Transcript: Webinar – Strife in Syria: The Threat to Syrian Druze
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow
Former National Security Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister; Former Director of the IDF Intelligence Analysis Division
Alex Makled
Managing Director, Accenture; Member, American Druze Society
Andrew Tabler
Martin J. Gross Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Former Director for Syria, U.S. National Security Council
Jonathan Ruhe
JINSA Director of Foreign Policy
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TRANSCRIPT
Jonathan Ruhe
Alex, I’d like to start with you. Let’s start at the beginning, at the most local level here. Could you start by giving our audience, just more generally, sort of a basic sense of what—we know as the initial precursor — the Bedouin attack on the highway. What led up to this event? How did we get to this point more generally? Because I think this is a new issue of discussion for a lot of our audience here.
Alex Makled
I appreciate you giving me the opportunity. Can you hear me? Okay, good. Thanks again for the opportunity to express my views on what really took place. This is not something that just happened overnight. This started, really in the early 2010-2011 when the population of Syria, or most of them, revolted against the Assad regime, and they created all these different factions trying to obviously remove him, and the Druze minority at the time decided to stay neutral in that war. What they did is, they stopped letting their young men serve in the Assad regime, because they didn’t believe that Syrians should be killing other Syrians. So they removed themselves from that civil war, if you would, until the last two or three years when they became more active in speaking up against the Assad regime, because they felt, and they knew, that the situation was unsustainable economically, from many different angles. So they did take a stand against the Assad regime in a very peaceful way.
And then, obviously, we all know the Assad regime was removed in December, and the Druze were actually one of the first groups that went down to Damascus to find a way to cooperate and work with this new transitional government. And they sent many, many delegations to see if there’s a way they could work with that group, and obviously nothing really of substance that took place. They went back and forth, and immediately they start seeing very, very bad signs that this new transitional government has its own ideology, has its own vision, and has its own way of running that country which does not include minorities, especially the Druze. And we have obviously very, very factual evidence that that’s exactly what took place, because they did extend their hand to see if they can build a country that’s democratic, that’s free, that’s civilized, that’s futuristic. And none of that took place.
So with the Druze there, and since I have family there, they [started] seeing real bad signs when other minorities start getting attacked — the Alawites, obviously we know the situation with the Kurds. And the Druze start having problems actually connecting and coming to Damascus for their daily lives, right? So the road between Damascus and Suwayda became very, very dangerous: kidnapping, killing, stealing by the transitional government subgroups, even though, on the surface, they deny that, but subsurface, we have evidence those folks are supported —- are actually motivated — for a bigger situation than the Druze in terms of cleansing and extermination of minorities and so on and so on.
So it started way back, it became very obvious to us in the last two, three months, and the Bedouin incident was just a trigger or a spark, really, that they were ready for it, and their entire goal is total extermination of minorities, including the Druze, and running Syria in a totally different ideology, and their vision and ideology goes beyond Syria, beyond the Druze and more. So that’s kind of the backdrop of this. I’m happy to get into specifics as needed, but just to give you a little bit of where all of this started.
Jonathan Ruhe
Thank you, Alex. General Amidror, I’ll turn to you next. So as we’ve heard, you know, Israel intervened with airstrikes against government forces. And so I want to use that as a context to ask you, you know, since the Assad regime fell late last year, we’ve heard, at least my understanding is, that Israel’s primary goal as it relates to Syria and that side of the Golan Heights was to ensure that no malign actors filled the vacuum there so they could pose a threat to Israeli borders. Now it seems, you know, is it fair to say, did Israel get involved because it’s worried that the events of earlier this month pose that kind of threat, that this is a way for government forces trying to try to fill that vacuum in a dangerous way along the border? Or does this represent something broader, you know, an Israeli goal as it relates to the Druze community, and perhaps something more ambitious like that?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Look, Israel should not intervene in the Syrian mess situation. That was the decision when the war against the Assad regime began years ago, in 2011, and that should be the decision in the future.
There are a few exceptions.
