Transcript: Webinar – Iran’s Threat to Global Shipping: What Can Be Done?
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Former National Security Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister
VADM Herman Shelanski, USN (ret.)
JINSA Generals and Admirals Program Participant; Former Commander, Carrier Strike Group 10
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
—
TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to another JINSA webinar.
I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, and we’ll be doing an update today on Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion to learn the latest about the Iran war and where it might go from here.
I’m delighted to be joined by Vice Admiral Herman Shelanski, former Commander of Carrier Strike Group 10, which he commanded during Operation Iraqi Freedom, including in the Persian Gulf—an area that is of some interest today. And I am also joined by JINSA Distinguished Fellow and former Israeli National Security Advisor Major General Yaakov Amidror. Thank you both for being with us.
Admiral Shelanski, let me start with you. Where do you see the operation going? Do you see sort of a transition into new phases in terms of targeting and what the U.S. is focused on during its operation? Or are we still in that same phase of going after the same target set as we were in the opening days of the war?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Thanks, Blaise. Let me just say it’s an honor to be here. And you know, for those of us that have been in the Navy, carrier Navy and naval aviation throughout our careers, it seems like we always end up back in the Middle East, and specifically the Persian Gulf. I mean, even as a junior officer back in 1985 through 1988, then the first Gulf War. You know, it seems to be a replay of all of our events. And we’ve been planning for this type of event seriously for 25 years at least and have good operational plans that have been in existence and have been practiced in many different places and then different areas.
What you see today is the culmination of this incredible war machine that our Navy has put together, our Air Force and really United States Joint Force in its ability to reach out over great distances and strike precision targets and the leadership, the technology, the joint operations, the skill set of our sailors and our airmen and everyone that’s involved in this operation. You can really see it coming together.
You can really see it really being effective as we reduce the targets throughout Iran and the capabilities that they have in terms of taking, you know, layer by layer, moving in, getting rid of their air defenses, getting rid of their intelligence, getting rid of their communications. The strike packages, the joint strike packages, have been really effective. So I think we’re kind of at a turning point now, because the enemy does have a say in any type of warfare.
As they increase their threats, particularly to the Strait of Hormuz, I think we’re going to see more of a shift, if it hasn’t already happened in the last day or so, to do better, to integrate our strikes and the capability that they have—the ongoing capability that they’ve shown that they have, to take out targets within the Gulf. I don’t think it’s that far away, though, from us being effective in terms of knocking out those capabilities, even though there are thousands of them. They have launchers on trucks. It’s a tough strike problem. But our intelligence and our capability have really shown that we are able to do it.
Of course, working alongside the Israelis is just a pleasure, and with their capabilities and their ability to target and their intelligence. So, in particular, I think we’ve seen a really good thrust. We’ve seen great effects. I think we’re going to see more of that in the next couple days, up to a week.
There’s a little bit of the glitch in terms of the USS Gerald Ford, which has to go back from the front line there and go into port for a week or so for repairs. And we can talk more about that as we go on, what that may portend for the pace of the operations.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, Admiral.
General Amidror, let me ask you the same question but on the Israeli side. How do you assess the effectiveness of the operation almost three weeks in? What is the phase that we’re in? And how does Israel think about what’s going to be happening in the days to come in this war?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
You know, people are looking for phases, and I think that this is a long, planned operation. Of course, every night, Israel is making plans for the next 72 hours. But there is a list of targets which has been there for a long time, and both the Americans and the Israelis are going through levels of priorities.
It begins with the highest priority, the missile issue, the missile production. Then the nuclear program. Parallel to that, there are another two missions that should be fulfilled all the time. One is to suppress the ability of the Iranians to launch missiles into Israel and other countries around Iran, the Gulf countries. Another is to identify and kill decisionmakers in Iran. Then there is also bombing of all the infrastructure relating to the capabilities of the Iranians, the industrial economic capabilities, what you call industrial base. Everything related to the missile production, the nuclear program, everything in that list should be destroyed. And every day we are destroying more and more and more and more. And there is a long list that will be followed for the next, I don’t know, four weeks. I don’t foresee any big change in that.
