Transcript: Webinar – Netanyahu’s Summit With Trump
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow and Israel’s former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister
Elliott Abrams, JINSA Iran Policy Project Member and former U.S. Special Representative for Iran
John Hannah, JINSA Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow, JINSA Gaza Futures Task Force Member, and former National Security Advisor to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Fellow for American Strategy Jonathan Ruhe.
—
TRANSCRIPT
Please note the transcript has been edited for flow and clarity.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Hello everyone. Happy New Year and welcome to JINSA’s final webinar of a packed 2025. I’m Jonathan Ruhe, JINSA Fellow for American Strategy. Today we’ll focus on yesterday’s summit between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, as well as its potential implications for both the United States and Israel, but also the broader Middle East.
As always, I am privileged to be joined by retired IDF Major General Yaakov Amidror, JINSA distinguished fellow and Israel’s former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. I’m also delighted to be joined by Elliott Abrams, former U.S. Special Representative for Iran, and, of course, also by JINSA’s Randi and Charles Wax Fellow John Hannah, who is former National Security Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
Because it’s relevant to today’s discussion, I’d also like to point out that Elliott is a member of JINSA’s Iran Policy Project. He is also a member of the Gaza Futures Task Force, which was led by John Hannah as a joint effort between JINSA and the Vandenberg Coalition to examine what the ‘day after’ in Gaza might possibly look like. So, certainly continues to be relevant.
As always, for those in our audience, if you have questions, please type them into the Q and A box on the bottom of your screen, and we’ll address them to the panelists as best we are able.
So obviously, there’s a lot to discuss, but I want to start by asking General Amidror, given all the topics that were covered in the meeting yesterday—and that we’ll try to get through in the hour we have here. General Amidror, if you could summarize how you saw this visit, which notably, was Netanyahu’s sixth visit with Trump this year, the most of any foreign leader that’s met with Trump since he took office for a second term.
General Amidror, the floor is yours.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Thank you very much for the opportunity. I think that everyone who was asked before the visit about it in Israel would answer that this is a very crucial visit. It’s kind of a juncture at the end of the long road of two years since the beginning of the war.
The war, as it was, is over. Now, we have to understand where we and the Americans—together and each of us by themselves—stand relating to the problems which are still open. Many people in Israel, in the media and so on, were more pessimistic about the visit as always, and as always, they have been surprised by the good mood. During the meeting—and I want to be specific about six points—but I have to add that before the visit took place, there were two very important issues relating to Israel’s strategic situation in the Middle East.
One is the recognition of Somaliland by Israel, which is giving Israel kind of a footprint in the Horn of Africa, something that we didn’t have in the past. [It is] an area which is very close to Yemen, which is near the straits, the Bab el Mandeb Straits. It made huge noise within the Arab world, within the Middle East, not just in the Arab world. And there was one important country which didn’t condemn the recognition [of Somaliland]: the Emirates. We have to remember it.
Israel is doing some actions in the Middle East, around the Middle East, which are more about the position of Israel in the future than about the war. Probably, it’s one of the results of the war from Israel.
And the second important strategic issue was the meeting between the President of Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Greece, and Prime Minister Netanyahu, hardening the alliance between the three countries. For Israel, it’s about three issues. One is the gas in the Mediterranean, energy in the Mediterranean. The second one is this alliance versus Turkey. And the third, this is the last leg of a dream corridor coming from India through the Emirates to Jordan, Israel, and then through the Mediterranean and Europe.
It’s a dream. It’s a vision – but it should be materialized in the future. Saudi Arabia is a very important part of it, and they are not [on board] yet. It is very much connected to the Abraham Accords policy. But it, by itself, is very important, because it’s the [maritime trade] leg which leads from this side of the Mediterranean into Europe. And if that will work in the future, it will be a huge achievement for Israel.
Also, I’m proud to mention something which is not so strategic, but for us, it’s a reason to be proud: the first operational laser system was handled by the R&D system in Israel to the IDF, and [as of] yesterday, we have an operational laser system somewhere in Israel ready to intercept missiles and rockets.
About the visit itself. The visit itself touched on four points. Each of them is important, but I want to begin with the most important. It’s Iran. The president was very clear, saying that if the Iranians will cross red lines relating to missiles—and he was asked specifically about the ballistic missiles—he said, ‘yes, including the missiles, and the nuclear [program] even faster, the reaction will come.’
