Transcript: Webinar – 1,000 Days of War
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PANELISTS
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror
Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Former National Security Advisor to Israel’s Prime Minister
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish
Julian (z”l) & Jenny Josephson Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, JINSA
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal:
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for joining another JINSA webinar. I’m Blaise Misztal. JINSA’s Vice President for Policy. I’m delighted to be joined this afternoon by Major General Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Major General Yaacov Ayish, the Julian (z”l) and Jenny Josephson Distinguished Fellow at JINSA and former IDF Director of Operations and Defense attaché here in Washington. Good evening to you both, Generals. It’s only been a couple of days since I saw you in Israel, where we were with our Generals and Admirals delegation for a week of high-level meetings, and one of the things that struck me was that in almost all of those meetings that our IDF interlocutors would mention how long Israel has been at war, I think, at the time they were saying 992 days, 993 days. When I went and did the math, I realized that in fact this weekend here in the United States, we’ll be celebrating our 250th year of independence and it’s going to be a much more somber occasion in Israel. Friday, tomorrow, marks 1,000 days since October 7, and so I thought that was a useful milestone for us to reflect on. My first question, maybe to you, General Amidror, is 1,000 days a long time since October 7, or is it a blink of an eye? Where is October 7 in Israeli public consciousness? Is it still recent, or has it been consigned to the past?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, it’s a very long time in Israeli terms. Remember that, unlike America, it’s a compulsory service, and the number of Israelis serving in the army, the regular army and reserve forces together, is huge relative to the number of citizens of Israel. It’s very hard to find a family in Israel without at least one member serving. In many cases, you can see a mother, who has a husband in the army, two children, one grandchild, and so forth. So, the war within Israeli society in 1,000 days is a very long time. There are many serving reserve soldiers who served during the 1,000 days, for between 300 and 500 days. Half the time civilians were serving in the army, not mentioning the regular army, which is almost all the days in a war whether it is in Gaza or in Lebanon, or in the West Bank. And the Air Force is going from all these fronts into Yemen, which is 2,000 kilometers away, and Tehran, which is 1,500 kilometers away. So, the Israeli society is in a war, in spite of the fact that if you look at the numbers of the economy, and so and so forth, the economy is in relatively good shape. The Israeli share market is very high, but within the society we feel it in every corner, because every family has at least one member who is serving somewhere in one of the fronts that I mentioned. So, it’s been a long time, within the society, many people feel it, but there are two significant numbers that should be mentioned. One is what’s happening with the new generation. In 1,000 days, many more graduates of the high school served in the army as new soldiers thanks to the compulsory service. Another thing to mention is the number of young people who are volunteering to serve in the fighting units. The numbers are very, very high, more than before the war. So, during the war, maybe because of the war, the readiness of the young generation to volunteer in fighting units is higher than before. And the second poll is even more interesting. It’s about the number or the percentage of the soldiers who are coming to service when they are called as part of reserve units. At the beginning of the war 120 percent of the old veterans of the units came back and said you are not going to fight without us. Now it is not reaching 100 percent but after three years it is around 75 to 80 percent which do not exist in other countries, and gives you kind of feeling about the resilience of the society, about the reserve forces, which are our more mature people, some of them are 35 or 40 and the poll within the young generation, which is even brighter than that. It is about the number of people who are ready to volunteer to the fighting units. It’s over 100 percent for every slot, which you have to fulfill in the Paratrooper Brigade, in Golani Brigade, and in the Engineering Corps, in the Armor Forces, you have more than what is needed, and I can tell you that we are going now to build two new battalions, one in the Nahal Brigade, one in the Golani Brigade, and this is thanks to the number of volunteers for the fighting units within the young generation, we are building more engineering battalions, which we learned are very needed in the battlefield, both in Gaza and in Lebanon, and the ability to do it is, as I said, is because the new generation is ready to volunteer. So, to your question, yes, it is part of the life, everyday life of Israeli society. It’s been a long, very long time, but up till now, thanks to the clear understanding of the Israelis that there is no real alternative, people are ready to continue to fight because they understand that that is the only way to prevent another seventh of October.