What we want to achieve is to make it so the Iranians will not have the ability to go back to the nuclear project. There is one problem, the elephant in the room: the 450 kilograms of enriched uranium. We don’t know, I don’t know, where it is. And even if the intelligence knows where it is exactly, the operation to take it out is very complicated. It’s possible, but very complicated. But they cannot have the ability to resume the nuclear project, to resume the production of long-range missiles. And, all in all, they will be much weaker.
People are speaking about regime change. If you remember from the beginning, I said that this is something that you cannot guarantee by using military action. People are saying that the Mossad and the CIA are working very hard inside Iran to promote the capabilities of the opposition. Maybe. I don’t know, but either way, at the end of the day, we can guarantee—we, meaning America and Israel together—a very weak Iran.
At the end, though, we cannot guarantee regime change. This is something that should come from the Iranians. If they decide to do it, we can help them.
Think about demonstrations in which an Israeli or American asset is above the area. And from time to time, it is intervening to kill the Basij forces which try to stop the demonstrators. It’s not something which is impossible in the present situation, in which the Americans and the Israelis are controlling, fully, the skies of Iran. It is not an impossible mission to help the demonstrations. So, I don’t know what will happen with the Iranian opposition. That is not in the hands of the military guys. It is not something that you can count on. It is not something that you can plan.
What we can do, and what we are doing very systematically, is to reduce the capabilities of the regime. Whether it is destroying the Navy, the Air Force—which was always very weak—the Basij commanders and the infrastructure, everything should be eliminated as much as possible.
It’s a question of time. There was someone from the BBC here in my home, and she asked me, ‘What do you need to complete the mission?’ I said time. That’s all.
Blaise Misztal:
General, if I could stay with you and dive in a little deeper to the different elements of the Iranian regime and its capabilities that you said it’s important to destroy or degrade. Going first with the nuclear [one], I think we’ve seen some strikes on the nuclear program, but there are some thorny issues.
There’s, as you said, the actual enriched uranium, and whether it stays in Iran or trying to get it out. That is thorny. But there are also sites that are hard to hit, like Fordow, which was hit in Operation Midnight Hammer, but we don’t know if it was fully destroyed. There’s also a new facility at Pickaxe Mountain, which is supposedly even more fortified, but maybe not yet operational.
Is there planning between the U.S. and Israel about how to get at some of these hardened nuclear sites to make sure that Iran has no nuclear capabilities at the end of this?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
These two examples that you gave can be done only by the Americans. We don’t have the heavy bombs that you have. And both sides are planning everything together. They can sit and decide to act again to destroy a site. It was done in Natanz, which is probably totally destroyed again. And then in some projects near Isfahan which are very important.
Israel does not have the ability to penetrate those very deep, underground facilities. It can be done only by the Americans. And if it will be agreed that the Americans will bring their heavy bombers and do it, it will be done.
Blaise Misztal:
On missile capabilities, Israel has been suffering the last couple of days with increased Iranian use of cluster munitions on its ballistic missiles. Is there a strategy or capability that the Israelis can bring to better defeat those weapons or hunt them more effectively?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
These missiles are like every missile. There is not any difference between intercepting these missiles and intercepting other missiles. This cluster munition is, in a way, much easier to defend ourselves from. If you are in a bomb shelter, which is in almost every apartment building, this submunition cannot penetrate into the shelter.
It would only be very bad luck that would cause someone to be hurt inside the safe room when they use this submunition. It’s causing a lot of damage to cars in the street, but very few Israelis had been killed or injured with it. There was one couple from Ramat Gan that hadn’t been in the safe room when it happened. It penetrated the seal of the room, and they were killed. But I don’t know about anyone in a safe room who had any problems. It’s easier to be safe when they use this cluster munition, in fact.
Of course, if there is a group of people somewhere, not going to the shelter, that will be a disaster. But most Israelis are very disciplined, and whenever there is a siren in Israel, the vast majority of them are taking shelter in the designated places, and the cluster munition is not a threat.
Blaise Misztal:
Lastly, let me ask you—you mentioned economic infrastructure as one of the four groups of targets where Israel has to deny the Iranian regime capabilities, and weaken it if it does stay in place.
