Transcript: Webinar – Israel Strikes Hamas in Qatar

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PANELISTS

Michael Makovsky, PhD

JINSA President and CEO

Elliott Abrams

Member, JINSA Iran Policy Project; Former United States Special Representative for Iran

TRANSCRIPT

Please note quotations have been edited for flow and clarity.

Michael Makovsky, PhD:

Hi, I’m Michael Makovsky. I’m the President and CEO of JINSA. I’m honored to have with us today Elliott Abrams, who’s a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and has held a host of senior positions in the U.S. government and at the National Security Council. Deputy National Security Advisor, Special Envoy to Iran and Venezuela in the first Trump administration, and a little farther back, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs at State, among many others. But just a note, of course, certainly here in Washington, [Elliott] is one of the leading wise men here in foreign policy, respected by both sides of the aisle.

Before we proceed, I guess I should say, because it’s just such big news here in the United States, but we want to express our condolences, deep condolences to Charlie Kirk’s family, his wife, his kids, his extended family. I’m sure many of you have been reading about this. I personally didn’t know him or follow him, but [from] everything I read, it sounded like he was an amazing young man and did an amazing amount by the age of 31. And also, [he] was a great patriot and a great friend of Israel.

Elliott Abrams:

I did not know Charlie Kirk either, but it’s extraordinary what he achieved by the age of 31 and [it is] certainly a real loss to the pro-Israel community in the U.S.

Makovsky:

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, Prime Minister Netanyahu texted condolences very quickly. You’re seeing a number of Jewish leaders say things. I had a text from someone I hadn’t been in touch with, he’s not a Jewish leader, but he just wrote about his interactions with Charlie Kirk and how positive he was. And this guy I know is not necessarily a good, constructive person, he’s a little difficult, and he said that Charlie Kirk was always so nice and responsive. [His work was] really very impressive, and it’s a tremendous loss. So obviously, they’ve got to find the assailant.

But I guess this might be a segue, Elliott, to talk about a different form of terrorism. I want to talk to you about Qatar and this attack that Israel executed. And I’ll just say a few quick things, and I’d like to get your thoughts, but, you know, I mean, the last I was looking and reading things, it’s unclear—some people were killed, it’s unclear how many were killed. There are questions whether the United States, did the [United States] tip off the Qataris in time for that to happen?

My sense was that Trump knew, not from the military, but that he had understood this, maybe even before. I want to get your thoughts on it, Elliott. I wanted to start here because it seems, before we talk about the implications of this, what’s happened, but it defies logic to me that [Israel] would do an attack like this without some consultation, or at least informing someone senior in the United States government. What do you think?

Abrams:

Well, there’s a lot of logic to that, partly because Qatar is, for reasons that are unfathomable to me, a [U.S.] Major Non-NATO Ally. It was given that status in the Biden administration, and we have Al-Udeid there, we have a large air base there. And one of the things you have to think about is the nature of the Israeli attack, and whether people at Al-Udeid might think, is this an Iranian attack on the base? What’s going on here? So, there’s a lot of logic to the idea that there would be prior information from the Israelis.

On the other hand, think of it this way. The Israelis tell the U.S. government, ‘hey, on that date, at that time, we’re going to attack Hamas terrorists, in Qatar.’ What do the Americans do with that information? Do you sit on it and then the Qataris say ‘What? You didn’t tell us!’ Do you pass it on in the knowledge that the Qataris are likely to pick up the phone and instantly warn the terrorists? You have to worry about leaks. Even if it is not the U.S. policy to tell the Qataris, it may leak to them anyway. So, I think it’s complicated. You know the old expression, seek forgiveness rather than permission. And I don’t know the facts. I don’t know what the government of Israel said to the American government and when. And there are various stories.