He didn’t elaborate on who will react, and what will be the reaction exactly. But it’s clear that it is kind of an understanding between the two states that if red lines are crossed by the Iranians, the notion that something kinetic should be done was understood by both sides. They have to elaborate on it. We have to show all the intelligence that we have to convince the working level and the professionals that we are right about it, so that they agree with our assessment [about] what the Iranians are doing. And it’s not always so easy.
When we found for the first time, in ‘93 or ‘94, the nuclear project, it took us two years to convince the professionals in America that there is such a project in Iran. So, when it comes to professional questions and relations, no one is making [life] easy [for] the other side, but at the end of the day, from our point of view—and I think from the American point of view—it is very important that we will be on the same page.
So [it] was basically agreed that if the red lines will be violated by the Iranians, a reaction will come. And now it is going down to the working level to bring all the information that both sides have and to agree about the situation. And it’s very important that we will be on the same page relating to this question.
The second point was Gaza. Gaza was less clear than Iran, because the president said that, ‘yes, Hamas should be disarmed.’ But he spoke about the second [ceasefire] stage. He didn’t take [as] a prerequisite the release of the last of the last Israeli hostage’s body. But I think the important point for Israel, more than anything else, is that it was agreed that Hamas should be disarmed. How it will be done, when it will be done – [these are] good questions. I believe that if that is not going to be done by diplomacy, by the United States of America, it will be done by the IDF.
There are some leaks [in the media] about a three-month period during which the Americans will have to get [the body], and if not, the IDF will go in three months from now. [Whether] it’s January, February, March, it’s good from the weather point of view, but I don’t know. It’s less clear than Iran.
In Iran, it’s clear that the Americans understand that a reaction should [happen], take part, if A, B, C and D, and we have to agree about the A B, C and D. In Gaza, it’s more blurry, but it well-understood that Hamas should be disarmed, and for us, this is the most important part of the whole big plan of Gaza.
Something which was not in the newspapers before was mentioned. The president said that there is no full agreement between him and the prime minister about the West Bank, what we are calling Yehuda and Shomron, you to war, but ensure that Bibi will do the right actions there.
I think it is more about the aggressiveness of some settlers. By the way, most of them are not settlers at all, they are coming from outside the West Bank, but it doesn’t matter. And maybe less vocal approval for new settlements in the West Bank, something which happened in the last few weeks. It’s not clear from what was said, what is exactly the disagreement. and what are the expectations of the president, but clearly there were disagreements, and there are expectations of the president that the prime minister will act in the right way.
Two issues haven’t been mentioned. Maybe it was discussed, but nothing leaked out, and they didn’t say in public anything about that. One is Lebanon. What’s going on with the disarming of Hezbollah, which was part of the agreement, and as far as we know, the Lebanese army does not continue to disarm Hezbollah. And the last issue which was not mentioned, I mentioned it in my first remark: the Houthis in Yemen – what the two countries are going to do.
We understand that it cannot continue the same way in which the Houthis are doing whatever they want, whenever they want. The fact that we now have something relating to the area in Somaliland, it’s very important as a beginning, at least for better intelligence. I don’t see a F-35 landing there, but it’s very close to Yemen. I think it’s 350 kilometers, versus 1800 that you have to fly from Israel to San’aa. But I think the fact that we are there is very important, and the fact that the Emirates didn’t condemn it is also very important, but the Houthis hadn’t been mentioned, and it is something that probably Israel will have to deal with the Americans about, okay, what can be done? It’s far from Israel, but it’s very, very important.
These are the issues which had been mentioned and hadn’t been mentioned, but I think the fact that the atmosphere was very good is very important from the Israeli point of view. There are many commentators that try to say ‘now it’s going to be a break, because the president and the prime minister see differently the whole situation.’
And, in our side, the fact that [former Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs] Ron Dermer was not within the team, it’s a big problem. He was a real expert and a very, very smart guy that can run the show relating to the United States of America. But they see that the present ambassador, Mr. Leiter, and the acting head of the National Security Council, Gil Reich, are doing a very good job preparing the meetings. Let’s see what will happen on the ground. Now, [we have] nice words, but let’s see what will happen on the ground and how the Americans and the Israelis will operate in the future relating to these issues.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Well, thank you, General Amidror, for your nice words in setting that up. It was certainly a complex portfolio, so I think we’ll just sort of go through and start handling in greater detail the issues you laid out. Elliott, please.
