Gaza. Yes, there are people who believe in Hamas. There are people with some Kalashnikovs and RPGs. From time to time, they kill an Israeli soldier.
Like Jenin! Gaza will be like a big Jenin. That will be the example that we want to achieve. Area A in the whole Gaza Strip. Someone from outside the Palestinian Authority or an Arab state, whatever, will come in, and will be responsible for rebuilding Gaza and for the civilian life. And Israel will be responsible for the security of Israel. That’s all.
So, the example that we have in mind is area A and that can be achieved. It will take between six to 12 months, but it can be achieved. The first stage will be very intensive, and then clean up. It will take time. And those who have historic vision and understand the long-range issues of Israel: how a state of eight million people survives in an area encircled by 200 million or more Arabs, and I don’t count all those who are not Arabs, Israel will have to show that there are red lines. If someone crossed them, he will not survive. And on the Seventh of October, many red lines had been crossed by Hamas. If Hamas survives, the message for the world will be, yes, we can do the Seventh of October and survive.
Makovsky:
Let me, I’m just going to continue to play devil’s advocate.
MG Amidror:
I didn’t say what is my view. I say [that] those who are for the full conquer[ing] of Gaza, this is their argument.
Makovsky:
Yeah, well, you should say what you think. It seems like you were, but please clarify if you’re not. I guess, you know, in a way, it’s a shame. It’s almost forgotten that Israel won this tremendous campaign or war, the 12-day war in June. Unbelievable. Just capped, you know, beating Hamas, Assad falling. It’s an amazing achievement.
And it seemed like there was a lot of momentum now if they could just settle Gaza, we could pivot to normalization with the Saudis. There are a lot of opportunities. But you know, if this war in Gaza is going to go on for, as you suggest, possible, for another 12 months — all that good stuff is going to, you know, be postponed, I guess.
And, you know, will Israel be able to achieve? And I guess, one other question — they, you know, you could argue, even if it’s not a complete victory, but it’s hard to argue that Israel hasn’t achieved significantly what it wanted to achieve in Gaza. The leadership has been completely wiped out. The area is in ruins. You think that alone is not sufficient as a signal to everybody? If you do October 7 to us, you know, we’re going to, we’re going to come after you. You think Hamas has to be completely wiped out?
MG Amidror:
You connected some issues together. Let’s speak about what people call expanding the Abraham Accords.
I can tell without giving any secret in public, that many of the Arab leaders which condemn Israel for Gaza under the table, tell us: ‘guys, finish the job’. The Middle East without Hamas is a better Middle East. They cannot say it, but they are saying it under the table. And as you know, under the table in the Middle East, it’s very crowded. Issue number one.
Issue number two: if we want someone, I don’t know who, to enter Gaza the day after and to rebuild Gaza, to invest in Gaza, to find people that will invest in Gaza, the, I don’t know, the $30 billion which are needed to build Gaza again. If Hamas will remain there, no one will come. Or I’ll say, if someone will come, it will be the Lebanese model. It will be the frame and Hamas within the frame, will do whatever it wants. Israel will not allow it to happen. So, no one will come in. And the people of Gaza, the Palestinians in Gaza, have to live in an unbelievable situation for the next 100 years, because no one will come to rebuild.
The only way to achieve something that will change the life of the people in Gaza is to get rid of Hamas and then maybe, I’m not sure, third parties from the Arab world and from the West world will be ready to come in and to say, okay, Hamas is not there. Let’s have a model of a Palestinian state without Hamas. We will build it together. We, the Arab states, the West, whatever money which will come, all those who are preaching [to] us not to get the Palestinians, maybe they will bring the money to build for the Palestinians.
By the way, everyone is preaching [about] what not to do. No one is telling us what we can do, what we should do, other than capitulation.
So, because of that, I think it is, you are right that it will be postponed, because the Abraham Accords cannot be expanded when we are fighting in Gaza. But after, if we succeed in Gaza, it will be much easier to expand the Abraham Accords, and it will be much stronger.
Makovsky:
What else was I going to ask? Look, I think those were my main questions. I guess, you know, obviously someone asked me last night: does the government care that, you know, Democrats here in the United States are very critical of Israel on this issue.
I apologize for the wind, for logistical reasons I had to be outside.
But it seems like at least President Trump has been very supportive of Israel. I’m not going to tell Israel what to do here. And that seems to be really what the government cares mostly about, that the President of the United States is supportive and, you know, unfortunately, leads others in the country to be more critical of Israel. So be it.
MG Amidror:
We understand that we are losing support around the world, within the Democratic Party, some within the Republican Party, around Europe. We know it. We are not blind.