I mean, one story that’s been around a lot in the last few days is [that] the Qataris were informed, but by the time they were informed, the bombs were going off. Maybe, I think we don’t know, let’s be honest, it’s convenient for the United States to say, ‘we didn’t know anything about this, and if we’d known about it, we wouldn’t have let it happen.’ That makes the Qataris and maybe some other people feel better. You know, on balance, it’s pretty gutsy for the Israelis to do this without even telling the Americans, without the details, just saying, ‘you should know that we don’t view those Hamas guys in Doha as immune and we’re going to go after them. You just need to know that. You don’t want to know the time of day, but you just need to know that.’ That’s my guess, but again, you don’t know.

Makovsky:

Let me ask this. Let’s get into this a little bit. You and I were just at this [Middle East-America Dialogue] conference. I talked to some Israelis, I’d say, on the center-left, [and] they supported it. I think there was no question that the Israelis were going to go after these people. There was a question of where and when, [which] was the only issue. But they were going to go after them, like they went after everyone involved in the Munich Olympics terrorist attack of 1972 where they killed, or eliminate [is] maybe the professional parlance, neutralized, people in Europe. In Europe, where [Israel] had a lot of close ties. So why not do it in Qatar?

Abrams:

It’s September 11th. We have to think back to the change in the United States after September 11. There were huge changes. For example, we created the Department of Homeland Security and the post of Homeland Security Advisor to the President. We changed the FBI – you know, no more going after bank robbers. It became a counterterrorism organization. We invaded two countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, because we said we’re not tolerating this. This will never be permitted to happen again. The Israelis have said—Prime Minister Netanyahu said yesterday, I think—October 7, 2023, was their 9/11. What does it mean? It means that, ‘okay, we [have] got to start thinking about things differently. We’re not negotiating with terrorists. When we can reach them, we will eliminate them.’ And that’s the Israeli post- October 7 view.

If you criticize what was done, then you have to say that these key leaders of Hamas, terrorist murderers, have achieved immunity because they’re in Doha. Because they sit in Qatar, they’re safe forever. I don’t understand why that would be the case. I mean, we should get into the whole question of Qatar and its role in this, but the notion that there’s geographical immunity, it seems to me, is one that we’ve never adopted in the U.S., and the Israelis, as you say, have never adopted. Their enemies attempt to kill Jews everywhere. They’ve attempted it with, unfortunately, great success in Argentina, we remember. The Israelis are constantly dealing with Iranian efforts to blow up embassies and kill Jews in Europe and all over the Middle East as well. So, the notion, again, that the Israelis have to kind of disarm and say, ‘well, Doha is a safe place for murders,’ does not seem to be persuasive.

Makovsky:

There are questions, was [there] a thought that this could help with the hostage negotiations? Because some Israelis have said, ‘well, you know, some of those that they were targeting, were obstacles.’ Like, it’s hard to believe that they’re even bigger hardliners in Hamas, but that these guys were challenging getting a deal done. Some of them, I think, had ties to Iran, it was said. So, was this [to] help with the hostage [negotiations], or both—they’re not necessarily mutually exclusive—that this was [also] an operational opportunity where you had a bunch of these guys congregating, and therefore they decided to attack?

Abrams:

I think this was the equivalent of the strike in Beirut that killed [former Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah. That is, you have a target you want to get, and now you have information, or you think you do, of where those targets are going to be. So, it’s an opportunity to do it. Now, those who argue, ‘yeah, but the timing is terrible,’ are suggesting, I guess, this is going to kill the negotiation or at least going to delay it for a long time.

Makovsky:

Or kill some hostages.

Abrams:

Yeah. I mean, it’s a reasonable, obvious question to ask. But first, I’d say we’ve watched now for nearly two years, these negotiations. And we’ve seen that when you ask the question, “why are so slow?” One of the answers is, well, the Hamas guys in Doha have to refer everything to Gaza, because the people making the real decisions are in Gaza. They can’t agree to anything in Doha anyway. They’re not on the ground. They’re not controlling the militant, the terrorist troops, inside Gaza, and those guys are still there. Whoever was there a week ago is still there. So, I question for one thing, whether the people who were killed were able to negotiate, or maybe they weren’t killed, I guess we’ll find out, but people who were attacked were really able and willing to negotiate a deal. I think that’s an assumption that people make.

