Transcript: Webinar – Iran Talks Deja Vu
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
Stephen Rademaker
JINSA Senior Advisor; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Ray Takeyh
JINSA Iran Policy Project Member; Former Iran Policy Advisor, U.S. State Department
Jonathan Ruhe
JINSA Fellow for American Strategy
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good morning and thank you for joining us for JINSA’s webinar on Iran Talks Déjà Vu. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. I’m delighted to be joined by Steve Rademaker, JINSA Senior Advisor and former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation and International Security. Ray Takeyh, a member of our Iran Policy Project and a Senior Fellow at the Council for Foreign Relations, and my colleague, Jonathan Ruhe, JINSA Fellow for American Strategy. Thanks all for being with us.
It does seem like we’re somewhat in a similar place to where we were a year ago, with President Trump seeking negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program. But of course, a lot has happened in the intervening year, and in particular in the last month or so, with major protests in Iran that President Trump supported, at least on social media, threatened U.S. intervention and support for the protesters, and then three weeks ago, stood down from those threats and said that the U.S. was going to watch what was going on.
In the meantime, we’ve seen a buildup of U.S. military assets in the region, with the Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group arriving on scene in recent days, and actually having some friction with Iran just yesterday. But at the same time, it seems that the administration has pivoted from its threats against the regime to returning to its interest in striking a deal, with negotiations set to begin, maybe on Friday, maybe now in Oman, I think is the latest, but we’ll get into all of that. Maybe just to catch us up from where we ended off with President Trump’s decision not to intervene three weeks ago, Ray, if I could ask you: what’s been happening on the ground since then? Are there still protests going on? Has the regime reestablished its grip on power? What are things like?
Ray Takeyh:
Well, Iran is gradually coming out of darkness, because for a long time there was an information blackout on the country with the disabling of the Internet and other means of connecting to the country, but now it’s largely back online, and the regime seems to have aligned [with the idea] that the protests began peacefully and they were infiltrated by foreign elements, and that’s how violence began. The regime, I think lately, has reported 3100 people killed, they include security services in that (about 400 people). Some of the human rights groups are suggesting, as of this morning, about 6800 fatalities, although that number will continue to change and likely go up, as more body counts are becoming confirmed. So this was a very substantial degree of killing that took place in a short period of time. I think it’s the most concentrated killing in the history of the Islamic Republic.
In three/four weeks, about 7000 people, at the very least, have been killed. More people were killed during this particular uprising (three weeks) than they were during the course of the Iranian Revolution (which took a year and a half to unfold). At least twice as many [people killed], if not three times as many. So this is a very serious thing that has taken place, the regime has seemingly redeemed command of the streets after this kind of a cascade of violence, one can expect that. The underlying problems remain unadjusted: lack of economic opportunity, currency fluctuations, political repression and even water shortages, so all the problems are there. But right now, there’s a veneer of violence that has essentially covered the country.
For now, the regime has come out of this particular crisis intact, in command of the street. How long will this take? When is the next convulsion? What will provoke it? Nobody is sure, but everybody is expecting something else to come. This is a very important inflection point in the history of the Islamic Republic, and it’s one that’s very difficult to come back from. This is a regime that now moves exclusively by fear and force, and it used a lot of force to reenact the fear barrier. That fear barrier had been compromised after the June war, when Iran lost that war rather ignominiously, so now some of that domestic deterrence seems to have been reestablished, at least as of now, but we’re in a cycle of protests and repression that will likely unfold over the next couple of months.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, Ray. Jonathan: at least one of the reasons that has been given for why President Trump might have decided not to act back in mid-January was a lack of sufficient U.S. forces in the Middle East, and we’ve seen a buildup since then. Can you talk us through what the U.S. force posture is now compared to what it was a couple weeks ago?
Jonathan Ruhe:
Sure, thank you. So when Trump first issued his threat around the New Year, the U.S. had basically pulled a lot of its most capable and movable forces out of the region, particularly naval power, carrier strike groups, things like that, in order to deal with what was the unfolding situation in Venezuela. So, when Trump issued that threat, he was then told by his military advisers that the military options you [Trump] may need to carry out that threat are not ready or in place in the region itself. So that’s why we’ve been tracking the movement of this Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group into the region. And not just the aircraft carrier itself, but also a host of other U.S. Navy ships capable of launching long range cruise missiles, things like that.
We’ve also seen the administration move in F-15 aircraft to the region, specifically to Jordan, but the presumption there – and this gets to a larger issue – it’s not just the forces we have in the region, but their freedom of action to make Trump’s threats credible and also to respond to Iran’s counter threats.
So, part of the issue is that we can move forces into international waters at our own discretion, but a lot of our partners in the region where we base a lot of our land and air forces have explicit restrictions on U.S. access at those bases, not only overflying those countries to conduct operations against Iran, but also being able to use those bases at all for counter-Iran operations, other than, as I suspect is the case with the movement of our F-15s to Jordan, to intercept any Iranian drones and cruise missiles that are headed to Jordan or Israel, given Iran’s threats to broaden the war to include Israel if the U.S. does strike. So right now, we do have the Abraham Lincoln carrier and strike group in the north Arabian Sea, about 500 miles off the coast.