But yesterday, the strike on the South Pars gas field was, I think, a different type of strike on a different type of target than we’ve seen Israel or the United States hit so far, and there’s been dissenting reporting in the U.S. about whether that was a strike that was coordinated with the United States or not. President Trump described it as being out of anger.
Can you tell us a little about what Israel was trying to accomplish with that strike, and what you know about whether that was something that was jointly planned or not?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
We are very sober. There is not any anger in Israel. And there is huge satisfaction from the cooperation with the Americans.
I believe—I don’t know—but I believe that based on the way that we are working together, the Americans had been notified about the plan. How far up the chain it went in the American system, I don’t know.
Prime Minister Netanyahu just said publicly that we agreed to stop it, and we will wait with these kinds of targets, and probably in the future, if someone in Israel will have the idea to do it, it would be much more coordinated than before. I believe that it was coordinated in the lower level and it didn’t go fully up the ladder to President Trump.
Blaise Misztal:
Admiral Shelanski, let me come back to you. The strike on the South Pars gas field returned focus to the lack of energy coming out of the Gulf right now, and obviously strikes on critical energy infrastructure are part of it, but risks to shipping are also part of the problem.
I wanted to get your thoughts on the ability of the United States and our allies and partners to be able to get ships out of the Arabian Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz safely. President Trump has talked about perhaps providing escorts, but as you know, there’s the threat of mines. We don’t seem to have any counter-mine ships in the area right now.
What would it take to try to get ships through the Strait of Hormuz safely?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Yeah, so I’ll just comment on what the general said. I’m a believer that, you know, that strike was coordinated. You know, in this type of coalition warfare, Central Command is where it’s all coming together, the liaison groups. There’s communication that’s going on all day long. I’m sure neither nation is ever going to be sending a strike without the other nation knowing about it, right? So I’m sure that there is a big amount of coordination.
The enemy always has a say, and they’re playing their economic card there. The United States economy and the global economy is now being hit, because what else can Iran do? You know, they’re failing. You know, militarily, they can’t stop us from hitting targets. We are striking virtually anything we want. So what are they doing? They’re sending missiles all over the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, even into Turkey, into Oman, and, especially, into Israel. I mean, this is a lash-out, but as you know, that’s their real strength.
This brings me back to my War College days. What’s the center of gravity in terms of the operation that’s going to really bring Iran to its heels now? I agree with the general. I mean, at the very least, at the end of this war, we’re going to have a neutered Iran. They’re going to have little capability. They’re going to be a very meek threat, except, of course, the missing nuclear stuff. That part is a big strategic thing.
But this has opened up the next phase, in terms of, now they’re really striking tankers in the Gulf and they do have a capability to stop traffic. They always have. They’ve created lots of cruise missiles that are mobile. They have the drones, which can be effective against an unarmed ship. Let’s face it. If you’re a merchant ship and a drone with small amounts of explosives lands on your ship, you know, the merchant ships have like 30 or 40 people. They’re not really capable of defending themselves. They don’t have real defensive capabilities and to put out a huge conflagration like that, it’s tough.
So now everyone’s worried, and this is exactly the effect that Iran wants to have. They want to create fear. They want to put a crimp on the economy. And I think that’s why, of course, the President said, ‘Let’s hold off on any economic things right now so that we can keep gas moving.’ Because it does have an effect on the world, but there’s a secondary effect to this, right? And the secondary effect, in my belief, is that the Strait of Hormuz is an international passageway. The Iranians, though they border the Arabian Gulf for 500 miles, they actually have no right to stop traffic from going through there. This now becomes, when they stop traffic, an international strategy for them.
But it’s backfiring on them, because the world depends on the Straits of Hormuz. So if they wanted to keep our allies out of the war, it backfired. Every nation, pretty much, has oil coming through the Gulf, and so this has now become an international crisis.
I think we’re going to see allies stepping up to the plate, and they’re going to send ships, and you can escort—I mean, it’s not easy—but you can escort tankers. We’ve done it before. We know how to do it.
Also, we have the capability, we have the technology, to shoot down cruise missiles, shoot down drones, and make that oil flow again. So, yes, we can do it. It’s going to take a concerted effort in terms of the number of ships that we’re going to need to make it work. And we’re probably going to need our allies to help us.
