Transcript: Webinar – Netanyahu’s Washington Visit and Potential Ceasefire
Tue, Jul 08, 2025
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Hi, I am Michael Makovsky, President and CEO of JINSA, sorry for the delay. Welcome. We are here to talk about Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit here in Washington. And joining me is my colleagues, IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror who is a distinguished fellow here at JINSA and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu and John Hannah, the Charles and Randi Wax Senior Fellow here.
I will start with you, General. Look, I know Prime Minister Netanyahu came here Sunday night, so he has been here yesterday and today. And the trip is not over yet. There has been some reporting, and they showed the Q&A with the press at dinner. Tell me, how do you see the trip and what do you think Prime Minister Netanyahu is trying to achieve?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I think the visit did not really begin. The first meeting was more about socializing [in the] meeting. It is very important because at the end of the day it is a dialogue between two people. And it is not that [there are] two people are coming with clear ideas and what should be done, and they have to argue and find the middle way. Here, it is about what concerns you, and what are the problems you are facing. What do you want to achieve. What do you want to give up. That is not the real meeting. The real meeting is beginning within an hour and a half… [crosstalk] …
For the Prime Minister there are I think four issues. First, and the more urgent one, because it is very sensitive because and it is about the hostages the end of the war in Gaza, the Prime Minister insisted before he left Israel that he would not leave Hamas to stay in Gaza, whatever will be the price. And if that can be achieved in negotiations, ok. If it cannot, Israel will continue the war.
And the war is not easy. We lost five soldiers yesterday. It [was] 7 [killed] 10 days ago. It’s a nasty war against guerilla[s], in a destroyed urban area. They can come out of every tunnel which still exists. I don’t know how many kilometers of tunnels they still have. They can surprise us, and we are paying a high price. But the goal of all these operations is to be sure that we are destructing [Hamas] to a level in which it is not relevant inside Gaza, and it will take time, [a] long time. If that can be achieved without a war, [that would be] much better. I’ll say something about the alternative in a minute. I want people to understand what the alternative [is] and why it is so problematic from our point of view, the world point of view, and the Palestinians’ point of view.
This is the first issue. This is [a] high priority, [but] it’s not the most important one. The most important one is Iran. What should happen in Iran? How we are monitoring Iran, we, the United States of America and Israel, how we are sharing information about Iran? [What is] a violation of what we think is important enough that we will act. How we act and when we act. And that should be coordinated, because the meaning of it is much bigger than just another attack in Iran, it might open a war. What happened if the Iranians are retaliating with big missiles into Israel? What will be the American reaction and so [on and so] forth?
So it is [an] issue which is very important, because we have to find [a] kind of monitoring regime that will be agreed between the two sides which will not allow the Iranians to come back to the stage of capabilities that they had before the war in at least three elements. One is air defense. Second is the ability to produce missiles, and third is [their] whole nuclear project. How we are doing it? And what Israel can do without coordinating with the Americans. And what the Americans insist to be coordinated. This is the most important, the most complicated issue, with] many questions and very few answers, but it’s very … [crosstalk] … I just want to mention the other two issues.
The third one is Lebanon. How we are squeezing Hezbollah to the level in which they will be ready to give up their heavy weapon systems, and Hezbollah, practically, will not be a threat to Israel in the future. And that can be achieved, unlike in the future, in Israel was very, very pessimistic about the ability to put pressure on Hezbollah and to achieve it. Now, disarming Hezbollah is not a far reach, it can happen. Because of the new situation in Lebanon, because Iran cannot help them, because the Sunnis in Syria are part of the new picture, unlike in the passing, that was part of the ability of this Hezbollah to recover.
So Lebanon is the third, and the last one is Syria. How we are coordinating our attitude towards the Syrian new regime. In Hebrew we say, [“Kobdeyu V’Chasdayu”] you have to be very cautious, but at the same time, give them the chance to show that they are ready to do what is needed to be done. And we know, everyone remembers [that] he came from, from al Qaeda. We know it. He pretends to be someone different. Let’s see if he’s really different or not, and if that will be coordinated with America and Israel, it will be much better for both of us. Because we have some capabilities they do not have in Syria. You have some capabilities we don’t have in Syria, and together, we can make the difference.
And now we are recruiting to this effort, as well as to the Lebanese effort, the Saudis, the Emiratis and others. So, at the end of the day, to see the big changes in the Levant, we have to work together and [agree] on what we are doing and what we are not doing. And this should be on the table. These are the four main issues. Of course, there is an elephant in the room. What we are doing with the Palestinian issue, what can be done and what cannot be done. Here in Israel, it is more political in Israel, not just [some] politics, but a lot of politics. This is why, for the Prime Minister, it is more complicated, but I think it is very important, that if we want to achieve something that in the American agenda is very important, is to broaden the Abraham Accords.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Okay, what is that expression in Hebrew again?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Kobdeyu V’Chasdayu [Be suspicious but give them the chance].