As to whether this means, ‘well, now there’s nobody who can do this negotiating.’ I think that’s false too. First, Qatar said immediately, ‘now, we’re still in this.’ I mean, they’re middlemen here because it serves their interests, and they’re not going to stop now. But a more important point, I think, is, what about Egypt? You know, there have been two middlemen. There’s been Qatar and there’s been Egypt. Between the two, I think we in the United States should have much greater confidence in the Egyptians. They’re there. It’s their border, first. Second, they oppose, rather than supporting and financing, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Makovsky:

Yeah, they hate them.

Abrams:

They know who Hamas is. So, I’d much rather have the Egyptians as negotiators.

Makovsky:

Let me ask, I usually wait until Q-and-A at the end, but Jay Solomon of the Free Press has written two questions that I want to ask you, Elliott, that are relevant to what you were just talking about. The first question is a legal question. He says the DOJ has indicted six members of Hamas for October 7, many of whom live openly in Qatar. Why on earth hasn’t the U.S. demanded the extradition of these men? They’re wanted for murdering Americans. The second question he has [is], do you think the Qatar attack will kill or roll back the Abraham Accords?

Abrams:

Let’s just turn to that, because I think the answer is no on the Abraham Accords. I don’t think it’s that complicated. And you’ve seen, for example, from the Emirates, condemnation, and [UAE President] Mohamed bin Zayed is, I think, today, visiting Qatar to express his condolences or whatever. But not a word about ending the Abraham Accords. So, I’m not concerned about that.

Makovsky:

Well, we know how much the Emiratis like the Qataris.

Abrams:

Right. I mean, can you take all this at face value? I don’t think so. And, you know, they want a relationship with a strong Israel, not a weak Israel. That’s another part of this. Jay’s first question gets at this whole issue of U.S.-Qatar relations. Why don’t we demand that they turn them over? Why don’t we demand that terrorist murderers be prosecuted? Why don’t we make all these demands of Qatar?

Well, I think the Qataris, you know, have figured out a really successful game. They pose as neutral. ‘We’re just one piece right in the middle of this, and we want to help negotiate. That’s all we’re doing.’ But it’s not true, because they support the Muslim Brotherhood everywhere. They fund it everywhere. That’s the ideology of the regime. We don’t seem to be paying any attention to this fact. Why not? Well, you know, I’ll sum it up in one word, Mike: money. I mean, we used to think that the Saudis, I’m talking 25-30, years ago, spent a lot of money on a lobby in Washington. This was child’s play compared to what Qatar is doing.

And, you know, I think everybody watching this knows the amount of money put into American universities, the amount of money spent on lobbying in Washington. It’s just astonishing. When I speak to groups, I sometimes start by saying, ‘am I the only person in this room who is not on the Qatari payroll?’ Because it’s a big payroll. Lots of former officials, law firms, NGOs, think-tanks. I mean, there’s a lot of money being spent around. And this donation of a plane to the United States for the use of the president is a classic example of this.

So, I think you got a lot of people here saying, ‘oh, we like them. They’re very cooperative. Don’t rock the boat.’ And so, they continue to get away with it. It seems to me, it’s the reason that there were such bad relations with their neighbors for a number of years, including the Emiratis and the Saudis, because they oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, and Qatar supports it.

Makovsky:

I mean, by the way, you could add, I’m sure you know that with this administration, you have some current administration officials who had financial relationships with the Qataris. I think Attorney General or [U.S. Special Envoy Steven] Witkoff, who, I think, had a real estate [deal]. I think the Qataris bought a building of his. Some of the sons of Witkoff and Trump are in business, I think with Qataris. Even [former Senior Advisor to the White House] Jared Kushner, I think, [has] Qatari investment.

So, I think this attack also shines an unpleasant light, because whenever you shine a light on Qatar, there’s a lot of unpleasantness. There’s the money that you talk about, then there’s what you were also talking about, which is the rabid anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-Semitism, of this government, and Al Jazeera, which is a powerful station in the Middle East, which is based in Qatar.

