Transcript: Webinar – War Back On?
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former Head, Israel’s National Security Council
Amb. Eric Edelman
JINSA Distinguished Scholar, JINSA; Former Ambassador to Turkey
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining us for another JINSA webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal, JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. We had actually originally scheduled today’s webinar and Ambassador Eric Edelman to talk all things Turkey, particularly the domestic political crackdown that’s happening there, but intervening events over the over the weekend last night made us shift focus to discuss the latest exchange of fire between Iran and Israel that happened over several rounds starting late yesterday, so to talk about that, I’m delighted to be joined by Ambassador Eric Edelman, a JINSA scholar, distinguished scholar, I should say, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Ambassador [to] Turkey. We are also expecting General Yaakov MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror to join us, a JINSA, distinguished fellow and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu. Hopefully he’ll be on the line soon, but I guess in the meantime, Ambassador Edelman, maybe you can tell us, where do we stand now? Are we back to cease fire? Are we on our way to a resumption of hostilities? How should we understand what transpired over the last 24 hours?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, I think this remains to be seen. I think what – what’s happened here is that the President has, over the course of several weeks, basically signaled to the Iranians in multiple ways that he is very reluctant to return to kinetic military activity, that he really, although he keeps saying they’re desperate for a deal, I think it sounds like he’s pretty much desperate for a deal, because of all the economic disruption that the war has created, and potentially more disruption to come as global energy stocks run down, and the I think Iranians sought to take advantage of that to take a much more forward position defending their proxies in Lebanon than they did earlier when Israel was reducing Hezbollah very significantly two years ago, and I think that’s what led them to fire at Israel on Sunday, and the exchange of fire we’ve had in the president’s behavior, his conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu, his public truth social post saying that, you know, we have to get back to a ceasefire. I think it just continues this pattern of suggesting to the Iranians that he really is very anxious for a deal, and I think that’s actually undercutting his leverage with them, because I think it only leads them to harden their positions and makes it harder, not easier, to get a deal.
Blaise Misztal:
Maybe backing up a little, if we could sort of dissect how all of this started, because at least the reporting in the [Intelligence Community] in America says it all started when Israel violated a ceasefire and launched a strike in Beirut, but how should what was the sort of the tick tock of events, and how should we understand what precipitated this exchange of fire?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, first of all, the Iranians have been insisting in their conversations with their U.S. interlocutors through mediators, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, others, Qatar, that they want to include Lebanon in the overall ceasefire package. Of course, the United States is not a party to the conflict directly in Lebanon, but the administration has gone out of its way to at least try to arrange a ceasefire in Lebanon between the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon. But the government of Lebanon is not really the party with which Israel is at war, it’s Hezbollah, and they’re not a party to these negotiations. And the government of Lebanon lacks the ability to really control Hezbollah in any significant way, so Israel has been subjected to continuing attacks in northern Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is obviously intolerable, and it’s led to continuation, despite the “ceasefire of military activity” in Lebanon. And the Iranians have chosen to use this as an excuse for, among others, not completing the negotiations for the extension of the ceasefire with which they have been engaged with the United States for several weeks now.
Blaise Misztal:
As you were saying, there’s a tense relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu in recent calls and social media posts, but we’ve seen various claims as to whether the Israeli strikes were coordinated with the United States undertaken in, and sort of in violation of President Trump’s telling everyone not to fire. What do we think of the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Obviously, there are tensions, and the interests are somewhat divergent between the Prime Minister and the President. I mean, but both have different political calculations to make with regard to their own respective domestic politics. I honestly don’t know whether the strikes were coordinated. I mean, there’s so much going on in the airspace that it’s kind of hard for me to imagine that CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] was not aware of what Israel was doing, but I don’t know that they were formally coordinated in any way.
