The massive funeral held by Hezbollah for its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on February 23 was intended to convey a clear message: the organization had not been defeated, remained a powerful force in Lebanon’s political landscape, and planned to rebuild with Iranian support to reclaim its role as a key player in the regional sphere of influence that Tehran seeks to restore.
However, the message that emerged was one of profound weakness. This was starkly evident in the glaring absence of Hezbollah’s new Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, from the event, the Israeli Air Force jets that flew over the stadium during the funeral—coinciding with strikes on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley—and the conspicuous decision by senior Lebanese officials to stay away. Lebanon’s new president made it clear that the country would not be drawn into wars that were not its own. Meanwhile, jubilant celebrations among Sunni communities—particularly in Syria but not limited to it—further highlighted the disconnect between the grand funeral and Hezbollah’s diminished standing in the region.
This display of weakness came against the backdrop of the severe blows Hezbollah suffered during the war. Most of its senior leadership and top operatives were eliminated, its vast operational infrastructure in southern Lebanon—carefully prepared for a ground invasion of the Galilee—was severely damaged, and its missile, air defense, and military production capabilities were significantly degraded. Compounding these losses, Hezbollah also lost its ability to receive military supplies and additional support from Iran via Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime.
Yet, this all happened despite the fact that the war against Hezbollah did not unfold as the IDF had originally planned. The conflict erupted unexpectedly after Israel was dragged into war with Hamas in Gaza—a war forced upon it by Hamas’s barbaric October 7 attack.
On that day, Hassan Nasrallah was caught off guard, regardless of whether Hamas had attempted to coordinate its attack with Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah quickly realized it had lost the element of surprise, which was critical for executing its planned offensive against Israel. The IDF’s rapid deployment of substantial forces—mostly reservists—to the northern border within hours of Hamas’s assault thwarted Hezbollah’s ability to launch its long-prepared attack. This swift mobilization complicated Nasrallah’s decision-making, forcing him to weigh his options: should he, as the leader of the “resistance,” commit Hezbollah to war—a war he was not ready for at that moment—or should he hold back, even though such a war had been his long-cherished objective?
Nasrallah opted for a middle ground. He sought to create the appearance that Hezbollah was engaged in battle without fully committing to an all-out war. He launched operations—but with extreme caution. He attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory with Palestinian terror squads, only to see every attempt fail. He therefore settled for rocket fire, initially imposing a self-restriction: limiting strikes to within roughly 10 kilometers of Israel’s northern border. Israel signaled that it would observe a similar limitation. Over time, however, Hezbollah expanded both the intensity and range of its attacks.
For 11 months, Hezbollah and the IDF engaged in a war of attrition, escalating as civilian populations on both sides of the border were displaced—about 80,000 Israelis were evacuated in an organized withdrawal, while far more fled from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah primarily targeted civilian settlements, while the IDF focused on military objectives. As a result, Israel suffered the destruction of hundreds of homes, mostly due to anti-tank missile fire, while Hezbollah’s military infrastructure was heavily damaged. Hezbollah also lost around 500 operatives, compared to approximately 50 Israeli casualties, including civilians. The elite “Radwan Force,” which was meant to launch a surprise assault on northern Israeli communities and had stockpiled large amounts of weaponry near the border for this purpose, was forced to retreat northward, ceasing to pose an immediate threat to Israel.
The IDF used the limited conflict to prepare for a broader confrontation by severely degrading Hezbollah’s air defense capabilities, which the group considered crucial to its ability to withstand an IDF assault. Meanwhile, Israeli special forces operated covertly in southern Lebanon, preparing the ground for a potential land incursion. By the end of the 11-month confrontation—primarily characterized by controlled exchanges of fire—Israel had significantly improved its offensive capabilities, while Hezbollah’s ability to mount a ground assault had been drastically reduced.
For Nasrallah, who had emerged as the leading figure in the Shiite resistance following Qassem Soleimani’s assassination, this period dealt a huge blow to his image. He likely realized that Hezbollah was weakening militarily but could not find a way to de-escalate after committing to support Hamas for as long as fighting persisted in Gaza. This deprived him of flexibility in decision-making and left him locked in a conflict dictated by developments in Gaza.
Then, when Israel reached a “use it or lose it” moment with its booby-trapped pager operation—after Hezbollah began to grow suspicious—it chose to proceed with the attack and escalate into a broader, more aggressive military campaign.
