Transcript: Webinar – Iran at a Crossroads: What’s Needed Now for Regime Collapse?
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
Elliott Abrams
JINSA Iran Policy Project Member; Former U.S. Special Representative for Iran
Mehdi Parpanchi
Executive Editor, Iran International
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for joining us for this webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s vice president for policy. We’ll be speaking today about regime dynamics and the possibility of regime change in Iran. What the current US and Israeli joint operations mean for the future of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
If you haven’t yet, I’d highly recommend checking out the webinar that we had yesterday talking specifically about those operations: what is happening in Iran, around the region, the U.S. and Israeli cooperation. We had a terrific cast, including former CENTCOM Commander Gen Frank McKenzie, Gen Yaakov Amidror, and former Israeli Director of Operations, MG Oded Bassiuk. You can find that on our website, where you can also find the daily updates that our terrific policy team is putting out every day, catching up with what has been going on in this momentous military campaign.
Today we’re focused more on what is going on inside of Iran and what might happen next. I’m delighted to be joined by two terrific guests, Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations, a former U.S. Special Representative for Iran and U.S. JINSA Task Force member. Mehdi Parpanchi, the executive editor of Iran International, a terrific news source that really has its finger on everything that’s happening inside Iran, and a really amazing analyst of the situation there.
Ambassador Abrams, maybe I could start with you. We focused this webinar on the possibilities of regime change in Iran, but I guess the question remains, is this a regime change war?
Is that the goal of the United States in this operation? We seem to have different answers from President Trump at different times as to whether that is something that the United States is actually pursuing or not. How do you see it?
Elliott Abrams:
I think the President has gone hot and cold on this. I think it may be because if he calls it a regime change war period, then he’s got to do it, and then he’s got to stay with it right until the end. The way he’s doing it now is he’s giving himself a little more leeway. Leeway, for example, for other outcomes. People have talked about a Venezuela-type outcome, by which I assume they mean that someone in the regime, or some forces in the regime, would cooperate with the United States and be willing to do things very quickly, that suggests that willingness. In the case of Venezuela for example, begin releasing political prisoners right away.
Now, whether the Venezuela model is actually going to work remains to be seen in Venezuela, but the idea there would be to make a deal with people from the regime who claim that they’re leaving behind many of the worst aspects of the regime.
I think it’s very dangerous for the President to be contemplating such an outcome, because the message then to the people of Iran is completely contradictory; it’s your turn to take over the government, when the war is over, go out in the street and do it.
That is not the message of “let’s make a deal with Ali Larijani and see how far he’ll go.” So I wish the President were clearer on the view that this regime, which has been saying “death to America” since 1979 has to go, cannot be reformed, is an enemy of the United States and a dangerous force for instability in the whole Middle Eastern region. What’s strange about the current situation is that, on occasion, the President says that and then they deviate from that view.
Blaise Misztal:
Mehdi, before we talk about specific potential outcomes that we could see in Iran, let me ask you how is this operation being seen by Iranians themselves? We hear a common criticism before the campaign, at least—was there any U.S. military action would cause a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that would be seen by Iranians as an attack on Iran and would cause them to support the regime? With this campaign, starting with a strike that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and seemingly 47 other high-ranking members of this regime, how is it being seen by the Iranians? Is it being seen as an attack on Iran? Is it being seen by an attack on the regime? How are people reacting inside of Iran?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
Hi everyone. Thank you so much. Thank you so much for having me again, and it’s a true honor to be with the Ambassador on this panel. The answer to that question is a bit complicated. It depends on which Iranians you ask.
So, the regime definitely has a base of 10, 15% maximum. Of course, they are not happy with what is happening right now on the ground. Maybe you can say that they are basically rallying behind the flag. But for the majority of Iranians, that is not the case. This not only today, or after the massacre that we witnessed less than two months ago, in which they killed thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of people.
Of course, it created rage and hate, and just assuming that people will rally behind the flag is completely false. But even I would say, starting from almost a decade ago, it was completely obvious that there is no such a thing in Iran, because the vast majority of Iranian people do not see the Islamic Republic as representing them.