Blaise Misztal:
What message does that send to Iran? I guess, as we’ve seen those public messages going back and forth between Washington and Jerusalem, how do you think they interpreted that relationship in the last 24 hours?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Now, obviously, anytime they can drive a wedge between the United States in Israel, they’re going to try and take advantage of that. I think they’ve been very active on social media here in the United States. I think they’ve been having some success, actually, in spreading anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic messages, and obviously this just feeds into that ongoing effort by the Iranians. We’ll have to see what the longer lasting effect is because that could be also quite considerable depending on how things play out.
Blaise Misztal:
What do you see as the impact of all this on the negotiations that President Trump sort of insists are ongoing or going well? The Iranians last week pulled out of talks, President Trump said they’re still continuing. Was this exchange of fire just negotiation by other means, or is it a signal that the negotiations are over?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
No, I don’t think it’s a signal that the negotiations are over. I mean, the Iranians actually kind of called a halt to this, or tried to call a halt to this, saying, okay, we’ve made our point, and let’s stop this round of military exchanges. The Interior Minister of Pakistan is in Tehran, has been while this has all been going on, so contacts are continuing. Obviously, there are a whole series of reports about different proposals to modify what had been agreed earlier, that the President has asked for with regard to the nuclear program. The Iranians are particularly anxious to get access to frozen funds, and that is a particular sore point, I think, for the President, because I believe he wants to try to persuade the American public that whatever deal this ends up being is going to be measurably better than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] that President Obama agreed to in 2015. In my view, that’s going to be a pretty tall order, but not giving the Iranians access to money before they perform whatever obligations they undertake as part of this deal will be a key part of that, so the president is very, I think. at pains not to be freeing up frozen funds or any other kind of funds that would flow to Iran as a result of this deal. But as I understand it, there are all sorts of workarounds being proposed, including a loan that Qatar would float to Iran, that would be in the amount of the frozen assets, with the idea that the frozen assets would be some kind of collateral to pay the loan back. I mean, if that is the case, if that’s where we end up, frankly, that’s just a difference without a distinction.
Blaise Misztal:
Do you think that issue of sort of unfreezing of funds or sanctions relief, what the dollar figure is sort of the primary thing that the President is focused on in terms of how a deal that he might strike compares to JCPOA, as opposed to something like the length of limitations or extent of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, first, let’s see what kind of limitations the Iranians actually agree to. I suspect that if the president can get some kind of undertaking by the Iranians to freeze all enrichment activity, he will tout that as being superior to the JCPOA, because the JCPOA did allow the Iranians to enrich up to 3.75 percent. But, we’ll have to see, because we just don’t know what’s actually in the agreement. The amount of money that we’re talking about, I mean, that I’ve seen brooded about, is $28 billion. Now, that is considerably less than the total amount that was potentially at issue when the JCPOA was signed, but it’s significantly more than the amount of money that was given to the Iranians as part of the hostage release deal in 2016 that President Trump frequently cites. So, it’s just going to depend on what numbers of people are using as a baseline. But it’s going to be important, however this comes out, to make sure that it’s an apples-to-apples comparison, and you’re not comparing apples to oranges.
Blaise Misztal:
What is the chance? I mean, as you understand it, where are we in the negotiations for the inclusion of a nuclear element? Because it seems like the reporting sometimes suggests that we’d be getting just a deal to cease hostilities, sort of end the mutual blockades of the Strait, and then negotiate something further. But President Trump’s statement seemed to suggest [that Iran’s] nuclear [program] will be included in a deal.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
It’s a little bit hard to say, and I think part of the problem here is [that] both sides are not being completely honest and straightforward about what’s going on. Each one has their own reasons for kind of obfuscating what horse trading is going on here. My fear is it’s not real concessions on the part of the Iranians. What they’re talking about is an extended ceasefire to be followed by ongoing negotiations. And there may be some statements about the parameters that will be negotiated that might appear to be they might make some statement about we’re not pursuing a nuclear weapon or we’re not trying to procure a nuclear weapon, but without really much specificity. So, I think that’s what the negotiation is about. But again, we’ll have to wait and see what actually comes out of this.