One of the reasons it’s so far out, beyond minimizing the operational capability of the planes that can launch, is because an aircraft carrier by itself is vulnerable. They’re not well defended by themselves, which is why they have to have the armada that Trump talks about to support and protect the carrier itself. And so we saw Iran yesterday start to gauge and signal to the U.S. that those capabilities should stay well out of range. They sent a Shahed drone, which can be used for intelligence and surveillance, but can also be a strike drone, toward the Abraham Lincoln in a not-so-subtle signal to say, it’s best you keep out of range.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, Jonathan, so Steve, against that backdrop of uneasy quiet in the Iranian streets, but build up the U.S. forces around Iran, we have the administration pivoting to negotiations that are supposed to happen on Friday. What do we know about when, where, who, or what is going to be negotiated?
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
These negotiations are very much a work in progress, and things may be changing even as we talk, but it’s unclear. There is some uncertainty about where they will take place, who will participate, and what subject matter of the discussion will be. I think this is all being worked out, but it’s being worked out in real time, with the meeting scheduled to take place in two days. Originally it was to take place in Istanbul, but the Iranians apparently have said they’d rather meet in Oman, where these would appear to be more continuation of the nuclear-related discussions, rather than a new round of discussions where other issues might be on the agenda.
The meetings in Turkey were to include the foreign ministers, of maybe as many as five or six of the other governments of the region. This would have been more like an international peace conference than a bilateral negotiation. If the meetings move to Oman, which seems to be the case, it may be that most, or all of those other regional foreign ministers are going to be disinvited, and it will end up just being a bilateral negotiation.
On the subject matter. President Trump has said he wants to talk about uranium enrichment, the nuclear weapons program, the missile program and he wants to talk about Iran’s support for regional proxies. Iran has basically said all those things are non-negotiable, and they don’t tend to make concessions on any of them. That seems to be their position going in. But on the other hand, their motivation here is quite obvious. Ever since Operation Midnight Hammer, President Trump has said he wants to go back to the negotiating table with Iran. Iran has been unwilling to do that, and I think Ray can explain some of the internal dynamics within Iran to explain their ability to sit down and talk to America following their humiliation last June.
Now suddenly Iran is interested: the obvious reason is that flotilla that Jonathan just described. Iran’s objective at this point is to forestall the threatened U.S. military strike on their country. So they have decided diplomacy is the best way to forestall that. I think their objective is clear. I don’t think they tend to come into these negotiations and make a whole bunch of concessions and sign agreements giving up any of these programs that have been so dear to them for so many years. But what they want to do is start a process.
So, I would predict they will try to lead the U.S. side to believe there’s possibility of agreement but more meetings will be required for this to happen. And of course, the meetings will stretch out over a period of time, and during that period of time, it would be inconvenient for the U.S. to conduct military strikes, because that would blow up the diplomatic process that’s being started here. So, I think that’s the Iranian strategy. It’s actually quite reminiscent of Vladimir Putin’s strategy in Ukraine: drag out the negotiations, lead the U.S. side to think that a deal is imminent, but it’s always a little bit further ahead and a few more meetings are needed to get there. The upshot is to buy a lot of time for Vladimir Putin, and that seems to be the Iranian strategy here as well.
Blaise Misztal:
Ray, how should we understand this wrangling over format: Istanbul versus Oman, bilateral versus having all these other people in the room? I guess at least they’ve agreed for them to be direct talks with the U.S., which was a sticking point a year ago. But why do these matter to Iran? What is it doing?
Ray Takeyh:
The agreement for direct, as opposed to, proximity talks—and even the proximity talks, I think, were violated— Steve Witkoff, Abbas Araghchi, would, at times, meet, go for a walk, or what have you. I think initially, the multilateral forum was to give some cover for the direct talks. In a sense, they would be conducted in a larger regional context, with other foreign ministers being present, as opposed to just the United States and Iran. So obviously they have decided to, seemingly at least as far as we know, to concede to a direct talk, as opposed to so-called proximity talks. Steve, I think, is correct in his diagnosis of the strategy — it’s not that hard to figure out.
There are a couple of things that I think the Iranians can propose. They can propose a framework for a deal, namely an agreement on principles. The principle being that Iran will never produce nuclear weapons, and the United States is committed to lifting economic sanctions. That’s an agreement in principles that the two sides could agree on. And then you have working groups to determine and actually explicate those particular principles – what does it mean not to have nuclear weapons, and so forth? These talks, as I see them, is giving everybody a way out of the jam that they got themselves into. It gives the Iranians a means that Steve suggested — to relieve pressure and essentially delay any prospective military action — and it gives the United States a way out of its own dilemma.