Abrams:

I agree. I don’t think we pay nearly enough attention to Al Jazeera. During the Gulf War, 20 years ago, it was the view of the then-vice president and secretary of defense that they were costing American lives. They were inciting Iraqis to kill Americans. If you look at it more recently, for example, polls tell us that the great majority of Arabs in the Middle East don’t believe what happened on October 7. Don’t believe the brutality, the rapes, the murders. Why not? Well, one great reason is Al Jazeera, which has never informed them of it, and instead is carrying on this great anti-Israel, and, to a substantial degree, anti-American propaganda campaign. And that station is, you know, owned or run by the regime in Qatar. So, they’re getting away with an awful lot. And I think Jay Solomon’s question is a good one. There are people there [that] should be brought to justice by the United States. And, I mean, it’s not just a question to ask of the Trump administration. It’s a question to ask of the Biden administration too. They keep getting away with it.

Makovsky:

Right, so they’ve been supporting Hamas, other Sunni terrorist organizations. There’s Al Jazeera. If I recall correctly, they blamed October 7 on Israel [in] their initial statement, if I’m not mistaken. But then also something I think there is not a full understanding here in Washington about, is about Al-Udeid, the air base.

The Qataris are very smart, and they’ve tried to be very useful, and it’s grown interest in the United States. I give them credit, actually, how shrewd they’ve been. One of the things is Al-Udeid. People think we need that base. It’s a very fancy base, costs a lot of money. Air Force guys, they all love that base. The thing is, I’ll just mention something, and folks watching could look on our website about this General Frank McKenzie, who is previous [U.S. Central Command] commander, is a distinguished fellow with us. And he wrote a paper last September reimagining our basing our posture in the region. And one of his comments was, this is last September, a year ago, he said that, you know, basically we have these bases. They’re kind of relics of the Cold War. But if the main issue is Iran, which General McKenzie thought, then we have to rethink some of this, some of these bases.

And he says Al-Udeid in a conflict with Iran would be a liability, and we should reduce our assets there, and we should think of other bases in the region, Israel, Saudi Arabia and so on. And what happened in June, in the 12-Day War of the 10,000 troops that we have in Al-Udeid? We took out all but like 50, we evacuated our airplanes. If this base was so important, how come we evacuated almost, virtually, the whole base? I think that needs to be better understood here.

Abrams:

I think you’re right. I mean, I think first, I agree with you that the way all of this has been handled for, I don’t know, a decade here, at least by the Government of Qatar, is very shrewd, very smart. You have to give credit where it’s true. I mean, they’ve played us like a fiddle. If you look at the geography of Al-Udeid, it’s too close to Iran, as you were saying, and it’s too far from Asia. You would if you, if you think about it, you’d be better off, from both points of view, having a base, in say, southwestern Saudi Arabia, which would just make more sense. The Qataris have made this essentially free for us, which is very smart on their behalf, and obviously, from many points of view, the Air Force just loves it. One can understand why, but it has not proved as useful in the crunch as people would hope.

Makovsky:

Yeah. So, it’s something that JINSA’s going to be working on even more, this basing issue.

Abrams:

I can tell you that there were points during the Iraq War, I’m talking again 20 years ago, and more recently, where I and others have said, you know, ‘let’s put some pressure on the Qataris about moving the base.’ The Pentagon has been completely against it. Even the idea [of] ‘well, okay, let’s announce a study of alternative basing possibilities.’ The Pentagon [was] completely against it. But I’m glad JINSA is doing it, and I wish the U.S. government would do it just as a thought experiment, because there are reasons to argue that a different location would be better for the United States.

Makovsky:

Let’s talk about the implications, and just for a few minutes about Gaza also. We don’t know, time will tell, will this help a deal or not help a deal? By the way, I should add, some soldiers got killed in Gaza the other day. You also had six civilians in Jerusalem that were killed in a shooting at a bus stop, and Hamas took credit for it. I don’t know if that has anything to do with the timing of this, but it offers a little context for soldiers in Gaza and six civilians. It’s actually it’s a lot of Israeli deaths in just recent days. So, I don’t know if it’s connected, but I just bring that up.

