Transcript: Webinar – The Widening War: Iran, Hezbollah, and the Gulf States
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Former National Security Advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister
Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)
JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command; Former Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, Pentagon
John Hannah
JINSA Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former National Security Advisor to the U.S. Vice President
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us as we try to shed light on what’s going on in Iran. General Amidror, if I could start with you, are we in a new phase of the war? Can you describe to us what’s going on?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think we are in a new phase. We have overall control of the skies over Iran, which means we don’t need to allocate many aircraft to counter Iranian air defense systems. We can operate day and night over most of the Iranian landscape. Having this control gives both Americans and Israelis full flexibility to act on new intelligence and respond as necessary.
It is clear now that this is not just about nuclear capabilities and missiles; it is about degrading the regime’s ability across multiple domains. The fact that the Americans targeted the Iranian Navy in the Gulf—and even farther away, reportedly near Sri Lanka—indicates that the objective is now weakening the regime, not just destroying nuclear and missile capabilities.
The Americans are openly stating that they are bringing additional capabilities to the region, signaling that the first phase is over and the second phase is beginning. With control over Iranian airspace, operations in Iran can accelerate. The deployment of additional U.S. forces is highly significant. It is important to note that Iranian attacks have targeted many countries in the Middle East—including Turkey, Egypt, and Cyprus—which may influence regional alliances.
What this will mean in practice, how countries will respond, and the potential emergence of new alliances remain uncertain. For example, Qatar recently announced that it had uncovered two Iranian spy cells operating within the country, an unprecedented development. While it’s unclear how these events will reshape the Middle East, from an Israeli-American perspective, we are in a stronger position. We will have to see how the alliance leverages this in the coming days.
Blaise Misztal:
General Wald, let me ask about the U.S. operation. You are responsible for planning the U.S. air war in Afghanistan. How does the current U.S. operation compare to past U.S. operations? Additionally, how long can the U.S. sustain this effort? We’ve heard conflicting assessments—some officials suggest the U.S. might run out of munitions in four or five days, yet President Trump has claimed we can continue indefinitely. How complex is what the U.S. is doing, and how sustainable is it?
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
It’s very complex, and Israel is also heavily involved—it’s not just a U.S. operation. As General Amidror mentioned, we are bringing additional forces into the region, including bombers like B-52s and B-1s, carrying conventional munitions. We have ample JDAMs [joint direct attack munitions] and other precision weapons. I don’t foresee running out of ammunition, and I’m confident we can fully degrade the Iranian military’s ability to project power, including their navy. Sustainability is not a concern; we are prepared for a prolonged operation.
Blaise Misztal:
What enables this level of cooperation and coordination between the U.S. Air Force and the Israeli Air Force? Are there other partners with whom we could conduct such operations as closely?
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
There are certainly other partners—for example, NATO, with whom we regularly train—but the integration with Israel is unmatched. After operations like Midnight Hammer, it’s clear we work in lockstep. This may go down in history as one of the most successful military applications of power.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I want to emphasize the exceptional level of cooperation from the Israeli perspective. Informally, those closely involved in this collaboration were surprised by the Americans’ readiness to coordinate. Today, it feels as if we are not just “on the same page,” but reading the same text—each side focusing on roles that match our respective strengths.
The trust between our forces—including intelligence sharing, planning, and knowledge of capabilities—is at the highest level we have ever experienced. This is unprecedented in any coalition war Israel has participated in. It gives Israel significant confidence in the U.S., and I believe the sentiment is mutual. Each side contributes unique capabilities to create a stronger, integrated force.