They are seeing it as an occupying force. I really don’t want to rely on rhetoric and talking. I’m really trying to describe the facts on the ground. So, this is not what I believe, this is not my political preference. I’m trying to be as accurate and as objective as possible. I can say with great certainty that at least for the past decade, there is no such a thing as rallying behind the flag, the Islamic Republic’s flag. People do not see this regime or this government or the political system, as a body which represents them. They see it as an occupying force.
One of the criticisms that we have been receiving all the time as media whenever we said, Ayatollah Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran. We would receive a barrage of hundreds of messages or emails on social media, that he is not the leader of Iran. He is Leader of the Islamic Republic.
So there is a distinction in the mind of millions of people, the majority of Iranians, I would say at least 80% of the people, that Iran is not equal to the Islamic Republic. If we do not get this distinction, then the analysis that we land on is not going to be accurate.
There have been so many articles, pieces of analysis, webinars, seminars, mostly in the West, saying that if there is an attack on Iran, then people rally behind the flag, no matter political preferences or political parties they are supporting.
If there is an external attack Iranian nationalism is strong and stuff like that. That is completely wrong, and I think we are seeing it today in play. Anybody who really looks at what is going on the ground will understand that people are cheering every time that the bombs land. When the news of the Ali Khamenei death was released, despite the risks that it has, because if you go out in the street and dance when the news of Khamenei’s death is released, that can be a serious risk, you can get killed for it, but people were doing it.
So I hope I answered your question that there is nothing. I mean, we must forget this once and for all. It’s not going to happen. It has been the case for the past two decades at least. This is not a new reality.
Blaise Misztal:
Mehdi, maybe I could stay with you and the theme of Khamenei’s death? Where does that leave the Islamic Republic? I think the Israelis have now said there were 48 top political, military intelligence officials that were eliminated and the opening strikes and thereafter. So a lot of the top ranks of the Islamic Republic have been decapitated. It seems that Ali Larijani has emerged as the premier spokesperson of what’s left of the regime.
What is its ability to anoint a new leader, to function, to have a chain of command? What are the different factions that are left, or what is the nature of whoever is left, that might be running the regime.
Mehdi Parpanchi:
According to the constitution, when a leader dies, Khamenei in this case, there will be a council of leadership. By law, the president is a member of it, the head of judiciary is a member of it, and a jurist from the Guardian Council is a member of it. That jurist is elected by..
Blaise Misztal:
The Guardianship Council?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
Guardianship Council, yes. There are six of them, and then another body basically selects which one. In this case, it is Arafi basically. You may have seen the pictures of Mohseni-Eje’I, head of judiciary and also Ayatollah Arafi. They are running the show now on paper, but in reality, I don’t think anybody is in charge.
What Araghchi said, Iran’s foreign minister, yesterday is very telling. In an interview with Al Jazeera, he was asked why IRGC, or Iran’s army, targeted Oman, because Oman was mediating with it and is perceived as a friendly country.
Everybody was surprised, why Oman? He answered that right now, our military is not taking orders from anyone. They are working independently based on the list of targets that they have received months ago. They are just following the orders. So they are not really listening to anybody now. In other words, that the country is not being really run by anyone. It is just day-to-day going.
Larijani, I don’t think he has that much power. It has never been the case, especially now. He is the head of the Security Council, of course, but he’s not the one who is pulling the trigger. If you really ask me, who is in charge, I would say no one. And that is not necessarily a good thing. It is mayhem and specifically because everything is being targeted.
Now, the bombing is so intense. Actually, as we are speaking, in the past half an hour, an hour, Tehran is under very heavy bombing. It has never happened in the past couple of days. Apparently Iran’s parliament is targeted as well.
I have not received confirmed reports, but it looks like the parliament is bombed. So it looks like Israel and the U.S. are trying to collapse the political and military infrastructure. So, I really don’t think, by this rate, this regime can continue that long. In terms of the regime infrastructure, it is collapsing. It has already collapsed, I believe, really, because nobody is in charge.