President Trump drew a red line. The red line was that if Iranians continue to kill their citizens, the United States would intervene. The United States did not intervene, but maybe for the logistical reasons that Jonathan thought, or whatever it was, however that came about. Then the President said he wants a nuclear deal, and so this process of negotiations — with some kind of an agreement on principles — will give everybody what they want. Their President will say that the pressure that he put on Iran got them back to the negotiating table and agreed to the principle of never having nuclear weapons. And the Iranians can actually relieve some of the international pressure that they’re on, and relieve some of their domestic difficulties. So these negotiations are a way for everybody to get out of the cul-de-sac that they got themselves into. In that sense, they do make sense.
Blaise Misztal:
To put a finer point on it, Ray, you said there’s a possibility that the Iranians would agree to a framework or agree to a process to keep talking…
Ray Takeyh:
…or principles. An agreement and principles.
Blaise Misztal:
Is there any chance they would actually agree to a deal here? Is there a deal to be had with the pressure of the United States is putting on now, seemingly, with these military forces in the region?
Ray Takeyh:
Well, I think as Steve indicated, their position on their nuclear program is that there is no nuclear program at this point. So what are we talking about? One thing that the administration could do — and I would do — is ask Iranians for the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to go into Iran and extract the 60% enriched uranium that may be buried in Fordow and transported out of the country. See if they agree to that — I suspect they will not, for a variety of reasons, but I would actually try to test this. I don’t think I require a test of Iranian intentions, but Steve Witkoff evidently does.
Blaise Misztal:
Jonathan, to continue with that question — as the name of our webinar suggests, we’ve been through this before last year with talks with Iran that yield any conclusion other than the 12-Day War. Does the administration have a reason to believe things are different this time around?
Jonathan Ruhe:
Not beyond the way out of the cul-de-sac that Ray just described, obviously the prospect of talks buys time for the Iranians. And you know, ideally would buy time for the Trump administration to think about and prepare for non-diplomatic options, if indeed, Iran — in the déjà vu that reflects the title of this webinar — goes back to doing all the things that Ray and Steve have described, which is, let’s first negotiate about what we’re going to negotiate over, that’ll buy some time. Iran will agree to the principle. We’ll agree to a deal that does not let us pursue nuclear weapons because we have no nuclear weapons program. We want a deal that allows us to continue our pursuit of ostensibly a civilian program in line with Iran’s self-declared right to enrich uranium as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
That’s all a way of saying I don’t see a deal where Iran actually agrees to do the things that would need to be done to get an acceptable deal that any of us would call that term, or that JINSA’s Iran policy project — of which we’ve all been a part of — would say is an acceptable deal. Which is Iran gives up it’s enriched uranium stockpile, the goodwill gesture that Ray mentioned, but also agrees to dismantle its infrastructure and do something it’s never actually done, but has actually wound back since the 12-Day War, which is agree to a full accounting of its nuclear program.
The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] director, who has, I think, been commendably dogged on this, has said, we’ve lost all track of it. We need to do a new baseline for Iran’s nuclear enterprise from top to bottom, especially now that I think Iran is going to continue doing what it always does, which is drag out talks and also use that time and space to build its own counter pressure. We’ve seen reports that they’re, potentially hardening a lot of their nuclear sites that were hit in the 12-Day War, potentially moving infrastructure into even more deeply buried facilities that may be certainly much harder for the Israelis and even the Americans to reach.
And then ultimately, this goes back to what Ray and Steve have said — there is no acceptable deal that’s possible as long as Iran correctly believes that diplomacy is a substitute for military options, that when Iran comes to the table, military options go off that table, and I think as we’ve discussed, for now, Iran certainly thinks that’s the case.
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
Blaise, can I try to answer your question?
Blaise Misztal:
Sure, and then I have another one for you, but go ahead.
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
Well, go ahead and ask that one then.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, you can answer both. But I guess the other one was, I think there’s always trying to read the tea leaves of what President Trump is actually thinking or actually intending. And, you know, there’s been, been some talk about, has he been playing for time to build up these military forces, to give himself better options? Is this sort of negotiations? We talked about the Iranians using negotiations to play for time, is that what he’s doing with these negotiations? Is there an ulterior motive here? Or should we believe that President Trump is now back to pursuing a nuclear deal as his key objective for Iran policy?
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
Well, to answer the question you just asked first, I think President Trump has been quite candid with the American people and the entire world. He sees himself as a peacemaker. He solved, what, eight wars? Clearly the most deserving candidate on the planet for the Nobel Peace Prize. And I think he would love an Iran deal. He would like to negotiate something. And that’s been his approach, from the day he entered office. I think it will be hard for him to resist testing this out — whether Iran is prepared to agree.
Now, to go back and answer your previous question. You know, has anything changed since the last time we were looking at negotiations? Well, you know, Midnight Hammer. A lot has changed. The last time we were talking about this, Iran had an active uranium enrichment program, they hadn’t been humiliated in the way they were, there had not been a snapback of UN sanctions on Iran. So, let me just say, if I were to do an objective assessment of Iran’s interests, set aside politics and political constraints, objectively speaking, it’s pretty obvious Iran should cut a deal here. They have had an anus horribilis here, their 45-year project to try and dominate the region and destroy Israel has been essentially dismantled, their nuclear program can be reconstituted potentially, but today it doesn’t exist, and as a result of that, their economy is in incredible shambles, which has given rise to these protests, which have required truly extraordinary crackdown.
