Transcript: Webinar – How Should the U.S. Respond to Iranian Protests?
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Former National Security Advisor to Israel’s Prime Minister
VADM (ret.) Robert Harward
JINSA Iran Policy Project Member; Former Deputy Commander, United States Central Command
Lt Gen (ret.) Charles Moore
JINSA Iran Policy Project Member; Former Deputy Commander, United States Cyber Command
The discussion was moderated by JINSA VP for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. I’m delighted to be joined by two members of JINSA’s Iran Policy Project: Vice Admiral Robert Harward, the former Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, and Lieutenant General Charles Moore, former Deputy Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. We will also be joined by JINSA Distinguished Fellow Israeli Major General Yaakov Amidror. He is also the former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu.
It’s been a really remarkable just over two weeks of watching these protests in Iran escalate and snowball. At the same time, watching the U.S. response, which started, I think, right before New Year’s. At the end of December, President Trump said the Iranians were “vicious, vicious people,” and that they usually shoot people during protests.
And then right after the new year, he escalated further and said that if Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters, the U.S. will come to their rescue. “We are locked and loaded and ready to go,” he said, and he repeated similar promises of aid and threats against the regime several times, including by saying that the regime is going to get hit very hard. He also said that help is on the way and directed his messaging to the protesters by encouraging them to keep going.
And then yesterday afternoon, President Trump said in a meeting in the Oval Office, that he’s heard that Iran has stopped killing people, and that is a hopeful sign, but we’ll continue to watch and see what happens. This message seemingly signaled he would stand down on what had looked like a buildup to some sort of response to the regime’s brutal suppression of the protests.
On the one hand, what we’ve seen is definitely a much more vigorous U.S. response to Iranian protest than what we saw in 2009 during the Green Movement under President Obama or in 2022 after the killing of Mahsa Amini and the Women, Life, Freedom movement that took to the streets thereafter during President Biden’s term. Both administrations, in the midst of negotiating with Iran over the nuclear program, seemed to decide not to weigh in or intervene in any way on those protests.
President Trump has taken that rhetorical step of weighing in but hasn’t necessarily taken any substantive steps. I am eager to talk with our panel about what the U.S. should be doing, how we interpret President Trump’s latest statements, and what more the U.S. can or should do.
Admiral Harward, I’ll start with you and just ask you, does this protest movement matter to the United States? Does it affect U.S. interests? Should we be involved? Should we care about what happens? If we can negotiate with the regime, get them to stop their nuclear program, should that be all that matters for our interests?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Yes, yes, and yes. This is an opportunity unlike any other and so we should not look the gift horse in the mouth. We’ve got to realize the opportunity. The regime of Iran for the last four decades has been the most brutal and oppressive in the region, but more importantly, it has been exporting terrorism, and attacking us asymmetrically, our banks and everyone else on the internet. They’ve been threatening and attempting to kill our people in the United States.
How did we adapt a policy of accommodation and appeasement when they do all that? We knew they were killing our people in Iraq with their surrogates. The impact of these protests is directly in our national interest and the interest of our allies. And I don’t think there’s anyone I know who does not support a change of regime, and, more importantly, if that change doesn’t come through, the people of Iran, it’s not going to be stable. It’s not going to be enduring.
But, with the right support, these developments present the opportunity to not only have a peaceful and prosperous Iran, but more importantly, to have a peaceful and prosperous region, be it Lebanon, be it Gaza, be it Yemen and beyond. So, yes, it’s in our direct national interest, and I don’t think the amount of support that’s needed is overwhelming or taxing.
And I think the President took the first steps with his initial comments and his follow-on comments, and so I was a little surprised by yesterday’s comments, but those comments alone carry so much weight in Iran and the region. Now that we have the movement, we’ve got support to bring this thing to fruition.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, Admiral. General Moore, let me ask you, is this the right move, to speak out in support of the protesters? The United States seems to have, largely, as President Trump has often said himself, been tired of regime change wars in the Middle East. Is this just inserting ourselves into another one?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
Well, I agree with everything that Bob just said. Let me start there.
Listen, we’ve talked before. If you go back to before Midnight Hammer, when we were having debates over what the United States should do, during the previous Trump administration, the approach that they took, especially economically, had put the regime in a really, really bad place. That changed over the ensuing four years.
