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What’s Legally Allowed in War

Excerpt below:

This past July, Geoffrey Corn, a law professor at Texas Tech and a former judge advocate general in the U.S. Army, joined the Israel Defense Forces on a tour of the Rafah border. Within hours of Hamas’s attack, on October 7th, 2023, Israel began bombing Gaza. But until May, 2024, just a couple of months before Corn’s latest visit, the city of Rafah remained relatively intact. The site of the only border crossing with Egypt, Rafah was already one of the most densely populated cities in Gaza, packed further by the flight of Palestinians from the north. In February, when it became clear that the I.D.F. was planning to invade Rafah, it was estimated that 1.5 million people were living in the city.

World leaders and various organizations lobbied Israel not to go through with the incursion, including President Biden, who, on the eve of the I.D.F.’s attack, called Rafah a “red line.” The I.D.F. moved forward anyway, even as the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) ordered Israel to “immediately halt its military offensive.” By July, when Corn surveyed the area, Rafah was largely rubble. “It looked like Berlin after World War Two,” he told me. “And, if all you do is look at that, you say, This can’t be right.”

Corn, at the height of his military career, was the U.S. Army’s senior adviser on the laws of war, also known as international humanitarian law (I.H.L.), or the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Corn brought up Berlin as a metric for the level of urban destruction he saw, but he was also, perhaps inadvertently, recalling a watershed moment in international law. The Second World War was the first armed conflict in which air power made the bombing of civilians possible at a massive scale. Military leaders pushed those possibilities to hellish extremes, following the logic that killing civilians might induce surrender. It wasn’t until the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions were adopted, in 1977, that an international agreement explicitly prohibited the intentional targeting of civilians. (The United States has not ratified these protocols, but it has incorporated the basic rules of civilian protection into the Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual and treats them as customary international law.) And it wasn’t until the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which began in 1993 and in which Corn served as a defense witness, that an international court had ever tried someone for violating this prohibition.

The war in Gaza has played out under this relatively young international legal regime. At the Rafah border, I.D.F. intelligence officers showed Corn surveillance videos that he says demonstrated Hamas activity in the area before the I.D.F. offensive commenced. The suggestion was that the destruction he saw was not the product of an indiscriminate assault and that the laws of war had been upheld. Hamas’s use of civilian buildings transformed those sites into “military objectives,” Corn said. The civilians killed were not targets but “incidental deaths.”

The claim that Israel has adhered to the laws of war is extremely contentious. There is the genocide case at the International Court of Justice, as well as the arrest warrants the International Criminal Court issued for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. Numerous experts have accused Israel of flouting the laws of war, including Francesca Albanese, the U.N. special rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian territories, who argued that Israel had weaponized international humanitarian law as “ ‘humanitarian camouflage’ to legitimize genocidal violence.” This was done “by deploying IHL concepts such as human shields, collateral damage, safe zones, evacuations and medical protection” to erode “the distinction between civilians and combatants.”

Israel has contested these claims in hearings at the I.C.J., and an array of institutions have echoed the defense. Corn’s trips to the region arose from these efforts. Besides the July visit, he also travelled there in March, 2024, with a group of retired three- and four-star generals, on a trip sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, or JINSA. The report he subsequently co-authored with the other members of that delegation found that the I.D.F.’s implementation of civilian-risk mitigation “reflects a good-faith commitment” to comply with the laws of war, whereas Hamas acted as a pervasive and intentional violator of the law. Corn, when we spoke on the phone in late February, argued that despite the visceral nature of the destruction, which even he was struck by, the charges levelled against Israel were hasty. He was adamant that the legality of an attack cannot be judged based just on its outcomes: “That’s like me saying one plus I-don’t-know is obviously ten.” A destroyed school does not tell you whether war crimes took place. For that, he said, you need to examine the decision-making that led to the strike. “I’m not going to say that all of the damage was necessary or justified, because I don’t have enough information to say that,” Corn continued. “What I can say is that the systems and processes that the I.D.F. implemented are very similar to what we would implement in a similar battle space.”

This idea, that Israel’s conduct in Gaza is in line with the U.S. military’s understanding of its own legal obligations, has become the general consensus among American military lawyers and their allies in the academy in recent years. That is the argument at the heart of a new paper by Naz Modirzadeh, a professor at Harvard Law School and the founder of its Program on International Law and Armed Conflict. As Modirzadeh writes, in a forthcoming issue of the Harvard National Security Journal, the U.S. government has been evasive about whether Israel has violated the laws of war. Where some have seen hypocrisy and geopolitical calculation, credit for this should also be given to “a deeper transformation within the U.S. military and its legal apparatus.”

In the past several years, the Department of Defense has become fixated on how the United States might fight a major war against an enemy that rivals the American military in force and technology. In such a scenario—known as a large-scale combat operation, or L.S.C.O.—combat would take place across land, sea, air, and into the thermosphere. Command of the air could not be taken for granted. Intelligence may be spotty. Casualties could soar into the hundreds of thousands, and whole cities could be flattened. “In short,” Modirzadeh writes, the U.S. military has begun “preparing for an all-out war with China.” And, with such conflagrations burning in the mind, “LSCO lawyers,” as Modirzadeh calls them, have been arguing that the laws of war are far more permissive than many of their peers and the public seem to appreciate. From that vantage, Gaza not only looks like a dress rehearsal for the kind of combat U.S. soldiers may face. It is a test of the American public’s tolerance for the levels of death and destruction that such kinds of warfare entail.

In reading through various accounts of the conflict written by American L.S.C.O. lawyers, it is striking how little is made of the incongruity between Israel’s tactics and military necessity—particularly given the asymmetrical nature of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, in which the former has a vast advantage in technology and firepower. Last year, former Lieutenant General David Deptula, after having been led on a tour of Rafah by the I.D.F., wrote that, from his observations, Israel was “using the right force, at the right place, at the right time.” The JINSA report that Corn co-authored provided a more nuanced, albeit legally idiosyncratic, analysis. While a large section of the report is spent emphasizing the I.D.F.’s efforts and ability to mitigate civilian harm, the authors concluded that Israel is under little legal obligation to do so. This is not because of the military threat that Hamas poses, but because of Hamas’s “motivation and intent.”

The most telling detail in reports like these, though, is the tendency to frame Israel’s main problem as a public-relations issue. “We believe the I.D.F. has fulfilled its legal obligations to provide humanitarian access and assistance to Gazan civilians,” the JINSA report reads. “At the same time, we acknowledge the strategic legitimacy of Israel’s campaign has been compromised by the perception of indifference to the humanitarian suffering in Gaza.” A current member of the JAG corps, Major Joseph Levin, put a finer point on it. “The lesson for America in the Israeli-Hamas conflict is that a democratic nation with power overmatch that is achieving consistent tactical victories still risks strategic defeat when its enemy effectively uses cognitive warfare to undermine public support,” he wrote in Military Review.

Read the full article in the New Yorker.