First, is Israel’s interest. We don’t want any military forces, terrorists and so on, to control or to be in a position to attack Israel from the south part of Syria, and for that, we are very determined not to let any of these forces take hold in the south of Damascus. We did it during Assad’s regime, and we will do it during this regime. We will not let anyone build a situation in which the south part of Syria is the launching bed for the next friction with Israel. This is first and clear. By the way, we made it clear to the Syrian regime and to the Turks. And it is known both in Damascus and in Turkey.
There is the second exception of the Druze. We have commitment because of our relations with the Druze in Israel, not to let the regime use its superiority relating to this minority of the Druze in the eastern part of Daraa [Province] and in some villages south of Damascus, and east [of] the Israeli line in the Golan Heights. In the area that we moved to the east, now we are controlling some new Druze villages, and Israel is very determined not to [allow] the regime in Syria to slaughter the Druze.
We have to remember that it is more complicated than just the extremism of this regime in Damascus. The Sunnis were the majority in Syria which was controlled by the Alawites and other minorities, including the Druze, which were part of the Assad regime system until they decided the Assad regime is too weak and they didn’t want to be identified with the Assad regime. When the Sunnis came back to control Syria—they are probably 85% of the population—they are taking revenge, and what they did to the Alawites is not connected at all to the fact that they are Islamist or extremist or Daesh [Islamic State] or whatever there is. There are memories about the way that they had been treated by the Assad regime during the years, and how the Assad regime butchered the Sunnis.
If in Syria today, there are out of 18 million people—that was the number of the population of Syria before the war—12 million are refugees: six inside Syria and six outside Syria, that one before the change in the region. Probably 90% of them are Sunnis. You will not find many refugees within the Alawites, the Druze, or the Christians, or the Kurds. We will find that probably 90 or 95% of the refugees, either inside Syria or outside Syria, are Sunnis. Out of the number is not known, but everyone is speaking about 600,000 people killed during the war in Syria, probably again, 90% are Sunni, and very few are from the minority side of the Syrian society.
So it is more complicated. It’s not just that the new regime’s origin and roots is ISIS and Al Qaeda. It is something about the situation inside Syria and the relations between the majority and the minorities. This is why it is much more complicated. In spite of all these explanations that you can get from experts on Syrian society, because of the commitment that we have to the Druze, we decided to intervene. And the strong reaction which we took, including bombing inside Damascus, the headquarters of the military part of the new regime, was because we had kind of an understanding with the new regime that they will not send military forces into the South. And when we understood that they were sending tanks and other military carriers into the Druze area we decided to tell them, or to signal to them, guys, it was against what was understood between us. And it was very important to [enforce] the red line [so] that the regime understands [what are] the red lines that Israel will not let it cross.
We continued the negotiations with the Syrians under the table in some places, including Azerbaijan, which volunteered to host the dialogue. And from our point of view, you want to give the regime the opportunity to show that, in spite of the fact that they are coming from ISIS and al-Qaeda, at least, they claim that they changed their attitude and they are supposed to behave like, [let’s] say, normal people. And not to use the opportunity to butcher the minorities. It is one part of our negotiation. We took some very strong measures at the beginning. We moved the line between us and the Syrian forces 10 kilometers east of the old line, including the peak of the Shomron mountain. We destroyed probably 80 or 90% of all the hardware of the old Assad regime army so they cannot take those carriers and things and so on and build their own army. And as I said, we are signaling [to] them again and again that we will not let any forces be in the south. We agreed that some kind of police force will come in to stand between the Druze and the Bedouin in the South. Both groups have weapons and they have a long history of friction between themselves and Israel cannot solve all the problems of the Syrian society.
Jonathan Ruhe
General Amidror, I’ll pause there, because I think that brings us up to a good [point]. We’ve gotten to the Druze and Israel, now want to go to the American perspective of how we got to where we are now, and then we’ll go forward from there.
So, Andrew. I’d like to sort of pose the question to you, because I can think of few people better to ask. You know, I guess if you could start just sort of a level set — what was US policy toward the new regime in Syria, let’s say, up until the events we’re now discussing, and then has that at all changed in the wake of what’s happened in Suwayda?