And then the question was, did we actually have time to go back to this maximum pressure campaign too? Do we have time for it to work based on where we thought they were with their nuclear weapons capabilities? And so, one of the secondary benefits of Midnight Hammer and the 12-Day War and all the great work that the Israelis did in Iran was not only to deal with their nuclear program, their ballistic missile program, but also to build space for this maximum pressure campaign 2.0 to have effect.
Now we’re seeing the fruits of that. We’re seeing this internal grassroots movement rise up from the people inside Iran. That’s exactly what we wanted to see happen. We have been trying to apply the lessons that we’ve learned over the last 25 years, be it in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya. So, I think this is exactly what we want to see. And I think we do want to see it obviously come to fruition, that is to say, a change in government.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, maybe I could ask you about the view from Israel, both about the situation in Iran and the opportunity it presents. Also, please give us a taste of the discussion in Israel. Is Israel considering whether and how to support the protesters or is it choosing to stay away from the current situation?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
First of all, I think that this is a unique situation in Iran with the perfect storm due to the success in the 12-Day War, which made everyone in Iran understand that the regime doesn’t deliver; internationally, strategically all the promises and all the investments that they did in the Middle East vanished during the war then in the 12 days.
Hezbollah is no longer a threat to Israel and cannot help Iran. Hamas for sure cannot help Tehran. Damascus does not provide the bridge between Iran and the Mediterranean because this bridge no longer exists. Inside Iran, the economy, the water problem, the miserable life of the people, the inflation, everything is going wrong, and the regime does not have any alternative to alter.
The leadership is very old. The system is very corrupt. And the demonstrators on the street are a real problem for the regime. I think that it is wise from the Israeli point of view not to intervene, because if all this kind of opposition is identified with Israel, it will be bad for the opposition. There are too many Iranians that don’t like being involved with Israel, and it is better for the Iranians who are demonstrating in the street, not to be identified with Israel. This association would give legitimacy to the very cruel regime against them. Because any association with Israel is used by the regime to justify its repression. So, I think it is wise not to interfere.
Now, the problem is not only an Iranian problem. Now it’s an American problem too. The President of the United States is losing credibility in the Middle East. He promised, and he didn’t fulfill his promises. He sent people to demonstrate, and they have been killed in the street, and he said, if they will be killed, I’ll act. They have been killed, and the President didn’t act.
So, I think it is now very important for America to make clear what the policy is, and to think about the question of the President’s credibility. For the Iranians, it might be too late. From all the signs which are coming outside Iran, the regime succeeded to oppress the opposition. The level of demonstrations now is much lower than it was in the last few days.
I identified from noise that I heard from some of the published videos that the Iranian government used weapons that the opposition couldn’t stand, and they killed, I don’t know how many people in the street. They probably succeeded to oppress the demonstrations.
As far as we can see from outside, without an internet, and I’m not privy to the intelligence inside the system, the regime probably succeeded to, at least to contain the wave, and in the future, it will be much harder for the movement to reemerge. The fact that Americans promised and didn’t fulfill, raises the question, what will their influence in the Middle East be in the future?
Blaise Misztal:
Yeah, on that, JINSA’s CEO and President Mike Makovsky and I wrote just recently that there are two separate issues for the United States in responding to the Iran protests. One is exactly the point that you just made, General Amidror, of credibility. Once the President has said that help is on its way, it draws a red line. If he says, if you kill protesters we will react and protesters are killed, that crosses a red line. If the U.S. doesn’t enforce it, then it risks having a situation like in 2013 in Syria with the chemical weapons red line.
And then there’s a separate issue that we’ve also talked about, of the benefits strategically to the United States, to the region, to our allies and partners of helping collapse this regime. So, I guess Admiral Harward, just sticking with that first point, do you think there’s a credibility issue here now for President Trump, if he doesn’t act? Do you think that he has to enforce this red line that he’s drawn or risk consequences?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Well, I think, going back to Yaakov’s comments, it’s a timing issue now, if we’ve missed this bow wave, as he suggests, we could take the opportunity in this pause to do some of the things that are necessary. We could ensure protesters have internet access not only so we can know of the details going on in the ground, but more importantly, to support coordination in the effort to change this regime.
