America Can’t Import Its Way out of the Critical Minerals Crisis

The U.S. defense industrial base today faces a critical minerals challenge—one with serious national security implications.

On August 4, media reports indicated that a major U.S. defense contractor is, for the first time, planning to source germanium and scandium—critical minerals used to build high-end defense items—from American firms. Here’s the problem: the prospective supplier does not have an operational mine—and will not until at least 2028. To highlight the scope of this challenge, consider the fact that the United States has not mined scandium since the 1960s.

Critical minerals are vital elements used in numerous defense platforms: warships, stealth bombers, fighter jets, missiles, sensors, and radars. Today the United States is import-reliant when it comes to critical minerals. China accounts for 90 percent of worldwide refining and processing capacity and is the top global refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals especially relevant to defense production.

Beijing’s critical minerals dominance is a threat to the national security of the United States and must end. For that reason, Washington is seeking to curtail critical mineral imports from China. It is also working to stockpile its own critical minerals. To that end, the Trump administration ordered the creation of the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve, or Project Vault, in February—a logical complement to America’s existing petroleum and uranium strategic reserves.

To create viable domestic stockpiles, the United States has looked beyond its borders. The Trump administration has recently signed nearly 20 bilateral framework deals, and created multilateral forums like Pax Silica designed to form U.S.-friendly critical minerals supply chains. Washington is right to pursue a multilateral approach to U.S. critical minerals security, but there are better ways to do so.

Relying on partners’ reserves to meet U.S. demand, however, is problematic. For reasons of geography alone, even the most U.S.-friendly countries cannot be relied upon to supply the United States’ needs in a true crisis.

The geostrategic vulnerabilities are glaring. The United States signed a critical minerals deal in 2023 with Mongolia, a landlocked country surrounded by China and Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan, a Pax Silica member, shares long and arguably indefensible borders with both China and Russia. And the COVID-19 pandemic, Iran, and the Houthis have exposed the extant fragility of global supply chains more broadly.

During a great power conflict, depending on global shipping would become problematic—potentially jeopardizing America’s ability to import critical minerals. Key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through chokepoints like Asia’s Strait of Malacca and Europe’s Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap would be threatened by U.S. adversaries. Imagine the United States, in World War II, having to import defense production items through the same waters where it was fighting the German Navy.

Even in peacetime, overseas sources have perils. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has large cobalt, nickel, and lithium reserves, has become a focal point of U.S. critical minerals strategy. Washington likely seeks to counter China’s own strategic mining in the DRC. However, the country’s track record of corruption and instability—including its recent yearslong war with Rwanda—makes it a risky bet for U.S. sourcing.

Fortunately, low-cost alternatives are emerging. The Trump administration, on July 30, gave the Commerce Department authority to impose export controls on industrial waste, which is often shipped abroad despite containing recoverable minerals. Extracting those critical minerals requires considerable technical capacity and expertise—which is where America’s allies can help.

Washington should consider forming a critical minerals consortium with friendly countries to boost American extraction, recycling, and reprocessing capacity. Pooling that technology and know-how would accelerate the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve’s progress. In exchange, the United States could offer mutually beneficial defense arrangements. Such inducements can include new or expanded joint research and development (R&D) projects and defense co-production.

The timing is auspicious: several major U.S. bilateral defense pacts are up for renewal. For example, the next version of the soon-to-expire U.S.-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement could leverage Greece’s new advances in refining gallium. Currently, China enjoys a near-monopoly on gallium, which is reportedly used in over 11,000 U.S. military components. The upcoming expiration of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding presents another opportunity. Israel is making significant advances in neodymium-iron-boron recycling and accelerating state-backed critical minerals research.

This approach has several advantages. First, reducing U.S. dependence on foreign-based mining hedges against potential supply disruption. Second, utilizing cheap and plentiful American materials—like industrial waste—would boost U.S. stockpiles at low expense. Third, harnessing partners’ existing R&D efforts would reduce private-sector research costs. That could stimulate industry interest in those U.S. critical minerals projects for which, as Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) recently said, “no free market [demand] exists.”

With challenges come opportunities. By better leveraging its partners and allies in the critical minerals race, Washington can breathe new life into its defense industrial base. The United States is, unfortunately, in another interwar period; it is time to act accordingly.

MajGen Tracy King, USMC (ret). is former Commander of Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, and a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program Participant. MajGen King also has served as Director of Asia Strategy on the Joint Staff.

Yoni Tobin is a Senior Policy Analyst at JINSA.

Originally published in RealClearDefense.