Blaise Misztal:
Well, let me welcome General Amidror. Thank you very much for being able to join us. When we spoke last week, General Amidror, just a couple of days ago, you discussed how Israeli operations in Lebanon were restricted, or were perhaps less than Israel might have wanted, due to an agreement with the United States not to operate, not to strike in Beirut. And then over the weekend, we did see an Israeli strike in Beirut. What changed, if I can ask?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
The agreement, which was put on the table by the Americans, was very clear. Hezbollah does not attack inside Israel, and Israel does not bomb Beirut. What happened is that Hezbollah violated the agreement, attacked inside Israel, and we said, okay. The obligation cannot be taken only by one side. If one side is violating the agreement, the agreement does not exist. And we hinted by bombing two empty apartments in Dahieh that we will not agree to a situation in which Hezbollah is violating the agreement, and we are going to keep it. What happened is that the Iranians who said that if Israel attacked Dahieh, they will attack Israel, and they did so. Immediately, it was clear for us that we cannot agree to this situation. In a way, the Americans should be blamed for this situation, because the Iranians – it’s not only the Iranians understood that the Americans accept the connection between the ceasefire in Iran and the ceasefire in Lebanon, something that, from our point of view, is unacceptable. We are fighting Hezbollah. We want to destroy Hezbollah capabilities to attack Israel. Hezbollah is attacking everyday Israelis, either inside Lebanon, the soldiers, or inside Israel, and the fact that the Iranians and others understood that it is America legitimizing the position, the standoff of Iran in Lebanon, is a huge mistake. And we said no. With all due respect to the needs of the Americans, we are going to attack, and that is what we did, and the Americans said no. But the question remains, what will be the reaction of the Iranians when we continue to bomb Lebanon to kill those Hezbollah members, and so on and so forth. We don’t have any reason to stop fighting Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is threatening our citizens and soldiers.
Blaise Misztal:
Was the strike in the Dahieh coordinated with the United States, or did the United States know that it was going to happen?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I think that the Americans knew that it was going to happen, but we didn’t ask for permission.
Blaise Misztal:
And what about the retaliatory strikes against Iran? President Trump seemed to say very clearly that he didn’t want Israel to conduct those strikes. Was there a discussion beforehand, or was that a unilateral Israeli action?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I think that the Prime Minister made it clear that we are going to attack Iran. We will take into consideration the American point of view, and it will not be a big one, but we will do it in spite of the fact that the Americans didn’t like it, because we cannot live in a situation in which the Iranians will retaliate or attack Israel. It’s not retaliation. It’s attacking Israel, initiating an attack on Israel when Israel is fighting Hezbollah. It’s an impossible situation from our point of view.
Blaise Misztal:
I guess one of the things that very much struck me in the exchange of fire was that U.S. Central Command put out a statement saying that U.S. air defense against the Iranian attack that happened yesterday and today [connection issue], but was that something that was known by Israel that was going to happen? Was that coordinated that CENTCOM was going to be involved?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I don’t know. From our point of view, the Americans are well integrated into the Israeli system of defense against the missiles and vice versa, Israel is very well integrated into the American system in the whole Middle East, facing threats of missiles, and I don’t see how that cannot change by a decision by someone. It is so integrated into each other.
Blaise Misztal:
Ambassador Edelman, let me turn to you, but I’ll pose the same question to you as well, General Amidror. What is the strategic calculus by the Iranians for linking the Lebanon ceasefire to the ceasefire with the United States, and the status of negotiations?
I’ve seen some supposed Iranian commentators online saying that it’s just about sort of establishing whether they can trust America, whether America, whether the United States can deliver on its promises, and it’s just sort of a some symbolic ask by the Iranians to try to build confidence, is that all that’s involved here, or why are the Iranians so interested in what’s happening in Lebanon?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
For the Iranians it’s crucial. The Iranians are facing a very problematic situation, their strategy, one of the pillars of the strategy was to build a proxy system around Israel, and because of the results of the war, they came to a situation in which they have to defend the proxies that were supposed to be the one which will conduct the war against Israel and Iran will be immune because Iran is far away, not involved, and the proxies will do the dirty job to kill and destroy Israel.