Number two, are we going to take steps in asymmetric warfare to supply arms, conduct cyber activities, and plan strikes that they’re not prepared or expecting to do? So, if all that’s going on, there is no credibility issue.
But if we let this bow wave pass, and we do not reconstitute and prepare better, including helping the opposition coordinate and figuring out what the Iranian government will look like after the regime falls, then, yeah, you’ve lost what little credibility we had regained with the change in administration last year.
This administration, if the credibility issue is unresolved, will take us back to where we were. All our red lines were false prognosis. So, I think time could tell on this again.
Yaakov, I think when the President made those first two statements, that became a policy, in my opinion, because that’s the first time a President has said that. So, I think time will tell. Are we going to take advantage and exploit this opportunity, or are we going to let it pass and not consider how to reengage our plan and to reconstitute and move forward in the not-too-distant future?
Blaise Misztal:
Well, speaking of time, General Moore, I’d be curious of your views, if you have any, on how we should understand President Trump’s statements yesterday that the killing has stopped, which seemingly hit pause on any potential U.S. response.
I’ve seen all sorts of interpretations from it is just about buying time because the U.S. doesn’t have the necessary assets in the CENTCOM theater, and so we’re sending a carrier strike group from the Pacific and moving other assets into place that we need in order to carry this out. Others suggest it’s misdirection or psychological warfare “to suss” out what the Iranian regime’s crisis response plans are. Others think it’s backing down. What do you make of what President Trump said yesterday?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
Well, Blaise, you kind of just listed all the things that I would suggest it could be. Like the other panelists, I don’t have access to all the intel on a day to day basis like I used to and with the blackout of so much information coming out of the country, we’re left to make our best guess on what we actually think is going on, but we do have a lot of reports about things changing at Al-Udeid and other bases in terms of their security posture, which tends to back up what the President said.
But I think you nailed what these potential options are. Remember, he made some really interesting comments right before Midnight Hammer happened, about continuing to negotiate, and then the next thing you know, the strikes took place. So, misdirection is definitely in his bag of tricks, and if he’s using that, I think that’s great.
You also highlighted the fact of time: moving more assets, especially naval assets and some other things that take a little bit more time to get in the region. That could be going on. We also don’t know, is there some type of deal in the mix? If you pay attention to Secretary Bessent’s comments over the last 24, 48 hours, there’s a lot of money that’s being moved out of the country right now, which would obviously indicate you have people that are thinking that they want to depart, whether it’s the leader and or his son and other individuals. So, all those things could be going on or one of them, and unfortunately, we just have to wait and see how it plays out.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, another new potential wrinkle in trying to understand what’s happened that’s being reported this afternoon is that, in addition to the Arab states, Prime Minister Netanyahu asked President Trump to hold off on any attack on Iran. Would you know anything about that or be able to speculate as to why that might have happened?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I’d be very surprised if that was recommended by Prime Minister Netanyahu in this situation. The truth is, I don’t know what America will do, and I don’t think that I can give advice to the Americans regarding what to do.
But I think from the Middle East’s point of view, promising and not fulfilling is something that is very popular in the Middle East to say about the Americans. I thought that the way in which some events had been run the President had been going against this trend in the Middle East, and now again, people will say another American leader promised and didn’t fulfill.
I think that is bad for us, of course, for Israel and it’s bad for America. But what Americans should do in the present situation, when the demonstrations are probably weaker than before, and the Americans don’t have enough naval forces around, I’m not in a position to advise the Americans.
It’s a very delicate question. What do you do in such circumstances in which you urge the demonstrations to continue? You promise that help is on the way, you don’t have the ability to give the help, because there is no air carrier, and so on and so forth. And slowly the regime succeeds to oppress the opposition. So, what do you do in such a situation? I’m not sure that there is an easy answer.
Blaise Misztal:
Admiral Harward, as a former deputy commander of CENTCOM, does the U.S. have enough assets in the theater right now to mount a meaningful response?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Well, look, my position is that a strike is the last thing you want to do. We want to work asymmetrically with everything else we get, we’re increasing the economic pressure, cyber activities, communication, and coordination with the opposition. That stuff should be consistent and going on now.
Regarding striking, what are we planning to strike? In my humble opinion, it’s not just the ayatollahs, we got to get rid of. It is the IRGC and the Basij. I think those are the real perpetrators of the horrible repression.
