Transcript: Webinar – Protests Sweep Iran
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PANELISTS
Mariam Memarsadeghi, Director, Cyrus Forum for Iran’s Future; Senior Fellow, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute
Ray Takeyh, JINSA Iran Policy Project Member; Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
The discussion was moderated by JINSA President and CEO Michael Makovsky, PhD.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been edited for flow and clarity.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Hi, welcome everybody. I’m Michael Makovsky, the President and CEO of JINSA. Happy New Year to everybody. Let’s get right into it.
The topic of the day is obviously what’s going on in Iran. I know there’s a lot of attention, of course, right now, on Venezuela, but obviously the Iran issue preceded that and remains. The protests on the ground are continuing. And obviously here at JINSA, we’ve been focused on Iran. It’s always been one of our most important issues that we focus on. We’re very fortunate to have two experts.
I’ll start with Ray, who’s a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. You have also been a member for a long time at JINSA’s Iran Task Force. That, I consider the most important credential. You are also an author of a very important book on Iran. And you’ll have another one coming out, I think later this year. Is that right?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Yeah, that’s right. That’s right.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Okay. And Mariam, if you can introduce yourself, please.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Sure, thanks for having me. It’s good to be back. Ray and I spoke at JINSA together before on Iran, maybe a year ago or year and a half ago, and it’s an honor. I mean, for me, Ray and his book, The Last Shot especially, it’s been everything. I go back to it again and again.
I have been writing about and involved with protests in Iran for over 20 years now. I was the founder and director of Tavaana, which continues to be a way for people to know about protests, Iranians to know about protests and to be better at protesting. And I’ve written about protests for a long time.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Thank you very much for joining us. Ray, I’m going to start with you. Tell me first, how you see what is going on, on the ground and what is not going on, on the ground in Iran.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, what is going on, obviously, are protests that, as often happens in Iran, began over economic grievances, and lately due to the fluctuation in currency inflation. Of course, the problems are persistent, with water shortages [and] everything that could go wrong.
But the importance of these latest demonstrations is they’re the first demonstrations that have taken place since Iran lost the war in June. So, the regime is somewhat humble, and in a way, crestfallen.
It’s somewhat to me an indication that Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, is being sort of sidelined. Because if you look at the way the regime is addressing these protests, they’re trying to take, at least notionally, a softer touch, like “we understand your grievances.” “Protests are okay, but riots aren’t,” and so forth.
They’re hoping that by that kind of language and limited use of force, they could propitiate the protesters and maybe ride this out. And this is actually a kind of mistake that the Shah made. When you try to be reasonable in order to separate the militants from moderates, you tend to enlarge the coalition opposing you.
So, this is how the regime is trying to deal with it. I suspect their response is going to become more aggressive as the protests go on. But the importance of this is this is a regime that in some way, has lost its bearing and in some places is trying to figure out its internal standing at the time when its external power has been severely degraded, if not altogether compromised. And it will be interesting to see how this evolves, because it is a unique challenge for the regime, in that particular sense.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
These protests, riots, in some cases, whatever you want to call them, have been, I think, taking place in virtually every province. They’ve been going on every day and night, it seems like.
Can you just describe who are the ones protesting? I mean, as far as I understand, it started with the merchants in the bazaar, but it’s obviously spread to students. Do you see poor people, working people and older people? Who do you see?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
It started out in the merchant community, I think, particularly in the cell phone distribution, and then it sort of caught on with that. It migrated to the universities, and it then became a part of [the] larger public that has its grievances.
And as I said, economic [issues] become very political very quickly. So, these are not protests about inflation. They’re yelling “death to dictator” and so forth and so on. [By the] Islamic Republic’s own acknowledgement, as of yesterday’s, these protests have taken place in 77 cities. That’s nationwide. Those are Islamic Republic figures. So, it’s probably larger than that.
They tend to have a cross-sectional appeal. We have seen that in the protest, even in the 2022 Women, Life Freedom movement, where, the particular grievance, in that case, started out with improper religious attire. Very quickly [it becomes an] aggregate of other concerns.
So now you’re seeing a whole-set indictment of the regime across the country, in every province, across all social classes. The challenge for the opposition is to maintain this momentum – that’s always been the challenge, and not to peter out.