Let me ask you – on the implications. You mentioned Egypt, for instance, maybe the talks should shift to there, and that may be better, as you point out. You mentioned MBZ [Mohamed bin Zayed], the Emirati leader, going [to Qatar]. I think MBS [Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman] is going too.

Abrams:

Might be today, might be tomorrow, but yeah, he’s going.

Makovsky:

We all know they don’t like the Qataris, but they’re all part of the [Gulf Cooperation Council], and they have to show some solidarity, right? And we know there’s no hypocrisy in the Middle East, so we know it’s really sincere. But I guess there’s some tension with Israel [and the United States]. Netanyahu spoke to Trump on this. Do you see any other implications of this strike that took a lot of people by surprise?

Abrams:

Well, first on the United States. I think it’s unclear. You know, we have a record now – President Trump’s first term, but even from just this term, of cases where there are a lot of stories in the press that, you know, he had a terrible meeting with this person or that person. He’s very angry at this person or that person, he loved this one or that one, and they’re often inaccurate.

So, I don’t know what to make of stories that say, well, he’s very mad at Prime Minister Netanyahu, or some other people in the administration are. I just don’t know, partly because, you know, we said this about MBZ and MBS. It’s obviously useful to them to posture by going to Doha and expressing solidarity. What’s in [the] bottom of their heart. Who knows? We know what the track record is.

I thought the President’s Truth Social statement was interesting. He did not condemn what the Israelis had done. He said he was unhappy with it. He wished it hadn’t happened. But on the other hand, ‘killing terrorists is a worthy goal,’ which may well actually reflect his mind about this. That is, he’s of two minds about it, as I think a lot of people are – about the location, about the timing. You know, we also don’t know the outcome, and I imagine he’d be a lot happier about it if it succeeded than if it failed.

So, if the question is, what’s the long-term impact on the relationship between the U.S. and Israel? I can’t see how it will have one. I don’t even know that it will affect the Gaza negotiations, but the fundamentals of relations between the U.S. and Israel are broad and deep, and if the president concludes, well, that you know that Netanyahu shouldn’t have done this, he’ll tell him you shouldn’t have done this, but it doesn’t change the overall relationship.

Makovsky:

Let me ask you one last thing on Doha and then I do want to ask you about Gaza. Turkey. Turkey is, unlike Qatar, an actual ally of the United States. Doesn’t always act like one. It also supports the Muslim Brotherhood. They have Hamas leaders that go to Turkey, that stay there sometimes. And [Turkish Prime Minister] Erdogan and Israeli relations have been awful since October 7, and I think he made noise, I don’t know, a month ago or something about how Israel’s going to attack Turkey. How do you think the Turks might be thinking about this?

Abrams:

It will make them wonder, of course, whether it’s possible that Hamas people in Turkey would be attacked. Now, there is a big difference, and we should be upfront about it. Qatar can’t attack back. Turkey can. Really, if you’re an Israeli, if you’re the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense or the IDF Chief of Staff, you have to think about that: what will Turkey do in response? I would think that if Israel has decided we’re going to go after all you guys, then it becomes a question of how. In the case of Turkey, for example, you may want to do the kind of assassination that’s been done in Iran, rather than a bomb or missile attack from the air. That would be my sense of it.

Makovsky:

The Mossad, apparently—according to reports—was not involved in this. At least, they let it be known that [Mossad was] not – maybe because they don’t think it’s been successful.

Abrams:

Yeah, that was a bad report in one way. In our own government, when you start seeing a news story that says ‘the FBI said we didn’t do it, CIA and DOD said we did not,’ all of those are bad stories, because people are leaking against each other when they should be on the same team. And that’s true in Israel. And I thought it was really bad that you saw people, for example, I mean, presumably from Mossad, saying ‘we had nothing to do with this.’ If I were the prime minister, that’s what I’d be saying to David Barnea, the head of Mossad: knock this off.

