Transcript: Webinar – Trump’s Postponed Ultimatum

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PANELISTS

IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish
Julian (z”l) and Jenny Josephson Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, JINSA; Former Israeli Defense Attache to the United States

Gen Frank McKenzie, USMC (ret.)
Hertog Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Commander, United States Central Command; Former Director for Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), United States Joint Staff

The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.

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TRANSCRIPT

Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Blaise Misztal:

Good morning and welcome to this JINSA webinar, an update on the latest in Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, and the war with Iran. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. I’m honored to be joined by two of my esteemed colleagues.

General Frank McKenzie is the former Commander of CENTCOM and JINSA Hertog Distinguished Fellow. General McKenzie, thank you for joining us. We also have Major General Yaakov Ayish, JINSA’s Jenny and Julian Josephson Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, and former Israeli Defense Attache here in Washington. General Ayish, thank you for being here with us.

In the past couple of days, we’ve seen a lot of developments in the war, with a lot of it centered on the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and attempts to make sure that commercial shipping can get through. We’ve seen President Trump’s ultimatum, that he gave on Saturday to Iran, to the postponement of that ultimatum. Most recently, President Trump said yesterday that the war is already won.

General McKenzie, I wanted to start with you and get your assessment of how the war is progressing and how operations are going, whether the U.S. is achieving its objectives. But first I want to congratulate you. You were appointed yesterday as the next Commandant of the Citadel, and I think that is a terrific honor and a great privilege for all those that will now be under your tutelage.

Eager to get your thoughts on where we are in this war, which is now in its fourth week.

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Blaise, thank you for your kind words. Always happy to join and offer my thoughts. The JINSA audience is always very well-informed.

We’re pushing four weeks into the war. I think we’re accomplishing the objectives that we set out. CENTCOM is executing a long-prepared campaign plan. This is not something that we’ve drawn up on the back of the envelope day-to-day. These are things that have been studied for many years, refined for many years, simulated in wargames every way that you can. We’ve examined this problem. I have some responsibility for this plan. As has my predecessor, as has my successor. We’ve been working on this for a long time.

I think if you’re sitting down at CENTCOM right now, you are satisfied with where you are. Let me sort of break it down a little bit and look at they might be looking at it. One of the key things you look at if you’re at CENTCOM is, is Iran able to generate significant volleys of ballistic missiles—either against Israel, or against our bases in the region, or against our friends in the region and their cities and infrastructure. Largely, we have denied Iran the ability to do that.

You know, I used to worry, as the CENTCOM Commander, about a volley of 200 or 250 missiles against Al Udeid Air Base, or Al Dhafra. That has not materialized. And I’ll talk about why it has not materialized in just a minute. But the fact of the matter is that fact has allowed us to continue to use, in some modified fashion, our forward bases against Iran.

Though I don’t know the mechanics of the actual execution of what we’re doing, and it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to talk about it if I did, I think we’re still getting a lot of use out of those bases. I worried that those bases would be knocked out early in a potential conflict with Iran. That has not happened, and Iran has not been able to mount massive volleys against Israel.

Have they been able to fire some number of missiles against all these targets? Yes, but not the massive volleys that would make it hard for us to defend those installations. And I don’t mean to say those installations haven’t been hit. Some of them have been hit. Some damage has been done. But, largely, we’re able to continue our operations. That’s very important.

So, why have we been able to have this success against Iran? First of all, I think the decapitation strike at the very beginning of this war was effective in reducing Iranian command and control. It made it hard for them to develop how they wanted to actually execute the plan. The fact that they were able to respond very quickly, albeit in an uncoordinated manner, speaks to the decentralization of Iranian command and control—Iran was able to respond quickly, but really not in a coherent manner.

Additionally, we’ve been able to take out Iranian air defenses to the degree that, I would argue, we have effective air supremacy over most of Iran. And what does that do? What that has given us is the opportunity to go hunt for ballistic missiles, and that means you look for where they’re stored, you look for where they’re fired. You look at the vehicles that transport them to the firing point.

You do all of those things, and when you have the level of air supremacy that we do now, you’re not limited to fifth-generation aircraft up there, by which I mean the F-35 and F-22. There’s the B-2. Now you can go north with the F-15, F-16, F-18, A-10, to some degree, and, of course, the B-1. You can use these large bomb trucks now. You’re not necessarily limited to standoff conditions. So you can use shorter range conditions to engage the targets. I think what we’ve been able to do is really effectively knock out a significant fraction, perhaps the vast majority, of Iranian ballistic missiles.

And also, frankly, the Iranians made a mistake in designing their ballistic missile force. They mistook hardening and burying for security. And the truth of warfare today is this, if you can see it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can kill it.

And even if you dig yourself deep underground with these beautiful missile cities, or whatever they call them, you know, with beautiful pictures of missiles stacked up, going way into the background—that just makes it easier for us to strike and destroy these missiles wholesale rather than retail. Because what you want to do is you want to get the missile before it launches. You want to get it in the storage area. And I think this has proven to be a major mistake by Iran. The way they’ve chosen to array their ballistic missile force, it’s going to aid us, actually, as we effect suppression going forward.