What happened because of the war, they [Iran] are now involved in a war to protect the proxies that are supposed to be the ones which will do the war that Iran will not do. They have found that they are paying with Iranian currency to save Hezbollah in Lebanon, but they don’t have any other alternative, because Hamas is not any more relevant, and they are going to lose the main proxies that they build in the Middle East. Everyone in the Middle East understands that if you cannot save your proxy, you don’t have to be taken into account in the future.
So, for them it’s about their position in the Middle East without Hezbollah and without Hamas. What is Iran now? It is Iran versus Israel. The whole strategy that they have, nothing remains. I think that for them it’s crucial to show, and this is the big mistake of the Americans, that they allow them to believe that there is a connection between the two areas, and between the ceasefire in Iran and the ceasefire in Lebanon. In spite of the fact that since the beginning of the ceasefire in Iran, we fought in Lebanon, and there was a ceasefire in Iran, but during the negotiations they convinced themselves, or they understood from America, and from both, I don’t know. There is a connection, and for us it was very important to place a red line, and to say, in Lebanon, we are discussing Lebanon’s future in Washington and not in Tehran.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
I agree with General Amidror. The Iranian strategy of creating a ring of fire around Israel is in shards, thanks to the hard work of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and Israel’s intelligence services, and in really laying waste to Hezbollah over a period of years. I think, as the ceasefire went on, and as the Iranians perceived the president’s desire for an agreement, I think they came to believe, I agree with General Amidror, I think they came to believe that they might be able to rescue something out of the wreckage of that strategy. Which is why I think the term that they’ve been using is that they want to create a new strategic equation by linking, as I said at the outset before General Amidror joined us, the theater in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah with the conflict with the U.S. and Iran. Even though the U.S. is not a, a belligerent, as it were in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and so that’s what I think you’re seeing they’re trying to do and I think unfortunately the president’s desire for a ceasefire is playing into that.
Blaise Misztal:
In light of this Iranian attempt to keep its proxy strategy alive, how significant is the fact that the Houthis joined in and fired on Israel in this latest exchange? Is it sort of a demonstration that there’s still a potent proxy? Does the fact that they only fired one missile, that didn’t even make it to Israel, sort of show how largely symbolic that was.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, first of all, it’s very striking that we have not heard much from Houthis for some period of time, since February 28. I do think that this is indicative again of what General Amidror was saying, the Iranians want to show that their proxy network still exists even if it’s been reduced in large measure from what it was before last year or before two years ago.
It is sort of striking to me that this seemed pretty much like a de minimis effort by the Houthis, I mean, we’ll see. They’ve also apparently declared that they won’t allow Israeli ships through the Red Sea, so we’ll see what they do. But I suspect that at some point, if they continue this, they will face some retribution, and we’ll see how much stomach and appetite they have for continued conflict. I have my doubts.
Blaise Misztal:
So, given this attempt by the Iranians to create the strategic equation that ties the two theaters together, Ambassador Edelman, and the dangers of that, as General Amidror has pointed out, what can or should President Trump do now to try to make sure that that link isn’t established to try to break that equation.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, I mean, I think he could say, “Look, the government of Israel has done its part, it’s made a cease fire with the government of Lebanon, the reason that there’s not a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is because Hezbollah is continuing, as the General said, to attack northern Israel. If you want to continue these negotiations, tell them to knock it off, and then we’ll get back to that. But we’re not going to prevent Israel from defending itself.”
The problem, I think here, is that the President has telegraphed to the Iranians that he does not want to go back to kinetic military activity, he’s even been quoted as saying he won’t go back to kinetic military activity unless the Iranians kill Americans. Which unfortunately is a permission slip to kill other people in the region, notably including Israelis, but not just Israelis.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, one last question for you, and then I want to open it up to questions from the audience. So, if you do have something you want to ask one of our panelists, feel free to submit it using the Q and A function in Zoom, and then I’ll read it out.