Andrew Tabler
Yeah. First of all, it’s great to be with you all and be joining this discussion. So in here I’m summarizing the last six to eight months, but you know, the Assad regime came down in the early part of December, quite dramatically, as many of you remember, and that was due in no small part to the policies of the Assad regime, but also an extensive American sanctions regime that was put onto the Assad regime, designed to drain it of resources and help hold it accountable for atrocities that were being committed inside of the country during the during the war and even up, you know, and then subsequently.
And so there was a general license that was issued — general license 24 — that allowed for a sort of modest, moderate suspension of sanctions or allowing aid and other kinds of material into Syria. But when the Trump administration took over, I think that Syria was not important. President Trump said that pretty directly. He said, we’re not going to be actually, even before he took office, he said we’re not going to be intervening in Syria, we’re not going to be doing anything in Syria. So the administration focused on other things: Iran’s nuclear program, Gaza, a whole host of other things. But as always, Syria has a way of creating attention when you least want it to. And so as the Al-Sharaa government constituted itself in Damascus, there were real concerns about it in US policy circles, as well as those in the region. Some of which, which we mentioned, have to do with its Salafist jihadist origins. That’s not a mystery to anyone.
And of course, there is the issue of Sunni revenge. That’s got to be natural, a natural tendency. It’s always hard enough to control your troops when you’re in a forward area. I can only imagine, after all those years of suffering, trying to control those forces. But I think the thing that became very worrisome was that there was an indication very early on from Ahmed Al-Sharaa and his circle, that he did not want to share power with anyone, and that became a problem as the central government and domestic transitional government tried to reassert its control over the country.
Now, there was a previous American approach [which] put about eight different points, reportedly, in front of the Al-Sharaa government, which they answered. And then there was a series of questions back and forth. And these dealt with a wide variety of issues, concerning their relationship, even their posture concerning Israel. The fight against ISIS, the detainees in eastern Syria, expelling Palestinian extremists and militants from Syrian territory, which had been there for decades. And of course, chemical weapons.
And so these issues were put in front of Damascus. And there was, early on, up until May 13, when President Trump went to Saudi Arabia, there was a policy of engagement with Damascus in return for conditional sanctions relief. It was all sort of staked out and was ready to be unfolded.
President Trump changed that on May 13 in Saudi Arabia, in that he wanted Syria to have a chance to shine as he talked about and to go in a different direction, which was the original sentiment I think of a lot of Americans at the end, when the Assad regime collapsed, that Syria did deserve a chance to shine. Then what happened is that President Trump ordered a cessation of all sanctions on Syria. Syria has some of the world’s most complex and thick sanctions as a result of years of being on a state sponsored list of terrorism and also, most importantly, Caesar [Act] sanctions, named after the regime photographer which smuggled images out of Syria during the Assad regime, depicting severe mutilation of bodies and torture.
So these have secondary sanctions effects, and so those sanctions, in particular Caesar sanctions, were standing in the way of investment by Gulf countries and other countries in Syria to rebuild. So very quickly, bureaucracy adjusted. They issued an executive order on June 30 of this year, and that repeals large swaths of previous executive orders that were in place, and also suspends other aspects of US sanctions. It’s too much to go into at this discussion, but two of them, in particular, state sponsors of terrorism, but also the Caesar sanctions remain US law as a result of them being produced by Congress and passed by Congress. So those were, those were still in those that remained in place. But the intent of President Trump was the cessation of the lifting of sanctions to allow for investment inside of Syria.
That effort has continued to unfold, and US envoy Barak has led the way on that, both the US government, but also recently at the United Nations, to lift sanctions on Syria. I think it was an actual, very earnest attempt to go in a completely different direction, to do something that no one had ever dreamed of, right? I think the problem that remained, though, is that the Al-Sharaa government was having a problem dealing with minority dominated areas of Syria. So in areas that are Sunni majority or dominated, it’s a little bit less of an issue because the sectarian issue is not as high. Also, military groups in those areas were being brought into the Syrian military in whole cloth, so whole divisions with commanders were being brought into the Syrian military, putting on new insignia and showing up for duty.