I think CENTCOM’s got to be pretty happy with where we are in terms of the ballistic missile exchange, where we are continuing to dominate their ability to fire those missiles.

The second category is drones. Look, over the last 10 years, there’s been an explosion in drone technology. We are still absorbing how to employ and defend against drones, as is really everybody else. And the Iranians have flown a lot of cheap, easily manufactured, low-cost drones against us. We’re getting better at stopping them.

The same rules apply to drones as ballistic missiles. You want to get drones before they launch. You want to get them in the supply chain. You want to get them where they’re stored. You want to get them where they’re built. You want to do all those things. And that’s very important. We’re having success doing that. I’m very pleased with where we are right now.

Look, I think every day that passes, Iran is going to have fewer drone options going forward. That doesn’t mean they’re going to go to zero. I wish we could say that. It doesn’t mean we’re going to get to zero, but it does mean we’re going to reduce their opportunity to do this. And again, the best way to do that is going to be by striking where the drones are manufactured, where they’re launched. The worst way to do it is to defend them in the terminal area. So we’re working all these things right now. I’m satisfied with where we are.

The next thing I’ll speak to is where we are concerning the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian Navy. And as you know, there are actually two Iranian navies—the IRN and the IRGCN, and I think both those navies, in terms of large combatant ships, are largely gone. We struck them all. So what we’re doing now is focusing on preparatory steps in order to clear the Strait of Hormuz.

What that means is first, working to get rid of Iranian submarines. Then, looking at the fast attack craft—the small cigarette boat type vessels that can swarm out from the southern coast of Iran, the northern edge of the littoral there, to affect shipping in the region. You go after those with slow moving aircraft, perhaps A-10s, perhaps attack helicopters. Perhaps we attack them from across the Gulf. There are a variety of weapon systems that we can employ to get after those targets.

Other targets include the short-range Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles that have been built, targeted and dug in on the northern edge of the littoral. For the Iranians, again, digging them underground is a mistake. We can see where you did it. We can strike it. We can get to you. CENTCOM is busy on a program of doing that. I think there’s probably some days’ worth of work left to finish that. But it’s progressing.

That leaves us with mines. The Iranians have a large and capable stack of mines. I’m sure CENTCOM, over the last few days, has been going after where they’re stored, how they get to the pier, and the ships that take them out. I know we sank a lot of minelayers here in recent days, and so I think all that is very positive. Now, what that’s going to lead to, at some point, is you can go up close if you think there are mines in the water. And I’ve heard assessments that they have not actually done any kind of serious minelaying. So, that’s good.

But if they choose to mine it, we do have the ability to clear the mines. Before you send your Mine Countermeasures vessels up there, though, you want to make sure that there’s no way for those Mine Countermeasures vessels to be hit, which is what CENTCOM is doing right now, removing the Iranian ability to go after those Minesweepers as they go into the Gulf. Eventually, you’ll be able to clear a route.

Remember, you don’t have to clear the whole Strait of Hormuz. You’ve got to clear a route that you’re going to bring vessels through. So you’re not clearing every bit of water up there. You’re clearing the bit of water that you’re going to use for your high value units.

Marines have entered the region. All of those capabilities give additional options to the CENTCOM Commander. We could use those Marines in raids up and down the Iranian littoral. We could use those Marines, potentially, to seize Kharg Island. I don’t know if we’re going to do that. I have no idea, but I can tell you, again, these are not back of the envelope plans that we thought up in the last week or two.

We’ve considered all these options for many years. We’ve wargamed them. We’ve looked at contingencies, and the 82nd Airborne will certainly have a role to play if we choose either to seize ground or to provide security for other installations in the region. What you’re seeing is [CENTCOM Commander Admiral] Brad Cooper getting more capabilities, and more capabilities that he can use.

Let me talk about Kharg island for just a minute to close out. If you control Kharg Island, you effectively control the Iranian ability to export oil. You can control cargo, in a couple of ways. You can destroy their capability, their oil transfer capability, on that island—which will shut the Iranian economy down but also have a pernicious effect on the global economy. Or you can seize Kharg Island, which also shuts the Iranian economy down, but keeps open the option of opening it in the future, and also gives you the opportunity to actually hold Iranian soil—which could be a key negotiating point of leverage for something going forward.

In closing, a lot of things are beginning to come together. This isn’t a plan that takes one or two days to execute, or takes a few weeks to execute. We’re now in the heart of the plan, and generally, I’m satisfied with where we are right now.