Elliott Abrams:
Two things. One, it isn’t even clear to me that there was a significant disagreement on the West Bank, on Judea and Samaria, because it may well be that it is helpful to the prime minister to have the president of the United States, great friend of Israel, push for greater restraint by some people in the West Bank, because now the prime minister can cite that as he pushes for that restraint.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I agree, by the way, that it might help the Prime Minister.
Elliott Abrams:
The broader question of, sort of the tone of the meeting, there were a few stories, mostly that went back to Axios, attempting to say that ‘no, no, behind the scenes, there was a lot of disagreement.’ And I just want to read a few lines from Ariel Kahane from Israel Hayom. ‘For a decade, Trump has pursued bold pro-Israel policy far beyond that of any of his predecessors. For 10 years, commentators, self-styled experts, and would-be prophets, have predicted any moment now he will turn on Israel. For 10 years, they’ve been spectacularly wrong. This dynamic, which is fairly amusing when viewed honestly, repeats itself ahead of every meeting between Trump and Netanyahu. To the disappointment of the Prime Minister’s critics, it becomes clear time and again that Trump is fully committed to Israel’s security of needs.’
And I would add, it becomes clearer that the relationship between them is maintained at an extremely high level.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you, Elliot, and that actually sets me up well for my first question to you. So given that we certainly saw lots in the media, both before and then, really, after the meeting, playing up the daylight between the between the two on all these issues – coming out of the meeting, was there anything about Trump’s statements on Iran policy, given your background working that portfolio under the first term, any statements from him that told you anything new? Or is this, you know, is this Trump sort of messaging the Iranian regime, ‘I can get tough with you, but there’s also the option to come back to the table.’ How many layers do you think are at play here?
Elliott Abrams:
I don’t think there was anything new. I think it is significant that the president reiterated that not only would he approve of an Israeli strike if it were needed, but the United States might join again. And I think it’s significant because, you know, it’s one thing to say it, but if it’s three months ago or six or 12 months ago, people wonder, well, does that still apply? Obviously, now it does still apply when it comes to Iran.
Where I thought there was a difference, and we should get to this later, was the question of Turkey and the question of Syria.
Jonathan Ruhe:
I backvoted a lot of those questions for the panel, but I want to, since we’re on the Iran issue, I wanted to address some questions from our audience.
So, in the backdrop of the meeting at Mar-a-Lago and these statements on Iran, there’s been another resurgence of protests across cities throughout Iran. And also, I saw reports yesterday, I think, that Trump said he has no public interest in overthrowing the regime, toppling the Islamic Republic. I forget the exact wording.
Elliott, just to follow up with you. I know these are late breaking events. Do these protests tell you anything new about what’s going on in Iran or how the regime views its competition with the U.S. and Israel?
Elliott Abrams:
One, they tell you that everything we’re reading about the Iranian economy is true: the collapse of the currency, for example, and the hardship of the Iranian people, such that these protests did not begin in the universities. They began with bazaaris and now have spread to universities.
Second, I think the Iranian reaction shows us this is a weaker regime than it was before Israel and the United States bombed the nuclear sites, because now they’re having to say, ‘well, of course we want to negotiate.’ Yes, there is police action. Of course. It’s a police state. But the fact that they’re talking about negotiating, that Pezeshkian saying, ‘well, there are legitimate demands.’ That’s very significant. That change in tone suggests to me fear on the part of the regime that the protests may continue to spread. They are well aware—they are more aware than we are—that they have almost no support among the Iranian people.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I can add something, just one sentence, to what was said about Iran: look, it’s a perfect storm from the Iranian point of view, the regime.
The total collapse of their strategy during the war; the [inability] of the Iranians to deliver in the Middle East, not to Hezbollah, not to Hamas, not to Assad; the loss of the Shiite Crescent which does not exist anymore; combined with the domestic problems – some of them, it’s mother nature, it’s a lack of rain and so on, and part of it is a lazy handling of the economy; it’s a perfect storm.