Michael Makovsky, PhD
I’m only asking that, not that I’m here to correct your Hebrew, General. I just wanted to clarify that. I want to come back to you, General, on those issues. But let me just go to John first. John, I mean, you have been watching these kinds of meetings a long time, you were National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney. How do you assess this? I mean, there was the dinner last night, which, you know, the press was invited to and now you have the second meeting. How do you assess [it] so far?
John Hannah
Unusual. I mean, it’s unusual to have successive days of meetings like this. It doesn’t often happen that an Israeli Prime Minister comes and needs to have a dinner and discussion with the President, and then, you know, the real business comes later in the week, or even the next day. I’m glad to see their meeting today, because my sense coming out of that meeting last night is that it was essentially [a] kind of victory lap, people talking in very broad and general terms. [A] little bit of dissonance, I thought, in the way they talked about Iran, of course, the President much more optimistic. You don’t really need a deal. A deal would be fine. The Iranians desperately want it. They respect us so much. They respect Israel now. I’m ready to go back and hit them if I have to, but I don’t think it’s going to be necessary. Whereas I thought the Prime Minister was probably, [and] appropriately so, much more cautious that we’ve done a lot, we’ve achieved a victory, but we’ve got to consolidate it, and we together, the United States and Israel, have now taken on full responsibility in combat for this job; making sure Iran never again gets anywhere close to having these kinds of military and nuclear capabilities. That we’ve got to have some very solid, detailed agreements about how we’re going to monitor this, especially in the absence of any international inspectors.
Let’s redouble our intelligence efforts together, our sharing, to make sure we’re on the same page, and let’s identify what those triggers might be that would cause one or both of us together to go back and restart some kind of military operations, to ensure Iran can’t rebuild. So, I hope that’s going to happen that those kinds of discussions, whether it’s between the Prime Minister and the President or between their aides. But there’s a lot to discuss, and here I [will] just put in a plug for the report we released, Mike, last Thursday. “Not Over,” is what [the] master of titles, Blaise Misztal, gave the report. “Not Over” ensuring Iran can’t rebuild, and discussing these issues of both the triggers, whether or not we have a new negotiation, triggers for new action, and then also, if we do get to a negotiation, what are going to be the set of demands and red lines that the United States and Israel have to agree together?
So, like I said, I didn’t see or hear what I wanted to hear last night. Hopefully it’s just as General Amidror said, that [it] was the two leaders taking a well-deserved kind of victory lap together on what they’ve accomplished so far, but still, obviously long way to go, and hopefully some of that work starts to get done today in a more serious way.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Yeah, I was going to bring that up, and I appreciate it. Everybody look on our website for this report. This paper, it’s like four or five pages, it is called, “Not Over.” It’s on our website, JINSA.org, [it is] about the situation right now, and what are the triggers and understandings that the United States and Israel [must] have on Iran? By the way, do you think John, that the fact, I mean, he didn’t have Melania Trump there, but you had Sarah Netanyahu at the dinner. And I guess, does that suggest a little more of a social dinner? I mean, it’s unusual to have a spouse at this type of dinner. Is that right?
John Hannah
Certainly, at what was, I think everybody expected a business dinner. It’s pretty unusual to only have one spouse there, and the rest [are] all aides or ministers in their governments, otherwise. So, it was unusual. But again, if it was particularly a chance to kind of celebrate and talk together and form those bonds and relationships and deepen them, then maybe, you know, entirely normal. I just don’t know enough to really pass judgment, but I certainly have never participated in a meeting, a business dinner like that, where the foreign leader brought their spouse.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Yeah. So General on that, let me ask you, we’ll see what they agreed behind closed doors, but maybe you could just initially address what John just said about the way the two leaders were talking a bit differently on Iran because, as we point out [in] our paper, this isn’t over yet. There are things that need to be worked out if the Iranians try to rebuild, as you pointed out, and as we’ve written. On their air defense, their nuclear program, and] their ballistic missiles. It seems to me, at least Israel will have to go in, and [they] would want to have at least support. I don’t mean, at least an okay from the US, but the two leaders spoke a little differently about it. Maybe it’s just their styles?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I don’t like this. The way that Israel is speaking about Iran and America is speaking about Iran. It is natural! America, if you don’t forget, it’s a few thousand miles away from Iran, and we are less than 2000 miles from Iran.