Blaise Misztal:

Thank you for that great overview, General McKenzie. Quickly, before pivoting to General Ayish: You said this is not a plan that unfolds overnight—to the best of your sense, given that you were involved in some of the planning that has contributed to the operation we’re now in. How far along are we and how much more time would you expect is needed to achieve U.S. operational objectives?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Look, I think we’re closing on a lot of these objectives right now. What has emerged as a current priority, of course, is the Strait of Hormuz. But we haven’t talked about the nuclear program, and that’s always a contingency that we can hold and go after, should we choose to do that. I think we’re still a little way away from being ready to declare the Strait of Hormuz ready to accept Minesweepers. I’m not read in to as much operational detail as I would like. But I would say we’re in a pretty good place right now. Probably, there’s a little work left to do, but we’re in a pretty good place right now.

Blaise Misztal:

Thank you. General Ayish, I’ll ask you the same question, focusing on just the Iranian front for now. What is your assessment of Israel’s Operating Roaring Lion—how far along is it, and in terms of achieving its objectives, how is it progressing?

Major General (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

Well, you know, listening to General McKenzie is quite amazing. I’m going back in my thoughts 10 or 12 years to the days that I was in Washington [as Defense Attache]. I’m thinking about the strategic goals of the U.S. and Israel, and I’m listening carefully to the list that General McKenzie gave, and I’m identifying the level of coordination and similarity between those strategic goals. It’s quite amazing.

In terms of those, I’m watching carefully what has happened to the nuclear program of the Iranians so far. I’m thinking about [Operation] Rising Lion in June and now. I’m thinking about the achievements in that area, together with the [Iranian] ballistic missile capabilities, i.e., stockpiles, launchers, and the production capabilities. It’s pretty amazing. And I’m starting with those two strategic goals, because they were very important for both of us, for Israel and the U.S., in this war, and in terms of achieving it, it seems like, together, we made significant progress.

I don’t want to dive into percentages, but when I’m examining the number of ballistic missiles that the Iranians have been launching in the last week, or two weeks, towards Israel, the average is around 10 ballistic missiles. When I’m thinking about the potential that they had—Blaise, you know it very well—at the end of Operation Rising Lion, they had the potential to launch a significant amount of missiles. Due to what the U.S. military and the Israel Defense Force have done since the beginning of this campaign, we degraded significantly their capabilities, both in terms of ballistic missiles and in terms of their nuclear problem.

I’m starting with that, because at the end of the day, these are the two major capabilities that we wanted to either eliminate or degrade significantly. And through that, and some other elements that were described by General McKenzie, we wanted to bring about a situation that will allow for regime change in the future in Iran. And I think we are on that track, if you will. If you were to tell me 10 years ago that this will be the situation after less than a month into such a campaign, I would tell you that you are dreaming. I think it’s pretty amazing—in terms of decapitation, in terms of air supremacy, in terms of the ballistic missiles, in terms of the nuclear program, the maritime capabilities that were eliminated, and so on and so forth.

Now, we are entering a strategic phase that was described already—the oil, Kharg Island, the Hormuz Strait. There are two ways to solve it. One is the diplomatic channel. There are discussions between the U.S. and the Iranians via certain mediators. The second there is the military one. And when you are analyzing the achievements that have been achieved until now, it seems like both options are viable. And I think the major reason for the Iranians to go into this negotiation is because they know the military escalation option, it’s very imminent. Both options are seriously on the table.

Our success, I think, serves us well in Iran but it serves us also—and maybe we’ll talk about it later—in Lebanon, and elsewhere. Israel is facing the Iranian front and some others. And wherever you see a terror proxy somewhere, you will find the Iranians behind it. So in that sense, it serves us well in both arenas, in the eastern one and in the north. And I assume that we’ll talk about it later on.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, thank you for that overview.

General McKenzie, I think I’ll use your checklist as sort of an organizational tool here. So let me start with ballistic missiles. Yes, we’re not seeing the launches of 250 missiles per salvo. We’re not seeing, as we know the Iranians were preparing back in June, a mass launch of 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in retaliation for Israel’s attack. But we saw yesterday, according to JINSA data, 55 missiles launched, which is more missiles than Iran was able to launch on the fifth day of the war.

So, the Iranians are still launching quite a bit, despite the fact that we’ve had thousands of strikes by the U.S. Air Force, by the Israeli Air Force, and both are hunting these capabilities. Are you surprised that they still retain as much launch capability as they do?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

No, I’m not. Look, this is war. It’s not a business deal, and it’s not a train schedule. It’s the conflict of naked human will, and sometimes the bad guy has a good day. What you can’t do in a campaign like this is look at it day to day.

You can’t say, ‘well, you know, they had a good day today and therefore our plan is bad.’ We have a good plan. I’m confident the plan will be executed. I’m confident we’ll be able to reduce whatever means the Iranians used to get a lot of missiles in the air yesterday. Let’s see what they do today. Let’s see what they do tomorrow. Let’s see if they can sustain it. That will be the test.

You have to take a longer view. When you examine these problems, you can’t look at them through a slice of time where they had a good event happen for them. They’re going to have good things happen occasionally. Every day, though, I think the opportunity for good things to happen for Iran narrows as we continue to press our attack.