The regime answers are not sophisticated enough. They lost something in these events. They don’t have an answer to the question, ‘okay, where [is] the state going after the crisis?’
I don’t see the strong opposition, or strong enough opposition, but the crisis itself is very problematic for the regime.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you, General. John, please.
John Hannah:
I was just going to kind of foot stomp what I think is an extraordinary success by the prime minister. Iran has kind of been a non-topic in the United States. The president kind of has put it off the table since June as, sort of, ‘we did the job. We’re finished. We’re done. Iran’s been put in the corner, and now we’re moving on to Middle East peace.’
And within only the last several weeks did Israel start this discussion, not about the nuclear issue, which the president has always been very focused on, but about the ballistic missile buildup and the fact that perhaps not as much damage was done in June as initially thought. The Iranians, maybe, have been able to recover and start to rebuild faster than anyone anticipated, it seems, increasingly with the help of China, which is a real issue, because China was behind the ballistic missile buildup before the June war. And they seem to have fallen right back into that pattern of really juicing the Iranian ballistic missile program.
But the fact [is] that within the space of a matter of weeks, an issue that was not a real pressing subject on the front burner of the Trump administration, [we] have moved from that to a point where the president is essentially endorsing the Israeli position. That possible trigger for renewed military action against the Iranian regime, certainly by Israel and potentially with American participation, is not simply a rebuilding of the nuclear program, which not a lot of people see at the moment. It’s this issue of the ballistic missiles as a real existential problem for both Israel and the broader region, as well as parts of Europe, obviously, and eventually the United States.
For the president to have adopted that and to come out as clearly as he did, saying, you know, ‘if the Iranians are not very, very careful here in the coming weeks and months, we could have the United States supporting renewed military action because of the Iranian ballistic missile program,’ I thought was a real coup for the prime minister that I don’t know if anybody saw on the horizon just a few weeks ago.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you, John.
And to follow that up, to pivot to another big issue, which is obviously Gaza, if you believe the press reporting, there’s a lot of daylight between Netanyahu and Trump over whether and how to move forward with Gaza [ceasefire] phase two. And then, coming out of the meeting, depending on how you might want to read it, those disagreements, those divergences, may not have been resolved.
To what extent do you agree with the proposition that there still is a lot of daylight between Trump and Netanyahu, and if there is, because Trump is transactional in a lot of his diplomacy, is it give a little on Iran, get a little on Gaza, something like that?
John Hannah:
I mean, of course, it’s always possible.
I think we don’t know. As General Amidror suggested, it was vaguer on Gaza. But again, I think the most important point coming out of it that wasn’t absolutely clear beforehand—although the president has, at you know, at different times, said slightly different things about what would happen if Hamas didn’t disarm, but certainly the plan itself, within its four corners, doesn’t necessarily lead you to the conclusion that in the event Hamas doesn’t agree to disarm voluntarily that the United States would be fully behind some use of force to compel Hamas to disarm and demilitarize—I think the President again, cleared that up entirely. That ‘Israel is exactly right.’ The disarmament, demilitarization are the very core, they are the sine qua non for any chance for this plan to succeed.
The president seems to be convinced that Hamas, through the Qataris and the Turks and the Egyptians, somehow agreed to disarm. I still can’t find any such statement by Hamas, anywhere, that they’ve agreed to such. But the president has said, if they don’t live up to fulfill that agreement, they’re going to be disarmed by force – most likely, as General Amidror says, by the IDF.
Interestingly, yesterday the president alluded to a group of other countries, perhaps countries outside the Middle East—I don’t know if that’s Pakistan or Turkey, or who he is referring to exactly—but [that have] suggested to him that if Hamas fails to fulfill its obligations to disarm, that they’re prepared to wipe Hamas out themselves militarily.
I think we have to take all that with a tremendous grain of salt, because the only thing we’ve heard from any of the likely countries willing to come in and form the international stabilization force, any Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim countries, is that they really want no part of any operation that would require them to forcibly confront and compel Hamas to disarm and demilitarize.
But the president was quite clear that one way or another, hopefully voluntarily by agreement, but, if necessary, the United States will support the forcible disarmament of Hamas, and if necessary, that means potentially the IDF going back in and finishing the job.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you. I want to come to General Amidror in a second about the Israeli next steps on that, but Elliott, first I’d like to turn to you.