With the minority-dominated areas, particularly with Jabal-Al-Druze, but also out in eastern Syria with the Kurds, they were being asked instead, in a process, to join as individuals, not whole cloth divisions, and not with their own commanders. And this caused, amongst other things, I think, a lot of concern among these minorities, in particular, because, like during the mandate period, going way back before the Second World War, these communities were used to self-rule in large part. The attempt of the central government to assert its authority was really in question, especially after all these years of Civil War.
So we saw the events unfold in Suwayda. Our guests on my colleagues here know much more about it, because a lot of the suffering and the shooting happened in southern Syria, as we’ve talked about. I’ll say a couple of things, from the US standpoint. US policy is pretty clear that there is as [US Ambassador to Turkey] Tom Barrack talked about, there is no plan B in Syria, right, there is the Al-Sharaa government. So I don’t think this is about regime change and it’s certainly not about nation building, they’ve been very clear about that.
But I do think that what the US seeks is to have a stable and viable government in Damascus that’s able to reconstitute it and control its territory, and to that end, what we saw just in Suwayda, both with the deployment of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces, but also some sort of hooligans fighting alongside of them, some of which the Al-Sharaa government openly talks about, has raised questions about the capacity of Al-Sharaa to move beyond a more narrow sectarian base around former HTS core and so on, and towards a more larger national army that would represent the interests of Syrians and and cut the kind of political deals that make domination like we saw, or the movement, or the events that we saw in Suwayda, not necessary, where you can cut a political deal and have a political process.
And, unfortunately, in Syria, we don’t have that. And because of that, because of the violence, because of the tension and the lack of a viable political process, to date, this is causing risk to go up and ultimately, will, I’m sorry to say, will probably get in the way of the ability of outside parties to finance Syria’s reconstruction in a way that benefits Syrians rapidly and comprehensively. Instead, we’re going to have a very messy situation going forward.
Jonathan Ruhe
Thank you, Andrew. That very helpfully covered several of my next questions as well. So let’s build off that. So, as Andrew mentioned, let’s, you know, adopt his skepticism about the Al-Sharaa government’s ability to find a workable solution here that incorporates a lot of a lot of serious, various communities. So I’ll use that as a jumping off point. Alex, I’ll ask you first, and then I’ll turn to General Amidror. And then I’m going to sort of bundle a couple questions from our audience together at once here.
So, Alex, would the Druze in Syria consider moving to Israel? And as a second part, you know, say, if not, you know, would it be possible for Israel to arm the Druze in the similar fashion that Israel armed its partners in the southern Lebanese army decades ago?
Alex Makled
Well, let’s take them one at a time here. Would the Druze consider moving and becoming part of Israel? The Druze, what they’re really looking for now is, peace, freedom, democracy, a future for their families, for their kids, for their brothers and sisters actually around the region. So, you know, the Druze in Israel are very close to the Druze in Jerusalem, the Druze in Suwayda are very close to the Druze in Lebanon. And their main goal in life is, you guys, leave us alone and we’ll leave you alone. We have never really attacked any other factions anywhere in the world. If we’re part of Israel, we love Israel, and if we’re part of Syria, and Syria is treating us fairly like everybody else, we love Syria. And ff we’re part of Lebanon, and Lebanon is treating us fairly like everybody else, we love Lebanon.
So they’re very peaceful people. They’re very attached to their land, and they’re very attached to their families. So whoever gives them that opportunity, they will go with. If it’s Israel, then it’s Israel, if it’s Syria, under a different government, under a different system, under a different ideology, under a different vision, it’s Syria. If it’s Jordan, it’s Jordan. So that’s really what they’re looking for: freedom, peace, democracy. If I have to evaluate the situation now and their options, really, Israel is their best option.