Of course, in any type of warfare like this, the best thing to do is always to get to the source before they can even launch their missiles. I mean, I can guarantee you, right now, CENTCOM and Israel are focused on where those things are on the ground, before the Iranians can launch them. And once we are able to focus on those and get rid of that capability, our ability to start moving tankers through the Gulf, through the Strait of Hormuz, is going to increase. It’s going to happen quickly. Very quickly. We’re going to see it starting to lessen the effect of, you know, the Iranians’ punch in the face.
So, after that, if they can’t close the straits, and they can’t stop us from hitting anything, what’s left for them? And that’s really the question, I think, where eventually we can go with this. You know, as the general said, it’s going to take time. We can’t be impatient in this. We can’t allow this to end prematurely. It’s going to take some time to get that established, to move those ships in and out of the Gulf so that we can bring the world economy back. But I think it’s all possible, and we’ve trained for this. And frankly, the sooner the allies get their ships over there, the better off the world is going to be.
Blaise Misztal:
So just to sort of dig into that a little further, Admiral, can you give us some more specifics about what types of naval assets we would need to have in the Gulf to execute a mission of protecting the tanker traffic and escorting them? Is it moving in the USS Lincoln carrier and its strike group? Or is it a different type of naval assets, and do we have them in the region or do we need to bring them from somewhere else in the world?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
It’s not a good idea right now to bring the USS Abraham Lincoln into the Gulf. They’re doing just fine where they are. And it just adds an extra level of risk. I mean, I brought the USS Truman in there. We operated into Iraq and Afghanistan from there. The advantage of it is that you can generate a whole lot more strikes. So in other words, if I launch airplanes off the carrier, and they’re only going 150 miles, as opposed to 600 miles, I can cycle them a lot quicker. I can put more bombs on target throughout the day. But I think the risk right now is too large to even consider that right at the moment.
So, then the question is, well, what are we lacking? We sadly moved all of our mine hunting ships out of the Gulf. They’re all in the Straits of Malacca and in the South China Sea. I will say, I don’t think we’ve seen any mines yet. I think we did a good job. The Navy did a good job about, you know, wiping out a lot of the mine laying capabilities that the Iranians have.
Now, granted, you can go out in a rowboat and drop a few mines in the waters. Anyone could do that. But I think the shoreline and the infrastructure have been relatively devastated, so the best course of action would be to get some type of mine hunting capability, whether helicopters or mine hunting ships, get them in there quickly and have them as part of the escort. So you would need surface combatants. You’d either need destroyers or corvettes. And you need a robust air defense system.
There’s a way to do it so that you keep the ships on the southern part of the transit as they go through. You need great intelligence. You need great airborne early warning. You need to be able to react quickly. You probably need to have a combat air patrol, air defense, all those things. We know how to do it, and I think we’re going to be well set to do that once we set up the plan to start this whole escort capability.
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I would not be surprised if prior to escorting ships, if that will be the decision, we will see a very extensive operation to neutralize the threats from land, mainly missiles that the Iranians have. I remember in the past, they gave some of their missiles to Hezbollah, and they have few types of anti-ship missiles. And if that has been neutralized, what will remain in their hands is drones. They need to launch drones from far away. And, maybe, cruise missiles. If they come from the Iranian side of the strait there will be a very short time to defend against it. It’s very problematic. When the cruise missile is coming from far away, it is easier to deal with it. It’s complicated, but still easier.
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, if they’re on the shoreline of the choke point there, you have 20 or 30 seconds to react. So you have to have really close-in weapon systems that enable you to shoot down these missiles as they come at you.
As the general said, if we haven’t already done it, we need to act on that whole piece of land within a 600-mile radius of the strait to take out any type of missiles. We have great capability in terms of detecting targets. We have the combination between our satellite capability and the new Hawkeye E-2D airborne early warning radar, in conjunction with the F-35 capability.
All those integrated systems now allow us to detect these things further off, or as they’re getting ready to launch them. We did a lot of work over the last 20 years detecting movable targets. It used to be a real pain for us. I mean, it’s still a challenge, but we’ve gotten much better with our capability to find them, take them out before they even get off the launch site.
Like the general said, if someone shoots a missile and they’re on the coast, and you’re only eight miles away, you don’t have a lot of time.