The Islamic Republic has benefited from the fact that the protest movements against it have always been episodic, and the intervals have extended. But what happens is several months of protests, then everybody goes home, recuperates, then they come back.
So, the challenge for the opposition today is to maintain some kind of resiliency. They don’t need structure. They don’t need an ideology, and they don’t need leadership. They need persistence. Once persistence happens, those things will suggest themselves.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Okay, Mariam, let me ask you. You are the director of the Cyrus Forum for Iran’s Future and also the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Senior Fellow. What do you see? And let me just ask you to look at specific cities.
I’ll give you an example. And again, you two, obviously are the experts, not me. But I had an uncle from Mashad, which is a religious city. I see demonstrations there, and it’s a very religious city. Is that significant?
Are there demonstrations in certain areas or is there an intensity of some of these protests in certain areas that are surprising you? Because, just as Ray just mentioned, the Mahsa Amini, the Women, Life, Freedom demonstrations of a few years ago – I’ve seen reports that they’re not as large, for instance, right now, as they were then, which did last for, I think, for a few months. So, how do you see this in the context of recent [waves of protests]? What cities are interesting to you? Which are not?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
It’s interesting. It’s a good question. I have to be honest and say that I don’t think there have been any surprises in those terms. If anything, as you say, it’s less than what was happening in 2022 with Mahsa Amini protests, [the] Women, Life, Freedom Protests. However, there is a big difference in these protests, in that Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah, and the grandson of the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi – his name is being called. Not that it wasn’t called before, but it’s been called more.
Something that’s been important to me and has been consistent across since at least 2017 is that the mustazafin, or the poor and downtrodden, in whose name the revolution was first waged, and who have long been considered the base of support for the regime – they really have been since 2017 the backbone of protests.
So not only is the working poor not supporting the regime, it is in full force against the regime. It shouldn’t be surprising, because they’re the ones that suffer the most from a command economy or rentier economy, a totalitarian regime that’s ideological, that cannot allow people to meet their own basic needs. Because, you know, underneath all this Islamism is a lot of Marxist approaches to governance and economy too. So again, [this approach], proved a massive failure.
And I don’t think we can overstate how difficult life is for people in Iran, economically, I mean the currency devaluation and just the reality of life. It’s very typical for a father to work two or three jobs, barely see his children and just not be able to support his family. And I do believe that that is a big driver.
I don’t think that this round so far is as ubiquitous or as cross-class, as the Woman, Life, Freedom protests were. The Woman, Life, Freedom protests also galvanized the very urban, modern youth. And not to say that they’re not on the streets this time, but you don’t see them in the same way, although the universities, I think maybe, are a little bit more out front, as you mentioned yourself already, than they were before.
I think [of the] things that are missing that can be corrected, that can change, they can maybe change very quickly, is that there does not seem to be an organized way about these protests. And theorists of nonviolent revolution tend to see that as a weakness, actually.
[They say] that street protest is a place that you get to that you culminate to once you have been able to create many other forms of civil disobedience, including regular labor strikes. The bazaar, for example, could leverage the power that it has and say to the rest of the economic sectors, including oil and transport and sugar, that have been big parts of previous historic revolutions that you know “we will strike for two months, but only on the on the condition that you do the same.” That kind of thing, that kind of like real organizing, rather than people just showing up on the streets, hasn’t happened yet. Again, it can happen.Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Did you see that in 2022?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
We saw more of it. And we saw more of it in late 2017 and 2018. In 2017-18, for example, the truckers were on strike for a long period of time. Many sectors of the economy were striking.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Let me ask you, Ray, you mentioned one of the significant things: the first demonstration since the 12-day war with Israel in June. You see a government here, a regime, that couldn’t protect [the country].
The Israelis had air supremacy within 48 hours, including over Tehran, which had to be phenomenally humiliating for this regime. The Israelis killed something like, I can’t remember the exact number, 30 something of the top military and scientific leaders of Iran within the first four minutes.
The one thing that the Iranians seem to have done especially well was fire ballistic missiles at Israel, which, I think, they got better at during the war, but otherwise they looked pretty bad. They have problems with water, they have problems with electricity. They have problems with heating in the winter.
