CNN’s optical illusion: Real impact of IDF gains in Gaza vs Hamas’s claimed resurgence

Recently, CNN published an in-depth article on the war in Gaza, claiming that while the IDF dealt a severe blow to Hamas, the organization is reorganizing on the ground.

According to the report, Hamas is recruiting new members, reviving damaged units, and regaining operational capabilities. Although it may adopt different combat tactics, its military strength remains intact and is renewing itself.

This claim reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, leading to a significant error. Let me illustrate with a scenario close to reality: Suppose a Hamas battalion consisted of 1,000 fighters divided into five companies. After a fierce battle, the IDF killed, severely wounded, or captured about 700 of them. Additionally, the battalion commander, one of his deputies, and four company commanders were killed.

During the battle, the IDF also eliminated the brigade commander to whom the battalion belonged and destroyed the command centers from which the brigade commander, battalion commander, and company commanders operated.

After the IDF withdrew, 300 young Gazans were recruited into the battalion. On the surface, it appears that Hamas has restored the battalion to its previous strength in the area where it was deployed before the ground maneuver. However, this is an optical illusion. Not only is the battalion now smaller by a third, with only 600 fighters, but it also bears little resemblance to its former self: Half of its members are completely untrained; most of its commanders are new and far less experienced than the previous leadership.

It lacks brigade-level support both logistically and operationally, and it can no longer receive intelligence and fire support from the destroyed command centers. While it may appear to be the same battalion, in reality, it is 10 times weaker. Furthermore, with Gaza isolated from Sinai and nearly all its weapons production facilities destroyed, there is no way to replenish the depleting weapon stockpiles in the Strip, either due to usage or IDF operations. This ensures that in the long run, as long as the IDF remains in Gaza, this battalion will become even weaker.

Operational control and military impact

The current situation, which the IDF refers to as “operational control in the field,” has practical implications. For example, the IDF recently reoccupied Shifa Hospital about two months after withdrawing from it – without a single shot being fired at the raiding force until it reached the hospital.

The force encircled the hospital (where 1,000 terrorists were killed or captured) in less than half an hour after the order was given. Or consider the 98th Division, which returned to Khan Yunis in July-August for a major clearing operation about a month after leaving the area following the dismantling of Hamas battalions there. The operation ended without any casualties on our side.

Israel has had a declared strategic goal since the beginning of the war, which is clear, known, and measurable: “To eliminate Hamas’s military and governing power in Gaza.” This objective was defined for the military on the eve of the maneuver. From conversations with some of the commanders leading the IDF in Gaza, it is clear that they believe they are advancing toward its full implementation.

The first task, concerning the “elimination of military power,” is clearer and easier. This requires four efforts: eliminating Hamas fighters – its leadership, commanders, and terrorists in the field; destroying the organization’s infrastructure – mainly its command and control centers, intelligence apparatus, and everything that served Hamas in its combat; destroying all weapon production facilities in the Strip and isolating the Gaza Strip from Egypt – to prevent the smuggling of weapons in the future and to deny Hamas the ability to rearm; blowing up the tunnels – to deny Hamas a hiding place in the present and future.

All these tasks are being carried out in practice, with Hamas unable to stop them. The fighting is not easy; it is conducted both above and below ground and constantly considers the hostages, so as not to harm them and to free them if intelligence becomes available for this purpose. However, in every place where the IDF has operated, the mission to destroy Hamas’s military power has been properly executed.

The task of “eliminating Hamas’s organizational ability to govern the Strip” is more complex. This is because it includes seemingly civilian components, as Hamas, being a smart and modern terrorist organization, has embedded its people and proxies within the system that appears to be civilian, through which it controls the Strip.

The IDF finds it challenging to eliminate these Hamas operatives who manage Gaza ostensibly as civilians, but it is learning to identify these figures and is succeeding in neutralizing many of them. The more the IDF succeeds in hitting the military side, the easier it will be to target the civilian system that will float to the surface.

Indeed, many Hamas terrorists remain in the field, occasionally harming IDF soldiers and even firing a few rockets at Israel, and (most importantly) they still hold hostages – but no one has asked what Hamas’s response from Gaza will be to the elimination of Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh. The reason for this is that Hamas’s military capability in Gaza has become far less relevant to Israel; every day that passes it loses more of its capabilities, which are already quite limited.

It is clear that in three months, after the dismantling of all units, the destruction of infrastructure, and the elimination of commanders and simple terrorists at the current stage, the IDF is expected to face a challenging task in the following year.

The clearing of the area from all Hamas remnants will continue, albeit with lower intensity and far fewer IDF forces remaining permanently in the Strip. This is not an easy task, mainly because the remaining Hamas members will fight fiercely for their lives, but their organized military force will be very weak or nonexistent.

At the end of the process, the Gaza Strip should become a large Area A, meaning there will be no Israeli military presence in the Strip, but the IDF will enter and operate there whenever there is intelligence on any terrorist organization. The decision to deploy forces will be at the discretion of commanders in the field without the need for political approval, just like in the West Bank.

This will mark the end of the war in Gaza, a war imposed on Israel by a barbaric event on October 7, 2023. Once it concludes, it will be possible to rebuild the Gaza border area with even greater vigor, and every leader in the region will know that crossing a red line, as Hamas did, will lead to their destruction.

The writer is a major general (res.), and a former National Security Advisor of Israel. He is currently a senior fellow at JISS in Jerusalem and a distinguished fellow at JINSA in Washington DC.