I mean, we are here. We are taking Iran on, on our shoulder. For you, it’s another problem, [a] big problem, and you understand how important it is to solve it. And you took part in defending Israel and attacking Fordow, but for Israel, it’s a crucial time and issue, about our existence. It is different from the American point of view. It is well understood, the success of the Israeli Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America, that despite the different perspective and language, they agree about actions. And they are coming to the action from two different perspectives, and they speak different languages about the action itself, it might be the same action. So, I think that this is very important. The basis for everything is to be on the same page relating to intelligence and that we know how to do [this]. We did it in the past, and we probably are doing it today.
But when it comes to actions, it cannot be done by professionals. It’s only the leaders who can put the most important limitations and probabilities and what is needed to be done. The principles should be agreed [on] by the leaders. Then the professionals will go and [do] all that is needed to do. You could see it from the from the war in Iran, when it was understood. What are the principles that both sides agreed [on]? I think that today and tonight, they will speak first of all about Gaza. Not because it is the most important one, but [because] it is the most urgent one. But they have at least to begin and to put a frame for negotiation between United States of America and Israel about the future attitude towards Iran.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Let me ask you. You know, it’s always hard to analyze Trump and I actually think Netanyahu and Ron Dermer, former Distinguished Fellow here at JINSA, who is now [the] Minister of Foreign Affairs. I think they’re probably one of the world’s leading experts on that, but that said, John, do you get a sense that President Trump probably feels like, you know, [I did] more than a lot of people expected. I defied people in my own party, some of the isolationists in my own party, [and] it was very successful. Do you think he really wants to go back in Iran, or does he most likely going forward, [say] it will be Israel, who by the way, conducted the brunt of the war anyway, as we all know, that this is going to be an Israeli activity going forward, if anybody goes in. Maybe with some US help, but that the US isn’t really going to go back in militarily. I don’t know. How do you assess that?
John Hannah
Yeah, I think that’s basically it. I wouldn’t disagree with you, Mike. I think the President thought he undertook a big thing here. It was an important thing. It was not only the crucial ingredient, that huge blow to Fordow, which [is] deep underground that the Israelis probably couldn’t do. But then I think he also saw it as the thing that allowed him within, I don’t know if it was 24-48 hours to declare a ceasefire that ended the war. I think he’s proud of both of those things [and] the way he wielded force. And the result it led to.
A sort of unusual situation in which the President United States was bragging that the Iranians called him up and said, we’re going to attack you. We’re going to attack at 1:30, do you want us to change the time and make it a different time? And the President said, no, you can attack at 1:30 and they attacked. And we, of course, shot down all the missiles. But he sees it obviously as a great success. Listen, I hope General Amidror is right. I think if I was sitting at the White House in this circumstance, I would have wanted the messaging to be a little more closely coordinated. But that’s not President Trump’s style whatsoever.
He sees this as a significant victory. I’m sure he doesn’t want anything to mar it. He would like this to go into negotiation. Exactly who wants the negotiations more at this point, whether it’s President Trump and Steve Witkoff or the Iranians, it’s unclear to me. Everybody keeps saying no, the other guy, he’s inviting us to meetings, and the other side says no, they want the meetings, so we’ll show up. So, we’ll see if there’s a meeting in Oslo this week. But I think the President is for the short term very much oriented towards that, and he hasn’t been particularly focused on the very high likelihood that we may not get IAEA inspectors back there. The Iranians have not changed their strategic objectives as far as we can tell. They’ve got high level religious clerics going around openly threatening that President Trump should be subject to death. So, there’s a lot. There is a very high probability that they may try and reconstitute elements and challenge this ceasefire very quickly.
And so far, we are two or three weeks passed, and I don’t see Israel and the United States, having any agreement yet on exactly what the way forward will be, hopefully they achieve it very quickly. I saw a report, but I don’t know whether it is reliable. About the Chinese being willing to deliver some new anti-aircraft or missile defense, and air defense equipment to Iran in exchange for some oil. I don’t know if it’s true or not, but I don’t think anybody should be surprised if we see these beginning to mount, these sorts of salami tactics to see how far they can push. In Lebanon, we have a model. We know what the answer was. As soon as there was any slightest movement of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the IDF knowing the Lebanese government couldn’t really take action, went and struck, and they struck repeatedly, hundreds of times since the November ceasefire went into effect.