But the question is, what is more important? Is it more important to stop the war, to surrender, to the demands of Hamas, to have Hamas again as the organization which is controlling Gaza and we’ll have to face a stronger Hamas within four years? And in between, from time to time, to have an operation in Gaza, because Hamas is gaining strength, and we will have to stop it somehow?
All those who are now preaching us [to us] will not support us when we will do it, that I know in advance. So, the question is, if there is no good solution, what is the less bad solution?
Is it a less bad solution, to get rid of Hamas and then to deal with all the problems that we are facing around the world within the unbelievable coalition of extreme liberal and extreme jihadists? And without Hamas near our border. Or to have Hamas near our borders and to gain some support, not within this coalition, this coalition was lost, but within friends of Israel — in the Republican Party and maybe some Democrats. I don’t have a clear answer because it’s [there are] two bad alternatives. But I think that for those who look, as I said, for the long-range, getting rid of Hamas is more important.
Makovsky:
Two other questions I have. One is, and I know you mentioned it, and we talked about, but I think it’s worth addressing again, which is, again, there are those who say: make a deal. Get the hostages back. We owe it to the hostages, you know. And we got to get them out. And you know, we’ll have to go back into Gaza maybe in a year or so, but we got to get these hostages out.
Now, would your argument be, ‘well, that sounds better, because, but we said we [would] go back in before Sharon, when Israel disengaged from Gaza, said we’ll go in if there’s one missile, but Israel never went in, and there’s such international criticism now [that] it’ll be even worse in a year. Is that… is that your [view]?
MG Amidror:
I have the experience of three retreats of Israel. One in Oslo from the West Bank and out of Gaza. One from Lebanon. And the third from Gaza, the unilateral retreat by Ariel Sharon.
In all these three retreats, the cabinet, the leaders, everyone said it clear and loud and no question: if we will face terrorism from the other side of the line, we will blah, blah, blah, blah. Rabin said it… Barak said it, everyone said it. No one did it. In the West Bank, we had to wait. almost two years till we had, in one month, 122 people killed. It means 1500 a year.
Only, then Ariel Sharon, the big Ariel Sharon, the big general, only then it moved to the West Bank. Ehud Barak never did it in Lebanon, only his successor did it. Once [unclear], did it, it was a failure, a huge failure. And look at Gaza. Ariel Sharon declared what he will do. Ehud Olmert was after him, and we had five or four operations. None of them was a great success. And we got the Seventh of October. So, with all due respect to all those who are promising us that, guys go out and the minute that they do something, we will stand behind you — at the end of the day, they will not stand behind us. They will stand in front of us and say: stop.
Makovsky:
One last question. Do you think the United States has put enough pressure? I mean, there, well, let me put it this way. Are there pressure points in Hamas that we really haven’t tried after all this time? I mean, for instance, one that comes to mind would be Qatar, right, and Qatar, it didn’t ever impress me that the Biden administration pressured Qatar. And it doesn’t seem like this administration, the Trump Administration, has done that either. And obviously there are a number of senior officials in the Trump administration with various ties to Qatar in the past. What’s your assessment on that?
MG Amidror:
I think that Qatar is an enemy of Israel. It’s a very smart enemy. They’re not launching rockets and missiles into Israel, but they’re doing everything around the world to delegitimize Israel.
They are standing with the money behind many demonstrations around the world against Israel, in many academies in the United States of America.
I’m not sure that they are putting a real pressure on Hamas. I don’t know. I’m not saying that. No, I don’t know. What I know is that they are still having the leaders of Hamas in Qatar. They don’t say guys, either you are negotiating honestly, or we are expanding all the leadership of Hamas from Qatar. Kind of an example, what measures had not been taken by Qatar against the operations of Hamas. A day will come, and we will have to do something with Qatar. They have too much influence in the West, in America, in Washington, in many countries in Europe. They’re buying everyone, now paying everyone. They are putting huge money everywhere. And by that, they have too much influence, and they are enemies of the State of Israel.
Makovsky:
Any concluding remarks about this issue that we didn’t discuss?
MG Amidror:
I must say that in Israel, the argument is huge. Because of the huge sentiment which exists here for saving the hostages, the whole issue is very, very, very, very sensitive. And the Israelis, in spite of the huge price that we paid during the war and despite the huge success that we had in Lebanon and in Syria and in Iran and in Gaza as well.
The fact that we still have 20 hostages in the hands of these barbarians is a huge issue. I’m not judging it, just describing it. It’s a huge issue. And it is part of the dialogue within the cabinet, and it makes the decision about Gaza much more complicated.