Pezeshkian never had power really, as a president. I guess everybody knows here. There is no one who has that authority. Famously, Pezeshkian, after the 12 Day War, some of the people here may remember, when he was giving a speech, and he said that my biggest worry was that if they target Ayatollah Khamenei, what will happen? Because it was obvious to me that then we will fight with each other, there will be infighting. This is what Pezeshkian says, right?
I always say that we have to believe politicians, and in this case, I believe him. I think now there is really an infighting. People are having one eye in the sky, and they can’t do anything about it. Bombs are landing. There is absolutely no air defense. The footage that we receive, and I’m sure you have seen, Israeli and US aircrafts are flying in very low altitude. I mean, people can see it. That tells you that there is basically zero air defense. So, there is one eye is in the sky, the other eye is on the ground, because they are extremely afraid of the people, when they will take two streets. So that is a source of worry for them.
In the meantime, even Khamenei, two months ago, two years ago, if he died, natural for natural causes, there will always be a power struggle inside the system. It is happening now again. So we all knew that when Khamenei dies, the system will enter into crisis in terms of who is going to be the next. Imagine that it has happened now, when, as I said, the system has one eye in the skies and one on the ground, and they are being basically targeted or threatened from everywhere.
Blaise Misztal:
Can you say a little more Mehdi about what the different factions that might be fighting over leadership of what’s left of the regime? Is it moderates versus hardliners, as people like to talk about here in Washington? Is it more theological elements versus the IRGC? Who’s buying for control?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
It is among the elites which are running the system now. So called ‘hardliners’, or those who were running the show so far. They do not think the same. It doesn’t mean that some of them are moderate.
When you are talking about Iran, you are also talking about a massive business. I mean, Iran’s GDP is half a trillion. When you think about the purchasing power parity [PPP] it’s like, in U.S. terms, about three or four trillion dollars every year. That is a massive, massive business. Nobody would like to lose that power. So when I say infighting, it doesn’t mean that it is a fight over ideology. It’s pure power. It’s human nature.
Now there are rumors. I don’t necessarily believe it, but Ali Larijani, that you mentioned, he has a brother, Sadiq Larijani, who used to be the head of judiciary. People used to say that he might be the next leader. You know, there are plenty of people that people have been talking about. One of them was Sadiq Larijani. Now we hear that Ali Larijani is trying to push for Sadiq Larijani, and another faction is pushing for Arafi. So, it is obvious that whenever Khamenei was gone, this would have happened. It is happening now in the worst situation that the Islamic Republic could imagine, or could not even imagine, because nobody really thought that this would happen.
Blaise Misztal:
Ambassador Abrams, given that description of sort of the chaos and infighting inside the regime, what does that suggest for the possibility or likelihood or desirability of the Venezuela solution that you’re referring to in your earlier comments. Does it make it easier for the United States to find someone, anoint someone, to take this over? How should we think about it?
Elliott Abrams:
I think it makes it very difficult, because you don’t know who to talk to. At some point this war will end, days, weeks, a month. Then there will actually need, probably, to be a discussion with someone in Tehran, for example, saying, are you willing to say you won’t try to reconstitute the nuclear program and will now let the IAEA inspect fully?
There are many other obvious matters to discuss, the missiles being another. Now, this is a discussion that many people will wish to have. We will. But what about all the Gulf Arabs? Qatar and Oman, I think, would have told you, we have a perfectly decent relationship with this Iranian regime, and they won’t hit us.
It’s really been interesting to me to watch. First Iran. Now Hezbollah. Hezbollah, we talk about sometimes wars of choice. Hezbollah’s attack on Israel is the clearest war of choice I can think of. They decided to drag Lebanon into this conflict.
It’s an invitation to the Israelis, of course, to smash Hezbollah even more, which may turn out to be a very, very helpful thing for the government of Lebanon. But take the Omanis, Qataris, Saudis, Emiratis, Bahrainis. What is their relationship with Iran going to be if this regime survives in some form?