I can’t see where the armed forces sit, but I think just like what we saw in the change of regime previously, in 1979, the military was intact because they’re loyal to the country. So, I think if that’s the case, my strikes would be focused on what are those things that are going to have the most impact to eradicate or pressure the IRGC to flip. And in fact, I don’t know if strikes on the Basij would do that, so my strikes would be focused on prompting a regime collapse.
I would assume that all of those cruisers and other assets that can deliver those sorts of strikes are pretty much in the region 365 days a year. So again, I think if we do have to reposition some assets, as General Moore said, we can reconstitute. Then with compelling speed and certainty, we can hit those strikes.
But yeah, I think we have enough time to support the objectives of what we’re trying to do with the Iranian people and not declare war or take a more proactive role in a war with Iran. This is more about supporting the people to drive this change.
Blaise Misztal:
General Moore, I am curious about your thoughts, about what the U.S. policy options here are and should be. Should it just be kinetic? Should it just be asymmetric? What would you recommend to the President?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
Let me back up to the President’s comments. I think that obviously coming out in support of the protesters and of the people of Iran was very, very important. Like you said, we didn’t hear that in 2009, and we didn’t hear that in 2022 so that was very important.
I also think that he did use language like, “Hey, we’re locked and loaded,” and “we’ll hit them hard. I personally think that you kind of hear what you want to hear there. I still think there is some ambiguity into what that exactly means in terms of supporting the Iranian people.
I think through this in a couple different buckets of the type of things that we should be doing. And Bob alluded to several of them. First are the things that further tighten the screws, which comes to the economic situation that we have them in that’s really fueling a lot of this. I think Bob even wrote something about that, and Blaise you as well, about the quarantine, the right language, by the way, borrowing from the Cuban Missile Crisis, it’s not a blockade, it’s a quarantine of their oil assets. I also think President Trump’s increase of a 25% tariff on countries that are doing business with the regime was wise in that regard as well. So, keep the screws going to them, and that regard would be bucket number one.
Bucket number two is things that we can do that help the population and the protesters coordinate with each other and get information outside the country. So, you’ve heard a lot about Starlink terminals continuing to try to get those inside the country. These are very important for us to expand the limited types of internet access that does exist, it’s not much. Obviously, you want to make sure they understand the high-end type of VPNs that can be provided. All VPNs are not created equal. Some types of VPNs the regime would have extreme difficulty in detecting. Also, there’s software enabled solutions that can create things like mesh networks with everybody’s phones and things like that, so that they can coordinate, they can organize, and they can potentially get data outside the country.
The third bucket is the more traditional, non-kinetic types of operations. I think we, and I hope we, are performing a lot of information operations, especially against IRGC, Quds Force, the Basij and all those folks, and reminding them that if this, if this government does fall, they’re going to be held accountable, and what that actually means for them and their families. I also think that campaign ought to go back to those senior level people that, as I mentioned earlier, are moving money out of the country. It is important to remind them that the United States can still sanction those banks. Those banks want to work in the broader global economic environment and that money may not be available to them. It could be if you decide you want to leave. So, it’s that type of information operation that we should be conducting. Most of that’s going to take place via, you know, in the cyber or cyber enabled type of operations and getting other types of messaging to those people.
On the cyber front, specifically, I think we really ought to be focusing on the things that allow the regime to see itself, to see the environment, command and control, and the forces it’s using against these protesters, and the deployment and logistics involved with all of that. So cyber actions against the regime C2 would be something that I think is very important. Cyber action against the maritime surveillance radars would be very important, again, to support that quarantine that we talked about. Cyber operations against military transports and logistics systems, all of those things are things that I will be looking at.
And then finally, the fourth bucket, which is the one everybody wants to talk about, of course, is kinetic. I think Bob made some great points here. What are you actually trying to accomplish with the kinetic operations? And will they succeed? The reporting we’re hearing now that the President is concerned that any kinetic needs to be decisive. So, if we take kinetic actions that don’t decisively result in the toppling of the regime, I think then you really do lose credibility. You look weak, and you may start being counterproductive in terms of emboldening the regime such that they can survive all of this, which also disheartens the people. So, the process of picking out those targets and knowing what you want to hit needs to be thought through well.