But General Amidror, given what we saw over the last 24 hours, is there a danger of the United States and Israel diverging and Israel returning to conflict with Iran without the United States or being isolated in some way or disagreeing with the United States. For example, an emerging deal and the two partners having trouble coordinating going forward on Iran.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I hope that it doesn’t happen. For us, the test will be the language of the agreement, if the agreement will be strong enough to bring all the enriched materials from Iran, and to bring out all the materials they enrich uranium from Iran and satisfy us with the continuation of the control on the on the ground that will not allow the Iranians to bring back or rebuild the nuclear project.
I hope that it will be a better agreement than the one which was achieved by the Obama administration. It will be a big shame if not because after the success of the United States forces, together with the IDF what we did together in Iran, we have cards in our hands, and I hope that the Americans will be smart enough to achieve a good agreement. Up till now, from all what was said by the administration, they still want to achieve such a good agreement, and I hope that that will continue. The problem that I see is that we cannot allow ourselves to sacrifice our ability to defend Israel from Hezbollah for the sake of a good atmosphere in the negotiation between America and Iran.
I understand the problem. I understand the tension and I hope that the Americans will agree that Israel has the right to defend itself, including fighting against Hezbollah in Lebanon as much as will be needed, judged on our needs and obligation for our citizens and soldiers. It’s not the first time that the situation is judged differently from Washington than it’s judged by the decision makers in Jerusalem; it’s natural. I hope that it will not lead to something, as you described, that Israel will be isolated, and so on and so forth. But, as you know, there were many years during which Israel stood alone against Iran and against Hezbollah. I hope that this is not the situation with this administration. I pray that it is not the situation of this administration.
We have agreement about the goal of the negotiations in Iran. It was agreed by both sides that it should bring an end to the Iranian military nuclear project, and I hope that Americans will not lose the cards that they have.
Blaise Misztal:
Sticking with that topic, General Amidror, we have a question from [Questioner], who asks, “Can we go over what Israel’s concerns about a U.S.-Iran deal are, where the U.S. and Israel diverge on what a good deal looks like? Is it just the issue of what happens with the highly enriched uranium that remains in Iran, or what are other sticking points that are important for Israel and for a good deal?”
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
First of all, we were very much surprised by the fact that the Americans did not put on the table the issue of the ballistic missiles at all. It’s like the Obama administration: it’s not in the agreement. We’ve been surprised by the Obama administration; we were surprised by this administration. The ballistic missiles are not on the table.
The second issue, which, as far as we understand, Americans and us are on the same page on, is about the nuclear [problem], exposing all the enriched uranium, and to build a system in which we can be sure that the Iranians are not resuming their efforts to achieve nuclear military capability.
Again, this is what we know. This is what the Americans said up till now, that this is their obligation. They committed themselves. The President, in his own voice, said the commitment of the United States of America. This one was part of the Israeli team which negotiated with the Obama administration about the agreement in Iran. I learned to be very suspicious. I think, I was the one of those who said Americans have an obligation, and they will come, and they are committed to this obligation, and this is at the end of the day, we found that it was changing the middle of the of the negotiations and instead of dismantling Iran nuclear project, the Americans moved to postpone and monitor. I hope that we are not facing the same problem with this administration again. It was promised by this administration that it’s not going to happen, and I hope that they will keep the word.
Blaise Misztal: (32:14)
Ambassador Edelman. Let me just ask you, your opinion, since you’ve written extensively with us at JINSA about what would constitute a good deal, but also ask you, there were reports late last week that that [U.S. envoys Steve] Witkoff and [Jared] Kushner, the two main negotiators for the United States, traveled to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to meet with U.S. nuclear scientists, presumably to discuss nuclear elements of a deal with Iran, should we take that as a, as a good sign or a worrying sign?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, look, I think, having done a bit of diplomacy in my life, having expertise on your side is always a good thing. Since then, Witkoff and Kushner have been engaged in this negotiation with Iranian interlocutors for over a year. I do wonder why only now they’re sitting down and talking with experts on enrichment.