So, am I surprised Iran can still mount missile strikes? No. Am I worried? Not particularly. At CENTCOM, and I’m sure in Israel, they’re looking at—how did this happen? What can we do to prevent it today? What can we do about it going forward?

Blaise Misztal:

Along the same lines, but on the defensive side, let me ask—are you concerned about our interceptor stockpiles running out before we can complete operations? How much of a stress are we under, on the defensive side of operations?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Well, as the CENTCOM Commander, you’re always worried about the interceptors. I was worried about it, and I’m sure Admiral Cooper’s worried about it. The best way, though, to stop this threat is to not have to fire the interceptors at all—to go up and get the missiles before they can launch. The least efficient, and most costly, way to stop them is by using your interceptors. So, I think everybody that’s addressing this problem is keenly aware of that concept, from CENTCOM to the Pentagon to everyone else.

We’re working very hard to make it impossible or difficult for Iran to launch those missiles. You know, you’re a lot better off with fewer missiles in the air than you are with a lot of missiles in the air. That allows you to husband your stock of interceptors. I’m sure that we’re looking at it. We have ways to cross balance globally. We practice that. We track it. But again, I come back to the point I made earlier: the best way to keep your stocks high is to prevent launches.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I’d like to add on to that a few things. You know, there are the strategic, operational, and technological dimensions to the defensive capabilities. I’ll start with the strategic dimension. When I’m thinking about the amount of ballistic missiles launched by the Iranians compared to what they have planned, I think they are in a very, very bad place. This is due to the fact that not only their command and control capabilities were shattered on day one of this war, but also because we are, together with the U.S. air force, hunting. That means launching at their missiles capabilities, or sealing the tunnels where missiles are, or delaying their capabilities to launch. That is just on the strategic level.

On the technological level, a lot has happened in the last year. And I’m not sure that I can elaborate on all of that. Let’s look at two things. One, is in terms of Israel being able to be fully coordinated with CENTCOM capabilities—and I’ll leave it there. And the second element is upgrading the technological capabilities—the players that are intercepting incoming threats towards Israel and other places are totally different, and we took them to the next level together, with the United States. So it gives us, at the end of the day, greater capacity, better capabilities, and at different altitudes.

Having said that, I agree with General McKenzie. This is something that you have to calculate very carefully, together with the whole concept of how you are managing the campaign on the offensive side, not only on the defensive side.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, I think we’ve seen the videos emerge from this war of Iron Dome intercepting ballistic missiles, which is not something it was designed for, but is really just due to incredible development and innovation that Israel’s been able to bring to bear—at the speed of war. But let me ask you—given the two strikes that we saw in recent days near Dimona, more specifically—your sense of Israel’s defenses and whether they’re in fact holding strong.

Why did these two missiles slip through? Was it because of an Israeli decision not to fire on them because of interceptor concerns that they got through? Did they somehow evade Israeli detection—should we be concerned?

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

Well, our system, as you know, is not 100 percent accurate. We maintain a very, very good percentage when it comes to intercepting incoming threats. But it’s not 100 percent. We have some other capabilities in terms of how to complement the defensive capabilities, and as I mentioned, offensive capabilities are part of it.

Regarding Iran’s strikes on Dimona and Arad. These are two unfortunate incidents. Both of them, by the way, were debriefed by the Israeli Air Force, and we didn’t find any systematic failure or anything like that. This is part of the statistics, and we are not intercepting 100 percent. Going back again to my argument, though, when you are thinking about what they have achieved since day one, until now, in terms of Iran’s launching capability, it is low. Think about the neighborhood. The region is watching them. For years, they were a very formidable threat for the region, in terms of their offensive ballistic missile capabilities—what is their performance like now?

You can add to it what has happened to Hezbollah, and is still happening. I think they are losing that strategic deterrence that they have cultivated, quite successfully, for many years. So when I’m looking at the events, how they are unfolding, in the last month—on the ground, together with the strategic posture of the Iranians—I think it’s now very clear exactly why they are aiming to negotiate and to achieve as much as they can via negotiations. They are in very, very bad shape.

Blaise Misztal:

One last set of questions on the missile issue, because this was such a critical threat, and a driver of both Operation Rising Lion and the current operations. As we think about how and when the war concludes, what is an acceptable level of remaining missile capability that the U.S. and/or Israel would be willing to leave Iran with? If they’re still firing 50 missiles a day, is that okay? If they’re still capable of firing 20 missiles a day, is that okay? Do we have to get them to zero missiles left in order to achieve our strategic objectives? Is it possible to put a number or an approximation on it?

General McKenzie, what are your thoughts?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

I think what you want to see is something different in terms of missile production facilities. And we’re going to have the ability, given the air supremacy we have over Iran now and will have for the foreseeable future, to put a pretty restrictive monitoring regime in place, should we choose to do that. So I think I would look less at the number of missiles remaining than I would look at the whole chain of building missiles and particularly the types of missiles that we’re going to be interested in. I would look for something there.