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
I’ll jump on that. I think that’s spot on. And don’t forget we’ve only struck once in Tehran and look at the effect that had. So, you know, calibrate it from the success we had in going after Iran’s nuclear program. That’s what enabled all this. So, I think that’s exactly right, and the right targets could be that tipping point that ensures this. So now, again, this is too good an opportunity to waste it now, but if you want take time to plan this thing out better, coordinate it better, so that shock and awe with one night of decisive strikes, maybe that’s the strategy, I do not know, but I think all the points you’ve raised are part of that and can contribute to successful action.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, you wanted to jump in.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Yes, I heard all these very wise recommendations, but you have to take into account that there are people on the street, and for them, all these measures will not be enough. By the time we see the effect of all these buckets, probably, I don’t know, the regime will defeat the opposition, and it will be too late for the opposition and not have a real impact on the regime.
And I am afraid that this is the situation that we are going to see in Iran, unless all this is a smoke screen, and the President is preparing something big, and he will do it. I don’t know when, but if he doesn’t, or the opposition in Tehran is defeated, actions against the regime will be too late, too little, too weak.
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Yaakov, what would you do?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Now, I don’t have a good answer. I think that we missed the window of opportunity. You can help the opposition when the opposition has momentum. Now when the opposition faced four days in which the regime butchered them in the street, the momentum has lost. I don’t know if you heard the noises of the heavy guns, which had been used by the regime. Immediately, when I heard the noises of the weapons, I understood that it is the end. No one can stand and go out to the street in such a situation.
I don’t know the number of people being killed, probably somewhere between 10,000 to 20,000. I understood when the regime decided to react severely without taking into account anyone in the war, including the President of the United States of America, by killing everyone in the street, I understood that it’s the end of the opposition, and if any help comes, it would be too late.
Blaise Misztal:
What does that do to the mentality of the regime in Tehran, General Amidror, if they think that they have survived the protest and put them down. They’ve ignored international pressure. The perceived threat from President Trump never materialized. What do they do? Do they focus on rebuilding at home, on trying to improve the economy, or do they become more aggressive? What would you foresee?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that the situation in the Middle East is totally different. They don’t have the proxies as well. Hezbollah is fighting for its existence under the pressure of the Lebanese government. Hamas is encircled by the IDF near the seashore of the Mediterranean. They don’t have any value for the Iranians. Damascus is out of their reach.
So, I think that they are not going to be aggressive. They will try to bring money to Hamas, to Hezbollah and so on and so on. And they will try to rebuild their nuclear project and the missile project, because this is inside Iran and it is under their control. They have the knowledge and the know. And now they know that they don’t have to be afraid of the United States of America because if the President promised something and then didn’t fulfill it, probably, he is less determined than people think.
And remember that we have been stopped by the Americans in the last leg of the war, when our Air Force was over Iran with the first big number of targets, which hadn’t been part of the nuclear and the missile project, but against the regime itself, Basij and so on and so forth.
So, I don’t know what would have been the results if we did what we wanted to do, but we didn’t want to say no to the President after he sent the B-2s. It was in deference to the decision of the President of the United States of America.
Here, let’s see what will happen in the next time. If it is the end of the involvement of the Americans in Iran, the regime will be stronger in its position regarding future opposition in Iran. I don’t think that they will be much more aggressive, because they lost the tools to be aggressive in the Middle East, but they will be more determined to build inside Iran what was destroyed by the U.S., and us.
Blaise Misztal:
Admiral Harward, do you have any concerns that if the regime were to fall, that what would follow it, would be worse? That’s sort of often a criticism that we hear here in Washington. That it is better to stick with the devil because you could always end up with someone worse than the supreme leader or the IRGC. Is that a valid concern?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
No, no, I don’t know how it could get any worse. It’s a government that’s been around for four decades, that has the experience of exporting terrorism, killing people. So no, I’m not concerned. There is uncertainty, of course, but what the Iranian people stand for is part of the equation here, so I’m less concerned with that.
But I do think that deserves discussion, planning, and anticipating of what it’s going to look like, and that may be part of the reason for this pause by the President at the moment, I do not know. I’d love to hear if there’s any discussions between Iran and the U.S. right now.
The Iranians have also known what democracy is. This is the Persian Empire. One time they had democracy, we stepped in and hijacked it by ousting their elected prime minister, Mossadegh, in the 1950s. So, it’s a different issue. We knew in Iraq that there was tribalism and multiple factions. Here, it’s the Iranian people.