Blaise Misztal:
So General Ayish, General Amidror just said that Israel and Israelis are still ready to fight, but how would you characterize the current situation that Israel finds itself in? 1,000 days after October 7, is Israel still at war? Has the war ended for now? Is it paused? How would you describe where Israel finds itself right now?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
Thank you for having me, Blaise. I’d like to try and address it from a bit of a different angle. The war started with the October 7 attack, total intelligence, strategic, operational failure, and immediately after October 7, Hezbollah expanded the war to the Northern front. Just a few months ago, with the strikes on Iran, we killed Khamenei, and if you are looking at this war and asking yourself, what is going on here, I think we should address it from the strategic level as the Israeli strategy was defined. Deterrence was one of the pillars, the second one was an early warning. Both of them collapsed on October 7. The defense posture, that was the third pillar which collapsed as well, and the last element that the Israeli strategy was based on, was a decisive win that had to be achieved by the IDF, should the other pillars collapse. And we are still fighting. We are still fighting on one hand, the system around us that was built by Iran almost totally collapsed. The ring of fire that was built around us in the last 20 years almost shattered. It’s not that we are not facing here and there certain threats, but basically, in military terms, Hamas is shattered, it is no longer a military threat, and I would dare to say that even Hezbollah, with the small capabilities, the 10 percent capabilities that were left over there, still I think was broken and shattered in terms of leadership, military capabilities, infrastructure, and the rest can be achieved should the government instruct the IDF. The [negative] of all of that has to be finished with Iran in terms of either a very solid good agreement with one pillar on the nuclear program, the other one on the ballistic missiles, and the third one on the proxies that Iran is orchestrating or trying to orchestrate again around us. Should those be achieved or finished, I think we will be satisfied that we succeeded to achieve the goals that were defined by the Israeli government. Right now we are not yet there. I’m not sure that the major means should be military means. It seems to me like moral political means that have to be implemented either during the new arrangements in Gaza or in Lebanon with the Lebanese government or with Iran via the U.S., and if not, I’m afraid we will have to be back, and we’ll have to address those threats again, because the major lessons, vis-a-vis strategy, is that we cannot live with imminent threats on our borders, we are not going to allow them to rebuild themselves, and we can see in the last almost three years that the Israeli government has been exercising, together with the IDF, a new strategy, which is a very decisive one, a preemptive strategy, and this is the major takeaway that I’m taking nowadays from what we have seen in the last 1,000 days.
Blaise Misztal:
General Amidror, I would be curious of your assessment of the current situation. Do you agree, as General Ayish just laid out, that sort of the major threats have been degraded through military operations, and now the challenges that remain for Israel are more political and diplomatic?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
First of all, I agree with General Ayish that when it comes to one of the pillars of the Iranian strategy, we need the huge project to destroy the proxies as a ring of fire around Israel. What the King Abdullah of Jordan called the Shiite Crescent does not exist anymore. Yes, we are still fighting in Lebanon. Yes, we still have forces in Gaza, but Hamas is not relevant as a threat. It is relevant to the Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip. It is relevant to anyone who will try to rebuild Gaza. You will have to deal with Hamas one way or another, and in Lebanon you can see the visibility of the organization to defend itself in every square kilometer in Lebanon that we decided that we want to control, we are now controlling with very few casualties. We are destroying infrastructure which was built in the last, I don’t know, 20 to 30 years, and Iran, unlike what was the plan to use the proxies to crumble Israel, and when Iran’s immunity will be kept, because they are 1,500 kilometers away, now Iran has to defend the proxies, kind of the other side of the pendant on which the Iranians have in mind that they will use the proxies now, the proxies in Iran to save them, because they will be distracted either by diplomatic means or by the IDF. Something about the connection between military and diplomacy. I was blamed in one of the newspapers in Israel that I preached to understand that in the modern situation now the international community, Israel and so and so forth, in these circumstances the old notion that at the end of the war what diplomatic means will be the tool to achieve the goal are not relevant anymore, and the success will be determined by the success or the failure of the military forces, whenever