I think we’ve reduced a vast amount of missiles. Though, you’re never going to eliminate all—there are always going to be one or two missiles launched and maybe more than that. But they’re not going to be able to sustain that, certainly not the way they thought.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, anything on how Israel thinks about that?

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

What we can see, by the way, is that in the last 10 days, the IDF is very much focusing on Iranian production capabilities. It’s not only their stockpiles, as the U.S. has focused on since the early days of the war, and the tunnels, and the launchers, but also their production capabilities. Iran is a very, very vast area, and for this, we need time, and that’s why we are investing quite a lot of resources in going after their production capacity.

Having said that, at the end of the day, unless we assume that everything is eliminated, something is left, so they will have a capability in place. That’s why the diplomatic measures and negotiations and the type of inspection, very intrusive inspections, in any agreement that will be achieved is a vital element to complete the successful efforts by the U.S. and by Israel. Without that, I don’t think it will be enough.

Back to the position of Iran that I described five minutes ago. I think it’s part of the deal. That’s why that arrangement at the end, and, I would say, Iran’s strategic posture in the region at the point after the war ends is a vital element.

The ballistic missile stockpile deterred the region—specifically the Gulf countries, and to some extent, Israel. That is an important element. And it is far more than numbers—it’s production capability, its technical know-how, and it’s also the range. What we have seen launched towards Diego Garcia is a threat for Europe. It’s only a matter of time that something like that will be implemented for export.

We can see it already happening. The strategy, and these elements, are things that the Iranians can use in the future elsewhere. That’s why I think it should be a vital element as part of any future agreement, together with the nuclear program.

It seems like the U.S. is offering Iran a civilian nuclear program under an American umbrella, and it would be accompanied by intrusive inspections, obviously. So, I assume what Iran is offered, in any reasonable agreement, will cover Iranian ballistic missiles and other types of threats as part of it.

Blaise Misztal:

Thank you.

General McKenzie, next on your list was the drone threat, then the maritime threat. Let me combine those. As you said, Iran has not actually mined the whole Strait of Hormuz—at least in any significant quantities, compared to what we saw in the 1980s, for example. And the ships that have been hit were hit by missiles or drones, and that seems to be the prominent way in which the Iranians are able to hold shipping at risk.

What is our ability—given, as you said, that counter-drone efforts remain a challenge at the fixed installations that we have around the Gulf—to protect ships in the Gulf from the Iranian drone threat?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Well, Blaise, you begin with the same principle as with ballistic missiles—you want to go after where they launch from. You want to go after where they’re built, where they’re stored. The worst way to shoot down a drone, to destroy a drone, is in the air. You want to get it before it launches. Left of launch, if you will. You want to do all that before the drone actually gets airborne.

I think what CENTCOM is doing right now is a very aggressive program of sweeping the northern littoral, around the northern edge of the Strait of Hormuz, going into the Arabian Gulf, to get rid of those drones and get rid of the launching sites. It’s going after command and control nodes, and facilities associated with that. That’s ongoing. I’m not able to tell you what kind of progress they made. I just don’t have access to that information. But I would expect, given the fact we’re able to put A-10s, probably rotary-wing attack aviation up there, and other slow-moving, highly-discriminatory platforms, we’re probably having a good deal of success with that.

The other thing is, if you’re going to send ships through, if you’re going to escort the ships with U.S. warships—and hopefully coalition warship—that would accompany those ships, in terms of working to get after the drones, the defensive system those ships have is not the preferred way to do it. You’d much rather get the drone before it launches. A manned platform, a fighter aircraft, going after it is not the most efficient way to do it, either. But there are also some promising magnetic technologies and other things that are entering the inventory now that will help us against drones. All of those things create a universe designed to make it hard for the Iranians to effectively fly drones down there to strike tankers and our warships in the Strait of Hormuz.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I agree. I prefer the approach of drying the swamp instead of, you know, following mosquitoes. And in that sense, I think whatever will be achieved, it should be part of the inspection regime imposed on the Iranians. That’s why. And I’m not sure that we are discussing it enough. That is why it’s very important with whom you are negotiating in Iran. I don’t know if it’s [Parliament Speaker] Mohamed Qalibaf, or the generals that are left in the IRGC. But whoever leads Iran will have to decide its path. The best thing is to reach an agreement where it’s very clear to them that it’s better for them to chart a different path instead of threatening the region, as they have done for decades.

Blaise Misztal:

Thanks, General Ayish.

General McKenzie, you mentioned in introductory remarks that we’re deploying a Marine Expeditionary Unit and now the 82nd Airborne to the region. Can you talk a little bit about the capabilities they bring to bear, and what sort of operational options they give the president in terms of trying to protect the Arabian Gulf and secure the Strait of Hormuz?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Sure. Let me begin with the Marines. They’ll come on U.S. Navy warships. They’re already, I believe, inside the theater. Now, I’m not sure exactly where they are, but I’m sure they’re close. They give you many abilities for a strike. For one, you can go amphibiously. You can go a variety of ways, to either execute amphibious raids against islands, against onshore targets, or against oil platforms, which has been done before—with great success—back in the 1980s.