So, you’ve got to have your weapons ready, you’ve got to be on alert, and you’re going to need to be ready to shoot down anything that moves. But again, that’s what we do, and I think we should be ready to do that.
Blaise Misztal:
General, is Israel able to lend any assistance to this mission of securing the Gulf, either to the air mission, as you described it, of suppressing the coastal fire capabilities? Perhaps it could send any of its naval assets like the Sa’ar corvette to a mission in the Gulf?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If there was a visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier to Israel, and you took the whole Israeli Navy to visit the carrier, there would still be, on the carrier, more American sailors than Israelis. So I think navy-wise, we don’t have any capability that can help the Americans deal with the challenge.
The Air Force is part of the coalition, and whatever will be declared or agreed as a target, it will be destroyed by us. We have some capabilities to identify the exact places, with a combination of satellites, electronics, and so on and so forth. In that sense, I’m sure we and the Americans are sharing information, and that might be very helpful.
If it is about more airplanes on the air going after more targets to be shattered, I’m sure Israel can help. With the Navy, we have to be modest. Our Navy is not meant for these distances. If it ends up coming to Navy SEAL capabilities, the equivalent of U.S. Navy SEAL, we have that. They have many capabilities. I’m sure that they can cooperate with your Navy SEALs to form a very strong fist, if needed, to act against any threat posed by the Iranians.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks. Admiral, you had mentioned earlier the troubles that the USS Gerald Ford is having and its need to return to port at Souda Bay. Can you tell us a little bit about what’s happening with the Ford, how long it might be out of the fight and implications of that for U.S. operations?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Yeah, it’s sad that they had this fire on board. These things happen on Navy ships. It’s unfortunate that it happened and how much damage it caused. You know, it’s a typical fire on the ship. We’re very good at putting out fires. This one, from what I’ve read, was pretty significant and to the point where they had to go back to port to do the repairs. So, you know, when you bring an aircraft carrier offline, you’re talking at least two weeks, maybe three weeks.
The beauty of a joint carrier operation is the cycling of the aircraft. So there’s lots of ways to do it. A typical thing would be, right, the Lincoln, you’ve got the day ops, and then forward, you’ve got night ops, so that the strikes are happening 24 hours a day. That’s the beauty of what we can do when you have two carriers out there, or really even three. If you want to get a third out there, the Ford in particular—because it is the latest carrier and has immense capability. And something like 40 new technologies on it.
When they redesigned the ship, they laid it out in such a way to add many new technologies. Better refueling for the airplanes. Where the planes refuel on the deck. How to get the airplanes up to the flight deck faster. How to get the bombs onto the airplanes quicker. How to shoot the airplanes off the deck with these new electromagnetic catapult systems. How to land with these new systems. It has brand new propulsion on it too, which is amazing. The loss of the Ford is not a 1 carrier loss, it’s a 1.5 carrier loss. That’s the type of fight the Ford brings. So if you have both the Lincoln and the Ford, you would have 2.5 normal Nimitz-class carriers out there. Now you’re down to one, so the sooner you can get the Ford back on there, the better.
Now, with that said, there’s a limit, and I’m sure that is on the Navy’s mind right now, and that crew has been out a long time, and they’ve been operating for many months. You typically send a crew out on a deployment, seven months, eight months. I mean, this could go on for 10 months, maybe 11 months. That’s a hard strain on a crew. Now, in addition to that, as people get tired, they make mistakes, and that’s maybe where we saw the fire come in.
The second part of that, I think, is people need to know that there’s a professionalism part of the sailors and these aviators and the carrier. That whole crew that’s out there, this is what we train to do, not that any of us ever hoped that we’re going to go into a war. But you know, once you start doing these types of operations, you get into a cycle. And there’s a feeling that overcomes the exhaustion, so to speak, and that is that, you know, we’re doing the things that we’ve been trained to do. We’re here for our country, and we are well trained. We’re well-led. We’ve got the technology.
And right now, it’s a matter of personal perseverance, and hopefully they don’t get so tired that they overlook the typical safety things. So, it’s a balance there. And I think maybe we’ve seen a tip in one direction on the Ford, when they had that fire. Now they get to reset a little, and when they send them back, I’m sure they’ll be energized and ready to go again.