Now, if there’s a kind of revolutionary change that’s different. The people who are guilty of having ordered these attacks will be gone. But if you look at the Venezuela model, and they’re still there, or almost all of them are still there, controlling the army, controlling the Revolutionary Guard. What is the relationship? How can these people really speak to each other after attacks, and not only on a U.S. basis, not only on military targets, but now economic and civilian targets.
So this question of who do we talk to, and what kind of conversation can it be outside of a real change of government, a real change of regime, is, I think, a very difficult one.
What does Mohammed bin Salman or Mohammed bin Zayed, want to say to Ali Larijani today? Presumably that you’re a criminal. So the future of all those relationships, I think, is not only ours, but all of those, it’s very difficult if the regime does not fall.
Blaise Misztal:
Let me ask you Ambassador, maybe about another potential scenario, and then would love to hear from Mehdi what he thinks of it as well. I think one of the other criticisms that we hear a lot in Washington, other than the rally around the flag scenario, is that the IRGC will take over, and you’ll get someone worse than before. Do you see that as a possibility or a concern now?
Elliott Abrams:
Well, I’ll go first. Well, you’d have to define “worse than before”. I mean these people have just murdered what is probably 10s of 1000s of their own unarmed citizens. So what are you going to get that’s worse? This is a regime that’s been killing Americans for decades. What are you going to get that’s worse than that? This is a regime that has attacked all its neighbors. So, I don’t take the “oh, it will be worse” seriously.
I’ve heard the theory that what you’ll get is a military dictatorship. That is, somebody will be called the Supreme Leader. You won’t be supreme at all, not in the way Khomeini and Khamenei have – maybe not so much Khamenei since last June, but for most of the period – been able to give instructions to the army, to the guards, to a person like Soleimani, and know that they would be followed.
So you’ll get a kind of theological cover for what is a military dictatorship, people who said it would be like Pakistan. That is not, from the American point of view, worse than the current regime, and it is conceivable that it will be a less aggressive regime with respect to its neighbors. I think the question is whether it will be better or worse was the same from the point of view of the Iranian people.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, what’s the possibility of us ending up with but just another form of some sort of autocratic regime, maybe just led by the IRGC or other elements.
Mehdi Parpanchi:
I agree with Mr. Ambassador. I really can’t see that a faction of IRGC, or IRGC, will rule the country. They have targeted 11 countries. I’m sure the people here know the names of the countries that they’ve targeted. And it’s not just military bases. They’ve targeted airports, hotels, shopping centers, energy, oil fields and everything, and it’s a massive disruption. It was obvious that they will do it, because they said that they will do it again. When they talk, you have to listen and you have to believe it, and they’ve been saying it for the past seven, eight months, after 12 Day War of June that this time around, if it happens, they will target all these countries.
The reasoning behind it was that we will make them go and beg Trump and Netanyahu to stop the war. So mass disruption, but I really think that it backfired. It’s not going to happen. There is a strong possibility that the Saudis may join the war. I believe if they do, the UAE will do the same. There might be some other countries. I don’t really know how helpful they will be.
Do the U.S. or Israel need their help or no in terms of the military? Maybe not, but when they commit themselves, I think it will be almost impossible to imagine that a part of IRGC or a part of the current regime is going to be the future of Iran.
I think the Islamic Republic is not going to be the future of Iran, because inside Iran, in terms of the Iranian public, as Mr. Ambassador just mentioned, they killed thousands of people. The official figure is 3117, [they killed them] less than two months ago. When they say 3117, this is the official figure released by Iran’s president’s office, that’s a fraction of the reality. I mean, I’m sure your audience know that it’s more than 30,000. President Trump said 32 times. TIME Magazine said over 30. We reported 36,500, but it is obvious that it’s 10s of 1000s of people. That kind of killing changes the social contract between the population and the political system. That has no legitimacy. It’s not going to continue.