I hope it’s not necessary in the case of Iran, and it presents so many more challenges, not only the distance, but the fact that Iran has still thousands of missiles left that, as General Amidror said it could start a significant war if they decide to retaliate for any effort to enforce a ceasefire by Israel or the United States. But those are the sorts of things I worry about, hopefully needlessly, because we’re just two separate countries with two perspectives on the Iranian problem…[crosstalk]…
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
If I may add one remark. There are many equivalent[s] between Lebanon and Iran, but there is one thing which is totally different. In Lebanon [when] we speak about something, what you call the shelf life, [which is] the time which is needed to do something is days or hours. In Iran, [however] we are speaking about resuming the effort to build missiles. It will take months to do it. Resuming enrichment or the conversion of gas will take years.
I mean, it is something that should be coordinated, mainly how we are monitoring it together, and what process we have when we find something. And then we will have, believe me, 60 days to discuss what we are doing. It is a different kind of decision making. And that would be very helpful. But the way to do it should be agreed [upon] now. Because the beginning of such [a] process should be agreed, and then it will take, I mean, you have time. It’s not Lebanon. In Lebanon you have to act within hours or days. Here, you have time.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Yeah. I’ll just say something on John’s point, which is very interesting. With President Trump, he’s talked about making Iran great again. He was talking about that before the war. He seems keen. He keeps talking about it that he’d like Iran to be able to rebuild. Look, he’s a developer. He likes building things up, and even if it seems like this Tehran regime is in power, he wants the country to rebuild. And you could see the difference certainly, from how he is looking at the Iranian issue versus Israelis, you know, for them, it’s such an existential threat, and they’re so close.
But let me talk about some of the other issues that General Amidror brought up. Obviously, we’ve talked about this many times, but let’s talk about Gaza for a second, because President Trump was quoted, I saw today this afternoon, that “most of this conversation this afternoon will be about Gaza,” and now my hope is, if that’s the case, I hope that’s because they settled the Iran issue already. It certainly seems like the Israelis want to, and they’re willing to have a ceasefire under certain terms. They seem in line with the United States. But Hamas, despite the press reports that they their response was positive, it seems like it was a yes, but kind of [a] situation with a lot of ‘the buts’ being deal breakers and for the Israelis, I guess I wanted to ask you, as you point out, General Amidror I know we’ve talked about this before, so you have all these soldiers getting killed. I think I saw something like maybe 20 or so in the last month, as you point out, there were [just] five, then you had a number of [them] injured, also yesterday, besides those that were killed. You’re reading the press there, it seems to be not the first-time different views between leadership under General Zamir and political leadership.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
No. The difference is about how to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza. The IDF is very reluctant to be responsible for that. They don’t want to be in a position in which they will have to provide between the one and a half million [and] two million people in Gaza [with] all their needs. Military food control of Gaza is a nightmare for the generals. They don’t want the soldiers to be involved in providing food to one million and a half civilians. It will risk the soldiers. They will have to open fire from time to time [because they will] feel at risk of their life. It’s a [horrifying] situation from the commander’s point of view.
The politicians think that it is not the military to decide. They don’t want that it will be provided by Hamas. What [then]? How do [they do] it. They don’t care. The IDF should do it. And this is the argument that was in the cabinet. It was not about the future of the war.
About the future of the war. There are two schools in Israel. and each of them has a good reason to think that they [have] the right thing. [One says], guys, we have achieved 80% of what we want in Gaza. We have one big issue, the hostages. Let’s say that we give Hamas the guarantee that we are not going to go back to retake Gaza. So, give us all the hostages living alive and bodies of hostages, and we will leave Gaza. And what will happen? We don’t know. If there is a need, we will come back. Maybe the Palestinian Authority will come and take responsibility, and so on and so forth. This is one.
Some of them believe that this might lead to an Emirate to come in and American money. And I think it’s a dream which will not be fulfilled. And why? Because no one will invest one dollar in Gaza if Hamas is controlling Gaza. Not the Emirates, not the Saudis, not the Americans, no one. And if Hamas is controlling Gaza, we will have to, from time-to-time act in Gaza. So, what do you see [if] the Emirates, or the Americans come in [and] invest dollars, it will be destroyed, because Hamas took it as a shelter. It is not going to happen. And the problem is, Israel will have to fight on the other side of the fence. And one kilometer after the fence [is] a kind of no man’s land. But on the other side of the no man’s land will be like the Somali breakdown, Black Hawk Down. It will be totally no man’s land with gangs and corruption, and I don’t know what. And the people of Gaza will not have [anything] to live.