Blaise Misztal:
Admiral, when the Ford does come back, we will be more than three weeks into this war. Do you think it’s time to think about maybe sending the Lincoln back to the Indo-Pacific? Are we assuming undue risk by having taken a carrier out of that theater?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Yeah, I don’t think you’re going to see the Lincoln move anytime soon. In fact, I think what you might see is the USS George Bush, which is ready to deploy, and should be deploying, I think in about a month or so. I think it’s going to head straight over there, and so there’s going to be another carrier coming in, and maybe that they want to relieve the Ford. I don’t know exactly what the plans are. I mean, it depends on, you know, how well opening the Straits of Hormuz goes.
If we get the allies over there, if we see continued degradation of the Iranian capability to launch any type of drones or missiles into the straits is significantly reduced, and that threat is lessened, then there’s the possibility that they’ll start relieving forces. That, or cycling them in and out, which is the best way to do it with our forces at large, in terms of our strategy for where carriers are in the world, and not putting all of our assets in one place at one time—since there’s a danger to that. Thanks.
Blaise Misztal:
I have one more question for you, General Amidror, and then I want to open it up to the audience. So if you’re watching and you have questions, please feel free to submit those using the Q-and-A function in zoom, and then I’ll be happy to read them out.
General Amidror, I wanted to ask you about another front in this war, namely Lebanon, where Israel is now operating both in the air and on the ground. Could you tell us a little bit about the scope of Israeli operations there, and what their objective is?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Okay, just don’t ask me about carriers. Ours is very secret. [laughter].
About Lebanon. We are now in a defensive posture. People are not understanding that. We moved forces in, but it is part of our defensive posture. We have not gone to the next stage of offense. It is part of our defense. We decided to push Hezbollah more to the north to be sure that first, no ground operation can be done against the communities near the border, and second, that they are losing the line of sight and they cannot launch anti-tank missiles into the civilian community. That was something that was very horrible in the last round with Hezbollah.
So, you will find more IDF forces on the ground 10 kilometers from the border inside Lebanon, making all the arrangements to defend themselves and to not let allow Hezbollah movement to the south.
From time to time, we are making raids into areas in which we have intelligence about gathering of Hezbollah terrorists or attack preparations, weapons storage, and so on and so forth. But this is not the offensive maneuver of the IDF, yet. The decision to move from defensive to offensive positions and to begin the big ground maneuver in Lebanon is very much connected to the question of Iran. We don’t want to allocate resources, which we need for Iran, to Lebanon—mainly Air Force, of course, because ground forces we didn’t send to Iran.
The decision is to do as much as we can to continue focusing on Iran and make Hezbollah the second priority. Right now, the decision to move to the north is to make sure that Israel will not be under pressure, make sure Hezbollah cannot attack the communities in the north. Though it can take a longer time, we know how to deal with it.
Remember, we had lots of forces in the Gaza Strip. We moved regular units out from the Gaza Strip. Now, most of the forces in Gaza are reserve forces. We have reserve forces as well in the north, but almost all the regular units moved to the north prepare themselves for the second stage, which would be the offensive stage.
Yet it might take time, because we want to focus our capabilities on Iran as much as possible to make Iran much weaker. And that was the decision about the priority in Lebanon remaining a defense-based posture, and to continue the offensive in Iran.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, we know that Hezbollah has fired hundreds of rockets and missiles at Israel since the war began. But was there evidence, any intelligence, indicating that they were also mobilizing the Radwan forces for a ground incursion? Evidence that they were able to come back to the border area? Or is this just a preemptive move, in case they were to try to do that?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, they tried to move some of their Radwan forces back to the south. As you know, in 2024, the Radwan Forces sustained a huge blow from Israel. Many were killed, and they retreated to the north. They tried to bring part of the Radwan Force unit back to the south, though not the same numbers as before. That was identified. Many of them were killed.
This is a preemptive action, not because they prepared something, because we didn’t want to be in a position where they can prepare something. I mean, we pushed them north, before they resume the old preparations. They, at the end, probably will be close to the Litani in the west, and maybe at the Litani in the east. In the east, the ability to make a buffer is not as good there as in the west.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, General.
