Cutting Houthi Supply Lines Key to Trade

The Houthis’ August 23 attack on the Greek-flagged MV Sounion, nearly costing 25 seafarers their lives, now threatens to become among the largest environmental disasters in history should the tanker and its 150,000 metric tons of oil capsize.

Houthi-broadcast images of the ship engulfed in flames brought into sharp focus the failure of US policy towards the Houthis – consisting largely of defensive measures and targeted, proportionate strikes targeting launchpads and storage facilities – which implicitly treats Houthi attacks as inevitable.

Since November, the Houthis have launched over 200 attacks from Yemen at commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, striking over 77 commercial vessels.

To re-secure this vital trade route, the United States should shift to countering these Houthi attacks through a proactive strategy focused on degrading the Iranian regional proxy network supplying them, much as Israel did on July 20, while also working long-term to lower the cost curve for defending against such attacks.

The Iran-backed terror group has reaped remarkable strategic success by diverting global shipping from the maritime trade chokepoint at Bab el Mandeb and impacting economies worldwide, furthering Iran and its proxies’ goals of pressuring Israel and its American backer.

Moreover, as one US naval commander stated, “I don’t think you can put a price tag on safety and the defense of … sailors on board.” Houthi attacks have killed four innocent mariners and the 25 crew members of one ship have remained captive in Yemen for over eight months.

The Houthis’ attrition tactics have inflicted other costs, such as straining US force posture. Houthi attacks have embroiled the US Navy in its first prolonged, high-tempo mission since WWII, requiring indefinite stationing of key naval assets in the Red Sea and forcing troops to be on heightened readiness for consecutive months.

Though largely successful at intercepting Houthi projectiles, the United States has done so by depleting a significant sum of vital, but preciously few, missiles to defeat the Houthis’ inexpensive drones and missiles.

The secretary of the navy testified in April that the US Navy has expended roughly $1 billion in munitions to counter Houthi attacks. As of mid-August, the United States has reportedly expended over 800 missiles, many costing over $2 million apiece, to counter the Houthi threat.

Despite these costs, US laxity suggests that Houthi attacks represent the new normal. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified in January that the Houthi threat “is going to remain active for some time.” The United States need not, and should not, accept Houthi attacks as an inevitability. Instead, US leaders should adopt a five-pronged strategy to lower the cost, and stem the flow, of Houthi attacks.

First, the United States should launch consistent strikes targeting both Houthi command-and-control nodes and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah advisors in Yemen helping to arm, train and provide intelligence to the Houthis.

Second, US leaders should intensify and expand efforts, including by allocating greater resources, on interdict Iran’s arms shipments to the Houthis. Taking the Houthis’ Iranian suppliers and advisors out of the equation would impede the terror group’s ability to continue its assaults.

Third, and most importantly, US strikes should target IRGC assets throughout the region, both to compel Iran to cease arming the Houthis by imposing direct costs on the regime rather than just its proxies, and to degrade Iran’s sophisticated proxy network.

Fourth, the United States should increase tactical missile budgeting (especially sea-based interceptors) to offset the tactical missile losses incurred by Houthi attacks.

Fifth, US leaders should increase R&D funding to operationalize developmental directed energy programs with the potential to counter Iranian proxies’ asymmetric attrition tactics, prioritizing those spearheaded by countries in Central Command’s area of responsibility like Israel.

Directed energy systems use high-powered microwave weapons or lasers to neutralize electronics on a projectile or physically destroy it, a significantly more cost-effective method than firing kinetic interceptors and one that would help thwart the Houthis’ attrition warfare.

Over the medium and long terms, US leaders should specifically explore the prospect of employing Israel’s Iron Beam-directed energy system, which is expected to be operational by the end of 2025. Iron Beam also has a naval variant reportedly capable of countering drone swarms and anti-ship missiles.

To advance directed energy initiatives with Israel, Congress should boost funding for existing programs fostering bilateral US-Israel directed energy research.

The US should also explore establishing a facility in the US or Israel to enable the two countries to simulate real-world settings while testing and interoperating directed energy systems.

Directed energy systems are not fully battle-tested and do not represent a panacea to Houthi strikes in the short term. In the near term, the US must be willing to flex its muscles more assertively to stop Houthi attacks, or risks subjecting the world to such costly attacks in perpetuity.

Lt Gen Henry A. Obering III, USAF (ret.) served as the director of the Missile Defense Agency and is a member of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) US-Israel Security and Iran Policy Projects.

Yoni Tobin is a policy analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in eKathimerini.