Let’s say Hamas does not disarm voluntarily. Is the IDF the best, or the only, option to actually disarm Hamas? As John mentioned, a lot of the countries that have expressed interest in this international stabilization force have made clear that fighting Hamas is not going to be part of that mandate. So what are, what are the options for, for moving on to phase two [of the ceasefire] here?
Elliott Abrams:
Well, I think we should turn to General Amidror in a second, because it seems to me that the notion that Pakistan or Turkey or Qatar or European countries are going to forcibly disarm Hamas, that is, they’re going to be willing to shoot, is a dream. It’s not going to happen.
Therefore, the question turns on what Israel thinks is its best way forward. You have the Yellow Line. You have the half of Gaza in which the IDF has really tossed out Hamas. And the question, I think, will go to Israel as to what and how it wants to act in the other half, maybe you can call it the western half, of Gaza. No one else is going to do that job.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I agree with this assumption. I can tell you that the IDF made the preparations. We have a detailed plan how to do it; the units that are supposed to do it made their own preparation, including training; and the IDF is waiting for the decision of the government, which probably will take time to make, based on the dialogue with the Americans.
If what was leaked is true, that both sides agree that they’d give Hamas three months to disarm itself, the IDF will be much more ready after three months. Basically, I think, and I don’t know, but I think that this is an operation of two to three months, a very extensive operation, in which many forces will come in to take Gaza City and the camps in the center. It will be much, much, much, much easier now.
First of all, Hamas doesn’t have the capabilities that it had at the beginning of the war. They don’t have the whole system of manufacturing weapons inside Gaza. They don’t have any connection outside Gaza. They’re separated from Egypt and the sea.
We don’t have hostages inside the tunnels. It is not going to be easy because so you have to fight on the ground and under the ground, but I believe that within two to three months, operational control of the area will be full, and then it will take another six months, more or less, to clean the area, meaning to go slowly, slowly, to kill everyone under the ground, to demolish the underground system – not every inch of it, we don’t have enough explosives to destroy each in every inch of the tunnels, but the system will not work afterwards.
Then in the new situation, that is kind of a time that the Americans should come with a tender to say, ‘okay, who is ready to come in?’ and to put the limitations on what should be done and what should not be done, and to begin to think seriously about the next stage of rebuilding Gaza. That cannot be done if Hamas is still there, strong as it is today. No one is ready to fight it, and no one is ready to put his money where Hamas is still the ruler of this area. You would be a very stupid business guy to put your money there.
I met members of the team, which was organized in America, to take part and the rebuilding in the future, and for each of them it’s very clear. They are not ready to speak about putting one dollar [into rebuilding Gaza] when Hamas is still as strong as it is today. It would be stupidity from their point of view. They were not ready to risk their money in areas that would be a battlefield between Israel and Hamas.
So Israel would have to go and to [do] what is needed militarily and to end it with a situation in which Hamas is not relevant anymore as a threat inside Gaza. It’s not a threat, it is not relevant today, as a threat to Israel from Gaza. It should not be relevant inside Gaza.
And then, foreign forces probably will come in [to Gaza]. Israel is determined not to let the Turks and the Qataris, the supporters of Hamas, to take part in the forces that will control the area and support the civilian side of the rebuilding.
Jonathan Ruhe:
If I might, this is a question that’s been coming up from the audience. What’s still the theory of – it is easier for me to ask this incredibly difficult question [than answer it].
How is three or six more months of operating against Hamas going to create some strategic change? What is disarming? Is it taking away every single weapon in Gaza? Is it killing every last Hamas fighter above a certain unit level? Destroying all the tunnels?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that what Hamas tried to do in the last few months is to reorganize itself inside the area, and from our point of view, it’s an easier situation now, because now we know who is Hamas. There is no question anyone who will fight will be killed, everyone that will surrender will be taken into Israeli prison. I don’t know if we [can] kill all the 60,000 people which [are] holding Kalashnikovs in Gaza. Probably not, but we will kill half of them, and for sure, the whole leadership.
And we will take all the infrastructure which still exists underground and on the ground, and in those which will remain will be under supervision in the area, because they will need to move from one point to another, and we will have the ability to make checkpoints, and to take them, and to neutralize them as well.