When you look at the regional relationship of the Islamic Republic and other countries, when you target 11 countries within a matter of three days, those countries are not going to trust you.
Iran launched more than 500 drones towards UAE. This is according to the official figures released by the UAE defense minister. If I’m not wrong, more than 300 ballistic missiles. They have ballistic missiles today, and they are not hesitating to shoot them towards all these 11 countries. Tomorrow, in five years time, if they have any other military means which is more powerful than that, they will still shoot it.
So these countries are not going to really trust, especially IRGC because your question was about IRGC, I think that’s not going to happen, specifically IRGC. If you say civilians, maybe there can be some sort of scenario. But even if it happens, let’s say Larijani, Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, whoever, they send the message to the White House and they say that we want to talk. What shape or form is that talk is going to have? They have to say we’ll stop fighting. We’ll stop our nuclear program. We’ll stop developing our missile program, and we will stop hostility towards Israel.
I assume there will be another term in it, that there will be an election in the next two months or next three months. I don’t think this is going to be in the terms of that kind of agreement. The moment this happens– I believe it’s impossible to happen, but let’s say if that happens, then millions of Iranians will take to the street because you surrendered.
What are they going to do when that energy is released in the society, in the country? They are not going to be able to shoot them and send them back home. That will not be acceptable, because they just signed a treaty, or whatever you name it, with the U.S. That’s what they want to do with the people. The Islamic Republic will transform and will change within a few months. If there is a free and fair election, you will not see Larijani
Elliott Abrams:
I was at a session this morning with a bunch of Middle East think tank people, and the general consensus of the group was quite pessimistic. That is, not agreeing with your view, my view, which is more optimistic, with saying no, no, no, it will. People are not going to go out in the street. It’s too dangerous. You can’t really ask them to do that and be murdered again in large numbers.
The regime will change. There won’t be regime change in the sense that it’s a whole new crowd, almost a revolutionary change. The regime will change. Some names will change. This institution will have more influence. This institution won’t. But fundamentally, the same people are in power.
Now, in Venezuela, I would say the President has accepted that temporarily. When you hear the Secretary of State talk about it, he says where are we heading? We’re heading for an election. I think that’s right, this is a transitional period. The political opening will get larger and larger. There will be an election, I think, next year, and that will be the end of the regime, formally and really.
The problem is, when you listen to Secretary Hegseth today. What do we want? What are the war aims? No nukes, no missiles, no proxies. He doesn’t ever mention the Iranian people being able to govern themselves. He doesn’t use the word democracy, which I think is a problem.
Blaise Misztal:
Go ahead, Mehdi.
Mehdi Parpanchi:
I think they have repeatedly said that they will leave it for the Iranian people to decide. If it’s for the Iranian people to decide, then I don’t think Iranians will accept the U.S. to get into a sort of a deal with parts of the current regime. We may say okay, who are Iranians? They don’t have much agency, they won’t be able to do it, which is fair enough, because if they were able to do it, then the Islamic regime wouldn’t be here now.
But then I have one question. The U.S. has said that no nuke, meaning that Natanz, Isfahan, no enrichment, zero enrichment. They have said that Iran’s missile program should be the reach of less than 300 kilometers. Also, no proxies. I think proxies, they can say we will do it, but they won’t do it. When Trump is gone, that’s a network that can be easily revived.
But the nuclear program, Larijani, Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, IRGC, let’s say they get into a deal with President Trump. What do they want to do? They want to give up the nuclear program or not? If they are going to do it, will not be acceptable for their own base. That will be the end of the Islamic Republic, because they could do it a week ago, when Khamenei was still alive. They could do it. They did not do it. I don’t think they will be able to do it today, to give up the nuclear program. So I think it is a Mission Impossible.
It doesn’t matter whether the US government will be willing to go to a Venezuela sort of scenario, or not. It is not possible. I actually wrote a piece about this, that Iran is not Venezuela, and I still believe Iran is not Venezuela. It doesn’t matter if people want to apply some sort of a Venezuela formula to Iran or not. It is not applicable. It won’t happen.