So, I mean, the regime is very fragile. They could probably get the end of sanctions if they would promise — and we’re not looking for a promise that they won’t produce a nuclear weapon — they promised that when they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they sold that promise again when they signed the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], they would be happy to sell that promise a third time to President Trump, but we already have that commitment. What we need is, I think what President Trump has said we want, is we want them to agree to commit not to conduct enrichment and reprocessing, you know.
In other words, foreclose the pathways by which they could actually achieve a nuclear weapons capability. And that’s where they have absolutely drawn the line, consistently. They have said we will not compromise our enrichment program, it’s an inherent right. But objectively, they ought to, because it’s been destroyed, the U.S. and Israel are quite clear that if they try and reconstitute it, the program will be attacked again.
So at this point they are suffering economically in order to vindicate a right that they’re never going to be able to exercise, at least as long as Donald Trump is president. It would make sense to trade that away for sanctions relief, but if you’re one of the U.S. negotiators, you look at this and say, well, maybe, you know, they will finally come to reason on this, and recognize that it’s time to cut a deal. I’m sure that’s what’s motivating Ambassador Witkoff right now. I defer to Ray, I don’t think anyone else in the Iranian system besides the Supreme Leader could make that decision. I think anybody else who tries to do that will find their career, perhaps even their life, at an abrupt end, but maybe the Supreme Leader could do that — I don’t think he will — but rationally, objectively, that is what Iran should do, given the current state of play and the fact that the regime hangs in the balance.
And let me make one further point: we just saw this U.S. military operation in Venezuela. One thing that has surprised a lot of people is, it turns out, this was not a regime change operation. I mean, that was not the U.S. policy. Actually, the Trump administration is prepared to work with what’s left of the Maduro regime. If you’re the Iranians, maybe they can work something out with this guy, if they make concessions on the nuclear program. Apparently, missiles are harder for them, but Trump, he’s probably looking for a modus vivendi with the regime, which I think actually is consistent with the objectives of most of the other governments in the region, which are fearful of Iran going the way of Syria and becoming a source of chaos and a source of threats to all the existing governments in the region. So, I think there are a whole bunch of reasons why the negotiators hope that they can achieve a deal, but I think really to me, it boils down to, is the Supreme Leader prepared to accept the current reality?
Blaise Misztal:
I want to ask Ray whether the logic that Steve laid out is the same logic that is seen in Tehran. But Steve, maybe I can play devil’s advocate and push back against you a little bit. You talk about the 12-Day war and how that has maybe changed the calculus, but when it comes to at least the credible military threat that was certainly underscored by President Trump deciding to take action in June — has that not been at least to some degree wasted when he drew the red line, as Ray talked about in January, and then left it unenforced, despite the regime killing protesters? And doesn’t the Venezuelan example, sort of cut against the credibility of the U.S. taking action against the regime? Can’t the Iranians look at that and say, you know, he’s not interested in regime change? He’s not going to come in here and get rid of us? Whatever he does, we can weather.
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
Yeah, you know, look, I agree with all that. But if I were, you know, a senior regime official, what would worry me even more than the U.S. and the Israeli military threat would be my own people, and what are they going to do. You know, the problem is Iran needs to fix its economy. That is actually the key to regime survival. You know, the U.S. and Israel have no intention of invading Iran. We’re not going to do a Desert Storm and go in and overthrow the regime. I mean, we may try to inflict harm on the regime, and they won’t like that, that will be humiliating, but I don’t think that actually fundamentally threatens the regime.
I think until they fix their economy, it’s their own people who are their biggest threat. And the key to fixing the economy is to end the sanctions. The key to ending the sanctions is to finally make concessions on the uranium enrichment and the spent fuel reprocessing programs.
Blaise Misztal:
Ray, to that point — if the greatest threat to the regime right now are its own people, what do these negotiations look like to the people of Iran and what signal does it send to them?
Ray Takeyh:
Well, let me make a couple of points. Number one, the position of the United States today is zero enrichment. It’s also the position of the European Union. It is also the position of the United Nations Security Council. That’s what snapback essentially meant. There was a time when zero enrichment was thought of as a nutty idea embraced by a couple of JINSA guys. And as I recall, at JINSA itself at one point, there was another member of our task force who wanted to have limited enrichment for Iran, Steve Rademaker resisted that, but I think we gave into that.
Jonathan can check the record — I think at some point we gave up on zero enrichment. Now, that nutty idea, that absurd right-wing idea is in a national position codified in the Security Council resolution. So that’s the first thing. And Steve Rademaker was consistent throughout that. So that’s our position. So that’s President Trump’s position. By the way Abbas Araghchi says that’s the reality of Iran today, zero enrichment. So what are we negotiating about?