From the highest levels of leadership—President to Prime Minister—to the technicians assisting American aircraft from Israeli bases, the operation functions as one unified Air Force. Many of our personnel are reservists, yet the cooperation is seamless. For us, this is a source of immense confidence and appreciation.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
I completely agree. I would also highlight the role of JINSA in getting CENTCOM to be the overseer of U.S.-Israeli operations in the Middle East and facilitating access to Israeli airfields—both are critical to operational success.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, within this one force, is there a division of labor? You mentioned that each side focuses on its strengths—are there joint operations with both air forces flying together over Iran?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, each country handles tasks suited to its capabilities. In some areas, Israel has an advantage due to decades of intelligence focus on Iran. The U.S. brings unique long-range capabilities, like B-2 bombers, that we cannot match. Missions are divided according to these comparative strengths.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
I agree. Israelis are also refueling from our tankers and leveraging our AWACS and early warning systems. They may not fly coordinated fighter elements with us, but we provide critical support.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Today, several American refueling aircraft are in Israel, which greatly enhances logistical flexibility. Israel functions as a strategic “carrier” for the U.S. Air Force, simplifying operations significantly.
Blaise Misztal:
JINSA has long advocated for KC-46 tankers to be sent to Israel, and it’s remarkable to see so many actively supporting missions over Iran. John, given that we’re in the early stages of phase two, are the U.S. objectives clearly defined? What do we know about operational goals?
John Hannah:
Objectives are being clarified. Broadly, there are four main goals under the rubric General Wald described:
- Completely degrade, constrain, and weaken Iran’s ability to project power beyond its borders, threatening U.S. interests, allies, and potentially the Iranian population.
- Further destroy Iran’s nuclear program, particularly the buried and hardened sites like the Pickaxe Mountain facility in Fordow. Its vulnerability remains uncertain, and it poses a challenge.
- Degrade Iran’s missile production capabilities, targeting the defense industrial base to ensure that rebuilding would take years. This goes beyond previous short-term operations.
- Neutralize Iran’s naval threat, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz, to secure shipping routes and limit the Iranian Navy’s ability to interfere. The administration is also exploring measures like offering affordable insurance for commercial shippers and possibly U.S. naval escorts.
Finally, U.S. objectives include countering Iran’s proxy network and mitigating terror and destabilization throughout the region. Operations appear to target a wide range of IRGC and intelligence assets, including in Iranian Kurdistan, reflecting the intent to weaken the regime rather than forcibly achieve regime change.
Blaise Misztal:
Regarding Iran’s retaliation over the past few days, what are the critical concerns?
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
Yeah, I think the big issue is whether Iran will mine the Straits of Hormuz or not. If they do, it will slow things down. First of all, it’s difficult—they would be working in a narrow, dangerous area. The U.S. Navy doesn’t have extensive mine-clearing capabilities, so that would be a major challenge. They need to avoid this scenario by neutralizing as much of the Iranian Navy as possible beforehand.
Secondly, looking beyond the Gulf itself, I hope this situation will motivate GCC countries, along with the U.S. and Israel, to conduct more collaborative training in the region and develop better integrated air defense and command-and-control capabilities to protect the Persian Gulf and neighboring countries. But first, the Iranian Navy and all littoral threats to shipping must be neutralized. Anything moving with mines or other hazards must be addressed immediately.
Blaise Misztal:
Do the Iranians need ships to mine the strait? Could they just deploy mines from nearby ports? How feasible is it to prevent that?
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
They could attempt to float in if they want, but it wouldn’t be very effective. Mines generally need to be carefully placed and tethered. I’m sure we are watching closely, and anyone attempting to deploy mines would likely be stopped quickly. I know they are paying attention to it.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, we’ve seen Iranian missile fire drop significantly since the first day of the conflict. Israelis have reported taking out around 200–300 missile launchers already. How much longer do you expect this trend to continue?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I cannot assess how many days. Fewer and fewer missiles are being launched into Israel. The Iranians have not even managed one big salvo that could stress our defense systems. As days pass, their ability to launch missiles diminishes—they are losing both missiles and launchers. It’s unlikely to reach zero before the end of the conflict, but the trend is positive.
The inability to coordinate large salvos is beneficial. We know how to manage this threat. In Israel, civilians can measure the number of hours spent in shelters based on official guidance. Life continues at this level of threat.