Elliott Abrams:
You know, I would just say again, the Venezuela model may fail in Venezuela too. That is, the Venezuelan people may not accept this. Maria Corina Machado, the leader of the opposition, said yesterday, she will go home in a few weeks. What is the regime going to do? Block her? Can’t do that. Allow her to come home? Can’t do that. So, I mean, it’s difficult to see how this works.
I’m struck by your comment about the inability to make this agreement, for example, to give up the nuclear program because Khamenei is dead. It reminds me of Khomeini. Who else could have made the decision to end the Iran-Iraq war?
At that point, the early history of the regime, he had the legitimacy, and only he, to say we have to bring it to an end now and accept whatever pain it gives us. Maybe Khamenei, as you were saying, a week ago or a year ago, the pain of sanctions is too great on the people of Iran. Let’s give up the nuclear program. We can revisit it in another lifetime.
I think this is a very powerful point, that whoever is a supreme leader will be brand new and untested and maybe even unknown. The other authorities will really not have the legitimacy in their system, not for the people of Iran, but in their system, to say, we abandon this, we sacrifice this, we abandon this. We give up our ideology of spreading the revolution. What is left? I think that’s a powerful point that should be conveyed to President Trump too, if the administration is expecting to do that kind of deal with a new leader.
Mehdi Parpanchi:
One of the reasons that Khamenei himself could not get into a deal with the US, with Trump, was that he repeatedly said it many, many times that Trump has Qassem Soleimani’s blood in his hands. Now Trump has Khamenei’s blood in his hands.
So, whoever the next leader, if there will be a leader or any other civilian, Larijani, Pezeshkian, whoever. Let’s think about a Venezuela scenario. Whoever is in charge cannot give up a nuclear program when Khamenei is gone.
I don’t think it is going to happen. I mean, politics is, of course, the realm of impossible becomes possible sometimes. But we need to look at various elements inside that system, because whoever does it will lose legitimacy for that 10 or 15 percent of the base that Islamic Republic has momentarily.
Blaise Misztal:
So I realized that I made a slight oversight or omission, Ambassador Abrams, when I introduced you at the beginning of this webinar. Not only in the first Trump administration, were you the special U.S. Special Representative for Iran, you were also the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela. So if there is going to be an authority on the possibility of a Venezuela deal for Iran. Surely, there’s no one greater than you.
Mehdi if I understand what you’re saying, if there is some continuation of the Islamic Republic, it’s not going to be able to give President Trump the deal it wants. So the Venezuela model falls apart on that basis. Also, you seem to be saying that the genie is already out of the bottle, that the Iranian people are not going to accept some continuation of the Islamic Republic. They are going to take to the streets at some point. Is that accurate? You think that the calls of President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu for the Iranian people to take destiny into their own hands. Do you think they will heed those calls?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
There are plenty of unknown actors. We don’t know what happens tomorrow, but I believe if people feel that it’s safe, they will be out in the street, even if they think they don’t feel that it’s safe. Because what we have seen in the past two months, to be honest with you, a few days after that massacre, I really thought that this a kind of insurance policy for them for the next couple of days, because people will be scared. This is going to create a kind of fear that people will not be able to do anything there, but that will basically paralyze people.
But I was wrong. A week, 10 days after that, we saw that there are protests. People were in all those funerals, then on the 40th day anniversary, and then in the university protests. We saw that people came out again with even more radical slogans. I mean, they burned Iran’s flag. You know that there is an Allah in that flag. You know that you can get killed for that, because by law they can basically say the death penalty, because you are burning the name of Allah, that’s what it is. Doing it inside the university campus, they are not doing it in a neighborhood that people wouldn’t know who these people are. They are university students of that university. So it’s very, very easy to find out who that person was. There are all loads of footage and videos.
So the courage that we witnessed, I think people are waiting. What we see now, by the comments on social media, the videos that people are releasing, the videos that we are receiving, the messages that we are receiving.