One thing, in Iran’s public diplomacy on this issue, has actually been very clever. Because they’ve been trying to separate President Trump from the Israelis, they’re pretending that United States didn’t bomb them in the June war, that it was just the Israeli’s, and they dragged President Trump in a war in the Middle East that the United States has no business waging and is consistent with his interests. So throughout, whether it’s Araghchi’s Financial Times piece a while back, or whatever else, they’ve been trying to say “President Trump, you’re being misled into a war that is going to damage your interests and your political standing by the State of Israel, and you need to be very careful with that.” That’s a very important break in the way the Islamic Republic has historically talked about the United States and Israel — the big Satan and the little Satan. So that’s an interesting part.
Second of all, prior to the June war, Abbas Araghchi actually tabled a proposal, which meant that Iran could enrich uranium, but below 3.5% or whatever it was that the JCPOA had agreed to. So, this way, Steve Witkoff could go back to Trump and say you got a deal that Barack Obama couldn’t get. So they actually have provided the administration with a talking point. Presumably, Araghchi can go back with that proposal and say “how about enrichment up to 2%, and you know, with time horizons [that] we can start talking about.” That essentially gives the United States an opportunity to declare victory. There will be a deal, it has to be worked out by technical groups — that could take 10 years. And so you begin to see how this thing can work out. I suspect that could be something that could be tabled.
How is the United States retreating from civilian protection and protecting the Iranian people? Which is the first time we actually have put the welfare of the Iranian people ahead of other things. How do they retreat from that? It’s honestly difficult for me to gauge public opinion within Iran at this point, so anything I can say will be speculative. I imagine there is a degree of disappointment with that, — [there] inevitably would be, but I don’t have any firm evidence to anchor that on in terms of gauging domestic public opinion in Iran. But certainly, when in 2013 Barack Obama drew a red line about chemical weapons use in Syria and did not honor that red line, there were a lot of people in the Republican Party who criticized that — a similar degree of criticism I have not noticed.
Blaise Misztal:
So first of all, Ray, I feel like I have to defend JINSA’s honor here and say that we never gave up on zero enrichment. I don’t think there was dissent in the task force, but I don’t think as the JINSA line we ever, we ever conceded that. And I know Jonathan and I, with Steve’s help, have engaged in many exegeses of why there is no right to enrich in the NPT and the Obama Administration claim is not withstanding. So we stand firm on that.
Ray Takeyh:
I was at the table that day, and Steve Rademaker was defending zero enrichment, which came under quite a degree of pushback.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Yeah, we issued a split decision in that paper Ray is referencing, before the JCPOA came out, and then we since reconfigured our task force to avoid any further split decisions.
Blaise Misztal:
But I guess Ray, if I could stay with you, and I realized, as you said, that understanding Iranian public opinion and where things are right now is hard, but you also said earlier that you do expect further convulsions are possible, that the regime is quite weak now. What would it do to the prospect of those further convulsions? What would it do to the regime’s strength, if there was a deal, if there was some sort of sanctions relief, if President Trump did meet with, I don’t know if it’s Khamenei or someone else, and sort of signs on the dotted line?
Ray Takeyh
Well, I suspect it will validate the Islamic Republic’s propaganda, which is as follows: we withstood sedition at home — foreign agents infiltrated and provoked this protest and provoked this violence — the regime held and the public held behind it. We went toe to toe with the United States, and now we have an agreement where they have to compromise and our principles have been recognized. So, that essentially enables the regime’s narrative.
In terms of domestic dissent, the hardest thing to do for any citizen of any country is to go out on the street and protest against a violent regime. That’s not easy, and it’s even harder after that regime demonstrated an ability and willingness to kill indiscriminately. So, whatever spirit of dissent there is — and I think it’s still there, given the underlying grievances and the massive violence that the government has used, and more bodies are going to be buried, and more commemorations will take place — but the United States and the international community giving up on the principle of right to protect within Iran is bound to dampen that spirit of resistance.
There’s just no way around it logically, and to do so for a nuclear deal that nobody believes is going to be adhered to is unfortunate, I have to say. Donald Trump, whatever you may think of him, did something quite remarkable. He stood up for the Iranian people, and then he stood back. The latter is more predictable. The latter is what you usually expect.
Blaise Misztal:
Sticking with that Ray, I mean, if the President were to take a step back forward, and go back to standing with the Iranian people, what would you want to see from him? In terms of, what more can he be doing? What more could the U.S. be doing to support the Iranian people, to be pushing on the weaknesses of the regime?
Ray Takeyh:
Well, first of all, it’s very important to acknowledge that the future of Iran will be determined by the Iranians themselves. That is, the essentially outside powers, however powerful they may be, will have limited influence. But that doesn’t mean no influence. I thought the President was well within his rights to target the Ministry of Intelligence and other Iranian repressive apparatus that was engaged in this mass killing. He did not. That would be one thing that would be important, and it would weaken the regime, and it will send a message, and it will also cause other people in the security apparatus to perhaps rethink the strategy of indiscriminate violence against civilians.