Within a few days, flights to and from Israel should resume, and business—including high-tech sectors, schools, and kindergartens—will gradually return to normal.
Blaise Misztal:
Were you surprised by the level of Iranian missile activity—higher or lower than expected?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Lower than expected. I was sure that the Iranians understood the importance of putting our systems under pressure with large salvos, but they were unable to execute even one.
Since the beginning, around 200 missiles have been launched into Israel, and they did not successfully hit any significant targets.Unfortunately, there were casualties due to very bad luck. For example, nine people were killed in a shelter when it took a direct hit, including people trapped in the stairs.
Aside from that tragedy, most missiles were intercepted, and casualties were minimal. Statistically, the system has performed very well.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
Blaise, first, our condolences for the tragic loss in Israel. Regarding the broader picture, as we discussed during the review of Operation Midnight Hammer last August, the intelligence community—primarily Israeli, but U.S. as well—has been extremely effective at neutralizing leadership early in the conflict. This success complicates Iran’s ability to plan counterattacks. The operational impact of removing key leadership is historically significant and will likely be remembered as one of the most effective activities in any conflict.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, does the lack of major Iranian retaliation against Israel—the fact that they were unable to launch large salvos, as you just mentioned—suggest that earlier concerns about Iran rebuilding its missile arsenal were overstated? Some assessments suggested that since Operation Rising Lion, Iran had nearly restored its missile capability. Was that assessment wrong?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, I think the assessment was accurate. What we’ve learned since the 12 days in June is the importance of creating a system to identify and neutralize launches immediately. Combined with American capabilities—satellites, intelligence, and aircraft operating across Iran—we can destroy missiles before they are launched or immediately afterward, reducing the number of available missiles for subsequent stages.
The assessment about Iran’s capacity was correct, and one reason for acting now is to prevent them from reaching the 1,000 missiles they intended to produce. Some in Europe and America argued that it wasn’t an imminent threat, but waiting until it was imminent—when they could launch thousands of missiles—would be unwise. We act to prevent threats from materializing, not to respond only when the danger is unavoidable.
Blaise Misztal:
On that topic of timing, some U.S. officials, including members of the Trump administration, have claimed that Israel forced the United States into action—that Israel was going to attack, so the U.S. had to join. Is that your understanding?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No. It reminds me of a story about a young woman asking her father what time to meet on a first date. She said, “Should I come a quarter before seven or a quarter after?” He said, “Why not just seven?” People say Bibi pushed Trump; others say Trump pushed Bibi.
The truth is, both leaders understood this was the right time and agreed on action. Each came with their own intelligence, national interests, and vision for the future. They concluded that now was the right moment to act.
It wasn’t about pushing one another—it was about determining the precise timing and method. Like the father’s advice, seven o’clock was simply good enough. Both sides agreed on the moment and the plan, not who “pushed” whom.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
Blaise, I agree with the general. In hindsight, the timing is appropriate. After the June attacks, we probably should have addressed ballistic missiles—both existing stockpiles and the ability to produce new ones—so if anything, this action was overdue rather than premature. I believe this is the right time, neither too early nor too late.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, General Wald. John, returning to the topic of Iranian retaliation: General Amidror noted that Iranian missile launches at Israel have been lower than expected. But in the wider region, Iran has been striking targets indiscriminately—U.S. bases, civilian infrastructure, energy facilities, ships, even Cyprus and Turkey, including today’s missile aimed at Incirlik Air Base. Are you surprised at the extent and reach of Iran’s response?
John Hannah:
Not really. For over a decade, we’ve been asking how Iran might respond to an attack. When the regime perceives an existential threat, it feels it has little to lose and attempts to create maximum disruption and pressure on the U.S., Israel, and the region.
Their principal aim seems to be pressuring President Trump—to damage oil prices, create chaos in the Gulf states, and push for a U.S. response that could allow them to survive.