Makovsky:

By the way, I’ll add on the other side, there have been a number of leaks, over the recent, I’d say, last year, on certain things. The beeper issue and a few other things. Things have leaked out about the Mossad, some of their accomplishments, because somebody in the Mossad seems intent on letting people know about some of the cool things they’ve done that had a big impact.

Abrams:

Understandable from a human point of view and understandable from a bureaucratic point of view, but a mistake.

Makovsky:

Yeah, let me ask you, and on this subject we’ll conclude, Gaza. So Israel now controls 75 percent of Gaza, 40 percent of Gaza City, as of a few days ago. They’ve moved at least a couple hundred thousand people, it seems like towards Mawasi. They’ve got more to go. You’ve had, talking about leaks, it seems like—based on reports—that Eyal Zamir, the Chief of Staff of the IDF, is – and he’s no softy – is very tough on Gaza, but he doesn’t agree with the approach of the government on Gaza and the hostages. Where are we on this? Where are we going?

Abrams:

I tend, on this, to be more analytical than to be telling the Israelis what to do, because I think there are no good answers. You know, it’s not ‘this is great and this is terrible.’ I certainly understand the views of hostage family members who worry about anything other than getting a deal to get the hostages out, now. I also understand the point of view of the minority of hostage families who think the best way to get our family members out is to defeat Hamas, and we should go at it all the way.

As you’ve just said, you know, there are differing opinions in the kind of security structure there, or at least there appear to be. So, I would say, as an American, I’m not going to say what I think they should be doing, and presumably they have more information than we do, too. It’s a terrible, terrible situation, and has been since October 7. I get what the Prime Minister is doing in two sentences. One, Hamas has been very reluctant to reach a deal and to let any hostages go. How do you make them less reluctant? How do you pressure them? Militarily, that’s how. And that’s what Israel is doing in the hope that a deal was more likely hasn’t happened yet. Maybe it happens tomorrow, and then we’ll say, ‘well, this idea was right of preparing, not announcing that that won’t do it, but of preparing and then beginning going into Gaza City.’

In the end, they may have to go in, and what they will be doing is further weakening Hamas in its last stronghold. And that’s a good basis for any future of Gaza, because any future of Gaza depends on killing Hamas. I don’t mean killing every single individual in it, obviously, but really killing the organization, not only as a military organization, but as a terrorist organization. So, we Americans, we don’t get to balance those equities and make the decision. Israelis, who live, whose lives are on the line, do, and, you know, the government has made the decision.

Makovsky:

And of course, you have, which we all have read about, all the reservists have done so much reserve duty and there’s a lot of fatigue in Israel about this.

Abrams:

It’s true. It’s absolutely true. And you know, I have family members who have been in this situation of being in Gaza for 300 days, for 350 days, but remember that this is, in fact, a national army. It’s a citizen’s army. The people making the decisions also have friends and relatives who are in Gaza. It’s not a distant expeditionary war. It’s right there, and it involves all of them and all of their families, which is why I think, you know, I don’t want to say this is right and that’s wrong.

Makovsky:

I have one last question we’ll conclude. JINSA partnered with the Vandenberg Coalition, and the chair is one of your hats. And John Hannah, my colleague, he chaired this project [along with] Jonathan Ruhe, and also another colleague. We, and some other experts, Scooter Libby and so on, put out together in early ’24, the end of February, if I’m not mistaken. So almost a year and a half ago, about five months or so after October 7. The day after. I know that could be a whole other webinar.

And I encourage everybody to go on our website to look this up. And some of the recommendations, I think, did influence at least the Israeli thinking. It took them a while to try to create this mechanism to get the aid outside of Hamas-UN channels. I don’t know why it took the Israelis that long. I mean, you guys wrote about it that. The team wrote about it already in early 2024 with recommendations how to do this, to separate Hamas out of this. But I mean, among the many issues that Israel has to face is you want to undercut Hamas [from] being in charge of the aid.