Second of all, I don’t know why we’re not, we should have an international tribunal where these people are essentially charged for crimes against humanity. And obviously, I will say we should maintain all forms of pressure, sanctions and others, and figure out the way, to the extent possible, to enable protesters against a vicious and repressive regime. Whether we do any of those — who knows. My guess is we will not.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks Ray. Jonathan, I wanted to pull on another thread that I think Steve raised in his comments, but I’m not sure we fully addressed, which is that the administration has said it wants to negotiate on a range of issues, some of them nuclear but some of them beyond the nuclear program, including the ballistic missiles and Iran’s support for terrorism. But the regime says it’s only interested in talking about nukes. Why is it important for the U.S. to address things outside the nuclear program, and why do you think Iran might be saying it’s willing to negotiate on nukes, but not on those other topics?
Jonathan Ruhe:
Yeah, it’s a really good question. First, just to start off, even though I’m not a lawyer, I’m playing one on the webinar here. To raise an earlier point about our initial task force, it wasn’t a split decision, technically speaking, it was a dissenting opinion. And then we reconfigured the task force to avoid that further dissent. So just to clarify that important point. To your question, I mean, a couple things.
You know, Iran has — the Supreme Leader — has always said, and we see that reflected in a lot of the statements coming out from regime officials, “ballistic missiles are a red line. They’re not up for negotiation.” That’s a sticking point, just like the core elements of the nuclear program. Also for the Iranians, especially with the nuclear program being set back by the 12-Day War, it remains their best point of leverage around the region, especially because the other pillar that Iran has suggested would not be up for negotiation, which is its relationship with Hezbollah, Hamas, other proxies around the region.
Of those three pillars, you know, the proxies have all been knocked down by and large, the nuclear program is sort of enshrouded or entombed right now, the missile program is being rejuvenated after the 12-Day War in a way that even I don’t think the Israelis expected last summer. It remains Iran’s, it’s not only a point of national pride at least for the regime, it’s also their best form of leverage. And so, Iran and also the Iranians have, to go back to Steve’s objective analysis, the Iranians have successfully stuck to that demand and gotten the U.S. to bend to it in past talks. It’s very interesting, when the JCPOA talks started, the Obama administration was insisting “Iran is going to have to agree to limits on its long-range ballistic missile program” — that butted up against the regime’s red line of no, we’re not, and the regime won out. So, I think they have yet to be disproven in their thesis that red line won’t hold.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve — a question for you, and then I’m going to open it up to the audience, so if you’re watching and you have any questions for Steve or Ray or Jonathan, please submit them using the Q&A function in Zoom, and then I’ll read them out. But Steve, as the administration, seemingly, is going into these negotiations, are there sort of guardrails or processes or things they should consider putting in place to avoid these being used by Iran to, as you’ve described, play for time, or release pressure, or sort of escape from U.S. military pressure? A year ago, President Trump wrote a letter to the Supreme Leader and said, “we’re giving you 60 days to reach a deal” and whether or not he planned to hold Iran to that deadline, I know Israel did, seeing as Operation Rising Lion was launched on day 61. Should we have something similar this time around?
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
Okay, I will respond to that question, first I want to add something to what Jonathan just said about the missile program and why, for the Iranians, it’s virtually inconceivable that they will make concessions on it. And its recent history — why did President Trump not actually follow through on his red line that he declared this year? From what I’ve read, it’s because Prime Minister Netanyahu called him up and said, “please don’t do this. If you do this, they are going to retaliate against us with their missiles, and we’re not yet in a position to defend against that.” And as a consequence of that, Trump backed down, and put in motion the deployment of the Abraham Lincoln that we’re seeing now.
But you don’t need to look further than that for validation, from the Iranian perspective, of the value, the critical value/critical importance, of the missile program. I mean, they would have probably experienced U.S. military strikes aimed at interfering with their ability to suppress their own domestic population, but for the existence of their missile program, which, in that case was an effective deterrent against U.S. military action. I don’t know whether it will remain an effective deterrent, but, for the Iranians, why on earth would you give away that capability when its value has just been demonstrated so vividly? So, I think that’s the reality that our negotiations will face when they try to demand from the Iranians concessions on the missile program.
On your question about guardrails for the negotiations, look, I think this is going to be very difficult because, you want a deal on their nuclear program? I mean, the JCPOA was a deal that took two or three years to negotiate it. It was hundreds of pages of text. None of this materialized overnight. A deal, a new deal that Trump might negotiate that would be better than the JCPOA? You know, airtight restrictions on their nuclear program? Maybe it can be done a lot faster than JCPOA, but, you know, it’s not going to happen the day after tomorrow when they meet in Oman. It will take a while to pull together something like that, and the Iranians will reasonably argue, “we were not prepared to sign a document yet, we need to keep talking.” Like Ray said, set up working groups, you know, a process. So I think this dynamic that the Iranians are creating is most likely to effectively forestall U.S. military action.