80% of Gaza was destroyed. They cannot live in tunnels. You can go from one place to another through the tunnel. You cannot live in [a] tunnel. There is no way that you can bring enough oxygen to live in the tunnels. So where will they live? In the rubble of Khan Yunis? In the rubble of Rafah? Rafah doesn’t exist. In Gaza, something still exists, but in Rafah and Khan Yunis, nothing exists. So, what will happen is an area controlled by Hamas. Hamas will be the ruler of the Strip. Hamas will be the one which takes all the humanitarian aid and use it for its purposes. They will begin to rebuild their military capabilities, and we will face a huge problem on the other side of the fence. What you will [you] tell the envelope of Gaza; they [can] come back and leave them when Hamas is on the other side of the fence? This is a situation which Israel cannot live with. It will take two years, and we will be in a war again, without the hostages, maybe it will be much easier, but we will be in a war again.
The other school of thought is saying, guys, the most important one is to destroy Hamas totally. Let’s put another two divisions in Gaza. Take everything, it will risk the hostages, we know. I hope that we will save most of them, and we will squeeze Hamas to the level in which they will, the remnants of Hamas will come [out] and say, just to save [their] life.
Hamas will not exist as an organization as a military capacity. As an idea, probably yes, but Hamas will not have anything that it can do with something against Israel or anyone the Gaza Strip. And then you can negotiate with the Emirates and the Saudis and the Americans, how to take responsibility for the civilian life in Gaza. And I believe that at the end of the day, it will be with some connection to the Palestinian Authority, because the Arab states cannot do something without kind of [a] connection to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, in spite of the fact that the right wing in Israel, including the Prime Minister, don’t like the idea that the Palestinian Authority will come into Gaza. There is no real alternative that can be done without some connections with the Palestinian Authority. And these are two [camps]. It’s clear that it will be a very problematic war.
Israel will lose support around the world because the pictures which will come from Gaza, will be devastating, and at the end of the day, you will have to agree to something [in] which we have a connection with the Palestinian Authority. These are the two schools of thought. Each of them has very good points to say [that] this is the best solution. Each of them [also] has very weak points that can be the basis for criticizing the solution. I don’t see a third solution.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
I just asked, and then I’ll go to John in a bit on Gaza in general. I thought I saw Netanyahu say today or yesterday, I don’t remember now, something to the effect, that we can’t allow Hamas to remain in charge, because effectively, it will embolden Hezbollah and Iran. Do you believe that? I think he said something like that. I don’t remember the exact words, but something like that.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I don’t see how Hezbollah [is] in any position to help anyone. [crosstalk] … Hezbollah is fighting for its survival now. And Iran, with all due respect, what we did to their missile project and to their nuclear project, that will not be changed or will not have other colors because of any solution which will be taken in Gaza. The problem in Gaza, if Hamas will remain [in] control of Gaza, it can get out of the water after the seventh of October, and to show the Arab world that such an organization can survive a war against Israel, in spite [of] the atrocities of the seventh of October, and this is very devastating.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
I see. Okay, I know John, we’ve had this debate before. So, we could reengage it. Talk about what you and I were just talking about a few minutes ago, which was about Syria. That it seems that if there could be some arrangement about Gaza, well, I don’t know if it’s dependent, on Gaza, per se, but …[crosstalk]…
John Hannah
Mike, let me just say, on Gaza, I’m in school one. I’m in the school of putting all these Arabs to the test. I’m in the school of believing Israel has achieved even more than 80% of what it wanted to do militarily against Hamas posing a serious threat to Israel for a very long time. Israel fortifying its border, getting a deal on Philadelphi, preventing any smuggling, getting freedom of action to go back in, getting that agreement, getting the Arabs.
Because they seem to believe that they can make number one work, despite General Amidror’s thought that nobody will touch Gaza if Hamas is still there in any way, shape or form. I’d at least put the Arabs to that test if, they want to be part of the solution, to create a political alternative, even while Hamas has some presence there, force Hamas into an agreement that it has to allow some new government to come in. They have to allow some other kinds of humanitarian aid, alternative distribution channels, to UNRWA and what exists there, building off this Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
Having the Arabs be somehow responsible for convincing Hamas to go for disarmament and to get those hostages back and to give Israel a chance after this sensational victory in Iran and over Hezbollah that has its deterrent power at its height, with Gaza in absolute rubble. I guess it could inspire jihadists around the world, but it’s an absolute mess in Gaza. And anybody who thinks that’s a victory [for Hamas], I think is, is entirely crazy.