So far, this strategy hasn’t worked. Gulf states, particularly in their defensive efforts, have stepped up impressively. CENTCOM’s work over the years, including air defense exercises and experience from the war with the Houthis, has paid off. The Gulf states have been resolute and have avoided offensive escalation.
However, the ongoing disruption—tankers unable to pass through the Straits of Hormuz, threats from drones, speedboats, and other attacks—is effectively slowing maritime traffic, which could impact supply chains and oil prices. If U.S. and allied operations continue to degrade Iran’s capabilities in the Gulf, within three to four weeks, Iran will likely face significant operational setbacks. By then, we may be able to claim substantial success regarding their nuclear program, missile capabilities, navy, and regional power projection.
Blaise Misztal:
John, you said Iran’s regional strikes could backfire. What about Turkey, specifically the missile that targeted Incirlik Air Base today? Turkey has been relatively cautious in this conflict—could this change their calculus, or will they just treat it as an attack on the U.S., not Turkish soil?
John Hannah:
It’s a good question. Like the Gulf states, Turkey has been cautious and initially tried to hedge. Until recently, Turkey had not been directly attacked. Now that this has changed, we’ll have to see how they respond. They have stated they would act in self-defense if necessary. My sense is that most countries, unless pushed to the edge by Iranian overreach, do not want to become active participants.
One area to watch is Iranian Kurdistan along the Iraqi-Iranian border. U.S. and Israeli strikes there, combined with potential covert support for Kurdish and other local groups, could force the IRGC to divert resources and defend against uprisings. This could create operational problems for Iran, although Turkey has a strong interest in preventing any emergence of a new Kurdish power near its border.
Blaise Misztal:
Staying on that topic, [audience member] is asking: Can support for the Iranian Kurds be effective? Is it a plausible strategy for weakening the regime?
John Hannah:
It could be effective, though I wouldn’t overstate it. The Kurds are armed and organized locally. If they receive air cover and support from the U.S. and Israel, they could disrupt Iranian operations near the border, seize towns, and divert regime resources.
However, this carries risks. It could complicate relations with Turkey and Baghdad, and within the Iranian opposition, it could create tension between ethnic minorities and nationalists. Still, in terms of weakening the regime locally, supporting the Kurds could be valuable if the risks are managed.
Blaise Misztal:
Thanks, John.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)
Blaise, I think John articulated this well. Iran is like a cornered animal, striking out indiscriminately. Targeting Incirlik Air Base was a strategically reckless move. Their leadership appears disorganized and unable to make sound decisions under pressure.
Blaise Misztal
Thanks, General Wald. General Amidror, I want to ask about Iranian proxies. Israel has entered southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah has begun firing at Israel. Was this expected? How significant is the threat, and how is Israel responding? Also, are we surprised that the Houthis have not yet acted?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Israel anticipated that Iran would pressure Hezbollah to take action. Hezbollah faced a difficult choice: attack Israel and risk severe retaliation, or refuse and lose Iranian support, which is primarily financial. Hezbollah is unpopular both inside Lebanon and regionally.
Ultimately, they chose to act, though minimally. By crossing the red line and breaking the ceasefire, they have invited retaliation. Israel is preparing a measured but severe response, potentially weakening Hezbollah as a fighting force and allowing the Lebanese government to assert control.
Regarding the Houthis, I am surprised they have not yet reacted. We expected them to respond following the start of operations against Iran, but we have not seen any activity. There may be unseen factors at play.
Blaise Misztal:
All right, General Wald and General Amidror, this might be a question for you from Admiral John Fozzie Miller. He asks: there’s a difference between the Iranian Navy, which is largely a relic from the days of the Shah and has been almost completely destroyed, and the IRGC Navy, which consists of small boats with RPGs, .50-caliber machine guns, explosives, and mines.
How much of a threat do we think the IRGC Navy still poses to the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Gulf region? Do either of you have an assessment?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
From what I understand, once the Americans complete their mission, the Iranians won’t have the ability to pose a serious threat in the Gulf.