How did the war impact this? The Rial, as we saw, [has] also reached a new low, or high, or however you want to call it, versus the dollar. How do you see the war affecting this, even though that happened six months ago?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, I think in the aftermath of the war, the regime, however, it’s making decisions – and I said, I don’t know if Ali Khamenei is still supreme – the regime decided to sort of offer a revised social compact to the Iranian people.
Namely, after 45 years of obsessing about women’s hair, they started now not really enforcing the hijab. So, in a sense, they cannot offer the Chinese model of economic opportunity for political compliance. They can, however, try to move to some extent, toward the Saudi model: cultural liberalization, for political passivity – to some extent, within the strictures of an ideological state. So, they were trying to essentially relax some of the pressures on the society.
But all politicians, including the Islamic Republic politicians always fight the last war. So, the last round of protests was provoked in their immediate cause, in their proximate cause, with the enforcement of religious attire. And they were concerned that if you go back and reinforce this, that could be a spark that provokes some kind of an uprising.
And of course, something else always happens: in this particular case, economic grievances that have mushroomed into political and social concerns. Here, maybe we’re witnessing a succession from the first generation of revolutionaries like Ali Khamenei to the second generation, like Pezeshkian, for whom the revolution is buried in myths as opposed to a lived experience.
Because they’re making a lot of mistakes that they didn’t before the Islamic Republic had a playbook for how to deal with protests. The playbook starts with this. You never acknowledge the grievances of the protesters. You grant them no legitimacy. You immediately decry them as agents of sedition on behalf of foreign powers. The category of foreign powers changes, but the two state statutory members are United States and Israel. Sometimes, Saudi Arabia has added to it and so on. Number three, you use violence, but you use it sparingly to some degree, just enough to establish deterrence, but not enough to produce too many mortars for the cause, and then you wait for it to peter out.
And that became a problem in the Women, Life, Freedom movement. That model applied in 2022 was problematic because suddenly the conscripts were asked to shoot young women, and they had a problem with that.
So that playbook is not being used today. They’re essentially acknowledging the grievances of the population. They’re cautioning them that agents of subversion are trying to hijack their concerns and turn them into undermining of the state. Violence is being used. 17 people, I think at least, so far, have been killed, but not as dramatically as the regime can with Basij and so forth.
So, this is a playbook, and it reminds me of the Shah’s playbook. And now, as of yesterday, they’re talking about, as I said, separating legitimate protests from riots. First-generation revolutionaries would not have made this mistake. So, there’s a subtle succession going on in this system.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
First of all, when I was in Israel last month, I was meeting a senior Israeli intelligence official, and they were saying, look, the regime is extremely weak. They’re not enforcing the hijab because they know they can’t, because they know that they’re unpopular.
So, they don’t want to push too hard, even though it was irritating to some of the, I hate to use this term, harder liners, I guess. I mean, I don’t know who’s a soft liner over there in the regime.
I want to just ask you, do you think that the Supreme Leader is not calling the shots as much now? Is that what you were suggesting earlier?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
That’s my view. It’s a speculative view, because if you kind of look at, and this is just trying to read between the lines, what Ali Khamenei says and what the regime does, they are two different things. For instance, in terms of negotiations with the United States, Ali Khamenei says, don’t. That afternoon, President Pezeshkian says, yes, we are. A day later, Ali Larijani says we have reached out to the Americans 15 times.
This is a real contradiction of Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei has come out for enforcement of hijab. Pezeshkian says no, not so much. You know, there was always some subtle game where they would try to play bad cop and good cop, but this is a little more than that.
And you know, Ali Khamenei’s cascade of misjudgments that led to the devastating June war even in the unsentimental politics of Iranian regime, that kind of weighs on you. Maybe it’s a combination of age, infirmity, misjudgments, but in my view, he is no longer essential to [the] decision-making process.
Therefore, how do they make decisions? Because they are making decisions. It’s taking much longer for them to make decisions. It’s very difficult to establish a consensus within the system, because you don’t have what Al Gore would call ultimate ruling authority.
So, if the regime is kind of muddling through, in a way, because it lacks that sort of pre-war cohesion. It’s much more vulnerable simply because its internal processes aren’t working.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
I see. Mariam, you wanted to address that.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Yeah, it’s bound to be more vulnerable when you look at how many people the Israelis killed and how important they were in the chain of command, and particularly for repression internally, it’s bound to be the case.