they succeed, the line that they will achieve, that will bring the results of this war and not negotiations. Of course, there are areas in which it might go in a different way. If, for example, the Lebanese army will do what is needed, because the Lebanese government will be determined, because they will be convinced by the Americans and understand that this is the only way to save Lebanon. Here the diplomatic tool will be kind of the extension of the military one, and they will achieve the goal. What are the chances that that will happen, probably very, very low, and if I have to put my money there to bet, I think that at the end of the day it will be done more by the Israeli forces than by the government of Lebanon and diplomatic means. So, I think that Ayish is right about the fact that we might find some areas in which the diplomatic tools will do the job. I think that we have to be very connected to the reality in the Middle East, in which I don’t see who will convince Hamas to disarm itself or the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah. The IDF will have to push in both places, and at the end, the military achievement will be what will be achieved. I always have to remember the decision of the United Nations 1701 after the Second Lebanese War. No one remembers what was in it, and what was not there. The United Nations forces came like no kind of savior, they didn’t do any good, not to the Lebanese, and not for us, maybe for Hezbollah. So, I’m very pessimistic about the ability of diplomatic means to achieve something, but at the same time we have to give the Americans the chance. They say that they will bring the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah, we should help them as much as we can, including an agreement in which we will have to move our forces to retreat from some areas. We should give the Americans all the chances in Iran, in Gaza, and in Lebanon. Even if at the end of the day, it will be clear that nothing was achieved, Israel will be in a better position to use its force, and the United Nations will be more ready to support Israel, because they will see that no alternative is a real alternative to fix the problems here. So I think that if you ask me to assess the achievements, it probably will be done by the military forces. What should we do? It’s to give the Americans all the chances to make it by diplomacy.
Blaise Misztal:
So, General Amidror, just staying with you for a second, reading between the lines of what you said, do I understand correctly that Israel has been at war for a long time already, 1,000 days, but you don’t foresee it withdrawing from all the yellow lines that it has established in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Syria, where its troops are forward deployed? You don’t see it pulling back from those yellow lines anytime soon, even if there’s not going to be fighting, that military presence is going to remain?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
It’s a part of the diplomatic tools. If you want to achieve something diplomatically, you need these forces to remain where they are, because this is the only way to put pressure on the Lebanese government and Hezbollah. If you don’t do it, you lose the leverage that you have, and without the leverage, just to think that you can convince these extreme guys to be more flexible, I think it’s a naivety that should not be part of our dialogue, we should understand that naivety is not a good beginning in the Middle East. The question is, what is the difference between a pessimist and optimist in the Middle East, and the answer is that the pessimist is an optimist with a lot of experience.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
I’d like to add on about the yellow lines. I think there is another element that I’d like to add to what General Amidror just said, the presence along the yellow lines in Lebanon, in Gaza, and to some extent also in Syria, the buffer zones that were created should be kept until the threat will be removed, either by an agreement or by other means. It means that it’s not only a matter of leverage, it’s a matter of allowing the residents of the North, the South, and the Golan Heights to go back to their houses and be with their families, and I’d like to say another point. General Amidror had rightly mentioned the resilience of the military and the Israeli public. As someone who volunteered for more than six months in the Reconstruction Administration at the South to build the villages and the city of Sderot, the situation right now along those villages, kibbutzim and the city Sderot, is that the population is growing rapidly, and it’s about to double itself in a matter of a decade. Right now, in most kibbutzim and villages and the city of Sderot, the number is higher than it was on October 6. So, in terms of resilience, I think it’s very, very deep in Israeli society, and I think what the government is doing rightly in the South is a very good example. I’m not sure I can quote and say the same about the North, but when you have the right tools, you can see that although we are in a war, a very long war, 1,000 days, the resilience of the public is impressive, and to some extent I think it’s unbelievable.