From my point of view, there’s been a lot of focus on the HEU [highly enriched uranium] that’s been enriched up to 60 percent for understandable reasons, 440 kilo[grams], which is [a] significant amount, and obviously not very far away from being able to be turned into bomb grade material. But there’s 9000 pounds of enriched material below 60 percent that needs to be taken care of as well, lest it serves as material for enrichment down the road after this conflict ends. If the regime stays in power and is able to reconstitute its enrichment capability.
Therein I think lies the concern about what kind of agreement you’re going to reach. Will there be in fact a moratorium on all enrichment, which would be a good thing, but how is it going to be verified? I mean, for a long time the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has not had access, even before this all started and I’m saying the 12-day war in May, to Iranian material. So, the chain of custody of all this material is very obscure right now, and so I think it’s going to require very intrusive verification. verification far beyond what was in the JCPOA, which basically allowed the Iranians to more or less degrade themselves with some oversight by the IAEA.
I’m very concerned about where this is headed and very concerned about the potential divergence between the United States and Israel. I agree with General Amidror that it would be a bad thing, were it to happen, but I’m quite concerned that we may be headed that way. Not least, because I see a trajectory of very serious erosion of support for Israel in the Democratic party, but in the Republican party as well, and if there’s a divergence, I worry that you’re going to really see the complete end of the traditional bipartisan support for Israel that’s been the hallmark of this relationship for a long time and that I think that would be bad for both countries.
Blaise Misztal:
Sticking with this topic of a good deal, John Hannah asks General Amidror, “What’s your suggestion for a good deal on Iran’s missiles, assuming it must take into account both Israel’s concerns about medium-range missiles, as well as the Arab Gulf’s concerns about short-range missiles?” And I’ll add, would you include drones in that agreement?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that we should add something else, because if nothing is done within five to 10 years, the Iranians will have the ability to launch missiles into the United States of America. Now they have the ability to launch it to 4000 kilometers. It’s half of Europe, give and take, and within 5 to 10 years they will reach the ability to launch missiles into the United States of America. There is nothing that will be done to stop it.
I think that the only way to change the situation is by the fact that we have to remember it is not on the table at all. The Americans didn’t put it as a demand from the Iranians. So, we are speaking about [a] theoretical question.
It should be a limitation on the ability of the Iranians to test and to manufacture big missiles. What is the range that we are speaking about? I don’t know. If you include the Gulf countries, it is 100-150 kilometers. I don’t see anyone succeeding to put such a limitation on the Iranians. In the end we didn’t succeed in bringing Iran to its knees. Iran is still a state which has the ability to resist, and I don’t see America ready to do what is [needed] to change the situation. So, I think it’s a theoretical question from the meaning that Americans didn’t put it on the table. It is not there.
Blaise Misztal:
Maybe picking up where that last point that you made, General Amidror, we have a question from [Questioner] for both of you.
Do you agree or disagree that four months into this war, U.S.-Israeli gains have been impressive tactically, but not strategically? The regime survives, there’s no evidence of fracture, they weaponize geography, threatening the Straits and Gulf states, and deterrence has been undermined because the regime has survived the combination of the world’s and the region’s most formidable powers. Ambassador Edelman, let me start with you.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Well, first, [Questioner] is an old, old colleague, friend, and someone for whom I have a lot of respect, who has toiled very hard in this vineyard for a long time. Look, I think in any war [that] turning tactical success into strategic outcome is not an easy thing, and it’s obviously the key objective.