They’re covering it up, I guess, reasonably well. I mean, Khamenei is still making the kinds of comments that he always made. He’s after Trump. After Trump’s social media post about how “we’re locked and loaded,” Khamenei said Trump is just babbling, so he’s trying to maintain that strong posture.
I don’t know how much good it’s going to do him, because I guess the big question mark here is, what is Trump going to do, exactly?
Let me respond to what I was going to say when Ray was speaking about how this might be a bit of a change that’s more fundamental in terms of how much power Khamenei has. I think one of the strong suits of the regime is how, well, like other totalitarian regimes, it makes people forget about their own past.
So, for example, in 2009 people were chanting, “no to Gaza, no to Lebanon. My life for Iran.” It’s actually an old slogan. Now the regime somehow makes people feel like it’s new. Or “death to the dictator” they chanted for the first time in 2009. This has actually been going on for a long time.
And the rejection of reform was actually something that the people delivered to Khatami 10 years before the Green Movement in 2009. So, in 1999 the student protesters said, “No, reform is dead. There’s no chance. We helped you to come to power, Khatami” who was the reformist president, the OG [original] reformist, “but there’s no chance of [reform], not that you can’t do it, although you can’t, but nobody can.”
But the regime somehow made people, just 10 years later, forget all that [and] participate in the 2009 presidential elections. A lot of the people that you see now who are supporters, close associates of Reza Pahlavi, were participants in the Green Movement. They were advisors to Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi you know, overt supporters of these reformists.
That’s to say that you know the Milan Kundera idea that the struggle of man against powers, the struggle of memory against forgetting – there’s a lot of forgetting that happens, partly intentionally, partly not intentionally, among Iranians. Their struggle is actually a very long one, and their rejection of the idea of reform is actually pretty deep and goes back for a while now.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Let me ask you just a little more. And I know I want to talk about what we do about it, but just a little bit more about the demonstrators. Somebody watching this said that 15 Kurds have been killed, which seems [to be] a pretty high percentage of those killed already. Does the regime deal with certain parts of the country, certain ethnic groups, differently than others in all this?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
I don’t know enough about that, but historically, the Kurds and the Balochis have gotten much worse treatment than the Kurds. So, I don’t think it’s an accident that in Iranian Kurdistan and Balochistan, the resistance is also very strong.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
I agree with that, I would just add one thing, there always has been sort of a simmering violence in those ethnic enclaves that of Balochistan and Kurdistan. That’s both a problem for the regime, but also a sort of an opportunity.
The conscripts that they have, even the Revolutionary Guards, are willing to use massive force against ethnic minorities [in a way] they may hesitate when they are called to repress demonstrations in the shanty towns that they themselves came from. Those are culturally familiar with them, but an ethnic insurrection is more violent and more serious, and during the 2022 protest, the regime had basically declared martial law in those areas.
They didn’t announce it, but they were practicing martial laws just to get control of the area. A lot of violence was used in the northern provinces because of the Kurdish insurrection. So, it’s a mixed bag for the regime. They can summon their foot soldiers to maintain national boundaries, but repressing school girls who are taking off their hijab – that’s harder.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
I don’t know if this impacted the protesters in any way, but it was my understanding, at least before the protest began, that since the 12-Day War in June, the regime was hanging something like 200-250 people a month. And I think the average was about 850 a year.
And obviously it is a regime that’s paranoid anyway, and after being humiliated in the 12-day War with the Israelis, they’re seeing, you know, enemies everywhere. Maybe some really are enemies of the regime, and some are just using this as an excuse to kill them.
I know it’s not directly related to the protests Ray, or maybe it was. Did those hangings, the increased execution of the Iranian people, did that have any impact, you think, on the internal situation there?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, I think the figures [state] 20,000 people were arrested. I think the executions, there may be updated figures, but about 1,000 people have been executed.
And whenever you have that sort of a mock justice system, that means there is a lot of score settling. So, it’s not clear that they’re actually dealing with a problem of external penetration. And maybe if you cast your net this wide, you can have success in eliminating foreign inspired cells.