I don’t know how many of the small vessels with mining capability have already been destroyed, but as the Gulf’s anti-air systems are neutralized, the U.S. will effectively be able to operate freely. It may be a slow process, but systematically both navies’ capabilities will be eliminated.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
You never want to get overconfident, and some of the bellicose rhetoric can be misleading. But I think the U.S. Navy will handle it decisively. It doesn’t matter whether it’s the large navy or the small IRGC navy—they’ll have their hands full once the U.S. Navy commits fully.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, generals. John, maybe a question for you about how this operation affects China. What are the implications, especially if there’s no more discounted oil from Venezuela or Iran?
John Hannah:
This is going to hurt the so-called “axis of adversaries”—Russia, China, North Korea. In recent years, they’ve lost Syria and couldn’t intervene, lost Venezuela and couldn’t protect Maduro, and now their key partner in fomenting trouble in the Gulf—Iran—is being degraded.
The Chinese quietly supported Iran with sanctions-busting, oil purchases, and intelligence sharing, especially on American weapon flows, but when it came down to real conflict, they were absent.
This hurts them reputationally, assuming the campaign achieves substantial U.S. military objectives and limits Iran’s ability to project power in the Gulf.
China is also affected economically: cheap Iranian oil is no longer flowing to them, which raises costs. Strategically, seeing the U.S. and Israel demonstrate high-tech cooperation and successful power projection is likely unappealing to Beijing, especially considering Taiwan concerns.
The only potential downside for the U.S. is if capabilities are diverted from the Indo-Pacific theater, but I don’t see that happening. Overall, this is a net negative day for China, Russia, and their allies.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
You also have to consider that, from the Chinese and Russian perspective, their supplied weaponry is performing poorly. So far, the only U.S. losses have come from allies, like Kuwait, and one unfortunate drone attack that killed U.S. service members. Compared to what could have happened, this has been a decisive display. Of course, we can’t be overly confident—there’s still a lot to manage globally—but so far, it’s been very effective.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, a quick few words to close out. You mentioned this is the beginning of Phase Two. How long do you expect this phase to take? What will it accomplish, and how will we know when Phase Two ends and Phase Three begins?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I don’t know if there will be a Phase Three. The mission is to weaken the Iranian regime, and that’s hard to measure. You can’t know exactly when the regime is weak enough—when the opposition can successfully challenge it. It’s a gradual process.
We need to be systematic, acting in the American way, systematically reducing the regime’s capabilities: command and control, navy, missile systems, and so on. Slowly but surely, we make the regime weaker. When the opposition emerges, if they can take over, that’s ideal. If not, Iran may remain formally the same, but practically it will be much weaker.
The key is ongoing monitoring and the ability to respond if Iran attempts to rebuild its military strength. There are two possibilities: one, we weaken the regime, and the opposition seizes control; two, the regime remains in power, but its capabilities are degraded, and we maintain the ability to act if necessary.
John Hannah:
One caution: even if the regime is weakened, if the people rise up and are crushed, thousands could be killed. At that point, the U.S. must decide whether to intervene or simply continue weakening Iran’s external power. The military’s job is to degrade Iran’s capabilities, not to intervene directly in internal uprisings. That’s a matter for intelligence and possibly covert operations, not conventional military forces.
General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.):
Ideally, the national security advisor advises the President not to intervene directly in Iranian internal affairs.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Exactly. There’s no need to make any immediate decisions. It depends on circumstances—the strength of the opposition and what commitments have been made.
These are issues to consider intellectually, not necessarily to act on right now.
Blaise Misztal:
All right. That’s something we’ll continue to watch closely. Discussing end states is ongoing and important. General Amidror, General Wald, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks also to our audience. Please stay tuned to jinsa.org for the latest analysis on developments in Iran and the region. Thank you, everyone, and have a good afternoon.