Although Hezbollah was ten times stronger than Hamas, the IDF was twenty times more prepared for war against Hezbollah than it had been to operate in Gaza before October 7. This disparity was reflected in the war’s outcomes.
While attention has remained focused on the negotiations for the release of the hostages held in Gaza, it is important to recognize Israel’s achievements in the north and against Iran, as these will shape the future of the Middle East.
Here are some key takeaways:
- Hezbollah has suffered a severe blow. The organization lost Nasrallah and most of its senior commanders, along with a significant portion of its missile capabilities and production infrastructure in Lebanon. It is also facing a serious financial crisis, struggling to compensate the thousands of Shiites who lost their homes, damaging its standing among its core support base. Since Israel exclusively targeted military infrastructure and Shiite villages where Hezbollah operated—without attacking general Lebanese civilian targets—the group can no longer claim to be “Lebanon’s protector.”
- A dramatic shift has occurred in Syria. The strategic bridge between Tehran and Beirut has collapsed. The land corridor that allowed Hezbollah’s armament no longer exists. Furthermore, Syria, through which Hezbollah received weapons and financial assistance (and served as a base for laundering funds from its drug trafficking operations), has now turned hostile toward the group.
- Iran has taken a major hit. Despite launching over 500 projectiles—including numerous ballistic missiles—at Israel, Iran failed to inflict significant damage. Moreover, Israel successfully struck critical Iranian targets across the country, even destroying key elements of its air defense system.
- Iran’s “Ring of Fire” has unraveled. This network of proxy forces, built at great cost, has disintegrated. The Iranian dream of bringing Israel to its knees through its regional proxies has faded. Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been neutralized as existential threats to Israel, and Hezbollah has been weakened to the point of becoming a burden, nearly impossible to rehabilitate under current conditions. In Syria, Iran’s attempt to establish Hezbollah-like forces under its direct command has also collapsed and disappeared from the map of threats against Israel. The only remaining pillar of Iran’s strategy is its nuclear program, but further progress on that front risks a direct confrontation with the United States—a nightmare scenario for Tehran.
- The “Shia Crescent” has collapsed. More broadly, what King Abdullah once termed the “Shia Crescent” has effectively disappeared, and the Shiite threat to the region has significantly diminished. Even Iraq has shifted its stance, ordering Shiite militias to halt their drone attacks on Israel and refusing Iran’s request to deploy forces to Syria.
Sensing Iran’s weakness, Sunni rebels and Turkey quickly moved to seize control of Syria—a country that was vital to Hezbollah and Iran’s strategic ambitions.
Taken together, these developments send a clear message: Iran has failed to deliver. It was unable to support Hezbollah against Israel’s relentless strikes, could not alter Assad’s fate in the face of the rebel offensive, and throughout the Gaza war, it remained largely irrelevant.
Even within Iran, the regime likely recognizes that it has lost the strategic battle for the Levant. Billions of dollars have been wasted on surrounding Israel with hostile forces, while Iranians themselves suffer from economic hardship, energy shortages, and a deteriorating economy.
The question is when will this recognition trigger a significant backlash against the corrupt clerical regime in Tehran.
The truth is, there’s no way to know for certain, but this is a moment of serious weakness for the Islamic regime. And at this very moment of vulnerability, Iran finds itself—contrary to the entire strategy it sought to develop—facing Israel directly, without proxies to bear the burden of confrontation.
Israel must not let its sense of relief over the northern war’s outcome and its exchange of blows with Iran weaken its resolve. It must continue applying pressure on Hezbollah, which is now isolated in Lebanon and could soon face a Sunni coalition that includes both Lebanese Sunnis and those ruling in Damascus. Further eroding Hezbollah’s military capabilities is essential, and Israel must do so without hesitation. The ceasefire terms in Lebanon grant Israel the right to act when necessary against Hezbollah’s efforts to reestablish itself in the south and rebuild its forces more broadly—Israel must fully exercise that right.
At the same time, Israel must position itself to better understand the evolving Turkish-Syrian dynamic. This relationship could prove to be more dangerous than it appears at first glance—but it may also hold unexpected opportunities.
The war in the north has reshaped the region. It is crucial to ensure that these changes endure and that no new threats are allowed to emerge.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a Distinguished Fellow with the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). MG Amidror was National Security Advisor to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and chairman of the National Security Council from April 2011 to November 2013.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Security and Strategy (JISS).