But here’s a problem with the regime that is so heavily penetrated that caused the Israeli success and American success: when you start trying to purify your security organs and your internal mechanisms, you create paralysis in the security organs. Everybody’s suspicious of everybody, and that leads to some degree of paralysis. And that paralysis may have been part of the factors that they didn’t anticipate this sort of a convulsion that came.
So, in some way, the arrest and execution lead you to believe that this is a formidable intelligence apparatus, but in another way, it’s the intelligence system and the regime that’s turning on itself to try to purify itself that actually creates a measure of paralysis and inability to sort of see around the corners.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Let’s talk about what we could do or what should be done outside of Iran to be supportive of this. Because, first of all, you have the President of the United States, Trump, who actually spoke out in favor of at least not killing the protesters.
Correct me, if I’m wrong, I think [Biden] made maybe a passing reference to the 2022 demonstrations of Women, Life, Freedom. It didn’t get a lot of attention by senior Biden officials.
I mean here at least the President said something, of course, he said more than that, he says, “We’re locked and loaded.” They have killed protesters. Of course, maybe Trump is a little consumed right now, understandably, with Venezuela.
Mariam, let me start with you. What do you think would be useful, to borrow from what Ray said earlier, [for] the durability of this protest. What could we in the United States do [and the United States government] to be supportive of the protesters.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Number one, that kind of social media post has a lot of power. It’s extremely impactful. So more of that is going to help. The United States and Israel together or alone, I think, have the means to do harm to the regime’s surveillance systems, prison system, so much of that is cyber.
[These measures are] really focused and make sure that the message is also delivered. So not just to do the damage, but also make sure that it’s publicly advertised surveillance systems and cameras are disabled.The regime’s cyber army is one of the most effective parts of its power and control over society. It functions in a very sophisticated and nuanced way. It creates divisions, it creates distrust, it creates a lot of paralysis, and it’s very busy right now.
Anything to get rid of the cyber army would be a huge boost to the people. Then, of course, the kinds of actions that the U.S. and Israel have already taken in terms of using drones to go after regime infrastructure, regime personnel, to use sabotage, as the Israelis have done again, to get rid of regime infrastructure, regime personnel.
If there is any real intention to get rid of this regime, either by Israel or the United States government, this is the time. This week. You have to go. If you have plans, contingency plans, it’s time to activate them and take on the regime targets. Because it may be that the regime cracks down heavily. It would be a disaster if Trump doesn’t enforce his own red line. But this is really the time to get creative and to get bold and to actually achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Yeah, so Ray on that. At JINSA, for years, we’ve talked about how regime collapse has to be the objective by pressuring the regime in every way. I’ve written [to not] do any deals with this regime. Don’t do anything that enriches this regime.
I want to address the same question, what we should do. But I just want to add, it’s been a curious feature of the second Trump administration, where the [Iranian] oil exports have remained very high. You know, in the first Trump administration, because of the sanctions that he pushed, I think when he left office, Iranian oil exports were under 500,000 barrels, right? And then, you know, under Biden, they didn’t enforce, it went over 2 million barrels a day.
And I don’t think there’s been any change, you know, I don’t think because of Iran, I think because of China. What would you like to see? What can we do to raise more pressure on this regime, to help it collapse from within?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
I agree with all the items that Mariam suggested, and you are correct that the oil export issue is going through the sort of Sino-American relationship, whatever the Trump administration is hoping to get. Although, if Venezuela does come back on, [Venezuela] has larger oil reserves than Saudi Arabia. Now, I realize it’s not the same degree of quality, but still, if that comes online, that further damages Iran.
And Venezuela has already damaged Iran in another respect. [The crisis] underscores their alliance with Russia and China that [also] didn’t do anything for [Iran] in June. All those treaties of friendship and solidarity that Iran has with Russia, Venezuela had with the Russian Federation as well.
Maduro was in Beijing about two or three years ago. So that reflects the fact that the external protection that you have, or you think you have, is further compromised. During the hostage crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini always used to say America can’t do a damn thing. We should have a campaign saying Iran cannot do a damn thing.
I always thought during the 12-day war that United States, not Israel, should have bombed symbolically Ruhollah Khomeini mausoleum. As a symbolic step, Israelis attacked the Evin prison system, though it was somewhat collateral damage.