Abrams:

It’s very striking. You know, some things appear to be unthinkable. ‘You just can’t do it, right?’ For example, the notion that that the UN won’t be in charge of food for Gaza. Well, ‘it’s impossible,’ right? I mean, how can you and the whole world is against it. They want the UN. So, it took a long time after October 7 for the Israelis to get to that point of saying, ‘this is nuts. We can’t allow this to continue.’ The UN itself acknowledges that 85 percent of the food that goes in through UN channels doesn’t get to the people it’s meant for, civilians in Gaza. It gets to Hamas.

And it’s true that the UN as an organization and all its parts—the World Food Programme, UNICEF, everybody, and above all, UNRWA—resisted this idea. ‘What do you mean you’re going to create an alternative channel? We’re in charge of this.’ They understood that it was, in a sense, a death blow to UNRWA. So, it took the Israelis a long time, actually, to get this Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and up and going. And I think one could say that in the beginning, it was not well-run. That is, it was, maybe it’s unfair to criticize, because nobody had ever done this before, but it took a while for them to get the distribution right and to get the security right. And they now have and they’re delivering millions of meals against the protests of the UN, and largely without the cooperation of the UN. But it’s the right thing to do, and it’s a critical thing to do, because as long as Hamas is in charge of food in Gaza, it obviously has its hands around the throat of every civilian there.

So, whatever you think should happen in Gaza the day after [war], a critical part of it is being able to guarantee food supplies, medicine supplies that are completely out of the hands of Hamas. Israel may have taken too long to get to that point, but they’re there now. And I think it’s fair to say the United States is supporting them in this, and nobody else is. I can’t name another government that is actually supporting them.

Makovsky:

By the way, we had a few more [task force members]. We had Steve Price, Gary Ginsberg. We had Rob Danin. It was a great group. It was a terrific group. The group briefed senior Israeli folks twice, senior U.S. officials, Arab officials. I think the Israelis were the most receptive.

Well, I keep saying we’re going to conclude, but there are more questions, then we’ll definitely conclude.

Okay. Jay Solomon had a follow up. He says, couldn’t the U.S. or DOJ—Department of Justice—be legally liable for not trying to prosecute these Hamas leaders? They’re indicted for killing Americans, not Israelis.

Abrams:

I think the answer that’s no. That is, you can’t sue the government for a prosecutorial decision like that.

Makovsky:

Okay, Charlie Kupchan, blast from the past. Great to hear from Charlie. Charlie asks, can you say more about the U.S. role? CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] must have been informed in advance, since Israel was flying into airspace controlled by the U.S. Is it credible that Trump did not know in advance?

Abrams:

Yeah, I think that’s right. You know, I’ve asked myself – I have no inside information on this – how would Israel have done this? And the answer is, they would have flown over Iraq. And the United States is pretty much in control of Iraqi airspace too. So, if you see planes making that route, it’s hard to believe that CENTCOM didn’t detect this immediately.

Now, if they had no information, they may have thought it was an attack on Iran, but either way, it’s odd. I mean, they would have notified Washington. That would have happened automatically. I mean, it’d be interesting to know who knew, when, and when did somebody notify the president? At what point did they go to the Israelis, maybe at CENTCOM, and say, ‘hey, what’s up? What is this?’ But again, the Israelis may have thought, the later we Americans know, the easier it’s going to be for us, actually.

Makovsky:

All right. Well, look, thank you very much. Elliott, you’re welcome as always. And I forgot to mention, actually your most esteemed position you have, which is, you’re a member of JINSA’s Iran Task Force.

So, I love working with you in any capacity, whether it’s about Gaza or Iran or anything. Thank you very much for joining. Thanks everybody for joining. We’re all going to be interested to hear as we learn more, as Elliott said. And obviously, we’ll keep following these stories. Please stay tuned and wish everyone a good rest of your day, good rest of the week, and again, we send our deep sympathies to Charlie Kirk’s family. Thank you very much.