Blaise Misztal:
Sticking with that theme of resilience, General Ayish, I wonder if you could look not at Israeli society but at the military. What is the ability of the military to sustain this forward posture that it has the much greater tempo of call up of reservists? On the one hand, General Amidror said that this has been a long time to be fighting for the IDF, but on the other hand, Israeli society seems to continue to be ready to serve, but is this sustainable for the idea for the long term?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
Well, you know, it’s not a secret that I was the Head of the Operation Director, and in such a job you are really responsible on the force design, and more than that, how this force is activated end to end within the IDF, and I must admit that what we have planned back in the past was not for such a long war. Having said that, when I’m speaking about the ability to adapt, to learn, to implement, to transform, I think what the IDF did is pretty remarkable. Admiral Fox and myself wrote about it, a paper at the Sapir magazine, which I invite everyone to read, how this transformation helped us during the war, not to wait until the end of the war, and then to study the lessons, and then to have a plan to implement them, but doing it during wartime. And to your question, I think this is exactly what the IDF is doing. It’s really a challenge. It’s not only the regular standing military forces, it’s the reserves that are playing here a significant role with a severe impact on the Israeli economy and that’s why you can see that there is an internal serious debate on what extent the service has to be prolonged and the ultra-orthodox Israelis Jews have to join and do their part in terms of either national service or military service or some other solutions. But to your question, there is no question, there is no alternative, and that’s why we will do whatever is needed, it’s everyone, doesn’t matter what age, and General Amidror mentioned when platoons and companies and battalions were called, the old generation that was released came too, no one called them, but they were there, to help, to assist, to bring their shoulder under the stretcher, and this is the resilience that we are talking about. It’s a matter of national need and necessity that is embedded very deep in Israeli society.
Blaise Misztal:
And General Ayish, you just talked about at the beginning of your response there about how the IDF has had to transform itself while in contact with the enemy. Can you talk about some of those transformations and how the IDF has tried to restructure and apply the lessons from October 7?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
I want to invite everyone to read Eli David’s paper that is about to be published by JINSA very soon about subterranean warfare. I think the strongest example is that we plan to fight subterranean warfare with mainly technological capabilities, robots, etc. and not go into those tunnels, and ended clearing up above ground and under the ground. And I’ll remind our listeners and participants how many times we spoke about clearing up above ground and under the ground, and that’s exactly what we did. We developed the tactics, we developed technology, we developed the doctrine, we trained the units on it, and we implemented, and are still implementing it, as we did. By the way, last week when we traveled together under the ground into one of these tunnels with our Admirals and Generals inside Gaza, right on the yellow line. So this is one example. You can see some other examples as we did with the way we were fighting in build up areas when you are doing a comparison between where we implemented in Russia or in Khan Yunis, it’s different tactics, different doctrine, that’s what we did and are still doing in terms of drones, and I have many more examples, and you have to nowadays transform very, very fast. Otherwise, take a look at what is going on in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and you will see the results, without adaptations, it won’t work.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, General Ayish. Let me ask the audience that we do want to make sure that we get to your questions, so if you have anything that you’d like to ask Generals Ayish or Amidror, please feel free to submit those questions using the Q&A function in Zoom, and I’ll be happy to read them out. But first, General Amidror, let me ask you maybe what surprised you the most in the course of the last 1,000 days, since October 7?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that the level of readiness of the ring of fire was the most surprising fact from my point of view, but remember, from when the war was beginning, I was a few years out of the system, so I don’t know what surprised the people inside the system. I was surprised by the level of readiness, which was a very high readiness of both Hamas and Hezbollah relating to the subterranean capabilities and the facilities they prepared because they wanted to launch the attack from within those facilities, mainly in Lebanon. That was the main surprise for me. I was not surprised by the Iranians’ capabilities, not by the ability of Israel to reach the targets in Iran, not even by the very accurate intelligence that we had in both Iran and Lebanon. I know that this is somewhere around where it was. I was not surprised by that, the level of readiness of those two elements of the ring of fire was a surprise for me.