So, I’m not concerned. A constitutional monarchy is one option. But I think again, what is important is, are we doing the planning now, understanding where we are, to realize and set in place what we want to do? And again, I’m a big advocate of more direct involvement in building and facilitating that MacArthur model after World War II in Japan. So, I think that sort of option should be on our table.
Blaise Misztal:
General Moore, as we’re trying to figure out where President Trump is taking this and what the U.S.’s next steps will be, what should we be watching that’ll sort of give us clues as to whether there is sort of a longer-term plan here, or we’re sort of leaving things as they are?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
Before I answer that Blaise, if it’s okay, I just wanted to offer something for the previous questions that you had. I’m not 100% sure that this was a culminating point and, you know, if we don’t take some type of additional decisive action, that’s it. And now we have to wait another four years, five years, 10 years. I think, you know, as General Amidror pointed out, first off, the circumstances throughout the region are significantly different. You know, whether it’s Hezbollah Hamas, the former Syrian regime, the Iranians have lost a lot of leverage. They’ve lost a lot of power, prestige in the region, and the challenging economic conditions will continue. This wasn’t a one off.
So, the thing that, by all accounts, really sparked this current uprising in the streets — even if we unfortunately see it settle, and we hope we don’t, but if it is settling — I don’t think it’s going away for a long period of time. I think the conditions remain, and I think they’re going to get worse, based on the steps that we talked about before. So, what does that mean in terms of the protests and their future? We’re going to have to see. But my point is, I think these conditions are different in a positive way, and I hope that relates to positive outcomes.
As far as your question, what should we be looking for, it’s going to be extremely difficult to know what’s actually going on inside the country. I think over time, we’re going to continue to have more situational awareness of what the true status is as information leaks out. And I think as we take some of the steps that I mentioned before in terms of helping us gain more information we will know more about how to proceed. I also think this President isn’t shy about talking about his thoughts and what he thinks the future is, whether it is short-term or medium-term. So, I think we’ll hear something from the administration.
In fact, I think there was an UN meeting scheduled for right about now. It’s probably been going on while we’ve been having this. So, it will be very interesting to hear what was discussed and disclosed during that meeting.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, General. I have one more question for General Amidror, and then I want to throw it open to the audience. So, if you have a question for any of our panelists, please feel free to submit it using the Q and A function in Zoom, and then I’ll read it out.
General Amidror, one of the things that we’ve seen in the last several days is pretty much all of the Middle Eastern states, the Gulf states, Turkey, others have come out publicly saying that the United States should not act militarily against Iran. Why do you think that is, even from countries like the UAE, or the Saudis, who are as equally threatened by Iran as Israel and the United States?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Ironically, our success in the 12-Day War reduced the threat of Iran against these countries and in a way, our success brought them to another situation in which they say Iran is weak enough that they don’t need the Israelis. They believe they know how to cope with weak Iran and will be better off if the Americans will not intervene.
Think about the situation in those countries. All of them are dictators. All the leaders. If the opposition in Iran succeeds at toppling the regime, we will find another Iran—I don’t know how democratic, how open. It’s a big question mark. It’s not the regime of the Shah. But think about a new situation in Iran in which the opposition succeeded to topple the dictatorship in Tehran. What is the implication for all the dictators in the Middle East?
So, if Iran is weak because of the Israelis, and if the alternative is a success of demonstrators against the autocratic regime, for all the regimes in the Middle East, it’s better that it will stay as it is. So don’t be surprised. I’m not speaking about your economy and money and so on so forth, that you know better than me. But think about from the Middle East point of view and what does it mean: a weaker Iran and the alternative is the success of more democratic forces in Iran? Is it a good example for other countries in the Middle East? The answer is no from the perspective of Middle East authoritarian governments. Think about Erdogan. He is a dictator. Think about other countries in the Middle East. So, I mean, it’s more complicated. I understand why they are against it. It is not in their interest that the opposition will succeed.
Blaise Misztal:
All right, we have a question from General Robert Neller, former Commandant of the Marine Corps: “Do you think Trump’s comments encouraging the protesters are helpful, or just going to leave them hanging again? How can the US help? Starlink, yes, strike key leaders. Strike their proxies, Houthis, proxies in Iraq. Do not want to give the demonstrators false hope.”