What it does is it gives options to the theater commander. Those are options that you can exercise outside the Arabian Gulf or inside the Arabian Gulf, depending on if you want to bring those ships in. You can also base the Marines ashore under certain conditions, and Marines bring heavy equipment with them. You can repair runways. You can dig yourself in. You can do limited localized air defense. You can do all sorts of things with the Marines.

The Marines are kind of a Swiss Army Knife with capabilities that allow you to do a variety of things. On the airborne element—I was a big fan of the airborne element when I was CENTCOM Commander, because it allows you to strike directly from North Carolina, if you choose to do so. And very quickly. With infantry, you can bring them in. The problem with just airborne alone is they don’t have the equipment to sustain themselves for an extended period of time, so you got to have a plan to relieve them, to supply them, and all that.

Again, these plans aren’t being made day to day. These are things we thought about, and did with wargames, and trained for—for a long time.

So the combination of Marines with the 82^nd Airborne, it gives Admiral Cooper options—and options he can exercise anywhere along the Iranian littoral. He can also use them to further protect defense sites on the southern end of the Arabian Gulf littoral, if they’re threatened by proxies or something like that.

Really, in every way, this is just providing him new capabilities that he can use to threaten Iran. So I think it’s very timely. Both capabilities, as well, are very good at working together. A lot of options are there for the CENTCOM Commander right now.

Blaise Misztal:

Is there an option, or perhaps even a strategic requirement, to put boots on the ground along the Iranian coast as a means of securing shipping? Is that something the President might be considering?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

I think it’s certainly something we want the Iranians to worry about. I think we want them to be very worried about that. I would certainly leave that on the table, and then, if I were President, I wouldn’t share what I was actually going to do.

We’ve talked about a lot of things, including Kharg island. There are other islands up there that we can look at. The Iranians have got to be worried about all those locales. Marines are very good at doing raids from the sea. I’m sure there are forces in the region that can do that. We can deploy the 82nd Airborne for some of those missions.

We have a lot of capabilities there now that the Iranians have to worry about. You want your foe to be worried about what you might do to them, particularly, I would say, on mainland Iran. I would go a step further and say that’s something that the personality of President Trump has brought to the fight that was absent under previous presidents, and that’s the willingness to entertain these possibilities.

The Iranians are very scared about what President Trump might choose to do. That’s good. That’s where we want them to be. They’re scared because of the audit trail. Going back to the strike on [IRGC Quds Force Commander] Qassem Soleimani, to the strike on the Iranian nuclear program last June, and the war now, President Trump has proven he’s willing to do certain things, whereas other American presidents have been significantly deterred by Iran. He is not deterred by Iran, and that’s given him remarkable flexibility, and really helps the military campaign that we’re running right now.

Blaise Misztal:

While we’re talking about these forces, let me ask you: we’ve talked about the maritime threat. Another part of the Iranian threat, as General Ayish referred to earlier, is the nuclear program. In particular, over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent—almost weapons grade—we believe, is buried under rubble after Operation Midnight Hammer last year. Is either the Marine Expeditionary Unit or the 82nd Airborne being sent to the region units that might be used to go in and secure that nuclear material? Is that something the U.S. would be considering now?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Well, Blaise, we certainly want the Iranians to be very worried about that possibility.

Blaise Misztal:

All right. We have a long list of questions already from the audience, so let me just ask some.

General Ayish, if you could, please briefly tell us about the Lebanese front and Israeli operations there. It seems like there are unfolding preparations for perhaps a bigger operation inside Lebanon.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

In terms of what we have seen in Lebanon until now, whatever’s left of Hezbollah is trying to show solidarity with the Iranians. Iran dragged them into this war.

Hezbollah, they opened the northern front, violating the ceasefire that was in place because of this show of solidarity. It created a very unique situation in Lebanon, where we saw the Lebanese Armed Forces arresting Hezbollah terrorists, and we saw the government in Lebanon for the first time expelling the Iranian Ambassador. But this is on the very-high political level.

I want to discuss three possible options that we can identify for Israel in Lebanon, and then to take it one step down—to connect it to what we see happening in Lebanon nowadays.

The first option for Israel and for the state of Lebanon is total disarmament of Hezbollah, to really put that focus and that pressure on Hezbollah, and to dissolve its capabilities. The second option is to renew the famous security zone that Israel left in May 2000. We were deployed in Lebanon at the security zone, basically between the Litani River and the international border with Lebanon for more than 19 years, until May 2000, when we withdrew from Lebanon.

By doing so, we will be able to remove the imminent threat facing the Israeli villages and the communities along the Israeli-Lebanese border, and to prevent Hezbollah from redeploying in that area. The third option, which I think is the best option, is for the Lebanese Government to exercise its sovereignty and really to take responsibility for what is happening in Lebanon as a whole—and, specifically, in the southern part of Lebanon.