Blaise Misztal:
Given that, were you also surprised that Hezbollah did not join in on October 7, or [that] there wasn’t greater activity from the West Bank?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
No, I think that was the biggest surprise of Sinwar. I thought that the Arab-Israelis and the Palestinians would be very, very careful, because in the time of the war they understood that many constraints that we took upon ourselves were not relevant, and this is why they understood that they should not join. I think Hezbollah not joining after October 7, that was probably the biggest mistake of Nasrallah. The Iranians didn’t push Hezbollah into the war, on the contrary. If you understand that they wanted Hezbollah to be ready to help act later, on behalf of Iran, you can understand why the Iranians were very cautious.
Blaise Misztal:
General Ayish, how about you?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
Well, I have a lot of surprises in this world, but I’d like to point out three elements. The first one is, we had, and I think to some extent we still have a very exquisite and very good intelligence. What I have learned, and I think the whole system has learned, is that it’s not enough to have that. It doesn’t mean that even if you have a very good intimate intelligence that you are doing the right assessment. This is one major flag that I’d like to raise. The second one, I think, to some extent, Iran took the role of Hezbollah, and then Hezbollah was playing the role of Iran instead of Iran activating Hezbollah as they planned, built, paid, trained for 20 years. What they did was a colossal mistake. They started a direct war with Israel. Now there are many explanations for why, and I think they lost a very important train, which was the second train that Nasrallah had missed in this war, and I think the credit has to be given to the leaders in the IDF and at the political level that exploited them, and that opportunity to create the corridor that led later on to Iran from Lebanon, Syria, and so on. To some extent, for so many years, they built that ring of fire to avoid fighting with us directly, they were doing it via proxies, and in one moment they decided to break this principle, and to try to attack us. And I think it led to what we have seen in the last year, specifically, which led to the degradation of their capabilities, on one hand, and to almost the end of Hezbollah, almost, we have to be very humble here. There is still 10 percent that has to be dealt with, but this is the second element. And the last point is a global point. I think the fact that at the beginning Bab el- Mandeb became a very significant element by the Houthis, and then Hormuz Straits by the Iranians, and the war became global, and the economic impact on 20 percent of the global flow, just because of the war that started on October 7, became such an element with so many implications, was also a surprise to me. I thought it would be contained, I thought it would be avoided, and should it be erupted, I expected it to be distinguished very fast, and it wasn’t.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you. Let me turn to some of the questions we got. One from [Questioner] is for you, General Amidror, and asks whether you consider the reports credible that Israel and the United States were planning to support Iranian Kurdish groups, but that the plan was canceled by President Trump following a phone call with Turkish President Erdogan.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I don’t know how far the Americans and Israel went with the Kurds towards having them be the element which will ignite Iran. I was very pessimistic about the ability of the Kurds to do it, and I think that the fact that the Americans are giving Turkey such an important position is a huge mistake. The Middle East will suffer from it in the future because the Turks dream about renewing the Ottoman Empire and they are. And their attitude towards Greece and Cyprus are promising to broaden the conflict in the Middle East to another area. I think that this is a big problem from the Israeli point of view, and from many leaders in the Middle East point of view, but I don’t know how strong the commitment of the Kurds was, and what their capabilities were to do what the media expected from them.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you, General Ayish, a question for you from [Questioner]. You mentioned the need for the ultra-orthodox to join the military or perform alternative national service. What forms of their national service would actually reduce the burdens on the IDF if they help in hospitals, for example, that doesn’t reduce the burden on IDF combat soldiers?