Makovsky:
By the way, on that. I mean, I don’t know the last poll I saw. I don’t remember, it was the other week, it suggested almost 70 percent of Israelis want a deal to end the war and get back all the hostages. In the cabinet, I don’t know the reports I was just reading this afternoon: Aryeh Deri expressed sympathy for General Zamir’s position, which was in opposition to taking over Gaza. Besides him, I don’t know if there’s really, is there really any other dissent within the cabinet on this?
MG Amidror:
No, even in the polls, they don’t put in the question the second half. [All that] you describe. But Hamas remains the force which is controlling Gaza from now on. They don’t put it. So, everyone is for releasing the hostages, no question. Everyone is for [the] soldiers [to] go back home, no question. But they don’t put the condition that the consequence of that will be that Hamas will remain the force controlling Gaza. So, in a way, it is a poll without [a] real question, because what they offer is not connected to the reality.
Makovsky:
You know, one last question. I’m sorry. Geoffrey Corn is a fellow with us and asked this, and then we’ll conclude. He asks: will the proposed occupation, in your opinion, mitigate the many problems related to humanitarian assistance, instead of facilitating such assistance, doesn’t this shift responsibility for providing for essential needs to the IDF?
MG Amidror:
If the IDF will take the whole Gaza Strip and will declare a military regime, they will have the obligation to support the population. But if it will be kind of a war area, in which there is [a] continuous [continuation] of the war, then the civilians, we will have to take care of only their humanitarian aid and be sure that they are not involved in the war, that they are not under fire from both sides. So, it is a totally different, totally different situation.
Makovsky:
How do you, also, just on that — a follow-up on what Geoff Corn wrote. As you know, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which Israel was instituting, which actually was based somewhat on some JINSA ideas that we put out a year and a half ago — the idea to separate, make sure, to try to get the distribution of the aid outside the hands of the UN in [and] Hamas…
MG Amidror:
That is the idea. That is the idea. It [does] not [work] completely. It’s not full. Hamas tried to stop the people who [are] coming and to take [it], they are looting from the people which are getting it.
So, to achieve a real change, you have to separate between the population and Hamas. And now, Hamas, most of the population, or at least more than half of the population is not more in the area which is, which is controlled by Hamas. So, to make there a separation between Hamas and the population is very, very hard.
Makovsky:
Do you think Israel is going to continue to try to make that work?
MG Amidror:
Yes, they are speaking about broadening the number of those centers after moving the civilians out of the area, which is controlled by Hamas.
Makovsky:
Yeah. You mean those centers, you mean, America, would also be helping set up some more centers.
MG Amidror:
Yes, yes yes. They have, I think, four, and they want to have 16.
Makovsky:
Okay, you have to have that improved security along with that.
MG Amidror:
Yes, yes, yes. But if you separate, you do it in an area which is not under control of Hamas, it is much, much easier.
Okay, I want to add one remark, which is: there are efforts now to put pressure on Hezbollah to disarm. And I think that what the Americans are doing is a very good job. And it might happen. Against all odds and all, all of us, veterans of Lebanon, who don’t believe that Hamas will give up. But it might happen, because Hamas is in a very bad situation, never was in such a situation. It lost the connection to Iran, because Syria is out of the bridge, and there is no bridge without Syria.
It might happen. The big problem is how we, I mean, the United States of America, [are] monitoring Iran and [taking] all the steps which are needed not to let Iran [go] back to the same situation that it had been before the 12 days, meaning that they have an alive and successful nuclear project. They have the ability to produce long-range missiles in big numbers. And they have anti-air defense systems to defend all these efforts.
Today, they don’t have the anti-air defense. They lost most of their ability to produce missiles and half of their ability to launch missiles. And they probably had been pushed a few years back in the nuclear project.
We have to make sure of both. After the price that we paid, the United States of America and Israel, to achieve this goal, [we must ensure] that we are not going back, and the Iranians are not using the fact that we are very satisfied with what was achieved to rebuild their capabilities. It’s very important. Strategically, it’s more important than Gaza.
Makovsky:
Yeah, we put out a paper at JINSA at the beginning of July, saying: not over. And we listed triggers that if Iran does certain actions. I encourage everyone to look on our website about it. It’s only a few pages. What, certain Iranian actions that should trigger Israeli military or American military intervention to counter. But I agree with you.
We’ll be following that. We’ll do a webinar on Lebanon soon. What’s going on there has been really impressive to watch. Look, I want to thank you General Amidror. I also want to thank you for wearing JINSA colors with your JINSA shirt. I want to let everyone else know on[line] that you all could have a free JINSA shirt if you go on one of our delegations to Israel, so please let our office know.
MG Amidror:
It’s a very expensive shirt.
Makovsky:
That’s true. Very comfortable and very durable. I’ve had them for a few…they last for years. All right, General, thank you very much, and we wish you a good night in Israel.
MG Amidror:
Thank you very much.