In the meantime, until one of these will be implemented, what we are doing is forming a very strong defensive posture, which is in front of the Israeli communities and along the border with Lebanon. Through that, we are providing security to the Israelis in the area, and allowing them to stay in their villages without having to leave them as happened after October 7, 2023. And the other element is that we are degrading significantly the capabilities of Hezbollah all over Lebanon, not only securing the southern part.

We are targeting their capabilities in terms of command and control, launching capabilities, UAVs capabilities, and many others. And by doing so, we are advancing, or cultivating, the conditions for one of those strategies.

Meanwhile, there is also a diplomatic channel headed by Ron Dermer. He was appointed by the Israeli prime minister for the task. On the Israeli side, this is being mediated again by the U.S., with Lebanon and some other players that are trying to play a role over here. But so far, the IDF deployment is more than enough.

Having said that, the Israeli government has confirmed the recruiting of 400,000 Israeli reserve troops. This means that the IDF will be on full readiness should the Israeli government decide either to take the southern part of Lebanon, or to gain control in other areas in Lebanon, in order to prevent Hezbollah from threatening the northern sector of Israel.

This is, at a basic level, the situation without going into the tactics and all the other constraints and elements that are highly relevant when you are talking about Lebanon.

Blaise Misztal:

Thank you for that overview, General. Let me stick with you, because our first question from the audience is for you. What do we know about how Israel is coordinating the air campaign with the U.S.? Are they using liaison officers in their respective command centers?

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

Well, I think in terms of coordination, if we judge it according to the results, it’s unbelievable. In that sense, it seems like what many others have built in the last, I would say, decade, or even more, created the conditions for very close coordination. A few of these levels we talked about already—about the air and missile defense, which is fully coordinated, and fully orchestrated, by CENTCOM, and we are playing a part in that puzzle as well.

And in terms of the offensive part, there are the elements of intelligence and other types of operational coordination. I’ll say it like this: it’s full coordination. Think about Israeli aircraft being refueled by American aircraft, and at the end of the refueling, the American pilot is wishing them success in their mission.

It’s unbelievable when I’m thinking back just a few years, back to our discussions in the past about how to coordinate this type of operation. It was unbelievable when I’m thinking about that today and the level that it’s done. It’s far more than just liaison officers. I think it’s a very close, well-coordinated mechanism that was built for many years, which involved training, and then wargaming, and other tools that were implemented in order to achieve it.

Blaise Misztal:

General McKenzie, any insights from you, given that you started as a CENTCOM Commander without Israel in your AOR [area of responsibility], and you ended with it in your AOR?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

I would just note that all of this proceeded ultimately from the decision of President Trump to bring Israel into Central Command [AOR] from European Command. He signed that in January 2021, and that’s proven to be a very consequential thing. We thought it was important at the time. It looks increasingly important with the virtue of hindsight, and what’s happened since, particularly in the last 18 months.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I’ll add only one comment. In 2018, when JINSA first wrote about the need for Israel to move to CENTCOM, I was discussing the subject with a very high-ranking general in the IDF. He said, ‘I’m agnostic about it. It’s America’s business.’ Nowadays, when I’m speaking with the generals, they can’t even believe how effective it has been. It started with JINSA’s recommendation in 2018 and we developed it until, as General McKenzie said, President Trump approved it in 2021.

Blaise Misztal:

All right, our next question comes from an audience member who says, ‘Incredible briefing. But let me ask you, if things are so great, why do I feel so bad? Quagmire. No strategy. The regime survives.’ What is he missing?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

I wouldn’t say things are going great, I would say things we’re executing the campaign plan and getting good results. It’s not a football game. You can’t let your emotions get the better of you. It’s a grind. Every day is a grind. You’re sending young people out to fight, and hopefully all of them are going to come back, but that isn’t always the case. The bad guy occasionally has something go well for him. But you cannot grade it every day. You can’t get up and down. You’ve got to believe we have a good plan that’s been worked on for a long time.

I think the plan will bear fruit. Time will tell. It’ll be very clear empirically whether this works or not. So I’m not prepared to get emotionally up or down about it one way or another. I know they don’t have time for emotion in Central Command right now.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I think in terms of the operational plans and the strategic goals, it seems like we are making significant progress in the right direction. Though, as I mentioned during the briefing, it has to be completed with the diplomatic effort, and it seems that it is going exactly in that direction, that the military’s role is really to create those conditions. It seems like the objectives being achieved so far, but we have to judge it once the agreement will be reached and implemented.

In this region, it’s not enough to just reach a diplomatic agreement. Just take a look at Gaza. Take a look at Lebanon. Take a look at other areas. But it seems to me, in terms of making progress, it’s going very, very well. It’s going faster than I would have expected—it is a vast challenge, and Iran is a huge country.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, another question from the audience: Any update on Iron Beam? Is it having an impact on the rate of drone attacks?