It’s not that it will be complete, all 100 percent, but if it will be 80 percent and only 20 percent will remain, we know how to live with it.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you, General Amidror.
A couple of follow up questions from the audience. John, I’ll ask this one to you first, and then we can go around the horn on it.
Given the difficulties of disarming Hamas that we’re discussing, isn’t it possible that the new status quo just becomes this Yellow Line that Elliot described? And there’s efforts, as General Amidror was alluding to, to try to relocate the population across the line, at least to provide basic services. Do you think that can become the new normal, and what are the risks of that outcome?
John Hannah:
Well, certainly within the plan itself, I think it’s point 17 or so, that acknowledges that if Hamas delays or rejects its obligations under the proposal that the plan, everything in the plan, will be implemented in those areas under the IDF control that are going to be ceded eventually to the international stabilization force [ISF].
So, the suggestion is that the ISF will deploy in areas now controlled by the IDF, that 53% of Gaza behind the Yellow Line. Maybe you’ll get some kind of technocratic Palestinian governance. There you will start some kind of rehabilitation and potentially even reconstruction in those parts of Gaza under Israeli control, and that you will allow, perhaps, Palestinians from the eastern part of Gaza or the western part of Gaza to flow back across the Yellow Line into those areas that that eventually would be under the ISF and a new technocratic government.
If that happens, then it becomes a complicating factor, certainly for a renewed IDF offensive, I would think, to have all that activity going on in areas of Gaza in between Israel and Hamas’s strongholds. But that is one potential outcome if, in fact, people decide they’re not going to necessarily forcibly disarm Hamas and its strongholds, that we’re just going to see a new status quo established along the Yellow Line, Israel will have some kind of buffer there, controlled by a technocratic government and the international stabilization force, hopefully with agreements that Israel will have continued freedom of action if necessary to act.
But it would become a complicating factor, I think, in any scenario to fully defeat and destroy Hamas and its strongholds. And it could. It has the risk of becoming a new status quo that further divides Palestinian areas and divides [Gaza] essentially into two parts, kind of an East and West Berlin situation.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
If I may, I think, if that happens it’s a huge tragedy for the Palestinians in Gaza, because the majority of the population will remain under the terrorist organization regime that ignores all the rights of the population, does everything for the benefit of Hamas, and tries to build the military capability of the organization. The population there will be under pressure and will not get what they are supposed to get, because Hamas confiscates everything that it can for its benefit, either the military benefit or the richness benefit.
It will be a tragedy for the people of Gaza. It’s very good for Israel, by the way. For Israel, it’s an ideal solution. No threat from Gaza. The Gazans will be in the mud, [and] will continue to be encircled by the IDF and far from the border of Israel. Security- wise, it’s very good for Israel.
But, it [would be a] tragedy for the Palestinians in Gaza.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Elliott, anything you’d like to add?
Elliott Abrams:
Yeah, just one thing on the force and Turkey. It’s interesting. The president called [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan a very good friend. He said we’re not going to have a problem between Israel and Turkey. And he said Netanyahu respects everyone. And that quote he’s ‘done a fantastic job, I’m with him all the way. I’m with Bibi all the way.’
And I think the question there is, what is the meaning of that with respect to Turkey’s role in a potential Gaza force? And I’m inclined to think that it’s a kind of consolation prize to Erdogan. That is to me, I don’t read it as being, well, Erdogan’s wonderful, so Turkey has to be in the force. I read it as the president saying, well, Turkey is not going to be in the force. The Israelis don’t want it. And then say, oh, and Erdogan, he’s just a terrific guy.
So, I don’t know, we don’t really know, but I don’t think that was a huge issue of contention between Trump and Netanyahu.
John Hannah:
And it is worth noting that when CENTCOM convened that meeting about a week ago to begin to try defining the mission of any such international stabilization force, that somehow Turkey was left off the invitation list to come and hear the presentation about the stabilization force.
Jonathan Ruhe:
So speaking of maritime one, I’d like to sort of jump to the next big basket. We’ll just call it Muslim Brotherhood-related issues.
John, I’ll ask you to comment first for our audience. By the way, John was the lead author on a paper on U.S. policy towards Syria that JINSA put out earlier this fall that I commend to everyone here.