I think [if] we do a net assessment of where we are, I think, [it] is a little early. I agree that we’ve had lots of tactical success, lots of degradation of Iranian military capabilities. With regard to the survival of the regime, I think it’s a little early to tell. The regime is still going to have a huge water crisis; it’s got to manage an electricity distribution crisis, a food distribution crisis, and a financial crisis, so it’s going to have a lot of very difficult problems to handle all at once. How successful they’ll be in doing that, I think, is an open question, but there’s no doubt in my mind that the Iranians have succeeded in doing several of the things that [Questioner] just suggested in this question. They have weaponized geography very effectively. I think the U.S. was very late to the issue of mines.
Admiral [Brad] Cooper, for whom I have a lot of respect, testified in open testimony that we destroyed 90 percent of the mines, but he also testified that the holdings were significantly higher by about 33 percent higher than the number unclassified that we had carried previously, which means they were still left with 800 mines. Frankly, one of the things Iranians have demonstrated is they don’t need to actually sow any mines necessarily to affect the strait and to create massive perturbations in the international economy.
To me, it’s to be determined exactly how to assess the strategic outcome. But right now, I think if this just stops and ends today where it is, and we don’t get any further, I don’t think you can say it’s been successful.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that the right question is not what was asked by [Questioner], that I’ve known for many years, but what was the alternative, which was offered by some people, is to do nothing. Today we could find Iran with nuclear capability, so I prefer tactical achievement without great strategic achievement in the situation of North Korea. Which strategically probably was a great success but they have nuclear capability and if I have to do it again to gain very little and not very important tactical achievements, and to prevent Iran from having nuclear capability, and still facing the regime, and all the success of the Iranians, which I don’t see anyhow. I prefer it in the situation in which we do nothing, because we don’t have strategic achievements that do nothing and having nuclear Iran.
Remember, it is not just nuclear, the whole strategy of Iran collapsed. Where is the ring of fire? It does not exist. Now, the Iranians are fighting, paying Iranian currency to make sure that Hezbollah will survive. It’s not the ability of Hezbollah to attack Israel. Hezbollah is isolated. When the Syrian’s got out of the equation, the land bridge from Iran to Lebanon, does not exist anymore. They cannot provide Hezbollah with a weapons system; they provided them with money. They can come to the airport with suitcases with a lot of money, but they cannot provide a weapons system to Hezbollah.
Factories to manufacture [weapons] do not exist in Lebanon today. They can make drones in many basements, but big missiles, and so on, they cannot. Syria is not there to provide them with a weapon system. So, the scenario is totally different from the Israeli point of view, totally different, and Iran is not so close to reaching the point in which they can make the weaponization.
So, if you ask if the regime is there, the regime is there. Will we have to do it again in the next five years? Probably, yes, but we made huge achievements by postponing the ability of the Iranians to produce the warhead and by destroying the strategy against Israel. The whole Ring of Fire collapsed, and now the Iranians, instead of being out of the war, far away, giving the proxies the order to destroy Israel, they must fight against Israel. This is because they want Hezbollah to survive. I’m not sure that Hezbollah will survive, but this is the goal of the Iranians.
So, I don’t know what these strategic achievements are. I don’t like all of the names. What we did, we postponed the ability of the Iranians to get nuclear capability for how many years? I don’t know. We destroyed the very important part of the strategy, the whole ring of fire around Israel. The ability of Hezbollah to survive is under a huge question mark. This very much depends on what will happen in the negotiations in Washington, very much depends on what the ideas will continue to do in Lebanon, very much depends on what will happen in the future between Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. If all the three decide to squeeze Hezbollah, which is in the middle, I don’t know what will happen. From the Israeli point of view, this will be a much better situation, not just better, a much better situation. Yes, the regime still exists, but as Zhou Enlai [Former Chinese Premier] said it’s too early to judge.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
I agree with much of what General Amidror has said, but I would take issue with one characterization, which is I don’t think that having been involved in a good bit of the diplomacy with North Korea, I don’t think one can characterize how we’ve handled North Korea as either a tactical or a strategic achievement, it was a failure.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
One of the big failures of American diplomacy.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
Yes, absolutely.