So, I would, at this point in time, take my chances on that option one, and put the Arabs to the test. And if Hamas refuses, [and] doesn’t give back to hostages, then Israel will be in a better position than it would be, or two years of war in which Hamas is devastated. The only other thing I’d mention is, I thought it was interesting in these talks that after President Trump had left his Gaza Riviera vision of voluntary migration, or involuntary I don’t know, the Prime Minister raised it quite prominently at that dinner last night. He said, we’re all in on the Trump plan about allowing voluntary migration out of Gaza, and the President didn’t, certainly didn’t dispute that. That would be [an] interesting phenomenon if voluntary migration becomes a major part of any look to the day after …[crosstalk]…
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Do you know what one country which is ready to accept the Palestinians?
John Hannah
No, I’m not saying it would be a great thing, General. I’m just saying the Prime Minister said it, and he said we’re making great progress on it. So maybe you know more, you talk to the Prime Minister more than I do. Maybe he’s got, he’s got real volunteers ready to take in large numbers of Palestinians. I doubt it, but that’s what he raised at that dinner, and the President, so far as I could see, isn’t disputing it. On the question, is there going to be a Palestinian state? The President had no position for the United States. He deferred entirely to the Prime Minister for [an] answer.
And I think the Prime Minister, basically, I haven’t heard him say it in a long time, resurrected some elements of his Bar Ilan speech in 2009 in which he said, the Palestinians can have all the powers to have a state, but none to threaten Israel, and that includes Israel retaining ultimate authority over security and all the Palestinian areas. And if people don’t like it, if they don’t think that really constitutes a real state, it’s too bad. You know, this is a new day, particularly after October 7, and never again is now. So, I thought those were two interesting elements, as we look to, you know, eventually, maybe getting to a day after and hopefully to broaden the circle of peace. Of course, the Saudis have hardened their position on questions of two states, Maybe they’ll ease up on that eventually, but you know, we still don’t have a lot of clarity from speaking of common American and Israeli positions on how both sides ultimately do view the possibility of the day after and when we should start trying to build and develop that.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
By the way, my own thought is that maybe they can make this part of the talks with Syria. That they’ll accept some of them, they’ve lost a lot of their population, and especially a lot of their Sunnis, maybe that would be part of the agreement.
But let me use that as a segue to talk about Syria, because John, you and I were talking about [this] right before this webinar. The focus on Syria almost seems to eclipse, and when I say Syria I mean, some agreement between Israel and Syria, whether it’s a non-aggression agreement, or something more, there seems at least there’s buzz about it. And Netanyahu was asked about it. Is Israel, meeting with the Syrians? And he basically didn’t answer. So, before I turn to General Amidror about this, do you have something you want to add, because this was really something that we were raising before the webinar?
John Hannah
Yeah, no, listen, since the President made his trip to the region and surprised everybody with his agreement to both meet with Al Shaara and to lift those sanctions, I think everybody’s had to adjust their policies, including probably Israel. It started out, of course, since the fall of the collapse of the Assad regime on the eighth since Jolani came in. I think the majority opinion in Israel was, can’t trust the guy. He’s a jihadi in a suit. They can’t change their stripes, and they probably won’t. So, we have to take care of business unilaterally. I think since the President decided he was going to take a bet on Shaara to see whether we could draw him in with together, with the help of some of our Arab partners, to becoming a responsible stakeholder in the Levant, [and] people have adjusted.
And I think you’ve just heard a lot of, I don’t know how much of it is true, but there’s a lot of noise in the system about Israeli Syrian contacts, including at high levels. I even heard today that, you know, there’s a prospect of Al Shaara meeting Netanyahu if they come to the United States in September, around the UN General Assembly meeting, I kind of doubt it. But stranger things have happened.
This guy, Shaara, he’s, on the one hand, very weak inside of his country. I think he’s entirely focused on what it will take to stay in power. He certainly can’t have Israel as an enemy. He wants the United States and those powerful Arab countries on his side putting money into his country, helping him consolidate his regime. So, in that weakness, maybe there’s a real opportunity to do something very interesting between Israel and Syria as part of this larger package to rehabilitate Syria and draw it in against the Iranians, to some extent, against the Russians, but part of this kind of US led axis in the region.
Now, whether you can get to full normalization and a peace treaty anytime soon, given the dispute particularly obviously over the Golan Heights, [with] Israel not leaving. And the question is, can a guy whose nom de guerre was Al Jolani, the Golani. Can he afford to surrender the Golan to Israeli sovereignty and perpetuity? But in between that state of war and full peace, there’s all kinds of interesting possibilities for what might happen down there, along the lines of the old 1974 Disengagement Agreement, you could plus that up with all kinds of potential economic, social, and cultural exchanges, assurances, and guarantees militarily in that part of southern Syria.