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
Well, there are many options that can relieve the burden, and there are many organizations that can be created, with the right conditions that will be provided for them. When I think about the logistics, the intelligence, the maintenance, and so many other areas that they can cover, obviously they can release the burden. When I think about fire brigade, when I think about medical support, when I think about hospitals, instead of having soldiers over there in wartime or the homefront command, obviously they can do it, but the solution is less complicated than people tend to think. I think we should agree on the principle, and the rest can be tailored, and I’m saying it as someone who was the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces for three years, and force buildup was my business. It is something doable. We should decide on doing it. Take, as an example, the Hasmonean Brigade that was built lately. It’s a great success. It started with one battalion, and today we already have a brigade. Take a look at the implementation in the Israeli Air Force in terms of intelligence. Take a look at what they did with the ultra-orthodox in terms of maintenance, teaching them a profession, providing them with a respectful environment and income and jobs where they can do the work on one hand and they can study on the other hand. This is something that I’m saying as a Yeshiva student until the age of 14, it’s doable, it’s only a matter of decision, and it seems to me like within the IDF, the climate and the will is there and it’s only about an internal society decision that has to be taken by the different sides. And I’m not talking about the extremists, there’s always a challenge there, but for the majority it’s doable.
Blaise Misztal:
Thank you. Maybe we can finish on an easy question from John Hannah. At a strategic level, the war’s impact on the US-Israel relationship and Israel’s standing in America has been huge, and for the most part not in a good way. People are still trying to understand the long-term implications, but can you discuss how this trend is becoming incorporated, if at all, in Israeli decision making about its war strategy going forward? General Amidror, maybe we can start with you.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror:
I think that the question should be asked by Americans to Americans, because it is something that is happening in America, and should be dealt most of it in America, but I think in Israel more people understand that we will have to deal with a different America in the future, and this is why we are giving up the idea, which was with us for so many years, that we are getting from Americans every year $4 billion. It is probably the end of this project. The second one is the dependency of Israel on America relating to spare parts, munition, and so on and so forth. Israel will be more independent, but I don’t see any substitute to the F-35, F-15, F-16, Apache, and so on, so forth, that there is a very high probability will continue to be manufactured by the Americans and bought by the Israelis. So, the whole issue of independence should be defined, what kind of independence, in which areas, and everyone in Israel knows that if America declared war on Israel, Israel probably would lose. So, the question is, how far will the Americans change their attitude towards Israel. As an old guy, I still remember that I fought in the Six-Day War without having even one American weapon system from my FN in my hands to the airplanes above in the air, the mirage. So, it very much depends on what will happen in America. It depends less on what will happen in Israel. We understand that we will have to adopt and to mitigate those changes in America, some of them can be done, some of these mitigations I think are a dream, for example, Israel will never be totally independent, it’s impossible, but we can be in some areas less dependent and other issues we have to change. We have to remember all the time to be very humble. There is no substitute to the special relations between Israel and the United States of America from the Israeli point of view.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
I’d like to add on that, with your permission.
Blaise Misztal:
Please, General Ayish.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish:
I think the relations will have to transform, and I’m saying it when I’m looking at the region I see opportunities here. I think when I’m listening to the President saying Israel is a model ally, it means that this model can be expanded, and I think building here in the region the right architecture with the right partners added by the U.S. via the tool of CENTCOM, CENTCOM, the same idea that JINSA came with in 2018 that was implemented since 2021 and proven itself time and time again in the last three years, can help us all to build regional architecture that, in terms of intelligence, space, technology, and the will to defend ourselves by ourselves, will be a key role, and I think at the end by going to that direction, leading to that transformation, it won’t be only moving from an MoU to a partnership, it will be an implementation, the philosophy behind it, and I think it’s doable.
Blaise Misztal
Great. Well, thank you both, General Amidror, General Ayish. Thank you for your time this evening. Thank you to everyone in the audience for tuning in. Please be sure to check out JINSA.org for all of our latest analysis and look forward to seeing you on the next webinar. Have a good day, everyone.