So, I think we’ve touched on some of those points. But Admiral Harward or General Moore, anything else you’d like to add?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Bob, good to hear from you. Well, I think number one, his comments are part of what helped this thing grow, but the fact that we didn’t follow through on anything, as well we know, is counterproductive for not only the Iranian people, but the President’s position. So, I’m hoping that it is a bait and switch.
The strategy could be, “OK, we’re going to let this die and use that time to reconstitute, to support the opposition, get them things they need, and execute at the time of our choosing with a plan that will get this to fruition.
So, if that’s part of a hook and jive type of thing, I’m all for it. We need regime change. The region does. I understand General Yaakov’s position: there’s a lot of bad governments in the Middle East. It’s a rough neighborhood. But there’s no doubt: these guys have been at the core of everything for decades now, and so it’s in everyone’s best interest to see the regime change. So, if that’s part of it, but if not, this is a missed opportunity that will squander a lot of capital and make people not trust us and believe in us in the region.
Blaise Misztal:
All right, we have another question: What is the value of our base and Qatar, meaning Al-Udeid, if we never use it and when we want to take action, we have to evacuate forces and equipment from it. It seems more of a liability than an asset. Admiral Harward, considering your experience with Central Command, any comment?
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
Yeah, all the foreign presence we have in the region is so valuable, and we flex up and down all the time. We flex the assets we have there. So having the base is very powerful. Never lose sight of that.
My father was part of the process to get us into Bahrain in the 60s and 70s and that took a decade to come to fruition. So, the fact that we move assets, we downsize, we move, that’s almost a moot point, and that in itself is somewhat part of what this possible feint could be. But again, the base is critical to what we do, not only to Qatar, but the rest of the region. So, I couldn’t disagree more. We need those bases. We want those bases. Our allies need those bases. And when we need them, they become strategic assets.
Blaise Misztal:
General Moore, any perspectives from the Air Force side?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
I actually agree with Bob, and I think that the more options that you have, the more you can move your forces around. I don’t think it’s a question of having the base there. I think it is a legitimate question when it comes to the weight of effort, or the number of forces and assets that we have there in a given time.
But when you have options, you can move those things around, including looking at options like we’ve talked about before, of more permanent basing with our friends in Israel. But if you eliminate the Iranian threat here, then, as it relates specifically to Qatar, and Al-Udeid, you really take away the biggest threat. Iran can reach that base with short range ballistic missiles. It does not even take their medium range ballistic missiles, and they’ve got a lot of them. Those short-range missiles were not the priority targets during the 12-Day War, previously.
So, I think flexibility is good. And I think moving them around, like Bob said, not only can contribute to your misdirection or feints, but also can allow you to post yourself for the best options.
Blaise Misztal:
And to that point of options, General Moore. General Frank McKenzie, the former CENTCOM commander and now a distinguished fellow here at JINSA, wrote a paper about a year and a half ago about the need for options, particularly further away from Iranian fire and sort of the western part of the Middle East. And my colleague, Jonathan Ruhe, just had a paper a couple months ago arguing for a base in Israel as an important part of those list of options that the U.S. should develop, particularly to deal with Iran and be away from those close range fires.
Another question we had is, would it make sense to attack assets that we would otherwise want to attack anyway, such as missile production and nuclear facilities and not only those things directly related to the protests, I guess, if and when there is a kinetic strike. Would you include those in your list of targets General Moore?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
Yeah, you know one thing we haven’t talked about, if we conduct these kinetic strikes and it’s not decisive and it doesn’t have the effects that we want, there’s going to be a lot of scrutiny. There’s going to be scrutiny no matter what, but there’s going to be a lot of scrutiny on the justification for those strikes, if it’s specific to just trying to support protesters within another country. I’m not a military lawyer, but you know, I do know that that’s going to be a difficult road to hell, if you will.
However, the type of targets that Israel and or the United States hit during the 12-day conflict, and the type of targets that we know have been used directly against U.S. forces and personnel in the region, whether it’s attacking forward operating bases or our folks for many, many years, I think if you’re going to go and do these types of things, that might be the time to hit those as well, if you’re going to make that kinetic decision.