I am confident that if Trump, if Netanyahu, if Prince Pahlavi, call people to come out, and I’m sure they will do it whenever it is safe, at least somehow safe, then people will definitely listen and will come out. I have no doubt.
Even now, although Trump said it a couple of times, including this morning, stay at home, do not come out, it is not safe. He said it today. Prince Pahlavi said it. Netanyahu, I haven’t heard from him. But they are repeatedly saying do not come out. It’s not safe.
Watch what was happening in Mashad today. And Mashad is not that hard because it’s really remote. It is very, very far away from the Persian Gulf and also from Israel. That’s maybe the most remote place. It’s not easy to reach Mashad. It was hit, its airport and other places. It was not hit like Tehran, for instance. People were out in the streets. Just to sum it, sum it up, I believe, yes, people will come out,
Blaise Misztal:
Ambassador Abrams, if there is this real possibility of people taking to the streets and trying to take Iran’s destiny into their own hands, what should the U.S. be doing now to support that and support that leading to both a better and a stable political outcome.
Elliott Abrams:
There are some things that the U.S. should have been doing on the question of broadcasting. For example, we’re very fortunate that Iran International is there because American official broadcasting has been undermined by this administration. Radio Farda and Voice of America, the budgets were cut, people were fired. They’ve tried recently to restaff, but we’re certainly not where we ought to be in the U.S. government in [terms of] broadcasting in Farsi through Iran. Secondly, the efforts that have been made on the internet. Again, we’ve been doing that. The question is whether it’s been adequate. That is, efforts to make sure that Iranians can hear the news and communicate with each other, and as we know the regime has been desperate to prevent them from communicating with each other and has taken down the internet repeatedly.
There is another question there, in your question, that’s the most difficult one for the President. What if the fighting in a few days is very significantly diminished? That is, the bombing is quite diminished. Iranians come out in the street, and the IRGC or the Basij or the regime starts to repeat what just happened and kill people in large numbers, particularly if the President has repeated “now’s the time”. What is the responsibility of the United States?
My own view would be that if we have encouraged this, we have a responsibility not to abandon the people who come out now. That may mean recommencing the campaign against the elements of repression. I’m very glad to see that our targets today, in all of this campaign, are not only the nuclear and missile sites, but also the institutions responsible for internal repression, which have been severely damaged in many parts of the country. I think if the regime, the remnants of the regime, start that up again, then we should continue, start or start up or intensify our attacks on them.
Blaise Misztal:
I’ll point out that back in January, when these protests first started up, and when President Trump made his first promises of assistance to the Iranian people, Mike Makovsky and I wrote that in addition to strikes against the organs of oppression in Iran. The United States should lend aid to the Iranian people to defend themselves, including supplying them with weapons. But Mehdi, that leads me to ask, the major armed element inside of Iran, other than the state, is the Kurds. What are you seeing happening in Kurdistan? What is the possibility of some sort of armed action by the Kurds, and what would that mean for the future of Iran?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
Well, soon, Israel, are bombing all IRGC compounds or police stations or passage stations in Kurdistan, in most of the cities, and also in Tehran. I think it’s important to understand what is happening right now in Tehran, that they are bombing all police stations, all IRGC stations, and I’m talking about small stations. I’m not talking about the big headquarters. They were also attacked, and most of them are gone, but now it’s neighborhood by neighborhoods. That’s what we believe Israel is doing, just to basically diminish or eliminate Iran’s IRGC, and also Basij, which are responsible basically for killing Iranians.
If there is another round of protests, they are supposed to come out and stop people from protesting. There are pictures that today I saw that now IRGC and Basij members are having tents in the street and based in tents rather than in the buildings, because they are being bombed. That’s why I’m saying that the country is basically in complete mayhem.