Blaise Misztal:
Ambassador, another John Hannah question for you. Do you see a convincing Kinetic plan to restore the pre-war status quo in the Strait of Hormuz that could be achieved at acceptable military and economic cost, as well as be sustainable for the long term by being immune from future Iranian efforts to shut it down again at minimum cost?
Amb. Eric Edelman:
It depends on who’s doing the assessment of the costs. I believe if the United States Navy thought they could do this at an acceptable cost, they would have done it already because we’ve got plenty of capability in the theater right now to try and do this. Although we have certain deficiencies that make it hard to do this, so for instance, we have zero frigates in the United States Navy which would be the vessels you would want to have doing escort duty. It’s pretty clear that the President has decided he doesn’t think it can be done at least what he considers an acceptable political and economic cost.
I mean, could we theoretically, do it? I mean, yes, we could open the Strait. Could we keep it open in perpetuity without a huge commitment of the U.S. forces for the foreseeable future? I don’t think so. Actually, Ray Takeyh and Ruel Marc Gerecht and I had a piece in the dispatch about 10 days ago now on this and talked about exactly what it will take to post wherever we get an agreement to actually maintain anything even close to the status quo ante. It’s going to be a considerable investment of U.S. assets in the theater way beyond what not perhaps quite as much as we have in the theater right now, but it’s going to be quite a bit larger than what we had been doing out there for most of the last 10-15 years.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
I believe that investing in pipelines, which will bypass the Gulf, I think either down all towards Jordan, Israel, and so on, will be cheaper and better for the future, that the Hormuz Strait will lose its importance as the bottleneck of the export of energy by making other ways more viable.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
That is already happening. I mean, first of all, the Saudis and Emiratis already have pipelines, although the volume is not sufficient to make up for what comes out of the Gulf. The problem with pipelines is it will take a while for these to eventually organize. Although they, I think, will, as General Amidror said, alleviate a lot of the energy concerns, and you already see adjustments being made anyway, in terms of people getting electric vehicles and other things, I worry that it’s not just the energy.
I mean, one of the things that this has, I think, demonstrated is it’s more than just energy, it’s urea and ammonia for fertilizer, it’s helium and sulfur for manufacture of microelectronic chips and things like that that are crucial for the global economy. So, I agree with General Amidror that pipelines are going to be helpful here in mitigating some of the damage that the Iranians have done in reducing some of their economic weapons, but I don’t think it’s going to solve everything, because there’s still going to be some issues. I mean, there’s not a pipeline for some of those things, and land transport; it’s not an easy substitute for, for coming out of the Gulf in large ships.
Blaise Misztal:
All right, let’s finish up with a question from David Steiman, who asks, some commentators have said that this is a religious war and the Iranian regime literally cannot make the kind of deal we are pursuing without violating the principles of their religious obligations. How do you see those opinions, General Amidror?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I remember Khomeini saying that ‘there are times in which you have to take the poison because there is not any other alternative’, and he was as religious as the guys running to the Iranians. Very much depends on what the alternative that they are facing and how strong the threat that they know might be, and I think that it very much depends on the American side.
Amb. Eric Edelman:
I agree with General Amidror. I think it depends on their sense of their own vulnerability and what they need to survive, and I wouldn’t rule out that they can make an agreement, whether it’s a good agreement or not. It’s going to depend on a lot of other things. But as long as that regime is in place, I would say, given both religious and ideological makeup, as long as the regime is in place, it’s going to be a huge problem for Israel, and it’s a huge problem for the United States.
So, for folks who want to reprioritize and put all of our emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, for which there’s some argument, I don’t see how we are able to do that as long as we’ve got that regime sitting out there.
Blaise Misztal:
Ambassador Edelman, General Amidror. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you to the audience for tuning in. I look forward to seeing you at the next JINSA webinar, and please check out our website at jinsa.org for all our latest analyses. Thank you and have a good afternoon.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
Thank you. Good night.
Blaise Misztal:
Good night, General.