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

Okay, so it is effective, and it’s active, and it is deployed in the north. We don’t have it yet in full capacity, in terms of quantities, in terms of systems, at the end of the day, you need to make sure that you are fully deployed. And we have to keep in mind that this is a complementary capability. It’s not there by itself doing everything.

It’s not a silver bullet. It is something that we have developed, together with the U.S. in order to complement our other air and missile defense capabilities. It’s highly effective against drones and at the end of the day, everything starts with the ability, really to identify and to classify and then to designate these capabilities towards the target.

But yes, in terms of systems, we don’t have yet enough of the systems, but we are working on it as we are working in so many other areas to expand our capabilities.

Blaise Misztal:

General McKenzie, an audience member is asking why it seems like CENTCOM wasn’t prepared to deal immediately or swiftly with the blockade of Hormuz, especially since this seems so far like Iran’s major silver bullet.

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

Well, I’m not sure I’d agree with that assertion. I think you build your plan off the forces that you have. We’re not going to station a number of destroyers in the Middle East, in perpetuity. You’re not going to keep 10 or 15 destroyers there. You’re not going to be able to maintain the forces that are necessary to immediately reopen it if something like this happens.

We’ve always thought there’d be a struggle over this. I’m not sure that this is not in the CENTCOM plan. Is it frustrating? Would you like for it to be open? Certainly. But, you know, the nature of warfare is you can’t get everything you want.

Sometimes it takes a little while to get what you want. And I think we’re working toward that end right now. I go back to a point I made earlier. This is a clash of wills. The other side gets info. They have good ideas within their framework, and they’re going to exercise those good ideas. It’s up to us to work and prevent them from implementing them, and I think we’re doing a pretty good job of that,

Blaise Misztal:

Our next question from the audience is as follows. President Trump said we need to continue until the work is completed, since we don’t want to come back every two years. If the hostilities ended today, assuming we can’t trust the regime, would we be in a predicament of potentially having to keep coming back every couple of years? The military operation you’re seeing, is it designed with an option for regime change?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

The United States is not pursuing regime change directly. It may be a product of what we’re doing, and of course, the leadership of the regime has changed pretty significantly over the last few weeks.

I think we’d like to get to a point where there’s going to be some entity in Tehran that will negotiate over the objectives we want for this campaign, whether it’s a completely new regime or a version of this regime that is so affected by pressure that they’re willing to make these concessions. I don’t think it matters.

Going forward, look, we’re always going to have to have something in the theater to look at these guys. It’s difficult for me to conceive that Iran is going to go completely away. But it could be a much smaller force than what we have now, since we’ve demonstrated pretty clearly our ability to flex forces back in, should it be necessary to do. Also, that fact’s not lost on the Iranian regime.

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I don’t think we would have to go back. It’s really a function of what type of agreement will be reached and who will be in power in Iran.

In that sense, I’d like to say two sensitive things. One, there are visible actions that we are discussing, and maybe the world can see. There are also invisible capabilities implemented in this war and not everything is immediately effective. We have to be very patient in certain areas.

We are planting seeds and we are waiting for them to grow. And in that sense, I think we are creating new circumstances that will allow a significant change in Iran, and this, by itself, will be the answer of whether we will have to go back or not. I’m not sure it’s totally aligned with the kinetic capabilities that are implemented.

And, keep in mind, that there are areas that are not implemented yet. Think about infrastructure paralysis that can be achieved via kinetic or cyber capabilities. These tools were not used yet, and they can influence the Iranian population in a certain direction, and then those in power may shift actions and decisions in a different direction.

So, I’m not sure that everything is visible, and I’m not sure that everything is totally synchronized with what the international community can see. We have to understand that there are some residual effects and ongoing impacts that we’ll be seeing in the near-future, and far-future.

Blaise Misztal:

All right. What are you going to be looking for in the coming days or weeks to determine if the plan is still unfolding as it should, General McKenzie?

General (ret.) Frank McKenzie:

I’ll be looking at the Strait of Hormuz. That’ll all become apparent over the next few days. I’m watching for how we get the success we want and what decisions we’re making about creating a path through for ships—either warships that might bring Marines into the Arabian Gulf, or other ships that will come through. I think that’s going to be very important in the next few days. And the second thing I’m looking for is a continued decline in Iranian ballistic missile activity.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, what are you looking for?

Maj Gen (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:

I’ll be focusing on the production capabilities, particularly regarding missiles, and making sure that we degrade them to the lowest level that we can. Obviously it goes to the second level, too, in terms of the nuclear program—I’m watching to see if it is going to be shattered as much as we can shatter it. The rest will be achieved, I assume, by either diplomatic or massive kinetic means that will be implemented in the future.

Blaise Misztal:

General Ayish, General McKenzie, thank you very much for your insights today. Thank you to everyone who tuned in, and please visit jinsa.org for all our latest updates and analysis as these operations continue. Thank you.