The bank of targets that they have is so, so massive that they are targeting neighborhood by neighborhood, the Basij stations, the police stations, and this is happening in Kurdistan as well. So in most cities, but specifically focused in Tehran, and also in Kurdistan. So, we don’t know, but I can see, perhaps by the end of this week, we may see Peshmergas basically entering Kurdistan from Iraq. You said that they are stationed inside Iran. They are not. They are mostly in Kurdistan. But I can see Kurdistan may fall soon. If it happens, then that means Islamic Republic is losing territory. Parts of the country will fall. This is a big if, but I can see it. I believe it may happen.
We have reports that the Kurdish groups, I’m sure you are aware, last week, five major British parties had a conference and unity conference. They are merging the Peshmerga troops that they have, and the specific goal that they announced was that they will take control of Kurdish territories when the central government falls. That’s what they said in that document. So I believe it can be, perhaps it’s not too far away, maybe end of this week, early next week, this can happen because the footage that we receive and also the bombing that we see in Kurdistan is unprecedented.
Blaise Misztal:
For more on that coalition announcement by the various Kurdish parties in Iran, I’d commend an analysis by my colleague Giran Ozcan, the JINSA fellow for Kurdish Affairs who wrote about that last week, which you can find on our website.
Mehdi, with just a couple of minutes that we have remaining, let me ask you about the nature of the opposition in Iran, and the lack, at least heretofore, of any sort of unified Iranian opposition, the disagreements between various Iranian factions.
Is that going to potentially complicate or undermine the possibility of the Iranian people, if and when they come to the streets, of having a say and being able to topple this regime? Does it matter if the opposition unifies or not?
Mehdi Parpanchi:
It doesn’t matter really, because like it or not, the reality is that what we have seen in terms of the street power that political parties or political actions people have, Pahlavi has been basically commanding these streets. No one else, not even close to it. People can have different opinions about himself, whether it’s a good option or not, whether monarchy is better or a republic.
Those are very legitimate debates, but the reality on the ground is that people are basically chanting his name only, both inside the country and outside the country.
Unity is good, of course, but at the end of the day, you have two, maybe three, major forces. You have those who are seeking a republic, those who are seeking a monarchy, and Federalists. Some people say they are separatists. Let’s say they are Federalists. They are seeking kind of an autonomy for mostly Kurdistan. There are other minorities as well. I myself, I am Azeri. So I am a member of one of those ethnicities actually in Iran.
The reality is that only Kurdistan has the power. The other ones, Azeris, almost none. Baloch, not that much, really. There are some armed groups, but I don’t think they will be able to really do anything specific. Arabs again, some but not that much. Kurdistan will fall, I believe. It’s an accident waiting to happen. That’s for sure. What will happen next is another story.
When you look at this, people who want monarchy, those who want Republic and those who want federalism. I mean, you are looking at two major projects. Monarchy, you cannot marry it with a republic. These are two different projects and uniting them means nothing. How do you want to unite the Republic with the monarchists? That is neither possible nor necessary, as we are speaking, because they don’t have that much other power. As I said, monarchists are commanding these streets, and they are going to have the upper hand.
Blaise Misztal:
So I think we heard from Mehdi sort of two or three major things to look for in coming days, in-fighting within the regime, the Iranian people coming to the streets when it’s safe, and potentially the regime losing control of Kurdish areas in the west of Iran.
Ambassador Abrams, what are you going to be looking for in terms of U.S. policy, or that of Israel, or other regional actors that might determine what happens inside Iran?
Elliott Abrams:
I wonder one thing about communications from the United States. Will the President, for example, address the American people? Not in a Truth Social video—will he speak to the American people? Will the European allies get on board? The chancellor of Germany is here next week. The British are changing their opinion. Where will we be by the end of this week in terms of more allied cooperation? Will the Gulf Arabs, or some of them, Saudis, Emiratis, start attacking targets inside Iran? I’d look for those things this week.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, thank you very much for your time. Thank you for your analysis. I’m sure we’ll have you back on as things continue to develop inside of Iran. Thanks to all who joined us, and please stay tuned to JINSA.org for all the analysis on all the latest developments. Thank you and have a good afternoon.