So yesterday, Trump said at a press conference that he has an understanding with Israel on Syria and that he’s sure Israel and Syrian leader al Sharaa will ‘get along.’
John, what are your thoughts? What are your thoughts on the likelihood of some sort of understanding between Israel and Syria?What does it look like? What does it take to get there? Or is this sort of casting about but nothing’s really on the table.
John Hannah:
Yeah, it was hard to tell. My guess is that whatever understanding or agreement the president and Netanyahu had was simply over the fact that, if it’s possible to achieve some kind of new security arrangement between Israel and Syria, that they both agree that would be a good thing.
But when you get into the details of what Israel may require from Syria, in terms of the Druze, in terms of the extent of demilitarization that Israel is requiring, potentially all the way up from the Israeli border to the outskirts of Damascus, what Sharaa requires, and certainly in terms of Israeli withdrawals, probably from the territory that the IDF took up positions in after the fall of the Assad regime in last December, including that that incredibly important position on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, that would be very difficult, I think, for Israel, in exchange for nothing more than some kind of new security agreement that’s kind of a 1974 demilitarization agreement, plus, plus.
Israel, I think, would really want to try and hold out for some kind of formal peace agreement, which also is, given the Israeli position on the Golan Heights, which is never going to change, it would be a tough climb for a former jihadi to make that deal. Obviously, the situation in Suwayda remains very tense. The entire situation with Syrian minorities is very difficult.
It’s not exactly clear to me what Israel is asking for, with regard to the Druze and Suwayda, whether they really require some kind of formal corridor that they’ll be able to use to provide humanitarian assistance. We did have a report in The Washington Post a week or so ago, I don’t know how accurate it was, about Israeli activity with the Druze, including weapons and arms and coordination with the Kurds in Syria’s northeast helping the Druze down in Suwayda.
So I think there are just a jumble of issues to include, of course, Turkey’s role in Syria and within the Syrian military and armed forces, and what kind of role it will play, and Israel’s concerns about Turkey in Syria. It’s all a lot of very complicated and difficult issues.
If anything, it looks like we’ve kind of moved a little bit backwards since Ron Dermer left. We had that very serious period of intense negotiations, face to face, between Ron Dermer and Sharaa’s most important aide, the foreign minister Shaibani, back in the July-September kind of time period. But those have lagged since then, and we haven’t really got a major resumption of those talks.
I think that’s probably the best we can hope for: that at some point Israel will identify Ron Dermer’s replacement in those negotiations, and that we’ll start to meet again under U.S. auspices and see where the common ground can be reached. But I’m not holding my breath on getting to yes anytime soon.
Jonathan Ruhe:
General, I’ll turn to you to pick up the other side of John’s American perspective. To what extent is Syria really all about Turkey, Israel’s view of Turkey? Where does Trump [stating] yesterday he’s still interested in selling F-35 combat aircraft to Turkey, where does that fall in Israel’s list of priorities, given everything else, the crush of all other events that are going on?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that the first priority of Israel in Syria is not to let anyone rebuild the threat to Israel south of Damascus. This is the most important priority that Israel has.
And, to add to that, the obligation that Israel has to secure the life of the Druze. Not to build the Druze state or something like that, but to guarantee that the Druze will not be butchered by the neighbors and the majority. With all due respect, we don’t have such an obligation towards the Alawites and even with the Kurds in Syria. Our commitment is very weak [with the Kurds]. They are more connected to the Americans than to Israel. So these are the two important interests that Israel has.
I believe that at the end, an agreement can be reached, because it’s the interest of both countries to have such an agreement for the Syrians to legitimize the regime, to let it have the ability to be responsible for the economy and the future of Syria, not to deal with Israel and the Druze and so on and so forth.
I think basically all sides have an interest to have a kind of understanding, if not an agreement. It can be on the table. It can be under the table. In the Middle East, it’s very crowded under the table. There are many things that are happening under the table.