And President Trump, whatever you think of him, is the first President who has said that “in order to protect the Iranians, I am willing to use force.” I mean, he says it in the Trump way, but this essentially goes back to the Responsibility to Protect what we used to talk about in the 1990s and early 2000s.
He’s the first president who actually has invoked that doctrine in terms of the Iranian people and in terms of [their] domestic events. Now, as I said, he’s not the most elegant and eloquent person, so it comes out as a sort of social media post as opposed to kind of a more elegant way of expressing it. But I think that’s very important. That’s an expression of solidarity that is meaningful now.
And [another] thing that the Trump administration has done that’s been very good [is that] they have rejected talks with the Iranian government. The Iranian government has persistently asked for talks, and the Trump administration has had three preconditions: no domestic enrichment, no missiles and no engagement in terrorism. Those are preconditions, and that’s a very sensible approach. I have to say, I don’t know how the Trump administration makes decisions, but they make all the right ones.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Do you think the fact that Maduro was removed also adds another element of uncertainty for the regime [that signals] these guys could be removed, or they could go?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, especially after the 12-Day War. Not only were a lot of the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and military apparatus killed, they weren’t killed on the battlefield, they were killed sitting by the kitchen table and lying in bed. So that’s a different way of being killed.
The regime is now demystified. There is no pretense anymore about its strength. For a long time, in podiums in this city and other cities, we used to talk about how strong the regime is. If you use force against Iran, it’s the beginning of World War III. [We used to talk about] the convulsions that the region and the international community will suffer. Well, you know, not so much.
And I would have to say the person who has to be given credit for this, besides Donald Trump, but maybe most of the credit, is one of the most maligned figures in Washington, Bibi Netanyahu.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
You mean because of the 12-Day War?
Dr. Ray Takeyh
Yes.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
And probably because he convinced Trump on a lot of these things.
Michael Makovsky, PhD
Yeah, I was going to ask you on that, if that’s what you think. That tough statement came out about what, a day or two after he saw Bibi?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Yes. Well, the first statement he made was that if Iran resumes enrichment and missile testing, Iran would be targeted by United States military reprisals. Then came the Responsibility to Protect to kind of cloak Trump’s statements with some sort of elegance.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
One thing that I found interesting, and I don’t know if you guys assessed this or not, but it seems that the Iranians, from what I’ve gathered, really think that they’re going to get attacked by the Israelis soon. More than I think the Israelis are planning to attack them soon.
The Iranians seem very nervous about it. It seems to me that now would not be the time for the Israelis to really change anything internally [so they] let the current process go. The Iranians really seem keen, like, you know, [believing that] “the Israelis are going to get us” and “
we’re going to have another war soon.”
I’m not saying there won’t be a conflict with Israel again soon, but I got a sense that the Iranians are more afraid about that than the Israelis are planning to do something.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, in light of what happened in June, I think that’s sensible of the Iranians to be concerned.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
You mentioned, Ray, that there’s a passing of the torch, so to speak. In the 12-day war the Israelis killed all these senior leaders. Many of them clearly told [the Supreme Leader] wrong things because they couldn’t protect the country.
But at least at the time, he trusted them. I wonder whether the Supreme Leader has people right now in senior positions that he feels that he knows [well] enough and long enough, that he can trust in such an emergency.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Well, they just appointed a deputy head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Ahmad Vahidi. He actually has a lot of experience. He’s been in the Ministry of Defense. He was actually one of the first commanders of the Quds Brigade.
He was responsible for the Argentinian bombing of the Jewish center [the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires] and that he’s been indicted internationally for that. So, he’s a man [they] can rely on. He has a long history of engagement and terrorism and domestic repression. Whether that’s going to be enough or not, I don’t know. But there are still people within the system, who you can rely on for that sort of a solidarity, for that sort of fidelity, if you want to call it.
But obviously it’s a depleted regime, and what you’re seeing with the purges that the regime has conducted and in the aftermath of the June war is what I essentially call the moronization of the Iranian politics. The more you purge, the stupider you get. And Ali Khamenei saw a lot of purging to cleanse the system.