Admiral Shelanski – it looks like we have a couple of questions for you. The first one is about the extra E-D Hawkeyes that are reportedly inbound to the theater, which I think you mentioned briefly in discussing the Ford and its capabilities.
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Yeah, great question. I’ll tell you, I just hearken back—it’s dated now—to 2012 when I worked at the Pentagon for the Chief of Naval Operations, the CNO. Back then I was in the Assessments Division, N81. I was tasked by the CNO at that time to take a look at all offensive weapon systems—like throughout the whole world—of our near-peers, our enemies, etc. And to look at, like, what capabilities do we have?
And there was one airplane that just kept coming up, one capability which was still in the basic stages at that time. That was the E-2D Hawkeye. And it was the one capability where we kept saying, ‘Oh yeah, the Hawkeye can do this. The Hawkeye can do that.’
At the time, I remember saying, ‘you know, this great airplane we’re developing, that Northrop Grumman is putting together, and this great brand-new radar system, which is incredibly advanced—no country has anything like this in the world.’ Maybe the Israelis have a little something that’s pretty close. And, you know, it’s going to mean at some point there’s going to be a big demand, and we see that demand today.
We’ve got five Hawkeyes. They’re on the Lincoln. We have five on the Ford. And you know, I think before the Ford was going to be pulled off-station, they said ‘we’d like five more Hawkeyes.’ And by the way, the Hawkeye now has in-flight refueling capability, so it can stay up. In the old days, we would do a five hour or a 5.5-hour mission and we’d have to land to get fuel. Now you can stay up 10 hours or longer if needed depending on the mission. Now you have the ability to cycle these airplanes in and out. And it’s not surprising that they’re sending them over there because of the capability of detection and the coordination and the intelligence.
As I said, there’s a huge dynamic between the new F-35 and the E-2D now. You have that capability throughout the Gulf. For other nations, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman, now you have an increased capability to be able to detect for them, and gather a better picture for the whole Gulf. And this is really going to play in a big way, in terms of the escort through the stratosphere.
The more eyes in the sky you have, so to speak, and the more ability you have to detect very small targets at long distances, the more you’ll be able to better detect early, defend, shoot against threats, and basically have that much more capably. It’s going to be interesting to see where they land-base them. There’s really not enough room on the carriers right now for them, so they’ll probably put them at one of the air bases—hopefully one of the ones that is a little bit further out, a little bit more secure.
Though, that’s okay, because the Hawkeye radar can see out over 400 miles. It has over 22 to 30 million square miles of detection space. I think it’s a great move, and having been part of that aviation community, it’s really great to see they’re being challenged to make this work. And I think it’s exciting for the Navy, in general, and in particular naval aviation to be able to have this asset available and send it forward. This is, I think, something that we have expected for many years.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, perhaps we could fly the Hawkeyes out of Ovda Air Base in Israel, where JINSA has suggested the U.S. base assets. Question from the audience on that point: Can the aircraft from the Ford carrier be based at a land base while the carrier is under repair?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
It can be. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, they could have flown all those off. Now, the beauty of an aircraft carrier is that all of the equipment and the repair and the maintenance crews, and the supply chains, and the feeding and the housing of all these people is all right there on the ship.
It’s one thing to say, I’m going to send five airplanes and their maintenance crews to an air base somewhere, because there’s going to have to be a follow-on airplane of people that are going to maintain those airplanes.
But it’s another to take a whole air wing, 70 or more airplanes, and land them somewhere and expect to have the capability to maintain them and launch and recover them the whole time. That’s a different story. The answer is yes, a tough problem.
Blaise Misztal:
Let me fold two questions into one. If Iran is able to sustain periodic fire in the Strait of Hormuz despite the air and naval effort to clear it, what further escalations options are available, and particularly are ground operations going to be needed—either by the Marine Expeditionary Unit that is supposedly underway, or special forces to seize coastal positions, either in the islands in the Gulf or perhaps in mainland Iran itself—in the future?
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
I think it’s an option. If the air war is unable to enable safe passage, then I think the next step—if the threat is still there, and we’re serious about getting stuff through the straits—then that is a possibility, and that’s a good place, I think, to do a ground operation if we’re going to secure the strait.