I’m not naive about the regime, by the way. But I think it’s in the interest of both sides to have a kind of understanding, not to be involved in another war in the Golan Heights. It’s bad for Shaara that we can destroy all that he has, and it’s not our interest [to do so]. We have other places in which we have to put our capabilities and to deal with real threats. So, I believe that an agreement can be reached, in spite of the problems that have been mentioned.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Just to follow up. I know this is of interest to our audience: the issue of Turkey and the F-35s. My understanding, at least, and I’m not the expert within JINSA on this, is that Turkey is not considered a country that falls under U.S. assessments of Israel’s qualitative military edge, which informs [U.S. arms sales]. When we sell arms to various Middle Eastern countries, we factor in its effect on the military balance with Israel. My understanding is Turkey’s not formally part of that.
Where does this fit in Israel’s list of priorities?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
For Israel, it’s bad that other countries will have the F-35. It’s not for tomorrow. It will take years to go through the queue that you have relating to the F-35.
I tried to explain in Israel that it’s not just the airplane. The F-35 is a fantastic airplane, no question. What we did in Iran with the F-35 is something that everyone that has the F-35 will try to learn. But whenever a F-35 group is taken off for a mission, whether it is in Lebanon, in Gaza, in Iran, or in Yemen, hundreds, if not thousands, of people are sitting in many places in Israel making all the envelope of the flight of the operation. Huge numbers of intelligence people, electronic people, planning people, radar people, and so and so forth.
The secret of Israel is not just the fantastic airplane that we are getting from the Americans and the very smart and brave pilots that we have – the best in the world. It’s the system which no one has in the Middle East, and probably not have in the coming future. To build the system is huge. It is based on years of experience. The old pilots which finished flying after 40 years of flying are now running those centers in Israel which are making all of the envelope for the fighting pilots there. And I think that the ratio is one to 10, or even [better] than that.
So, yes, it’s bad for Israel. It’s very bad for Israel. We should be compensated by the Americans to keep our qualitative edge. But it’s not the end of the world from our view.
Jonathan Ruhe:
General Amidror, you talked a little bit about, you know, the future of the relationship. So Elliott, I’ll ask you sort of a broader over the horizon question.
One issue that seemed to be missing from the press conferences and statements yesterday, maybe the ghost of the feast at Mar-a-Lago, is any discussion of a possible new bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on U.S.-Israel security cooperation. The current one was 10 years and I believe it expires the year after next. Those things take a while to negotiate. I’m just using that as an opportunity to tee up a question for you.
Beyond the issues that we’re immediately focused on for the first 50 minutes here, how do you assess the future of the US, Israel, bilateral security partnership. It’s certainly, in some ways, at an all time high, relatively speaking, right now. But there’s also headwinds, certainly here, at least. So what’s the degree of optimism as you look out to the future of the bilateral partnership?
Elliott Abrams:
Your point is very well taken. There were all sorts of discussions of what went on, and there were leaks, real or fake, about what went on, but nobody mentioned that question. And it’s a very important question because you have new opposition to Israel, and U.S.-Israel relations and the U.S.-Israel alliance in both parties now that you didn’t have last time you went through this exercise.
You have a beginning of a discussion of, for example, whether what we need now is a 20-year agreement. You have a beginning of a discussion of whether that agreement, which will go to Israel’s 100th birthday, should lead to a phasing out of military aid, as 30 years ago, economic aid was phased out.
There have been some suggestions that there should be a phase-out by 2048. Not a phase-out of the relationship, but rather a change in the kind of relationship to what we have, say, with the United Kingdom, or with Canada, with Australia, with Japan, where there is no aid, but there’s a very close military relationship.
This did not appear to be discussed, but it really should be discussed that’s going to happen under President Trump, and it’s going to happen in this new context of both criticisms of the alliance in a serious way, and suggestions in a serious way, and a kind of disgusting antisemitism on the left and right that that was not part of the background to the last round [of MOU negotiations].
This is really quite critical, and I hope that people in the Trump administration are really beginning to think about this, because it’s going to be a really important question, maybe in the ‘26 elections, maybe in the ‘28 elections, but it’s going to really set the basis for the relationship at a crucial turning point.
Jonathan Ruhe:
Thank you very much. With that food for thought, looking forward into the new year, I’d like to thank everyone for joining us again on the final webinar of a very busy and in some ways unforeseeable 2025.
I want to wish everyone a Happy New Year, happy holidays, and we’ll see you again soon on another JINSA webinar. Thank you to the panelists. Thank you.