From an American perspective, sitting here for the last 35 years and watching what’s going on in that region, even under the Assad regime and his dad, the Druze, yes, they lived in peace and they lived in somewhat prosperity. But that’s not because of Assad and his system. It was because of the Druze themselves and their love for their land and agriculture and their Druze sons really around the world, providing them with ways to live. So if you evaluate the situation now, and me talking to the local leadership there in Suwayda, and I’m not concerned saying it: think Israel provides them with the best opportunity at this point of time, because we have seen how the our brothers and sisters in Israel have been treated and how they contributed to the to the growth and prosperity and stability of Israel, and we think we can do the same thing. So that’s how I would really approach that.
Now if Syria, which is very unlikely, overnight changes the system, and they share in power, and they become an inclusive, prosperous, civilized, free, democratic society, I have to tell you that most Druze would probably prefer to stay there because of their history and because how the Druze back in 1925 led the process really to allow Syria to become independent of the French at the time. But I’m skeptical of this government in Syria. I don’t think they know how to lead. I don’t think they understand what democracy is. I don’t think they know what freedom is. I don’t think they know what women’s rights are. I don’t think they know how you can live in peace and prosperity and share power and depend on people. So I’m very skeptical from that perspective.
I don’t think Jordan has the ability to absorb the Druze for many, many reasons. So I hope and pray that the Druze get an opportunity to become either independent or part of a civilized futuristic country that could leverage their resources. Not only human resources, but natural resources, and really create a stable cornerstone in that region with the Druze as a major part of that. Now, what was the second question there, please?
Jonathan Ruhe
If the Druze, you know, if staying in Syria is the option, you know, with all the caveats you mentioned about wanting to be a peacefully integrated in the country, you know, the sort of the southern Lebanese army option, the, you know, acceptance of not just Israeli military intervention against government forces, but even direct supplies of arms?
Alex Makled
Yeah, again, that could be, could be a solution, but I’m not sure it’s really the optimal solution. Again, Druze like to belong, and they like to be part of a bigger country that has, again, futuristic visions, and it may be an interim solution, but in the long run, I’m not sure that’s really the way to go. And reflecting back again for the last six, eight decades the Druze in Syria and in Lebanon, obviously, they struggled, really, because they’re a small minority in the sea of ideology that’s totally different. So it may be an interim solution, but it’s not a long-term solution for the Druze.
Jonathan Ruhe
Thank you. So General Amidror, just very quickly, if I get your thoughts sort of on the Israeli counterpart to what I asked, Alex. What are you know, other than the red lines you mentioned toward the Syrian government in Damascus, what are, are there Israeli policy options under consideration, or that you would think of in terms of direct relationship with the Druze, either supporting them directly in Syria or encouraging even relocation to Israel’s Druze communities?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I don’t think that relocation to Israel is an option that the Druze will like, or it is good for the Druze minorities around the Middle East. Remember that the Druze are in Lebanon as well. I think it will be a mistake. The Druze should defend themselves in the Jabal-al-Druze east of Daraa. We can support them. We cannot do the job for them. They know that they can get help from Israel if the situation deteriorates. And I think that is what is very important for them at the moment. I believe that in our conversations and dialogues with the regime in Damascus, we can make them understand our red lines, and that will help the Druze very much, because it would be well understood that the Druze ability to defend themselves is part of our interest. And I think that should be sold within the new Syrian state, and not by forces which will be sent by Israel. Israel can help, but Israel cannot [do] the job.
Jonathan Ruhe
Thank you, General. And just very, very quickly, one follow-up question, I believe Israeli officials and Syrian officials are continuing to meet and discuss issues. We also heard, you know, before recent events that we’re discussing here, there was, there was talk, at least at high levels of potential and Israeli-Syrian agreement, maybe, maybe not normalization, but something less ambitious, a non-aggression pact or an armistice. Call it what you want.