As a result, the true believers are left. People like [Iranian intellectual] Saeed Jalili], you know they’re true believers. But they’re, shall we say, intellectually limited. But what you’re forfeiting, in terms of analytical acuity, you’re getting, in terms of ideological solidarity.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Mariam, let me ask you how do you see this playing out? I mean, obviously it’s impossible to predict. But how do you see this playing out based on what you’ve seen so far?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
I think a lot hinges on whether Trump decides to take action or not and if Israel decides to take action or not.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
You say action, what do you mean by that?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
A, the red line that Trump has set has been crossed. People are being shot to death. The regime is attacking hospitals and even putting tear gas, in the hospitals – that happened today – torturing children, bringing them out for forced confessions. If the United States is looking to point to brutality, it’s already there.
So, if that was a real intention to do something to help the protesters, well, [the justification is] there. So, a lot for me, hinges on whether the United States is going to take some kind of a military action or one of those kinds of actions that I described. There are so many [actions] short of kinetic attack that the United States government, United States military and the CIA, can [do to] help the protesters.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
One thing, just to follow up, when you say military action, what would you think would be a constructive military action by the United States?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Well, I’m not a military person, but I think Israel did a fantastic job.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
I mean to help the protests is what I mean.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Well, by getting rid of the top brass of the regime, you help the protesters, it sends a very strong message, especially if the regime doesn’t know when you’re going to stop. So, let’s say you kill five important people today, and you [send] the message that if you continue killing protesters, we’re going to kill five more in a few days.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Yeah, I would add to that, when facing this kind of a protest, the regime doesn’t mobilize all the garrisons or all the military. They [mobilize] selectively [by choosing] the ones that they think are the most reliable under the circumstances and in the local situation. You can target those particular installations because there’s some more reliable in their perspective than others. You kind of saw that in 2009 when if that protest had extended to more cities, the regime probably would not have had enough wherewithal to repress all the cities.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Yes, they even said that themselves.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Geographical expansion [of the protest can] tax the Iranian government’s resources. Because remember, in these circumstances, Mike, they’re not using all of the cadres that they have, because they don’t trust them.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Who are they using, now? Is it just the Basij or is the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] involved?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Usually, the first line of attack would be mobile units of the Basij, I think. But Mariam can talk about this.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Yeah.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
One last thing on this. On the one hand, when [the operation] happened with Maduro, people said, “Oh, what a great signal to send to the Iranians.” On the other hand, Mariam said they’ve crossed [Trump’s stated] line. The regime killed people with all the attention on Venezuela in recent days. It looks like maybe the regime had a little more leeway to be even tougher with their people. Do you think that?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
I think that they’re being hesitant. It’s an awful regime, and its repressive tactics against people, are severe, but I think [the Iranian government] is a little bit on its back foot. As Ray said at the very beginning in terms of their strategy, they repress enough to instill fear, but not enough that there’s a strong sense of outrage domestically and internationally. And of course, obviously there is a lot of outrage. Partly what has motivated these protests is the long chain of abuses until now.
But I also think it’s important to remember again that the economic crisis is what sparked this round, and has sparked previous rounds as well, and that is something that the regime is not going to be able to address. It’s humiliating how the regime has tried to do so.
I mean, it’s talked about giving people $7 a month when people know how much they spend on, for example, a Hezbollah fighter [which costs] over $1,000 a month in Lebanon. Or how much the regime [members] spends on themselves. They drive around in Ferraris and Lamborghinis. One of the protest chants is “their children are in Canada. Ours are in prison.” You know, the regime’s children are in Canada, but our children are in prison.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Given all the corruption that has happened over the years in Iran, you would think there would be a reservoir of funds that the regime could draw upon to help mollify the people. As Mariam just said, these economic issues, even if they want to [solve them], these things take time to fix. If the water situation is so bad that you’re thinking of moving your capital, that’s a big structural problem, it seems to me.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Right, I mean, the apartment buildings that their kids own in Australia and so on, these problems cannot be fixed because of corruption, because of incompetence, because of the fact that, you know, so few are benefiting from this level of corruption.