So I certainly think this is a fruitful area for people, the United States and Israel, and some of our Arab friends in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to really explore in a very serious way, because I just don’t know how long Al Shaara is actually going to going to be there. I just don’t know enough about the internal politics in and around that palace in Damascus, where he’s holed up and surrounded by, let’s face it, a lot of very bad actors who may not like a move toward Israel.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
General Amidror, do you want to address this issue?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I think that the assessment of John is very close to mine. The ability of the ruler of Damascus to say that he is he’s giving up the Golan Heights with the name Jolani, [or] without the name Jolani, the one who is now controlling Damascus, he will lose every support within the Arab world and within his own people. It’s all very close to impossible.
But okay, we will not eat the hummus in Damascus, but under this very clear idea of what cannot be done, a huge area that we can explore and find cooperation and to work together to help them to build their country, devastating situation. We can provide them with some elements that they don’t have, from water to gas and electricity, and whatever. There is a huge area to explore and agree on. And it is not a secret, I think, that the National Security Advisor, a name we said, that he is in contact with Syrian representatives. So, it’s almost a formal kind of dialogue.
John Hannah
And that is not to mention Mike, the deep common interest, obviously, in keeping and making sure that both the Iranians and Hezbollah stay out of there. That’s a very strong common interest. And I even [think] Jolani has a real deep interest in making sure he’s balancing Turkish power and influence in Damascus and, I think Israel, the United States, and some of the Arab parties can be very helpful in that, in maintaining that that balance.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Maybe he could educate and share some thoughts with President Trump about the concerns about the Turks, that [in] my view has escaped President Trump, unfortunately.
Let me just mention a couple things [and] I want to wrap up. First, I didn’t say the beginning, but you know, it is amazing, you have the Israeli Prime Minister now meeting the third time with the US President in the first six months of his administration. It’s impressive. I mean, Ron Dermer, [was] I think, one of the first foreign officials to meet with President Trump after his election in Mar-a-Lago. He spent a lot of time with President Trump, it’s amazing. And then, you know, Netanyahu spoke to Trump almost immediately, I think even before the full final results were in or was officially declared.
Other countries in the world, certainly the Arab countries, but other countries in the world I’m sure, are noticing this, and that says something about the close relationship between the two countries that you we see now, and of course, that the fact that the two countries fought together against Iran is really an amazing event that I think is still sinking in, in the region and around the world.
John Hannah
Mike, can I just say on that, the one item that wasn’t on this agenda that very soon, I think, needs to be on the agenda is that discussion about the future of the US-Israel, strategic relationship that obviously has played out and includes and encapsulates all the things that you just mentioned, in particular, this decision for the United States to play such a major role last year in the defense of Israel, and then again this year, in the defense and helping actually go to war with Israel against this major threat of the Iranian nuclear program. Israel’s been at war a long time on multiple fronts. It obviously needs to retool and rebuild and look to the future.
We’re in a new phase of the strategic relationship. I’m not exactly sure how to define it, but we’ve had some unprecedented things occur and we need to assess those and think about, sort of what, what is the future? And obviously this discussion [is] around a new, multiyear Memorandum of Understanding on the on the defense and strategic relationship that hopefully will get started very soon and can do some of that.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
I would say, one of the things that’s changed we talked about this before is Israel being under the air responsibility of CENTCOM. At JINSA, which we were the only organization outside, that actually was pushing for this, or the only one outside that was pushing for this. And I think General Kurilla of CENTCOM, who is retiring in a month, deserves a tremendous amount of credit for his performance as CENTCOM commander.
Let me just conclude with these two quick points. And I know it’s very late in Israel, General Amidror, if I could ask you one thing, and I don’t know if you saw this article, but I think I might have sent it to you. But there was a piece in The Wall Street Journal, a long piece, interviewing, and making issue about in the West Bank, the sheikh in Hebron. And this idea, he claims to represent Hebron, and he wants to collaborate with Israel. He was extremely critical of the Palestinian Authority. And he and some other sheikhs signed a letter, and they want to see about maybe forming like a sort of Emirate and this might seem like an alternative way of resolving the West Bank.
Now, I checked with one retired IDF General, I won’t mention his name, but particularly an expert on the West Bank, and he dismissed it and said, this is nothing new, this Sheikh doesn’t even represent all of Hebron and so on. And there’s nothing really to this story. But there was a long piece in The Wall Street Journal editorial page about this.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Look. I think that these kinds of solutions are what people want to have. How is it going to be in reality? Some background within the Arab societies, almost all of them, in spite the fact that they are organized like countries in many places, the most important connection is within the family and the tribe. It is not just like the West, where connection, which comes with your feeling of having some sort of obligation. It is much more than that. At the end of the day, this is the body with which you have real affiliation. What will happen to your family, the big family, not the hardcore, the core family, the big family about the tribe is very, very important.