And in some cases, we may find target sets that overlap between the two that may provide direct benefit in this particular circumstance and also alleviate some of the threat back towards Israel, specifically the ballistic missiles and/or our force posture in the region.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, I know that you said earlier that it would not make sense for Israel to intervene or respond to the protests, but is there a scenario in which if there is some sort of American kinetic operation going on, Israel would participate much the same way that it played such an important role in clearing the airspace ahead of U.S., bombers and fighters for Operation Midnight Hammer?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
My assessment is that the Americans probably have asked Israel not to intervene. It’s bad for America that it will look like America and Israel are helping the protesters, which have, in the eyes of the regime, been sent to the street by America and Israel to protest against the “legitimate” regime in Tehran.
The only situation in which I see Israel intervening is if Iran, in response to U.S. strikes, makes a counter-strike against Israel, because they cannot reach enough American targets and Israel is the best friend of America in the Middle East. So, if the Americans attack Iran, Iran is attacking Israel. Then Israel will have the legitimacy to act in Iran. And as you understand, after the 12-Day War, we have many capabilities to reach Iran, to hit Iran and to cause destruction in Iran. So, I think this is the only scenario in which I can see Israel intervening.
Blaise Misztal:
One more question here from the audience: How much impact would an increase in European sanctions and decrease in trade with Europe impact the Islamic regime?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Now, I think that the impact of what we call the snapback sanctions by the Europeans was very important. It was very important to put the economy of Iran in a very bad situation. It’s not the only one. The American steps are at least as important, maybe even more. But yes, the European sanctions were very, very important.
Blaise Misztal:
All right. Well, thank you all. Any final thoughts or statements as we close out, Admiral Harward, let me start with you.
VADM Robert Harward, USN (ret.):
I agree with Yaakov’s last comments. That European factor is critical, and I think another one of those tipping point events. But I was surprised by his other comments, after everything Iran’s done to Israel with attacks; the regime has made the destruction of Israel their number one priority, and they said that consistently. I think Israel has the legitimacy to do anything with Iran anytime they want, predicated on what Iran’s done previously to Israel.
I’m a lot more hawkish on that, and I know we wouldn’t be where we are today without the actions of Israel. So again, I think the end state of a better, more secure, peaceful Iran is in everyone’s interest. I think this objective is legitimate in and of itself and all the more validated by what Iran’s been doing over decades and will continue to do, if unabated.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I agree with the admiral, but to do it with the direct connection with the demonstrations in Iran, that is the unique factor in this situation. But I agree with the hawkish view about what Israel should do in Iran.
Blaise Misztal:
General Moore, any final thoughts?
Lt Gen Charles Moore, USAF (ret.):
I would just add, the one thing we haven’t touched on, which is different than Midnight Hammer is that the most important thing to the regime is to remain in power. And so even if we do determine that we can hit targets that we believe will decisively topple the regime, which I think should be the requirement, right, if we’re going to go down the kinetic route, I think the United States, our allies in the region, and especially Israel, have to be prepared for the Iranians to empty the magazines.
The regime would have nothing holding them back at that point if the U.S. takes kinetic action. The regime did a performative and symbolic strike back at Al-Udeid, after Midnight Hammer, just to save a little bit of face, but if they’re going down, they have absolutely nothing to lose, and that has to be part of the equation. I think that’s probably some of the discussion that’s going on between our allies in the region, maybe even Israel, as well, regarding how we’re going to deal with that.
Blaise Misztal:
On that point of the need for defensive coordination, I’d be remiss if I didn’t point out that today is the fifth anniversary of President Trump’s announcement that Israel is moving into the area of responsibility of Central Command, which enabled the dramatic and extremely successful coordinated defense that we saw in April and October of 2024 and throughout the 12-Day War in June of last year. And so that was, I think, part of, part of the story of how we’ve gotten to this place where we are today, where we at least, can think about the potential for this regime to collapse.
So let me thank all our panelists and thank our audience for tuning in. Please make sure to check out. jinsa.org, for all the latest. We’re putting out a daily update on the Iran protests. As I said, Michael Makovsky had a short analysis yesterday on U.S. policy response options, which I’d recommend to everyone. Obviously, as the situation continues to unfold, we’ll continue to put out our work on our website, jinsa.org. So, thank you very much, and I look forward to seeing you on the next webinar.