The economic problems of the Islamic Republic will not be fixed, and the problem that the regime has, after many problems, is labor protest and economic grievances become politicized right away. So, in the public imagination, your economic situation is not going to be fixed until you live under a different regime.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
What are you looking for on the ground that would indicate to you that there’s a change in the dynamics? Is it more cities [with protests]? Is it certain people that are not protesting, that are protesting? Is it just the [number of protesters]?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
If the demonstrations persist, they’re bound to enlarge in terms of social groups that will join. The longer this goes, the more expansive the coalition opposing the regime is likely to be.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
I agree.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
My last question is this: do you see any change in the regime’s international posture? Do you think they’re going to focus more on the people and on the economy?
As Mariam said, look how much money they’re giving to Hezbollah. Maybe they give a little less to Hezbollah or to the Houthis, because they got to shore up their domestic position.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
I’m just going to say briefly that in order for them to do that, they would have to have a really strong decision-making process. And I agree with Ray that I just don’t think that that’s there right now, that they’re capable of deliberation and strategizing. The Soviet Union was in much better shape, and even they, in the end, just couldn’t do it.
I think that Khamenei, yes, he’s old and frail, but he’s a very good student of that Soviet experience. He is not going to mess around with anything that might even look like reform, even if it’s not reform. Like to look like they’re maybe, you know, shuffling the deck a little bit. I just don’t think that he’ll do it.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
One of the foreign policy decisions they have made, and they might continue to sweeten the offer, is trying to negotiate with the United States. If I know anything about Ali Larijani, he’s doing a massive outreach to Steve Witkoff, through Europeans, through Saudis, through whomever he can get. And the question is, at which point do we [the United States] bite on that? If we bite on that at all?
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Will it change how they support their remaining proxies? I guess the Houthis are their most potent one right now.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Iraq and also Hezbollah [are important proxies], because they have lost the Syrian land bridge. In some ways, the collapse of Syria has helped them. They don’t recognize that. They spent $15 billion on that, on [the Assad] regime during the [Syrian] Civil War, and that regime fell in three weeks in December 2024.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Okay, that’s a good point. Mariam?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
An adjacent point is that I think the way that Trump is handling Venezuela so far has raised a lot of eyebrows, because basically, he’s engaging with the regime. He’s gotten rid of one person in order to facilitate engaging with the regime.
It might change, but Trump saying that [Venezuelan opposition leader] María Corina Machado does not have respect, that raised a lot of eyebrows, including among Iran opposition people. It [is interpreted as] “be careful for what you wish for. If there is some kind of a US intervention and everything moves around, maybe it’s not going to move around the way that we would hope.” Maybe some IRGC people are going to be elevated in order to deal with the foreign terrorism problem, the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program. But when it comes to the people, they’re left with a new boss [who’s seen as] the same as the old boss.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Yeah, it’s a very good point. Ray?
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
I agree with that. When the President says somebody who won 70% of the vote does not have a mandate, that’s a real experience.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
If he can say it about her, he can say it about anybody.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Maybe [Trump said that about Machado] because she won the Nobel Prize and he didn’t.
Mariam, do you have anything I didn’t ask you that you want to raise before we conclude?
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
There’s a lot of talk in the opposition right now about Pahlavi, pro-Pahlavi, anti-Pahlavi. Pahlavi chants are real. Pahlavi chants are fake.
Pahlavi chants are real, but he really needs to step up and go beyond speeches, op-eds, tweets and all that, and actually show an ability to bring people together. A lot of what he has done since the Women, Life, Freedom protests has galvanized people on the ground, because they don’t see any other alternative.
Of course, they compare this regime to the Pahlavi regime, and they prefer the Pahlavi regime. With all due respect to those people and their aspirations, they may not be as in touch with the reality of [Pahlavi’s] capacity to organize and deliver on a transition.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
I agree with that. I just want to commend JINSA for the Task Force that we have had, that has been on this issue, looking at it from all angles, arms control and others. And I think we should just keep that up. Maybe one day the Task Force will convene in Tehran.
Michael Makovsky, PhD:
Amen to that. Thank you very much. Appreciate both of you for joining us on a very topical conversation that obviously is very important, certainly for the interests of the United States. So, thank you very much for joining. I want to thank the audience for joining us, and I wish everybody a good week.
Dr. Ray Takeyh:
Thank you.
Mariam Memarsadeghi:
Thank you, Michael. Thank you, Ray.