And in Hebron, because it is a more conservative side of the West Bank, it is stronger. They don’t find it not in Ramallah, with all due [respect], they’re not in Al-Birah, and probably not in Tulkarm and maybe in Nablus. And in Israel there are some people who are promoting it … [crosstalk]… and they believe that this will be the alternative for the Palestinian Authority. We tried it in the past, but it didn’t work, and it probably won’t work. It was a good solution 100 years ago, today I don’t believe that it will work …[crosstalk].
And you know Palestine emirate, because you know, [there] is an emirate Kuwait and an emirate of Bahrain … [crosstalk] … there is [the] United Arab Emirates. I said yes, but you know, what is the big difference? They don’t have oil.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
You mentioned 100 years ago, and I’ve written about this many times, but you know, I think people following the Middle East forget that this area, you know, a little over 100 years ago, was all Ottoman. And you had ethnic groups, you had tribes; you had clans. And then, you know, after World War I, they, they drew; people say it’s Sykes Picot. It’s a mistake to say Sykes Picot, that was superseded.
But people use that because they don’t know, but it becomes like a code word. But the reality is, certainly there was some agreement to divide these areas into arbitrary borders. I always say it’s like a blind drunk cartographer that kind of, you know, drew these lines, and it’s been generally a failure. These are not nation states as we understand them, and almost no nation state in the region has really succeeded, I’d say Israel, and maybe a few others in the region, but most of them are complete failures, because these [are] tribal and ethnic clans. They’re very strong, and even 100 years later, they remain, as you point out, you know, they resonate with the people there more than these national boundaries.
But I’m going to end on a light note. John, one of the things that was kind of interesting or had a little drama, was Prime Minister Netanyahu giving a letter to President Trump yesterday saying nominating him for a Nobel Peace Prize, and the President seemed to appreciate it. I wonder. I am no expert on the Nobel Peace Prize. I do not follow the politics. I don’t know really anything of it, but I wonder, did the Prime Minister nominating Trump, did that just sink any chance? That Trump, I mean, if you think about who are two leaders that a lot of Western Europeans dislike the most [it] is probably Netanyahu and Trump.
John Hannah
Right. Who do you want to get your recommendation letter for your admission to college, that hotbed of conservative ideology, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. So, I had exactly the same feeling.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
You know, if the UK, the Labor Leader of the UK, maybe that would have had a little more. Or maybe, you know, certainly, maybe the German chancellor, but I don’t know, having Bibi as your nominator, it probably doesn’t help him too much in the Nobel Prize, but reports suggests that President Trump really does care about this actually. Of course, President Obama, when did he get his Nobel Prize? It was his first year, wasn’t it?
John Hannah
I think I was on the day of his inauguration vote they may have had a secret vote, and he was the future, and he was the change, so yeah.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Enough said about the Nobel Peace Prize. Okay, we got three minutes. Anything you wanted to say in conclusion General Amidror seriously or in a lighthearted manner.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Seriously and not connected to prize that I’m not familiar with, the process maybe should be a letter which begins the process in and in no way, and this is why the letter might begin the process. But something which is more serious.
I think that it is a crucial time after the huge success of the Israeli, of Israel within the war, crushing Hamas, isolating and minimizing Hezbollah, taking Syria out of the Shiite crescent, as it was called by King Abdullah of Jordan. For him, it’s a huge relief. Making [a] big blow to the nuclear project of Iran and stripping Iran from its ability to defend itself against the Israeli Air Force. Huge, big, big, success during the war, but there are many problems which have not been solved. And the time, to begin to deal with the problems and to decide what is the way to solve it, if not finding an agreed solution is now, and this is why this meeting between the Prime Minister and the President is very, very important.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
I agree. And as John mentioned, I encourage you all to read JINSA’s “Not Over” paper that we put out on Thursday that addresses some of these things on Iran. And, you know, leaders could bond for all sorts of reasons. They bonded in war. They could bond that the Nobel Prize Committee doesn’t like either of them, even though they both probably should have won it for the Abraham Accords.
But hopefully, we’re ushering in a new period in the bilateral US- Israel relationship, and let’s see how both countries start with, and how they’re going to deal with the Iran issue in the near term. Thank you very much for joining us. I know it’s very late there, it’s 11 o’clock at night. Thank you very much, General Amidror, John, here in Washington with me. Thanks a lot for joining.
Thanks, everybody. Have a good rest of your week.