As long as they dangle enough in front of the Trump administration, enough hope of progress on these issues to keep our negotiators at the table, I think the threat of military force will be withheld. And the Abraham Lincoln can’t stay there forever. I don’t know what the realistic timeline is, but you know, it’s measured in weeks and maybe a month or two, not much longer than that. So, the negotiations are likely to take longer than the Abraham Lincoln can be kept in place. But, what would my recommendation be, given that reality? I would insist, before agreeing to the continuation of the process, that Iran make clear that its position is not, “we will never give up our enrichment program, we will never make concessions on missiles. We will never make concessions on our support for regional proxies.” There needs to be some evidence that, in fact, Iran is prepared to negotiate on these things and not simply talk about these things.
That’s what I would make clear, the process can only commence once Iran backs away from the talking points that it continues to use with the rest of the world, which is, “we’re not making any concessions on any of these issues. Yes, we’ll promise never to have nuclear weapons. We promised that decades ago, when we signed a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we promised to be with the JCPOA, we’ll promise it to you a third time. But beyond that, no, we’re not going to give up our enrichment and reprocessing.” If that remains their position, we should walk away.
Blaise Misztal:
Ray, if the administration is serious about these negotiations, is it going into them with the strongest possible hand? Is there anything else that the U.S. could be doing to increase its leverage over Tehran?
Ray Takeyh:
Well, first of all, as Steve suggested, if our position is zero enrichment, you don’t need technical groups for that. But I would also include in that, not just terrorism as missiles, but also, you know, domestic treatment of the citizens. Iran should be held liable for mass murdering its citizens. At least six, as far as we know today, six times as many Iranians died in this protest than Chinese did at Tiananmen Square. This is a huge mass murder that took place in the country. We just can’t pretend it didn’t happen and go back to talking about [the] gradation of uranium enrichment. It would be inappropriate and ill advised.
You can make a case, and a rather good one, that the regime that massacres its citizens like this and has molested the region as often, should not be part of a diplomatic compact with the United States, because they’re fundamentally untrustworthy and they have obviously no respect for international norms or religious convictions that they profess to base the regime on, but we’re perhaps past that sort of a thing in our national narrative. I would actually include the issue of human rights and release of political prisoners, of which the Iranians are still arresting people.
I will say [the] unconditional release of all political prisoners should be part of that conversation. There are 1000s of people. Since June, the Iranian regime has arrested 2000 people. Since June, before these convulsions, it executed 1000 people. That aspect of the regime’s behavior cannot not be part of any negotiations that the United States and the international community conducts with Iran. But, you know, whether it will be or not I have no idea.
Blaise Misztal:
Jonathan, if we were to take Ray’s point that a regime that does murder its own people in cold blood in such numbers should not be party to a diplomatic agreement with the United States, what would the alternative policy be to one that pursues nuclear negotiations with Iran?
Jonathan Ruhe:
You know, that’s a good question, and answering that question now has to be considered in light of what we’ve been discussing, which is Trump issuing a clear red line and then finding a way out of enforcing it. And, as Ray mentioned, the regime’s belief that it, you know, withstood an attempt at overthrowing, being overthrown by the United States. So it’s, you know, yes, its nuclear program is profoundly diminished. Its proxies are profoundly diminished. But to some extent, the regime does feel like it has wind in its sails.
I mean, fundamentally, the answer is to continue applying concentric pressure to the regime, doing any number of things to support the protesters, increase their ability to receive outside assistance and counteract the regime’s efforts, as Ray mentioned, to basically shut off outside access to the world’s ability to see what’s actually going on, the regime’s attempts to hide its brutality.
Steve mentioned snapback, and Ray as well — this reimposition, thanks to the determination of our European partners, to reimpose what are actually very stringent UN Security Council sanctions on Iran’s arms trade with the rest of the world, and also include very stringent enforcement mechanisms. The administration’s made some initial steps in that direction, ramping that up and leading a global effort to basically seal Iran off as much as possible from receiving a lot of reinforcement after the 12-Day war is a big element of it. And then additionally, and sort of fundamentally, making clear that Iran’s efforts to basically split it off the United States and Israel — this novel approach that Ray talked about — is not going to work.
Basically saying, as we at JINSA like to say, there is zero daylight between the United States and Israel when it comes to dealing with, certainly Iran’s ability to export instability and project power in the region, basically, you know, continue issuing the threats like it has been over the past month toward the United States, Israel, and also our Arab partners, because those have, to some extent, been effective. Basically making clear the United States and Israel have the same red lines towards Iran’s future behavior, and as Ray talked about, including, you know, continuing to insist, and making Iran believe that it cannot do again what it just did, which is conduct the most brutal crackdown in its long history of brutal crackdowns.