Did you lend much credence to those discussions before these recent events and if so, have you changed that view since?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I think that we should continue to speak with the regime in Syria. It is a very important country in the Levant. It is a key for keeping Hezbollah under pressure, and not letting the Iranians to reconnect directly through the land with Hezbollah. So I think it’s too important a state not to try, at least to see if we can come to an arrangement which will keep the area quiet without a wall, and will secure the existence and the ability of the Druze to defend themselves and to flourish in the areas in which they are located. So my view is that we should continue these conversations with the Syrians. The red lines of Israel should be well understood on the other side. And I believe that if that would be the situation, and Israel clarified red lines, it will help the Druze and it will help us to save our interests as well.
Jonathan Ruhe
Thank you, General. So Andrew, I’ll turn back to you in the couple of minutes we have left and we’ll sort of pull back as far as we can go on the perspective here.
So I guess going forward, you talked about sort of the US position toward Syria. But more broadly, since the Assad regime fell, we’ve seen all sorts of other Western but also America’s Arab partner governments, you know, either making high profile visits to Damascus or doing a lot of diplomatic, diplomatic engagement with the Al-Sharaa regime.
So I guess from that broader perspective, what ability is there, what likelihood is there, that the outside world more generally—not just Israel and the Druze—can shape Al-Sharaa’s incentives to do a lot of the things you talked about in your earlier response, so we can avoid further things like this, but also have, you know, ‘partners’ the wrong word, but have a government in Syria that, at least, you know, helps prevent Iran from reconstituting ISIL from reconstituting, things like that?
Andrew Tabler
Sure. So, you know, I think that the US is for the moment anyway, all in on trying to work with the Al-Sharaa’s government to stabilize Syria. And as I mentioned, the events of the last few weeks indicate that’s going to be very, very difficult. And of course, we have a looming issue concerning northeast Syria, where the Syrian Democratic Forces, which work with the United States to suppress ISIS, are also in their own negotiations with Damascus.
So I think that the US has an ability to, they have front loaded many of the carrots in the form of sanctions relief, which is an which is an unbelievable opportunity for the Al-Sharaa government to go in a different direction and to cut a deal with Druze and with Kurds and others in the country that’s viable, that can bring all Syrians together into a stable political entity. But we just don’t see that so far, and I think that’s a real cause for pause.
I’m not so much of a skeptic, I’m just trying to be realistic in the sense that we want to make sure that the people… I’m from Western Pennsylvania, the people in my hometown who voted for President Trump, they are sick of plowing good money after bad into the Middle East and coming up with horrible results. It’s as simple as that. and their sons and daughters dying in the military, right? It’s not so much about isolationism. They want policy that makes sense and that does well for America and its allies. And in Syria, it’s a very tricky situation.
It’s, as General Amidror said, it’s a very important central you know, sort of, it’s the row house in the middle of the block. And what happens in Syria, as we know from the war, doesn’t stay in Syria. And there are a lot of interests there. I think the US is trying its best. But Syria has been, throughout the 20th century, one of the world’s most unstable countries. It has these tensions for its own reasons, not all of which, by the way, are sectarian. And so overcoming all of that is going to be interesting.
Syrians suffered, though together, during some horrible slaughter during the course of the Syrian civil war, and sometimes such wars and such slaughter can bring people together. Unfortunately, the events of the last couple of weeks don’t indicate that those lessons have been fully learned, but there’s still hope with good diplomacy, leadership and the involvement of US regional allies.
Jonathan Ruhe
Great. Thank you. We have one late arriving question from our audience. I want to sneak in before the buzzer and pose it to you, Alex, in 30 seconds. How united are the Syrian Druze in their support for close relations with Israel?
Alex Makled
On the surface, they’re a little bit fragmented. Below the surface they are very united. Again, and I say it one more time, they’re united to belong to a nation that’s stable, that has a future that’s peaceful, that appreciates their contribution to its success.
Jonathan Ruhe
That’s a great note to end on. I’d like to thank all of our audience for joining us for this webinar, and thanks to my panelists for joining as well. It was great to hear from your different perspectives as a reminder to everyone in the audience. JINSA has a paper on these issues coming out next week, so keep your eyes peeled for that. I’d also like to thank General Alian and COGAT for sending their video remarks as well. Thank you all, look forward to seeing you again soon on another JINSA webinar. Have a good weekend.