It’s a lot easier than flying in Special Forces to find nuclear material in Iran somewhere in the heart of Iran. Not saying that it’s not important and not saying that it’s not needed. It is a whole lot easier for us to get to the straits and secure that with land operations. I hope it doesn’t come to that. You know, though, we see Marines moving into that area. It’s a possibility. We could do it if we needed to.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, you said that Israel has enough targets for maybe another four weeks of trying to degrade Iranian capabilities. What is the chance that Israel and the United States together are going to get rid of all Iranian capabilities? What is the possibility that, if the regime stays in place, it retains the ability to send a drone or a missile? You know, maybe one a day, or every other day.
What does that do to the risk perception of commercial shipping in the Gulf? Is there a possibility that even after we declare the war is over, we would have to maintain naval escorts and air patrols over the Gulf to keep shipping lanes open?
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that we should be humble. Iran is 92 million people, 60 times the State of Israel. It’s huge, with very deep capabilities. It was not declared a state 100 years ago. It has 3,000 years of tradition and knowledge and capabilities. We should be humble. We cannot destroy all the capabilities of Iran.
We can make Iran weak enough, and we should. What does it mean for Iran to be weak enough? From my point of view, how to measure that they are weak enough is if America and Israel find something which we think might endanger us, or the countries around Iran—for example, if after five years, Iran will try again to rebuild its nuclear capabilities—that Iran will be weak enough to where we can come again and destroy it. This is the way to measure if Iran is weak enough.
Iran being weak enough means we can prevent it from doing in the future what it did in the past. Those who think that we can completely destroy everything in Iran are wrong. We should be humble.
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I agree. I think the more professional you are, the more humble you are about your capabilities. It’s very easy to sit somewhere, knowing nothing about what are the challenges, what are the risks, and so forth, and say, ‘we should destroy everything.’ It’s not going to go like that. If you are professional, you know there are limitations and risks you’re not ready to take. And at the end of the day, you have to postpone the threat as much as possible, and to be in a position to do it again, if need be.
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
Well, I agree. I don’t think there’s a need to blow up every possible site. It’s really about that word: again. What will it take to bring the Iranians and whatever government happens to be there at the end of this to the negotiating table, to give us the endstate that the United States, Israel, and frankly, our other allies, want to see? We may not even need to destroy everything. It’s really about, what it will take to get them over to a place where they negotiate in our favor? In other words, what do we want to get out of it? And that’s frankly the big question: what is the end state? What does the end state look like?
Look, we’ve always tried to do the big shift to the Pacific, which was purposeful. It was important, because there’s some near-peer competitors out there, and we have issues in the South China Sea and all sorts of things are going on there. You know, though, we never really left the Middle East. We’ve always had ships there. So what will it take in the future? Probably, some type of capability to be there, maybe on a constant basis for the next year or so, while we see and make sure that the Iranians, when they come to the negotiating table, really do what they say they’re going to do. So, we’ll see.
I think it’s probably in the cards that we’re going to be there for a while. Maybe, and hopefully, not in a full wartime state. Instead, it’s us having patrol status. That, I think, we’re going to see for quite some time.
IDF Maj Gen (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
After the war, we need to add economic pressure and other pressure on the Iranians and make them isolated in the area. It’s a combination of putting pressure on its economy, which will remain, and diplomatic efforts to isolate it.
I remember when we were told the Iranians will never discuss the nuclear issue with the Americans. Under very heavy economic pressure, they came to negotiate. The fact that the Americans didn’t get a good agreement is because of their negotiators, not because the Iranians were strong. They were very weak. But I think that the combination of all three efforts—the kinetic effort, the economic effort and the diplomatic effort—can bring the Iranians to the negotiating table.
Vice Admiral (ret.) Herman Shelanski:
I agree. I think it’s time for it to become more than just a two-nation coalition. We need our NATO allies and the rest of the world to be a part of this, and I think the more the rest of the world is a part of it, the stronger our ability is to do what the general was talking about—the other type of pressures that we can continue on Iran—that, I think, is an endgame that can work.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, Admiral Shelanski and General Amidror, thank you for your time. Thank you to the audience for tuning in. Please visit jinsa.org for our latest updates and analysis on the war in Iran. I look forward to seeing you on the next webinar.