Ray Takeyh:
Can I just say one thing about this? There is an Iranian narrative here today that is important to pay attention to. Their narrative is, “at the end of the day the June war ended. We didn’t ask for it to end. They did.” That dictum they’re saying, ‘”hey, we didn’t ask for negotiations — they did.” So, this is why Steve’s point is so very important. The negotiations have to begin with Iran renouncing uranium enrichment, not privately, not whispering, but publicly. They have to walk back this narrative that they’re putting forth, which actually enables the regime, to some extent, domestically, in a sense that it energizes whatever limited support it still has.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, Ray, since, since you mentioned the nutty JINSA idea of zero enrichment earlier. Let me throw out another nutty JINSA idea that Mike Makovsky has written about, six years ago and earlier, which is regime collapse as the ultimate objective of US policy here, and particularly given the fact that the nuclear clock has been set back, as Steve was pointing out, and the regime collapse clock has been pushed forward. And prior to June of last year, maybe it made sense to focus on the nuclear clock that was inching towards midnight, but with that threat now pushed back, and certainly the regime significantly weakened over the last month, I think it makes sense to push on the regime collapse clock.
And part of that, as Mike has written, should be saying there will be no negotiations, there will be nothing done to strengthen the regime, to legitimate it, to suggest that it could be a partner for the United States, and thereby, to dispel whatever hope the Iranian people had that we were going to stand with them after Trump’s tweets.
Ray Takeyh:
First of all, I did agree with that nutty idea at that time. And JINSA guys are always ahead of the curve. We were for regime change before it became cool. So, President Trump has called for regime change. He said Iran needs new leaders. Now, to me, that says regime change. So, the barrier, the idea that you cannot talk about [a] collapse of the Iranian regime, because, you know, important people thinking important things don’t say those things, or don’t believe them, is behind us. And I have always thought, and I suspect other people on this webinar have thought, that the ultimate answer to the Iranian problem is a different regime. That’s certainly what the Iranian people want. At least 7000 of them, as of today, were killed trying to get that.
I don’t think that can be a position of… all decent democratic countries should have that position. It’s not about Iran’s arsenal. It’s about the regime. As long as that regime is in power, it will continue to brutalize the citizen[s], endanger the region, and menace American interests. That’s whatever compact is signed.
Blaise Misztal:
And that is a great nutty JINSA idea, right there. Maybe I can ask you all for just, last thoughts on what is going to happen, maybe in Oman, maybe on Friday, what should we expect? Jonathan, let me start with you.
Jonathan Ruhe:
So, given all the once-unthinkable events and developments that have taken place in the broader Middle East in the past couple years, I try to retain the capacity for surprise, and to have my existing assumptions completely confounded at the drop of a hat. That all being said, you know, the way everything is already playing out so far suggests that Iran is reverting to its tried-and-true playbook that has yet to be proven unsuccessful, which is what we’ve talked about: let’s start by negotiating about negotiating, and then, basically, the longer we can drag out these talks, the more time the regime has to basically dilute America’s military presence in the region and basically start eating away at whatever the Trump administration wants to come to the table with in terms of hard-headed demands.
So, we saw this last year in the spring, where Trump issued a 60-day ultimatum, and then, from the start, Iran did everything it could to basically start running out that clock, saying, “well, we just need several more meetings, and then we’ll get to a decision point,” and then when that clock ran out, “oh, we still need some more meetings.” So, I think it’s most sensible to act as if we’re going to start seeing that again, and then plan accordingly.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, what are you expecting on Friday?
The Hon. Stephen Rademaker:
So, I take that as a question — not what do I think should happen, but what do I think will happen. And, you know, we had a nice conversation about what the guardrails should be on the negotiations, but I think my prediction is that at the end of the day, the Trump administration is more eager to achieve diplomatic success than it is to use military force at this moment. You know, military force when the Iranian people were demonstrating in the streets, there was a logic for it. Events have moved forward, and I don’t think there’s the same rationale for use of force right now as there was then.
So, my prediction is that the Iranian tactic will succeed. We’ll find ourselves in a negotiating process. I’d like to be pleasantly surprised that the Iranians have looked at the new reality and recalculated what’s in their interest, but I don’t think they will, I think they’re too wedded to their conventional, or their traditional way of looking at things. So, I think we will probably, you know, I think it plays out kind of the way it’s played out with Vladimir Putin in Ukraine — I think there will be a prolonged diplomatic process, and we will be reading about meetings, working groups, and discussions, but we will all be frustrated in the end that nothing actually is emerging from it.
Blaise Misztal:
Ray — any reason to expect anything different?
Ray Takeyh:
I tend to agree with Steve. Abbas Araghchi’s purpose is to entangle America in a protracted diplomatic process. Steve Witkoff will have the chance, either to behave as previous American emissaries have acted, namely concede to that, or do something without precedent in [the] history of US-Iran diplomacy — call a press conference, say “there is no deal here, I’m going home.” I suspect that’s not going to happen.
Blaise Misztal:
Steve, Ray, Jonathan, thank you for your time and your insights today. Thank you to everyone who tuned in. This is obviously something we’re going to continue tracking closely, and I’m sure there will be more nutty JINSA ideas that end up being validated, so please stay tuned and check out jinsa.org for all our latest analysis. Thank you, everyone.
Ray Takeyh:
Thanks guys, thank you.